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Humanist Society Scotland 
Chief Executive’s Preface 
 
It is an honour to be able to give a preface to this landmark report. 
 
Humanist Society Scotland commissioned this research in November 2014. The 
motivation for this commission came from the increased public and political 
awareness of the changing role of religion and belief in Scottish public life. Our 
history, our institutions and our society have been shaped by religious and non-
religious believers over centuries.  At a time when Scotland remains in deep 
conversation about where we are going, it is necessary that we first understand where 
we are now and how we got here.  
 
From the outset, the scope that HSS set for this project was that it should be a wide 
audit of the ways in which religious individuals or organisations were specifically 
protected or privileged in Scots Law. Another key objective of this project was to help 
develop the sophistication of the ongoing debate about the role of religion in public 
life. Understandably, issues of religion and belief sometimes elicit an emotional or 
highly sensitive response. We wanted to help produce a document which could be 
used to inform all sides of this debate, and, hopefully, to contribute to a better quality 
of discussion. 
 
In order to do that, HSS and the University of Glasgow agreed that this report should 
be published in full, free of charge in the public domain. We hope that this will be a 
useful document to academics, policy-makers and campaigners, as well as members 
of the general public who are interested in these issues. 
 
 
Gordon MacRae 
HSS Chief Executive 
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About Humanist Society Scotland 
 
Humanist Society Scotland is the national organisation for Humanists in Scotland. It 
is a Scottish charitable incorporated organisation, and is a member of the European 
Humanist Federation and the International Humanist and Ethical Union. 
 
Humanist Society Scotland traces its origins back to the first Scottish Humanist 
Conference which took place in Edinburgh in 1962, although there had been an 
ethical non-religious movement in Scotland in the guise of the Rationalist Press 
Association of the 1930s. In the 1970s, in the context of ongoing discussion of 
proposals for devolution to Scotland, the Humanist groups of Glasgow and Edinburgh 
agreed to set up a Scottish Humanist Council. This led to the formal establishment of 
the Humanist Society Scotland in 1989. 
 
In the early 1980s HSS saw a significant increase in the demand for meaningful 
secular alternatives to religious ceremonies for marking the major occasions in life. In 
2005, after successful campaigning by HSS, the Registrar General Scotland was 
persuaded of the arguments to grant Humanists in Scotland the right to conduct legal 
wedding ceremonies. It is now the case that the network of HSS Registered 
Celebrants provide one of Scotland’s most popular types of wedding ceremonies. 
 
HSS experienced a continued rise in membership which led in 2011 to the Society 
becoming incorporated and beginning to seek the input of professional staff and 
consultants. As of January 2016 HSS has over 15,000 members in Scotland and 
across the UK.  
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Authors’ Preface 
 
This project was commissioned in Spring 2014 by Humanist Society Scotland (HSS). 
The Society funded the research to be conducted jointly by the Principal Investigator, 
Callum Brown, and the Co-investigator, Jane Mair, both at the University of 
Glasgow. The funding enabled the employment of a researcher for ten months, and Dr 
Thomas Green joined the project between October 2014 and August 2015. A series of 
intermediate reports, one written and two presentations, were submitted to the Board 
of Trustees and the Edinburgh branch of HSS during the early part of 2015, and a 
presentation report was made to the Commission on Religion and Belief in British 
Public Life (CORAB) on its evidence-gathering hearing at University of Glasgow in 
April 2015.  
 
Green undertook all the primary research for this Report, looking principally at statute 
law together with some selected case law, and undertook the writing of initial 
research reports to the investigators. Mair, Green and Brown then jointly participated 
in the writing of the Final Report, presented to the HSS in January 2016. Final editing 
and copy-editing has been by all three. Further copyediting and proof-reading has 
been by Gary McLelland of HSS. 
 
This project took place against the background of growing co-operation between the 
University of Glasgow and HSS, including a series of four research workshops, 
funded by the Royal Society of Edinburgh, on Humanism and Civil Society in 
Scotland which were conducted at Gilmorehill between March 2014 and January 
2015; as part of that series, an open evening for the public was held in November 
2014. Other joint meetings and liaison have developed over a number of issues 
concerning Humanism in Scottish civil life, including in the Education sector and in 
relation to research into the place of belief and non-belief in Scots life and law, and 
co-hosting by the University of Glasgow and HSS of a visit by CORAB in April 
2015.  Callum Brown utilised financing from the Royal Society of Edinburgh to 
digitise the records of the HSS, and obtained HSS assistance over several years in 
recruiting volunteers to be interviewed for his project on the history of modern 
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humanism. From these activities grew interest in establishing an authoritative guide to 
the place of religion in Scots law.  
 
The authors wish to thank office bearers of HSS who commissioned and participated 
in the project. A constant figure assisting us has been Gary McLelland, currently 
Head of Communications and Public Affairs for HSS, as well as HSS Chief Executive 
Gordon MacRae. At the University of Glasgow, thanks for financial and 
administrative management go to Elaine Wilson, formerly of the School of 
Humanities Office (now College of Arts Research Office), and to James Muir in the 
School of Law. 
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PART I 
The Context 
 
 
In this opening Part of the Report, the historical and religious context is briefly 
explored, together with the aims and outcomes of the project. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
1.1 Where might we find religion in law?  
1.2 The Scottish background: the historical origins of religion in Scots law  
1.3 The impact of secularisation  
1.4 What this project has done  
1.5 The structure of this report  
 
1.1 Where might we find religion in law?  
Scots lawyers, in common with lawyers in many other western European legal 
systems, have tended to assume that contemporary law is secular and if they have 
considered the place of religion in law, it has been predominantly from an historical 
perspective. Whereas religion once had a central place in Scots law, most obviously in 
the form of Canon law, that is now firmly in the past. Recently, however, there has 
been a remarkable revival of interest in religion and law. Many reasons might be put 
forward for this; the increasing presence of religion in the courts in the context of 
individual human rights and equality-based claims; the presence of minority religions 
and concerns about religious fundamentalism; the strength of religious voices in 
public consultation and debate.  
This revival of interest in religion and law highlights the complexity of their 
interaction. While we might have assumed relatively straight and simple paths of 
decline and divergence, the reality is likely to be much more complex. The old ties 
between an established church and the legal system may now be much weaker but in 
their place are new protections for religion in terms of human rights and guarantees of 
equality. Where once the issue was the place of a single, dominant religion or church 
in the legal system, the questions are now more about religious diversity and 
pluralistic beliefs. 
In Scotland, there has been little detailed exploration or analysis of the place of 
religion in contemporary law and, in the absence of explicit conflict in the courts 
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between secular and religious values, such as has occurred in other jurisdictions in the 
context of crucifixes in schools or Islamic head coverings in public spaces, there has 
been little need to consider the interaction between law and religion. The Scottish 
legal landscape has been relatively untroubled by religion in recent times, and as a 
result it has been rather overlooked. The Scottish government in recent years has 
tended to emphasise the diversity of Scottish society and its tolerance to pluralist 
values but, it might be argued, there is little detailed evidence on which to base these 
claims. We might assume that the law is broadly secular but in truth we have rarely 
looked.  
This research project offers an important opportunity to address that neglect and to 
begin to explore what place, privileged or otherwise, religion has in contemporary 
Scots law. So where might we look for religion in Scots law? Scots law has four 
principal sources: legislation, common law, Institutional writers and custom. While 
much of modern law is now contained in legislation, the remaining sources remain 
important particularly where there are gaps in the coverage of the legislation. The 
starting point for our research is legislation, both current and historical and it is here 
that the changing place of religion is most obviously seen. While in many areas of 
regulation, it is the legislation which represents the modern restatement of law, it 
often builds upon pre-existing common law or is underpinned by deep rooted values. 
Theology informed much of the work of the Institutional Writers and, while modern 
legislation may seem far removed from their work, their founding principles of Scots 
law may continue to shape legal understanding. Religion may not be explicit in the 
legislation but its influence might still be discernible in the underlying values and 
models. 
Legislation is often used to create a framework within which individuals or 
institutions have considerable discretion. Various forms of guidance or policy might 
be used to inform the exercise of that discretion. While such guidance is not legally 
enforceable it may nonetheless be highly influential. Custom too has a significant role 
to play in the way that law is interpreted and applied. Practices continue because that 
is the way things have always happened without consideration of why or whether they 
remain appropriate. 
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There can be significant gaps between the law “in books” and the law as it operates in 
practice. Within the confines of a relatively short project, we can only look at the law 
as it is written but we can begin to identify areas where the practice may be of 
significance and where further investigation might be usefully conducted. The 
principal focus of this research is legislation. In some areas, we have sought to 
identify only current legislation in force whereas in the other areas we have tried to 
trace the pattern of change in order to highlight how religion has retained a privileged 
place or indeed where it has become equalised with other beliefs. Where there are 
significant decisions of the Scottish courts, these have been highlighted but no 
exhaustive search of case law has been carried out: here too there may be scope for 
further work.  
 
Identifying the place of religion in Scots law is not a simple task. We can highlight 
provisions, identify areas of regulation and point out anomalies but the interaction 
between law and religion is complex. Religious values, religious influence, individual 
religious beliefs and religious organisations all emerge in different ways within the 
law: sometimes privileged, sometimes protected and sometimes equalised. 
Increasingly, the place of religion and religious organisations in at least some areas of 
law is changing to incorporate the place of non-religious belief and its related 
organisations.  
 
 
 
 
1.2 The Scottish background: the historical origins of religion in Scots law  
 
Like all nations in Europe, Christianity was embedded in the laws of Scotland from 
the early medieval period. With the arrival of Christian missionaries, and the 
prolonged and intermittent conversion of what we now refer to as Scotland to the 
Christian faith, legal systems of the various kingdoms and that of the Scottish 
kingdom which came into being in the early Middle Ages became infused with 
Christian ideas. From then until the Reformation, the Roman Catholic Church was the 
form of Christianity that covered most of Western and Northern Europe, and 
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enveloped Scotland as it did other territories. The Scottish Reformation, generally 
dated to the year 1560, introduced a Protestant ascendency to Scotland, which until 
1690 vacillated in its form of government between presbyterianism and episcopacy, 
changing numerous times in 130 years. The enduring of presbyterianism injected four 
key influences into legislation of the Scottish Parliament down to 1707: the special 
protected status of Protestantism and presbyterian forms of church government; the 
outlawing of “Popery” and, intermittently, episcopacy; the imposition of legal 
constrains upon the people to uphold mainly presbyterian ideals of behaviour (for 
instance in relation to observing the Sabbath); and the promotion of a Protestant 
education policy (with the plan for a school in every parish). These four influences 
were to be sustained in continuously modified forms well in the late modern period 
after the 1707 Union. To this day, in certain regards, they – and especially the last two 
– retain a presence, welcome or unwelcome, in legislation affecting Scotland.  
 
This is most apparent in relation to the outlawing of Roman Catholicism in the 
centuries after 1560. This was a struggle told by other scholars in some detail, and the 
Report cannot better those accounts.1 Gradually, the penalties against Catholics and 
the Catholic Church were removed: in 1793, in 1837, 1926, and 2013. Still surviving 
is the law preventing a monarch of the United Kingdom being a Roman Catholic, and 
failing to be a member and “Supreme Governor” of the Church of England. In all 
other respects, the heritage of religious discrimination has been removed from 
virtually the entirety of Scots Law, and made subservient to equal opportunities of 
European Law and anti-bigotry legislation of the Scottish Parliament.  
 
The bulk of historical religious legislation since 1560 has been concerned with the 
status and governance of the Church of Scotland, and its interaction with the people. 
As this Report will show, not everything was legislated; much was assumed in Scots 
Law regarding popular behaviour, and unlike other nations there were areas (such as 
Sabbath legislation) that Scotland was, perhaps paradoxically, weak in legislating. 
Other areas of activity were less well legislated for. Some offences, for instance, were 
                                                             
1 For which, good starting points are Jane E A Dawson, Scotland Re-Formed, 1488-1587 (Edinburgh, 
Edinburgh University Press, 2007); Christine Johnson, Developments in the Roman Catholic Church in 
Scotland 1789-1829 (Edinburgh, John Donald, 1983); John R Watts, Scalan: The Forbidden College, 
1716-99: The History of a Catholic Seminary, 1716-99 (Edinburgh, Tuckwell Press, 1999).  
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seen to be both civil and ecclesiastical in nature, and might be investigated and 
seemingly tried by both civil and church courts; this extended to witchcraft, 
infanticide, public drunkenness, and even on occasion murder when isolated kirk 
sessions of the Church of Scotland might undertake investigations in the absence of a 
civil magistrate. This overlap between civil and church powers was not unusual in 
Europe, but was regarded by many Scots of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries as 
a baleful, distinctively Scottish, heritage.  For others, the persistence of ecclesiastical 
influence in the law of Scotland after 1707 was considered vital to the survival of a 
sense of Scottish nationhood and national identity in the midst of union into Great 
Britain and, from 1801, the United Kingdom. Scottish opinion has always been 
divided on this issue, though, including amongst those who might share a nationalist 
dream of reclaiming political independence. The Kirk has been seen as both 
character-giving and malevolent in Scottish history (including in Scottish literature 
and the arts), and the same has applied concerning the religious influence in law. 
 
For many, religion has claimed a monopoly over people’s belief systems. From the 
1450s to the 1720s, Scotland became transfixed by witchcraft, in the form of state-
prosecuted witch-hunts and a popular culture which accepted accusations of witch 
activity as legitimate grounds for pursuing grievances of all sorts in religious and civil 
courts; in 1722, the last execution in the British Isles for witchcraft took place at 
Dornoch when Janet Horne was accused of turning her daughter into a donkey.2  In 
1698, Scotland achieved the unenviable status of being one of the last places in 
Western Europe where somebody, student Thomas Aikenhead, was executed for 
blasphemy, in his case inter alia for doubting miracles and the trinity, by burning at 
the stake at a spot adjacent to what is now Leith Walk in Edinburgh.3 The kirk session 
system was obsessed from the late 17th to the mid nineteenth centuries in pursuing the 
sexual misdemeanours of Scottish people, bringing before them parishioners accused 
of fornication and adultery, and punishing them with monetary fines and humiliation 
                                                             
2 See Julian Goodare, The Scottish Witch-Hunt in Context (Manchester, Manchester University Press, 
2002)  
3 Michael F Graham, The Blasphemies of Thomas Aikenhead: Boundaries of Belief on the Eve of the 
Enlightenment (Edinburgh, Edinburgh University Press, 2008). 
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before Sunday congregations.4 Church taxes also raised ire, though perhaps not so 
commonly as elsewhere in Europe. Indeed, one of the key features of distinctiveness 
about Scottish church history of the last three centuries is how weak anticlericalism 
was, even when people were forced to pay church taxes at harvest time and every 
time fish was landed at river or seaport.5  
 
Finally, a word about the civil courts. In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, 
during the operation of the state support of Church of Scotland ministers in their 
manses and glebes (or farm land), the lower courts of the judicial system were often 
clogged with case brought by ministers complaining that heritors (landowners) and 
sometimes parishioners were not stumping up the legislated-for slice of the harvest 
for the maintenance of the minister’s household, and not performing the required 
labour dues (or work) upon the glebe and the re-thatching of the manse or church. A 
special court, the Court of Teinds, sat from 1707 to the 1930s, sorting out the cases 
appealed from Sheriff courts. We will learn something of the legislation behind this, 
but we will not be dealing here with the way this infused Scottish culture – in formal 
legal announcements from the pulpit punctuating Sunday sermons, and the appeals for 
assistance to ministers suffering from inadequate financial returns from the heritors.  
The way that religion entered Scots law is only a fraction of the way it impacted upon 
the people as well as the power system of the land. For that, we commend you read 
one or more of the many histories of Scottish religion.  
 
1.3 The impact of secularisation  
 
                                                             
4 Leah Leneman and Rosalind Mitchison, Sin in the City: Sexuality and Social Control in Urban 
Scotland, 1660–1780 (Edinburgh, Scottish Cultural Press, 1998). 
5 Callum Brown ‘Rotavating the Kailyard: re-imagining the Scottish ‘meenister’ in discourse and 
the parish state since 1707’ in N Aston and M. Cragoe (eds.), Anticlericalism in Britain c.1500-
1914 (Stroud, Sutton, 2000), pp. 138-58.; but see Pete Aitchison, Black Friday: The Eyemouth 
Fishing Disaster of 1881 (Edinburgh, Birlinn, 2006). Green notes: A reason there may have been 
little anticlericalism over tithes is because the teinds were often simply uplifted by the 
landowner along with his rents (with no churchmen in sight) and then the landowner had to pay 
up stipend in his capacity as parochial heritor. Certainly, before the Reformation tithes went 
straight to churchmen, but after the Reformation many tended to go straight to laymen. 
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Scotland has long been famed for the strength of its religious institutions, the 
enduring place of religion upon the civil institutions and popular culture of the 
country, and the vibrant place of faith in the lives of the people. From the 
Reformation, it was renowned for the disputatious character of its ecclesiastical 
history, and the predilection for church schism within the dominant Presbyterian 
community. In the 1920s, an American delegate to the general assembly of the 
Church of Scotland, told commissioners: “We find that wherever a great piece of 
work is being done a Scot is at the back of it, and whenever there is an ecclesiastical 
dispute a Scot is at the bottom of it.”6 
 
But things have changed in the late twentieth and twenty-first centuries. Scotland has 
been propelled with some vigour and speed from a position in which it was famed 
within Europe in 1960 for its religious character, to being in 2016 – along with the 
Netherlands, the Nordic nations, and some former Eastern bloc countries – one of the 
most secular nations in the western world. Decline in churches, falling church 
membership and affiliation, and the rising proportion of Scots registered as having 
“no religion” (sometimes referred to by sociologists as “the nones”) has transformed 
church and faith. Following on, somewhat lagging, have been the diminishing 
religious influence in public affairs.  Changes in the law have been the most 
interesting and in some regards the most telling aspect of this secularisation of the 
nation. This section contextualises the legal changes – their timing, nature and extent 
– which are the subject of the rest of the Report.  
 
In 1980, one of the leading experts on the law of church and state in Scotland, Francis 
Lyall, wrote that: “It seems inevitable that there will be further change in the Law of 
Scotland on Church and State. The decline of institutional Christianity, the 
polarisation of divergences within the denominations, the spread of the smaller and 
more cohesive churches, and the trend towards individualism and ‘liberty’ in civil 
life, in short the emergence of the so called ‘secular society’, will make that change 
                                                             
6 Quoted in Lord Sands, “Historical origins of the religious divisions in Scotland,” Records of the 
Scottish Church History Society vol. 3 (1929), p. 94. 
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and development necessary.”7 The necessity of which he spoke has not diminished in 
the intervening years, but, rather, has intensified. Secularisation has changed in ways 
not envisaged by Lyall, inflecting the moral law which, long governed by the 
churches, has been savaged by both non-religious forces and by changing theology 
which, when not actually changing the majority of the denominations, has certainly 
weakened resolve. In the realms of laws on gay marriage, non-religious forms of 
marriage and removal of Sabbath restriction, and in the wider societal acceptance of 
freedoms relating to each of these, Scotland has shifted markedly to be one of the 
least religious regulated countries of Europe. Other changes are pending which 
signify secularisation: the legalisation of medically-assisted suicide, already 
introduced in some nations, is a change that may not be far away in Scotland. 
 
1.4 What this project has done 
The idea of an “audit” of Scots law lay behind this project and with that word came 
notions of examination, checking and reporting. The term perhaps belies the 
complexity and uncertainty involved in what we sought to do. Law is rarely a matter 
of black and white.  
The principal objective was to look at the place of religion in contemporary Scots law 
but, the nature of the legal system and the piecemeal ways of reform meant that we 
often needed to combine a review of current law with an exploration of its history. 
We combined a broad review of contemporary legislation and cases across a wide 
range of areas of law with a series of three detailed case studies: (1) the Church of 
Scotland, (2) marriage and (3) education. 
The starting point for our research was legislation which was traced through Westlaw; 
an extensive legal database. Beginning with current legislation, we worked backwards 
through a series of reforms. Where appropriate, we sought to uncover how the 
legislation has been applied and interpreted by the courts in reported cases. Again 
these were tracked through Westlaw, supplemented by other legal databases, 
legislation and case reports where needed. Wider reading was also undertaken 
particularly in the context of the three studies in Part 2 of the Report.  
                                                             
7 Francis Lyall, Of Presbyters and Kings: Church and State in the Law of Scotland (Aberdeen, 
Aberdeen University Press, 1980), p. 147. 
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This report is intended to set out the current legal landscape and therefore it sets out 
considerable material quoted from statute and other primary sources. There is an 
overview of debates and of wider literature and there is some commentary from the 
authors, particularly in areas where the law is uncertain or untested, but, by and large, 
this report is intended as a resource to be used as a starting point for future 
development. 
 
1.5 The structure of this report  
The report is divided into three parts. The first part sets out the context; explaining the 
background to the study. It explains the nature of Scots law with a view to identifying 
the various ways in which religion might influence law or be regulated by it. It also 
situates the legal research within a historical context with a view to highlighting the 
changing position between law and religion which we might expect to find.  
The second part consists of three detailed case studies which focus on the law relating 
to the Church of Scotland, marriage and education.. To some extent this research 
consisted of an exploration: an investigation to see if and how religion features in 
various aspects of contemporary Scots law. In these three areas, however, we already 
knew that there was an obvious interplay between religion and law. We also knew 
that these were areas of particular interest to HSS and so our aim here was to explore 
the relationship between law and religion in much more detail. In part 2, therefore, we 
trace in some detail the development of the law in each of the three areas, identifying 
historical origins of the law, highlighting key points of reform and seeking to relate 
them to the current legal provisions. 
In the third part of the report the intention is to provide a much more general and 
consequently superficial audit of a wide range of areas of law. The focus is 
predominantly on areas of law which have a specific Scottish context and we have 
looked less at areas where the law operates in broadly similar terms across the UK. 
Here it was our aim to identify provisions which in some way recognize, regulate or 
protect religion, religious belief, religious organisations etc. Unlike in Part 2, where 
we present in-depth studies, the findings in Part 3 are intended as a starting point. 
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They set out the law as it currently exists and highlight issues which may merit further 
exploration.  
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Part II 
 
Three Case Studies 
 
 
 
 
In this Part, we examine the three areas of Scots law to which religion has been 
most linked historically – those relating to the Church of Scotland, Marriage and 
Education.  
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2.1 How do we identify an Established Church in Scotland? 
The status of the Church of Scotland has been something of a bone of contention 
since at least the 1920s, and, in various indirect guises, since the Union settlement of 
1707. The reason is that, unlike most other nations in Europe, the exact linkage of the 
Church to the state has been, and remains, very far from clear and indisputable in 
Scotland. It has been suggested that the issue of establishment in Scotland is less 
controversial than in England because the establishment status is less visible north of 
the border.8 Nonetheless, there remains the central issue: is the Church of Scotland an 
“Established” church? 
 
In this chapter, we look firstly at the possible conditions of church establishment, and 
then at the arguments of various scholars concerning it. Then, the chapter proceeds to 
look in detail at the trail of legislation and the survival of rights and privileges of the 
Kirk in the present day.  
 
2.1.1 The nature of establishment 
Many European nations have, or have had, established churches. The nature of the 
link between church and state is or has been identified usually by one of the 
following: 
 
(a) A constitutional statement or code that one church holds a special position in 
regard to the state 
                                                             
8 R.M. Morris, 'Introduction', in R.M. Morris (ed.), Church and State in 21st Century Britain: The 
Future of Church Establishment (Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), p. 2.  
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(b) Sovereignty of the head of state, national legislature or government over 
control of the church, demonstrated in acts which control its management, powers 
and/or some or all of its official appointments 
(c) Ecclesiastical representation by right in the national legislature in recognition 
of the church-state link 
(d) The people’s payment of church taxes for its maintenance, or the state’s 
subvention of monies for that purpose 
(e) The people’s compulsory membership, or submission to the authority, of the 
Church 
 
In most nations, one or more of the above have pertained in those European nations 
which have, or have had, established churches.9 There may be additional 
characteristics though not conditions of establishment. Near universal popular 
membership of a church, as in the case of the Church of Sweden, is one; but when that 
Church ceased to be the established church of the country on 1 January 2000, the 
large-scale membership persisted – thereby indicating it was not a character peculiar 
to establishment.10 The connections have been usually founded on a trail of legislation 
which identifies the following: a church (a denomination) by name, the nature of the 
links between the church and the state, the nature of the obligations upon the people 
towards the church, and the nature of the obligations owed by the church to the 
people. This has also created the singular church as a legal entity owning property, 
most often a very considerable amount of property, comprising churches, manses, 
other buildings, burial grounds, and other tracts of land. In some nations, like Ireland, 
the state-church connection between 1937 and the 1973 was laid down as a clause in a 
national constitution,11 and in many countries there are or have been church taxes 
                                                             
9 For a guide to models of state churches, see Edward J Eberle, Church and State in Western Society: 
Established Church, Cooperation and Separation (Farnham, Ashgate, 2011). 
10 From 1686 to 1860, Swedish citizens were compelled to belong to the Church. From 1860-1951, a 
citizen had to belong to a church. Even when they could leave all churches after 1951, the unaffiliated 
had to pay a ‘dissenters’ tax’. Frank Cranmer, ‘The Church of Sweden and the unravelling of 
establishment’, Ecclesiastical Law Journal vol. 5 (2000), pp. 417-30 at pp. 417, 419, 421.  
11 Article 44.1 of the 1937 Constitution acknowledged the 'special position' of the Catholic Church in 
Ireland; this was removed in 1973. However, this did little to change the strong influence the Church 
had acquired in various realms of the state. Ireland is also distinctive, possibly unique, in modern times 
in that it has had two established churches: the (protestant) Church of Ireland (which in 1800 was 
united with the Church of England, and remained in that status until 1871, followed by the  Roman 
Catholic Church 1937-1973. 
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owed by the people to the church (either directly or indirectly through lay patrons 
who have had legal ownership of parts of the church’s fabric or management), to 
which there may have been added or substituted state financial subventions. In 
Protestant nations, the head of state may be ascribed in law a special status in the 
church (as in the Church of England, of which the monarch is “the Supreme 
Governor”). Likewise, and this is an important point, where there used to be an 
established church, there is customarily an identifiable legislative process which 
caused disestablishment; this is evident in the disestablishment of the Church of 
Ireland by the Irish Church Act of 1869, and the Church of England in Wales and 
Monmouthshire by the Welsh Church Act 1914 (which took effect in 1919-20, 
creating the Church in Wales).  
 
2.1.2 The peculiar case of Scotland 
In regard to Scotland, there is a peculiar difficulty in identifying the way in which a 
single denomination has held the status of the established church. This difficulty 
arises, firstly, because all of the legislation relating to what we now refer to as the 
Church of Scotland did not, until after the Union of 1707, use that title. As far as we 
can ascertain, the title “Church of Scotland” was not used prior to the Union. As a 
result, there is a problem defining what precisely those working on the Union 
Agreement in 1707 thought was established by law. It is technically and 
ecclesiastically a serious problem: the Scottish Episcopal Church in effect claims to 
be the successor of the pre-Glorious Revolution Church, while the Free Church of 
Scotland claims to be the true Presbyterian “Church of Scotland”. The Church of 
Scotland itself may be aware of the ambiguity of its own place in relation to the 
historical Protestant Church in Scotland, as in the Articles Declaratory of the 1920s 
where it had to firmly insist that it was “in historical continuity with the Church of 
Scotland which was reformed in 1560, whose liberties were ratified in 1592, and for 
whose security provision was made in the Treaty of Union of 1707”.  So in a way 
what we are dealing with is that the present day Church of Scotland as we know it 
claims to be heir to the Reformation era Church, the Reformed Church as it was in 
1592, and the Church as it was in 1707, and that claim appears to be accepted by the 
British state, or at least countenanced by the monarchy. So, things are not at all 
straightforward. As a result, much legislation before, and some after, the Union 
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referred not to a church but to “religion”, and to “Protestant” or “Presbyterian”,  and 
to “Church Government”, though there are references to “laws establishing the 
Protestant religion”. This may or may not be a significant point, to which we return 
below. The Confession of Faith Act 1690 had other phrases, such as “do hereby 
revive, ratify and perpetually confirm all laws, statutes and acts of parliament made... 
for the maintenance and preservation of the true reformed Protestant religion and for 
the true church of Christ within this kingdom”; “the Protestant religion and 
presbyterian government now established”; and “that all the said presbyterian 
ministers have and shall have right to the maintenance, rights and other privileges by 
law provided to the ministers of Christ's church within this kingdom”. In this way, 
coded phrases of the period identifying Presbyterian church government were not 
perpetual monikers of a single Church of Scotland. More clear-cut references in the 
Act of Security 1706 to “the church of this kingdom, as now by law established”, and 
in the Union with England Act 1707, to the “Church of this Kingdom as now by Law 
established”,12 is as close as we get to a clear statement of establishment status in the 
early eighteenth century.  
 
The second difficulty is that there is no single Act of the pre-1707 Scottish 
parliament, the post 1707 Westminster or the post 1997 Scottish Parliament, which 
defines the nature of the link between church and state. Even the Act of Union dwells 
upon specifying the ecclesiastical regime for Scotland, and its freedom from 
interference by the forthcoming united legislature, and not the detailed nature of the 
link between a church and the state.   
 
Third, there is no representation by right for officers of the Church of Scotland within 
the government or legislature of the United Kingdom or of that of Scotland. Fourth, 
there is now, in the 2010s, no privileged financial position for the Church of Scotland 
as compared to other denominations; the Church gets access to building and similar 
grants in competition with other churches and owners of historic property, but there is 
no tax or subvention given in acknowledgment of a special ecclesiastical status. Fifth, 
those privileges which the Church of Scotland now receives in law are, in nearly all 
                                                             
12 Union with England Act 1707 c.7, s. XXV. 
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cases, shared with all or some other denominations; this, then, indicates not an 
established church but a more widespread from of special place for religion in 
government.  
 
There is another dimension to this question addressed in this chapter. This concerns 
the presumptions of establishment that are evident in ecclesiastical and state ritual, in 
royal appointments related to the church, and in principles embedded in not merely 
the post Reformation Church but in the medieval (Roman Catholic) church in 
Scotland.   
 
The result is that there is considerable disagreement between authorities on whether 
the Church of Scotland is established. There is even a long-lasting disagreement on 
this issue amongst academics and office bearers within the Church of Scotland. For 
this reason, it is important for us to lay out what published opinions there are on this 
issue. These relate to the history of the Church and its changing status between the 
sixteenth and the twentieth centuries. Before that, however, the next section briefly 
outlines some of the key historical phases though which Scottish Protestantism has 
passed since the Reformation. 
 
 
 
2.2 The establishment  legacy from sixteenth and seventeenth-century 
Scotland 
Since the earliest years of the Scottish Reformation of 1560, the Protestant parish 
churches of Scotland have been governed in religious matters by systems of 
government at district, regional or national (Scottish) level. During the Reformation 
era, this comprised a hybrid system of kirk sessions, superintendents, commissioners, 
reforming bishops and general assembly. This developed into the mixed systems of 
Presbyterianism co-existing uncomfortably with the Episcopal government promoted 
with intermittent success by the British Stewarts during the seventeenth century. 
Following this, a Presbyterian hierarchy of church courts has governed the parish 
system in religious matters since the Glorious Revolution of 1689-90. Whilst these 
developments did not necessarily imply centralised control, they signalled a unifying 
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element in the institutional life of Scottish Protestantism and gave meaning to the 
term “Church of Scotland”.  
 
If the period of Stewart Episcopalianism is briefly examined, then the idea of an 
established Church of Scotland during this phase seems coherent and difficult to 
dismiss. Of the three estates of the pre-Reformation Scots Parliament, the principle of 
a spiritual estate comprising of bishops and abbots survived the Reformation, despite 
undergoing considerable alterations. In respect of bishops, they retained their places 
in parliament after the Reformation. As bishops died, they were succeeded usually by 
clergy of the reformed church, occasionally by lay titulars, and those holders of 
bishoprics, whatever their ecclesiastical status, sat in parliament as part of the spiritual 
estate. By the time the office of bishop was first abolished in the established church, 
in 1638, the general assembly had lost its taste for parliamentary representation, and 
the clerical estate came to an end for the time being, to be restored again from 1661 to 
1689.13 In this, the seventeenth-century Church of Scotland enjoyed a degree of direct 
representation in the Scots Parliament, which representation betokens establishment. 
Parliamentary representation was not to be a feature of Presbyterianism following the 
Glorious Revolution, and in that sense a relative degree of disestablishment as to 
direct parliamentary representation may be said to have been a hallmark of later 
seventeenth-century Presbyterianism. 
 
Stewart bishops in the Scottish Church were also appointed as to title and attendant 
revenues by the crown, although ordination was of course a religious matter, although 
one initially performed by Anglican bishops at Westminster.14 Royal appointment is 
another clear hallmark of establishment, but again the final abolition of episcopacy in 
the Scottish Church during the Glorious Revolution witnessed an end of this hallmark 
in favour of “diocesan” level church government being administered solely by 
Presbyteries comprised of parochial ministers and elders; again, disestablishment at 
national level is suggested. 
 
                                                             
13 Gordon Donaldson, Scotland: James V to James VII (Edinburgh, Oliver & Boyd, 1971), p. 277. 
14 Ibid., p. 206. 
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The meeting of general assemblies of the ministry of the Scottish Church was also 
from time to time subject to royal control. The General Assembly Act (1592) stated 
that the sovereign or their commissioner had the right to appoint when general 
assemblies were convened. During a period of increased royal control over the 
Scottish Church by James VI and Charles I, there were no general assemblies in 
Scotland from 1618 to 1638. The 1638 assembly abolished Episcopal government in 
the Scottish Church during the covenanting revolution, to be restored in 1661, only to 
be abolished again in 1689. Whilst royal control over general assemblies again 
suggests a form of establishment, the fully fledged Presbyterian polity of the mid 
seventeenth-century and of the era of the Glorious Revolution contained within it a 
direct rejection of royal control over religious matters in the church through the 
agency of episcopacy. This can be seen as a form of rejection of establishment in 
respect of the religious government of the faith, doctrines and liturgy of the Church of 
Scotland, with an attendant loss of the establishment privileges enjoyed by the 
Stewart episcopate.  
 
When discussing what the “Established Church of Scotland” was from the era of the 
Glorious Revolution to the early twentieth century, a distinction between the 
parochial and supra-parochial Church of Scotland ought to be made. At the supra-
parochial level, the hierarchy of Presbyterian church courts by which “the worship, 
discipline and government of the church of this kingdom, as now by law established” 
were regulated actually represented the assertion of the will of the Scottish Church 
over and against the Episcopalian establishment promoted by the House of Stewart, 
and as such represented a type of supra-parochial disestablishment. It is not at all clear 
that Presbyterian church government was “by law established”; rather it seems that 
this system of church government was long fought for by the presbyterian party 
within the Church of Scotland, often in direct conflict with the Episcopalian 
establishment, from which it appears that Presbyterianism was a kind of rejection of 
establishment in favour of dis-established self government, which self-government 
was recognised in law, and indemnified against alteration by the British Parliament in 
1707.  
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A clear division of Church and State is suggested. At the parochial level, the Church 
of Scotland clearly continued to enjoy many features of establishment and preferential 
endowment, in what has been referred to as system of individual established “parish 
states”. In this, if the term established is to be used in relation to the pre-1929 Church 
of Scotland, then its meaning ought to be understood in relation to the parish system, 
and not to the supra-parochial system of presbytery (district), synod (region) and 
general assembly (nation) by which the worship and discipline of the Church was 
governed. As we see below, the Presbyterian character of the Church of Scotland was 
recognised in law, and was protected against state encroachment by the Treaty of 
Union. Yet, it represented the desire of Presbyterianism to be free from any form of 
establishment which involved state or royal interference in the religious life of the 
Church. Thus, paradoxically perhaps, Church establishment was conceived as being 
free from the state's establishment. The details of this arrangement are reviewed later 
in this chapter. 
 
 
2.3 Opinions on the existence of the Established Church of Scotland.  
The central issue in disagreement in most of the literature concerning the status of the 
Church of Scotland is what precisely happened to it in the 1920s. Over that decade, 
the reunification of the vast bulk of Scottish Presbyterians was in prospect, taking the 
form of the union of the Church of Scotland with the United Free Church of Scotland 
(UFC), two denominations then of about equal size. The union was concluded in 
October 1929 with the UFC, minus a very small remnant of its clergy and members 
who “stayed out”,15 being absorbed into the Church of Scotland. The UFC would only 
agree to the union if the established status of the Church of Scotland was ended. 
Negotiation over this issue was complex, as powerful forces within the Church of 
Scotland sought to retain as much as possible of the Kirk’s privileged position in the 
ranks of Scottish denominations. The result was Westminster legislation, still in force 
today, which left “wriggle” room for people on both sides to claim some measure of 
victory. This ”wriggle room” is the cause of much of today’s uncertainty about the 
establishment status of the Church of Scotland in 2016. 
                                                             
15 What was initially called the United Free Church Continuing still exists today (now without the 
‘Continuing’). 
38 
 
  
All authorities agree that prior to the 1920s, the status of the Church of Scotland is 
ambiguous; this ambiguity led one to retreat from attempting to define 
“establishment” in the case of this Church, and from trying to deduce any rules, 
concessions or principles of law pertaining to it.16 But the attempt must be made. On 
the one hand, the legislation is clear that since the Scottish Reformation of 1560, the 
Scottish Parliament and the Treaty of Union legislation prioritises the removal of 
papal authority over Scotland and the establishment of the Protestant religion with a 
Presbyterian system of government. But at no juncture in all this legislation is the 
establishment defined, with the powers and relationship of church to state, or the 
relationship between church and people, specified clearly. As C R Munro, one-time 
professor of Constitutional Law at the University of Edinburgh, said in 1997, “in none 
of these instances is the term defined. In each the meaning is assumed, and the 
reference is to an existing state of affairs”.17 In 2009, Bob Morris pointed to the 
paradox that claims to a special status for the Church of Scotland rest on the notion 
that the Church of Scotland Act 1921 was thought to guarantee a complete separation 
of that Church and the state (meaning that, unlike other denominations in Scotland, 
the Church's operation was immune to supervision by state or civil courts).18 No legal 
authority provides a definition of establishment, and some English authorities 
assumed that the term only applied to the Church of England within the U.K.19  
 
The idea that “establishment” was abandoned around the time of the Church of 
Scotland Act 1921, and associated legislation passed during the 1920s and 30s, is 
supported by the ecclesiastical historian J. H. S. Burleigh: 
 
It was often asked while the Union [of 1929] was approaching whether the 
United Church would be an established or a disestablished Church, and the 
                                                             
16 Francis Lyall, Of Presbyters and Kings: Church and State in the Law of Scotland (Aberdeen, 
Aberdeen University Press, 1980), p. 148. 
17 C.R. Munro, ‘Does Scotland have an Established Church?’, Ecclesiastical Law Journal vol. 4 
(1997), pp. 639-45, at p. 639.  
18 R.M. Morris, 'Introduction', p. 7. 
19 Munro, 'Does Scotland have an Established Church?' p. 644. The Laws of Scotland: Stair Memorial 
Encyclopaedia, vol. 5, Constitutional Law, Section 6. ‘Church and State’ (Edinburgh, Butterworths 
Law, 1991).  
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only possible answer was that it would be neither, or perhaps that the question 
had little significance.20 
 
An alternative view to Burleigh’s understanding of the 1921 Church of Scotland Act 
has been recently been provided by another Principal of New College, David 
Fergusson:  
 
those more voluntarist members of the United Free Church who happily 
assumed that something like disestablishment was taking place in the Church 
of Scotland Act [1921] were deceived. In a revealing letter, Lord Sands wrote 
to John White [one of the leading architects of church union in 1929] that “the 
privileged position of the national established church remains just where it 
was. It would be injudicious to tell them this and it is best to let them talk.”21 
 
While Ferguson maintains that “Scottish establishment” continues to be “signified by 
a series of provisions that have not historically been extended to other churches”, he 
argues that the 1921 Acts provided a “negotiated freedom by which church and state 
may reconfigure their relative independence and relationship to one another”.  
 
Francis Lyall has also offered various conceptions of establishment in Of Presbyters 
and Kings. At the beginning of this work Lyall defined “establishment of religion” as 
“simply a state connection largely for ceremonial purposes, formally created by 
law”.22 At the end of the work he notes that “to talk of ‘establishment’ is to use a term 
which in other jurisdictions has connotations which we would not welcome." The 
most useful is expressed in the Report of the Group on Church, Community and State, 
Appendix One to the Report on Anglican-Presbyterian Conversations, 1966: 
 
The fundamental essence of “establishment” consists simply in the 
recognition by the State of some particular religious body as the “State 
                                                             
20 J. H. S. Burleigh, A Church History of Scotland (Edinburgh, 1988), pp. 404-5. 
21 David Fergusson, Church, State and Civil Society (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2004), 
p. 184. 
22 Lyall, Of Presbyters and Kings (1980), p. ix.  
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Church”, that is, as the body to which the State looks to act for it in matters of 
religion, and which it expects to consecrate great moments of national life by 
liturgical or official ministrations.  
 
Lyall comments of this extract: “Establishment' should mean no more. But even the 
existing ‘establishment’ may need review”.23 
  
One final view on the problem of “establishment” has been offered by Frank 
Cramner, who has argued that the Church of Scotland “still bears some of the marks 
of establishment, even though it is a very different kind of establishment from that of 
the Church of England”. Cramner goes on to list five “marks” of establishment, 
namely (a) the Lord High Commissioner to the General Assembly; (b) the “special 
protection” given to the Church of Scotland “by the Treaty of Union”; (c) the 
Ecclesiastical Household in Scotland; (d) the special position of Church of Scotland 
ministers in respect of the Marriage (Scotland) Act 1977; (e) the freedom of Church 
of Scotland courts from judicial review.24 
 
It should be noted that there were at one time more of these “marks of establishment” 
following 1929, such as the sole right of the parishes of the Church of Scotland to 
proclaim banns ahead of marriage solemnisations, and the disqualification of Church 
of Scotland ministers and Church of England clergy from sitting in the House of 
Commons,25 but both these “marks” have perished with time. From this it would 
appear that “establishment” is itself a claim for the Church of Scotland which does 
not give rise to a fixed set of “marks”, but is rather a claim used to explain certain 
unique features of the Church of Scotland’s recognition in law and custom. As 
Francis Lyall has put it “sometimes the law is adapted to accord with a theory, and 
sometimes the theory is produced to justify the law”.26 
 
                                                             
23 Lyall, Of Presbyters and Kings (1980), p. 149. 
24 Frank Cramner, ‘Church State relations in the United Kingdom: a Westminster view’ in 
Ecclesiastical Law Journal (2001) 6(29), pp. 111-121, at pp. 116-117.  
25 R. King Murray, ‘The Constitutional Position of the Church of Scotland’ in Public Law (1958), pp. 
155-162, at p. 161. 
26 Lyall, Of Presbyters and Kings (1980), p. 147. 
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2.3.1  Before the 1920s 
It seems as if the Presbyterian form of church government was initially legislated not 
by the Scottish parliament but by an Act of the General Assembly in 1592 that was 
merely reaffirmed by the Parliament in the century and more that followed.27 It had to 
be variously reaffirmed because the British Stewarts kept trying to gain control over 
the Scottish Church by imposing Episcopal government on the Scottish Church. Thus 
in the early seventeenth-century James VI comprehensively revived Episcopal 
government in the Church. Episcopacy was then overthrown by the Presbyterian party 
from 1638. At the Restoration Charles II restored Episcopal government, which was 
then overthrown at the Glorious Revolution of 1688. So it seems to have been the 
case that the Scottish Church was divided as to its form of government for most of the 
seventeenth century, and the conflicts were bound up with the Presbyterians who 
sought independence from royal government, and the Episcopalians who were happy 
with a more Anglican settlement. So, each time Presbyterian government was 
reaffirmed, it amounted to a grudging acknowledgement by the monarchy that it 
would stop trying to dictate the form of church government the Scottish Church had, 
and leave it up to the Church to decide. 
 
The Revolution Settlement of 1689-90 spoke about the same issues, but went no 
further in defining the nature of the church-state relationship, merely reaffirming 
Protestantism and Presbyterianism. Though the Confession of Faith Act 1690 is 
ambiguous, making no clear reference to “a church by law established”, some 
ecclesiastical authorities, including Burleigh, stated that the phrase originated in this 
period. In any event, it is the coded phrases which were then repeated more or less in 
the 1706-7 legislation surrounding the Union with England.   Munro opines that all 
the 1560s-1590s legislation “may fairly be regarded as betokening establishment, for 
they dealt with relations between church and state in a way that recognised the special 
                                                             
27 Munro, 'Does Scotland have an Established Church?', p. 641. 
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status of the reformed kirk”,28 whilst that of 1689-90  “may be regarded as the second 
foundation of the Church of Scotland and the re-establishment of the Church.” (italics 
original).29  Likewise, Munro notes that the enactments at the time of the Union 
stipulated the status quo concerning “the Church of this kingdom as now by law 
established”, emphasising Protestantism and Presbyterianism as the form of worship 
and government. 
  
If the phrase “established by law” is to have any meaning for Scotland, then it must be 
defined in relation to the 1560-1690 legislation, ambiguous as it may have been to the 
modern eye, much of which was incorporated into the Union Agreement. Certainly, 
we should acknowledge that the legislators, and the presbyterians in particular, were 
clear that the creation of an established Presbyterian polity to the Protestant church 
was what they intended. If this is granted, then we may talk about disestablishment 
from the Disruption of 1843 onwards (of which more in a moment), which makes 
present-day talk about the Church of Scotland as established appear rather thin, if not 
merely a residual legal and constitutional construct from the era of Establishment. 
However, it is not clear whether this established church was to be of a form that 
included centralised management and control in the manner of the Church of England. 
On the contrary, as we shall get to, there are grounds for seeing the establishment that 
they created as locating ecclesiastical management in a highly devolved manner in 
each of Scotland’s parishes.     
 
A lot of attention has focused over the years upon the Patronage legislation 1712-
1874 and the impact this had upon attitudes to establishment, if not on the established 
church itself. Patronage was the system whereby hereditary lay patrons in each of 
Scotland’s approximately 942 parishes had the right to appoint parish ministers. It 
was definitively reintroduced, after a period of confusion, in 1712 until its abolition in 
1874; this led to the split of the Kirk into Moderates (who favoured it) and 
Evangelicals (who opposed it), most of whom left the Church either in individual 
parish disputes over patron-selected ministers, or at the Disruption of 18 May 1843, 
which led to the formation of the very large Free Church of Scotland.  The Ten Years 
                                                             
28 Ibid. 
29 Ibid. 
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Conflict over the issue in 1833-43, and the Disruption of 1843 that ended it, were to 
have profound consequences, creating a decision in the courts (concluded in the 
House of Lords) that the General Assembly of the Kirk could not abolish or disregard 
parliamentary legislation on patronage.   
  
The patronage issue led a number of authorities to conclude that the court cases over 
the 1712-1874 period categorically showed that the Church of Scotland was 
subordinate to Parliament and the civil courts which enforced and adjudged upon Acts 
of Parliament.30 But some have pointed to a drift after 1843 of Parliament, at the 
behest of the Church of Scotland, to clarify and essentially weaken any powers the 
Church might have over ordinary citizens. For in this area, as we shall see later in the 
chapter, the Church claimed into the nineteenth and even the twentieth century to 
have rights independent of civil courts to, for instance, summon ordinary citizens to 
appear as witnesses in ecclesiastical issues being heard in kirk sessions.31  Munro, for 
one, argues that the Kirk was moving in the direction that the Free Church seceders of 
1843 would have wanted, and that this was a sign of rapprochement underway in 
Scottish Presbyterianism.  
  
Distinct in the literature, one of the present authors (Brown) has previously argued 
that the established state of the Church of Scotland did not exist as a single entity at 
any time after the Union of 1707. He argued that there was no single institution called 
the Church of Scotland which we could identify as characterised by owning property, 
having funds, employing people, or legally entitled to do anything within the Scottish 
legal system. On the contrary, Brown’s argument was that what was established was 
the parish Church of Scotland in each of the 942 parishes, each with separate legal 
powers, taxation rights, employees and institutions like poor relief and parish 
schooling governed by Acts of both Scottish and Westminster parliaments, and by the 
creation of a complex set of individual conventions, often the outcome of legal cases 
between the minister, heritors (the landowners), the schoolmaster and the kirk session. 
                                                             
30 Harold Laski, Studies in the Problem of Sovereignty (orig. 1917, Abingdon, Oxon, Routledge, 2015), 
p. 113. Francis Lyall, Of Presbyters and Kings: Church and State in the Law of Scotland (Aberdeen, 
Aberdeen University Press, 1980), pp. 23-53. 
31 Andrew Herron, Kirk by Divine Right: Church and State: Peaceful Co-existence (Edinburgh, Saint 
Andrew Press, 1985), pp. 10, 13-14, 109. 
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The parish Churches also owned and managed the only legal graveyards in the 
country. The parish church was governed by two state-recognised courts, the Board of 
Heritors and the kirk session, each with powers and responsibilities, and each with a 
series of officials with state responsibilities – the kirk session clerk, the beadle, the 
minister, the school master and the clerk to the board of heritors. Brown argues that 
some of these powers were transferred – largely at the behest of the churches, and by 
their design – to state-managed institutions controlling the poor law in 1845 (the 
parochial boards, revised as parish councils in 1896) and controlling education in 
1872 (the school boards, revised in 1919 as ad hoc education authorities, with powers 
transferred in 1929 to standard local authorities). In each of these state institutions 
there was effective ecclesiastical influence from various churches through 
appointment or popular election, lasting until 1929 when these functions were 
terminated and passed to other public bodies.  In this way, Brown argues that there 
were 942 “established churches" in Scotland from at least the Union of 1707 until the 
1920s. This case might be disputed, but essentially doesn't affect judgement on the 
legal position today. 
 
2.3.2  The 1921 Declaratory Act 
This, then, leads the bulk of the attention of authorities to focus upon what happened 
in the 1920s. Most attention descends upon the Church of Scotland Act 1921, the so-
called Declaratory Act, which is composed of a relatively short main Act and a series 
of attached or appendixed articles which were composed by the Church of Scotland.32 
Along with the Church of Scotland (Properties and Endowments) Act 1925, the 
Declaratory Act specifically signalled the freedom of the Church from the state’s 
interference, but in the appendices there are statements of the Church’s principles, 
including most importantly one in which it was declared of the Church of Scotland 
that: 
 
"As a national Church representative of the Christian faith of the Scottish 
people it acknowledges its distinctive call and duty to bring the ordinances of 
                                                             
32 The process of composition of the Declaratory Act, which started in 1914, is dealt with in detail in 
Murray, Freedom to Reform, passim. 
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religion to the people in every parish of Scotland through a territorial 
ministry."  
 
Interpretation of a sentence lies at the heart of most modern rhetoric and debate about 
the issues of establishment in Scotland. That interpretation varies significantly. To 
this, Munro responds by stating that: “Generally, it is fair to say that the Act may be 
regarded as a recognition by Parliament of the Church’s constitution, rather than as a 
conferment of a constitution.”33 For Munro, the 1921 settlement was a “change of 
tone”, but he goes on to argue that the church remained, and remains, established. He 
regards the 1921 Acts as “difficult to view” as a disestablishing measure. He says that 
the Act was “a recognition by the state of a concordat which allowed that the Church 
had its own sphere of jurisdiction” – in others an established sphere of jurisdiction, 
citing a 1995 court case which affirmed that the civil court had been effectively 
deprived by the 1921 Act of the right to interfere in the suspension of minister of the 
Church.34 Munro concludes that “in a variety of ways the Church of Scotland has 
official recognition and a different status from other churches, and meets the 
requirements of his own working definition of ‘establishment’.” But because of the 
1921 Act, he regards it as “an interesting example for a ‘lighter’ form of 
establishment”. On the basis of this he quotes Sir Thomas Taylor that it is “a Church 
that is both established and free”.35 This sentiment has had a strong influence in parts 
of the Church of Scotland, though notably less so in the Highland and Hebrides 
elements of the kirk where Free Church anti-establishment sentiments introduced via 
the Union of 1929 are strongest.   
 
A variation on this narrative has been developed by Marjory A MacLean.  Following 
in the tradition of Andrew Herron, she has evolved a detailed historical account of the 
thinking on the established status of the Church of Scotland from the point of view of 
the Kirk’s own theological and legal minds. Her account of the issue is focussed on 
the question of the Church’s spiritual independence from the powers of the state. 
Much of this revolves around the concept of “the two kingdoms” – the idea, first 
                                                             
33 Munro, 'Does Scotland have an Established Church?',  p. 644. 
34 Ibid. pp. 643-4, including fn 18. 
35 Ibid. p. 645.  
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developed by Luther, that there is a kingdom of the monarch (the state) and a 
kingdom of God (namely the church) – which she describes as changing in 
ecclesiastical thought from the sixteenth to the nineteenth centuries. Key to her 
analysis is the way in which the Declaratory Act of 1921 contained a “conceptual 
trick”, whereby the separate legal powers to the Church acquired at the Reformation 
of the 1560s, was not to be regarded as a grant from the civil state (the Scottish 
Parliament) – a grant, which if recognised theologically, would acknowledge that the 
Kirk was beholden to the state for its freedom, thereby undermining the concept – but 
was merely protection of them. By thus satisfying the establishment-minded Church 
of Scotland and the anti-establishment-minded United Free Church, the church union 
of 1929 could proceed with both parties satisfied, leaving the Kirk with its spiritual 
freedom intact and notionally untouchable by the state. MacLean concludes that 
though the Kirk cannot be regarded today as being established, it is still unique for it 
its spiritual freedom.36  
 
There are various problems with interpretations arising from the 1921 Act. First, it is 
not clear that the idea of a unique “spiritual freedom” for the Church of Scotland has 
been determined in law. A case could be argued that “spiritual freedom” might be 
regarded as a right which any church, religious association or individual holds under 
general human rights, or under rights of clubs and associations to determine their own 
rules and to operate internally by them. Second, leading Church of Scotland 
commentators like Andrew Herron and Marjory MacLean (each at separate times 
holding office as clerk and depute clerk to the General Assembly) have asserted that 
the 1921 Act legislated the Church as Scotland as “the National Church” (usually, as 
here, rendered with a capital letter for National and including the definite article).37 
This interpretation has been disputed by Douglas Murray and Callum Brown, who 
each pointed to the wording of the Act’s appendix as “a national Church”  - note the 
capitalisation as well as the indefinite article - and argued that this clearly signalled 
that the word “national” indicated a geographical mission of the church, not a 
                                                             
36 Marjory A MacLean, The Crown Right of the Redeemer: The Spiritual Freedom of the Church of 
Scotland (Edinburgh, Saint Andrew Press, 2009), esp. pp. 109-10, 124-5. 
37, Marjory A. MacLean, "Church and State in Scotland: The Articles Declaratory", Theology in 
Scotland vol. xvi (2009), pp. 5-14 at p. 1. Herron, Kirk by Divine Right, p. 109. 
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constitutional status.38 Moreover, from the manner and wording of Article III as a 
whole from which the phrase “a national Church” comes, it seems difficult to contend 
that this was intended to be a statement of establishment either by the Church or by 
Parliament.39 Third, as MacLean notes, the Church itself has the right to amend the 
Articles, demonstrating that they are not an enactment by Parliament so much as “the 
constitution of the Church of Scotland in matters spiritual”.40 Certainly, much legal 
opinion between 1921 and the present, as quoted by Morris, shows that many 
commentators thought “establishment” had been effectively removed in word and in 
law by the Act.41 Fourth, and most importantly perhaps, the interpretation of the 1921 
Act has been clarified by recent legal judgement in the Percy / Douglas case discussed 
below at Chapter 2.6.5. and by MacLean.42   
 
 
2.3.3  Other modern facets of establishment 
Whilst most attention has fallen upon the 1921 Act, Callum Brown has previously 
drawn attention to the oft-forgotten other pieces of legislation of 1925 and 1933, 
together with reform of local government that occurred in 1929.43  Brown points to 
how this group of legislation ended “the local parish state”, or the 942 established 
churches as he called them. They collectively abolished Boards of Heritors (the state-
enacted committees of landowners in each parish which previously managed church 
taxation, and provision of the church, manse, glebe and parish school), enacted the 
dissolving of church taxes (principally the teinds), abolished ad hoc education 
authorities and parish councils (upon which kirk and other church clergy had been 
significant members since the middle decades of the nineteenth century), and 
                                                             
38 Douglas Murray, Freedom to Reform: The 'Articles Declaratory' of the Church of Scotland 1921 
(Edinburgh, T&T Clarke, 1993), p. 4; Callum G. Brown, ‘The Myth of the Established Church’, in  
James Kirk (ed.), The Scottish Churches and the Union Parliament, 1707-1999 (Edinburgh, Scottish 
Church History Society, 2001), 48-74 at p. 71 
39 Article III. From the wording of this Article as a whole, it seems difficult to contend that this was 
intended to be a statement of establishment either by the Church or Parliament.  
40 Ibid., p. 6fn4. R.M. Morris, “Establishment in Scotland”, in Morris (ed.), Church and State, p. 81.  
41 Ibid, pp. 83-7. 
42 See MacLean, Crown Rights, pp. 179-214. 
43 Brown, Myth, p. 71.  
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nationalised Church of Scotland graveyards, tendering them to the ownership of 
Scottish local authorities.  
 
So, in Brown's argument, the Church of Scotland of today was only formally 
constituted in the 1920s; pre-Union legislation was concerned with privileging 
Protestantism over Catholicism. Yet, Brown has been the first to admit of the power 
of “the myth of the established church” in the Scottish imagination since the 
Reformation, and notably within much of the Church of Scotland. The myth remains 
strong in certain branches of the Church, though by no means in all of them (notably 
in the Highland and Islands where the United Free Church element that re-joined the 
kirk in 1929 was, and remains, anti-establishment in desire and interpretation of the 
Church’s status), and in parts of the Scottish nationalist intellectual movement.44 
However, the mythology is by no means universal in the nationalist community. Tom 
Nairn famously saw the Church as an obstacle to independence, claiming that 
“Scotland will not be free until the last Kirk minister is strangled with the last copy of 
the Sunday Post”.45 
 
On a different dimension, ritual has been part of the way by which establishment 
status has been ascribed to the Church of Scotland. This includes the rituals 
surrounding the annual general assembly in May (at which the monarch or his/her 
representative Lord High Commissioner is in attendance), the appointment of royal 
chaplains in Scotland (who appear in the order of precedence), and at the opening of 
local authority sessions (traditionally opened by a “kirking of the council” in a local 
parish church, but from the mid twentieth century often going on ecumenical 
rotation). There is also attention drawn by some to the role of the Church of Scotland 
in the ritual of coronation; but, as Bob Morris has observed, at the 1953 coronation of 
Elizabeth II (and I of Scotland) “a small, virtually undetectable, role was found for the 
Moderator of the General Assembly of the Church of Scotland (and a role so tiny that 
it created intense controversy with the Kirk at the time)”.46 Still, the mythology is 
                                                             
44 William Storrar, Scottish Identity: A Christian Vision (London, Hansel Press, 1990); Lindsay 
Paterson, The Autonomy of Modern Scotland (Edinburgh, Edinburgh University Press, 1994).  
45 Tom Nairn, quoted in The Observer 3 October 1999. 
46 Bob Morris, ‘The future of church establishment’, Ecclesiastical Law Journal vol. 1 (2010), pp. 214-
18 at p. 216.  
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updated in such events, appearing to mollify regional ecclesiastical allegiances, and to 
recognise to some extent the multi-faith character of Britain. Yet, it is difficult to see 
such pageant as conferring an “establishment” status to the Church of Scotland as it 
does to the Church of England, whose role in the Coronation is based on a legislative 
and constitutional history of much stronger pedigree. Notwithstanding, the Church of 
Scotland does have a series of connections to the civil state embedded in law. But, as 
we shall see in the remainder of this chapter, these partly are derived from 
connections that might rightly be regarded as having lapsed through disuse over a 
very long period, or, in some cases, by the enactment of very recent provisions 
conferring privileges or status not upon the Church of Scotland alone but upon other 
denominations too.  
 
2.3.4  Complexity of Church of Scotland status 
The view that the Church of Scotland remains established is vexed by problems of 
defining what “established” meant or means in a Scottish context, so much so that it 
has been recently referred to as a matter of taste.47 If this historically coherent Church, 
which is purported to have existed since its reformation in 1560, is a priori held to be 
perpetually established by virtue of the Union Agreement of 1707, then howsoever 
the legal position of the Church of Scotland deteriorates, is altered or reformed, the 
new legal position itself defines what establishment means in Scotland. If the 
assertion found in the Union agreement that there was a “Church in this kingdom by 
law established” is accepted, and if the “national” Church of Scotland is held to be its 
heir, a further problem is encountered in that it is difficult to maintain that the 
principle of establishment is fixed, and that the principle dictates various statutory 
provisions. Rather, “establishment” appears at best to be a shorthand way of referring 
to a collection of legal provisions which change over time. The problem with this 
view is that the principle of establishment is mutable, and has come to mean whatever 
the legal position of the “national” Church of Scotland is. The obvious problem from 
this perspective is that the principle of establishment is not objective, and may either 
change beyond all recognition, or become almost meaningless to the point that it is 
rendered obsolete, which, in some views, it has already become.  
                                                             
47 Marjory A. MacLean, ‘Church and State in Scotland: The Articles Declaratory’ in Theology in 
Scotland, XVI.1 (2009), 5-14, at 6. 
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The result is a highly complex series of powers and provisions relating to the Church 
of Scotland and its status within the state.  Indeed, in the sections that follow, the 
chapter proceeds to examine other provisions in detail. Its status as the Established 
Church of Scotland is now rarely asserted by anyone, in the Church or outside, and its 
pre-eminent position as the leading church is both considerably weakened and, in 
ecumenical times, rarely asserted either. This in large part reflects the fact that, 
though the Church remains the largest denomination in Scotland, it is only marginally 
so, accounting in 2003 for 40 per cent of churchgoers (compared to 35 per cent for the 
Catholic Church),48 and, at the 2011 Census, only 32.44 per cent of those Scots who 
identify themselves with it (overtaken by those of “no religion” at 36.65 per cent of 
adults).49 The Church's legal position today is most often attributed to the 1921 Act, 
but, equally, the failings of that Act have given rise to calls for altering its provisions 
in a direction that can only be described as enhancing the Church status as a voluntary 
organisation.  As Marjory MacLean has observed, “The written constitution of the 
Church of Scotland is gradually desiccating: its usefulness is waning and the power of 
its terms is gradually becoming risible.”50      
 
Notwithstanding issues to do with the established status of the Church of Scotland, 
other provisions associated with the Church exist in law and the legal heritage that 
still have impact today. To these this Report now turns.  
 
 
2.4 Historical Statutes and the Church of Scotland: The Place of Scottish 
Protestantism in the constituting documents of the United Kingdom of Great 
Britain 
 
The constituting documents of the United Kingdom of Great Britain, being the Union 
of the Kingdoms of England and Scotland created by Acts of the Scottish and English 
                                                             
48 Peter Brierley, Turning the Tide: The Challenge Ahead: Report of the 2002 Scottish Church Census 
(London, Christian Research, 2003), p. 16. 
49 Census 2011, Table KS209SCb. 
50 MacLean, Crown Rights, p. 214. 
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Parliaments in 1707, contained various provisions in respect of Scottish 
Protestantism, Presbyterianism and “the worship, discipline and government of the 
church of this kingdom, as now by law established”. These provisions in effect 
embedded a series of statutes enacted by the pre-Union Scots Parliament between 
1560 to 1690 in favour of Scottish Protestantism into the Union Agreement, and 
formed the substantial basis of the legal understanding that the Church of Scotland 
existed as a unitary institution and was the “Established” Church in Scotland. It is 
argued below that this term nevertheless needs to be treated with considerable care: 
“establishment” is not a term of art in Scots law, and historical analysis of the 
constitution of the old “Established” Church of Scotland suggests that it was in fact a 
hybrid of disestablished Presbyterian government and established “parish states”. This 
historical “Established” Church of Scotland can be considered to have existed in law 
between 1707 and the 1920s, at which point, following a series of church divisions 
within Scottish Presbyterianism during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the 
“Established” Church of Scotland adopted a formal constitution which purposefully 
avoided any mention of the term “Established”. This was intentionally done, as in 
1921 the “Established” Church of Scotland desired to unite with the United Free 
Church, which rejected the principles of establishment and endowment of the Church 
by the State. Following the disestablishment of the financial fabric of the “parish 
states” of the “Established” Church of Scotland from 1925, the two Churches united 
in 1929, thereby forming the present-day Church of Scotland. The 1921 constitution 
adopted by the old “Established” Church of Scotland remains the official constitution 
of the present-day Church of Scotland. This constitution asserts the claim that the 
present-day Church of Scotland is: 
 
a national Church representative of the Christian Faith of the Scottish 
people...in historical continuity with the Church of Scotland which was 
reformed in 1560, whose liberties were ratified in 1592, and for whose 
security provision was made in the Treaty of Union of 1707. 
 
This section of the chapter therefore seeks to understand what statutory provisions are 
thereby claimed to apply to the Church of Scotland formed in 1929 before considering 
to what extent such statutory provisions are still held to be in force, and seeking to 
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ascertain the practical consequences of such provisions for the present-day Church of 
Scotland. This involves an unusual level of historical analysis for a report concerning 
the place of religion in law in Scotland today, but such an approach is necessitated by 
the historical dominance of Protestantism in Scotland since the 1560s. 
 
At the time of the Anglo-Scottish Union of 1707, a “fundamental and essential 
Condition of any Treaty of Union” with England from the Scottish side was the 
incorporation of the Protestant Religion and Presbyterian Church Act (1706), also 
called the Act of Security (1706), into the Acts of the Scottish and English 
Parliaments by which the Treaty of Union was ratified. This was with a view to 
preventing the predominantly English Members of the British Parliament from 
undermining the Presbyterian settlement in Scotland. As such, when the pre-Union 
Scottish Parliament passed the Act ratifying and approving the Treaty of Union of 
the two kingdoms of Scotland and England (1707) - also known as the Union with 
England Act (1707) - it contained the following provision:  
 
And that the said estates of parliament have agreed to and approve of the said 
articles of union, with some additions and explanations as is contained in the 
articles hereafter inserted. And likewise, her majesty, with advice and consent 
of the estates of parliament, resolving to establish the Protestant religion and 
presbyterian church government within this kingdom, has passed in this 
session of parliament an act entitled, act for securing of the Protestant religion 
and presbyterian church government, which, by the tenor thereof, is appointed 
to be inserted in any act ratifying the treaty and expressly declared to be a 
fundamental and essential condition of the said treaty or union in all time 
coming.51  
 
The full text of the Union with England Act (1707) together with Act of Security 
(1706) may be viewed online here.52 The main point to note here is that the Act of 
                                                             
51 RPS, 1706/10/257 ; cf http://www.legislation.gov.uk/aosp/1707/7/introduction. The Act of Security 
(1706) follows the last article of the Treaty of Union (that is, article 25). 
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Security (1706) itself ratified an earlier Act of the pre-Union Scots Parliament, 
namely the “...fifth act of the first parliament of King William and Queen Mary 
entituled, act ratifieing the Confession of Faith and settling presbyterian church 
government...”. This was the Act Ratifying the Confession of Faith and Settling 
Presbyterian Church Government (1690), the full text of which may be viewed 
here.53  
 
This 1690 Act ratified and accepted the Westminster Confession of Faith as a true 
confession of the Protestant faith in Scotland, and, moreover, “revived, renewed and 
confirmed” the “114th act, James VI, parliament 12th in the year 1592, entitled, 
ratification of the liberty of the true kirk etc.” This 1592 Act was the Act for 
Abolishing of the Acts Contrary to the True Religion (1592) – also known as the 
General Assembly Act (1592) – the full text of which may be viewed here.54 
 
The General Assembly Act 1592 in turn ratified and approved: 
 
all liberties, privileges, immunities and fredomes quhatsumevir gevin and 
grantit be his hienes [James VI], his regentis in his name, or ony of his 
predicessouris, to the trew and hally kirk presentlie establishit within this 
realme, and declared in the first act of his highness’s parliament on 20 October 
1579, and all and whatsoever acts of parliament and statutes made of before 
by his highness and his regents regarding the liberty and freedom of the said 
kirk, and specially the first act of parliament held at Edinburgh, 24 October 
1581, with the whole particular acts therein mentioned, which shall be as 
sufficient as if the same were herein expressed, and all other acts of parliament 
made since in favour of the true kirk. 
 
The “first act of his highness’s parliament on 20 October 1579,” was the Church Act 
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(1579), the full text of which may be viewed here.55  
 
The “first act of parliament held at Edinburgh, 24 October 1581,” was the Church 
Act (1581), the full text of which may be viewed here.56 
 
The Church Act (1579) in turn ratified and approved: 
 
all and whatsoever acts and statutes made of before by his highness, with 
advice [of his] regents in his own reign or his predecessors, concerning the 
freedom and liberty of the true kirk of God and religion now presently 
professed within this realm, and especially ratifies and approves the sixth act 
of his highness’s parliament held in the first year of his highness’s reign, 
entitled “Concerning the true and holy kirk and of those that are declared not 
to be of the same,”  
 
namely the Church Act (1567), the full text of which may be viewed here.57 
 
The Church Act (1581) in turn ratified a great many earlier Acts of the Scottish 
Parliament passed in favour of the Protestant Religion in Scotland,  which are cited in 
the following text:  
 
Our sovereign lord, with advice of his three estates and whole body of this 
present parliament, has ratified and approved and, by the tenor hereof, ratifies 
and approves all and whatsoever acts of parliament, statutes and constitutions 
passed and made of before, agreeable to God’s word, for maintenance of the 
liberty of the true kirk of God and religion now presently professed within this 
realm and purity thereof, and specially the act made in the reign of [Mary], the 
queen, his dearest mother, in the parliament held at Edinburgh on 19 April 
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1567 concerning the quashing, annulling and abrogating of all laws, acts and 
constitutions, canon, civil and municipal, with other constitutions contrary to 
the religion now professed within this realm,58 and the acts likewise after 
following made in diverse parliaments held since his highness's coronation, 
namely, the acts concerning the abolishing of the Pope and his usurped 
authority;59 concerning the annulling of the acts of parliament made against 
God’s word and maintenance of idolatry in any times past;60 the Confession of 
the Faith professed by the Protestants of Scotland;61 concerning the mass 
abolished and punishing of all that hears or says the same;62 concerning the 
true and holy kirk and of them that are declared not to be of the same;63 
concerning the admission of them that shall be presented to benefices, having 
cure of ministry;64 concerning the king’s oath to be given at his coronation;65 
concerning them that should bear public office hereafter;66 concerning thirds 
of benefices granted in the month of December 1561, for sustaining of the 
ministry and other affairs of the prince;67 concerning them that shall be 
teachers of the youth in schools;68 concerning the jurisdiction of the kirk;69 
concerning the disposition of provostries, prebendaries and chaplainries to 
bursaries to be founded in colleges;70 concerning the filthy vice of fornication 
and punishment of the same;71 concerning them that commit incest;72 
concerning lawful marriage of the own blood in degrees not forbidden by 
                                                             
58 Act Concerning Religion (1567) (RPS, 1567/4/6). 
59 Papal Jurisdiction Act (1567) (RPS, A1567/12/1).   
60 Repeal of Acts in Support of Papacy Act (1567) (RPS, A1567/12/2). 
61 The Confession of Faith Act (1567) (RPS, A1567/12/3). 
62 Abolition of Mass Act (1567) (RPS, A1567/12/4). 
63 Church Act (1567) (RPS, A1567/12/5). 
64 Thirds of Benefices Act (1567) (RPS, A1567/12/6). 
65 Coronation Oath Act (1567) (RPS, A1567/12/7). 
66 Holders of Public Office Act (1567) (RPS, A1567/12/8). 
67 Ministers Act (1567) (RPS, A1567/12/9). 
68 School Teachers Act (1567) (RPS, A1567/12/10). 
69 Church Jurisdiction Act (1567) (RPS, A1567/12/11). 
70 College Bursaries Act (1567) (RPS, A1567/12/12). 
71 Fornication Act (1567) (RPS, A1567/12/13). 
72 Incest Act (1567) (RPS, A1567/12/14). 
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God’s word;73 ratification and approbation of the acts and statutes made of 
before concerning the freedom and liberty of the true kirk of God;74 
concerning the true and holy kirk, that the adversaries of Christ's evangel shall 
not enjoy the patrimony of the kirk;75 concerning the disobedience which shall 
be received to our sovereign lord's mercy and pardon;76 the explanation of the 
act made concerning manses and glebes;77 concerning purchasing of the 
Pope’s bulls or gifts of the queen, our sovereign lord's mother;78 approbation 
of the act made concerning the disposition of benefices to the ministers of 
Christ’s evangel;79 concerning the reparation of parish kirks;80 the ratification 
of the liberty of the true kirk of God and religion,81 that the glebe of the 
ministers and readers shall be free of teinds;82 concerning the true and holy 
kirk and of them that are declared not to be of the same;83 concerning the 
jurisdiction of the kirk,84 discharging of markets and labouring on Sundays 
and playing or drinking in time of sermon;85 concerning the youth and others 
beyond sea suspected to have declined from the true religion;86 that 
householders have bibles and psalm books;87 for punishment of strong and idle 
beggars and relief of the poor and impotent;88 and declares the said acts, and 
every one of them, and all other acts of parliament made in favour of the true 
religion since the said reformation, to have effect in all points after the form 
                                                             
73 Marriage Act (1567) (RPS, A1567/12/15). 
74 Church Act (1571) (RPS, 1571/8/3). 
75 Church Property Act (1573) (RPS, A1573/1/4) 
76 Pardon to Rebels Act (1573) (RPS, A1573/1/5) 
77 Manses and Glebes Act (1573) (RPS, A1573/1/6) 
78 Act anent Bulls Fraudulently Obtained (1573) (RPS, A1573/1/10) 
79 Benefices Act (1573) (RPS, A1573/1/11) 
80 Parish Church Act (1573) (RPS, A1573/1/13) 
81 Church Act (1578) (RPS, 1578/7/3) 
82 Glebes Act (1578) (RPS, 1578/7/6) 
83 Church Act (1579) (RPS, 1579/10/21) 
84 Church Jurisdiction Act (1579) (RPS, 1579/10/22) 
85 Sundays Act (1579) (RPS, 1579/10/23) 
86 Converts to Papacy Act (1579) (RPS, 1579/10/24) 
87 Bibles Act (1579) (RPS, 1579/10/25) 
88 Beggars and Poor Act (1579) (RPS, 1579/10/27) 
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and tenor thereof.89 
 
Of the Acts ratified by the Church Act (1581) it may be noted that:  
 
(i) the Papal Jurisdiction Act (1567) ratified the Papal Jurisdiction Act (1560); 
(ii) the Repeal of Acts in Support of Papacy Act (1567) ratified the Abolition 
of Idolatry Act (1560); 
(iii) the Confession of Faith Act (1567) ratified the Confession of Faith Act 
(1560); 
(iv) Abolition of Mass Act (1567) ratified the Abolition of Mass Act (1560). 
 
From this it may be concluded that numerous statutes enacted by the pre-Union Scots 
Parliament in favour of the Protestant religion and the Church of Scotland, including 
all the extant Acts of the Reformation Parliament of August 1560, were indirectly 
incorporated into the Union with England Act (1707), and as such formed part of the 
constituting documents of the United Kingdom of Great Britain. 
 
Those historical Scottish Acts were: 
1. Confession of Faith Act (1560)    (RPS, A1560/8/3) 
2. Papal Jurisdiction Act (1560)    (RPS, A1560/8/4)  
3. Abolition of Idolatry Act (1560)    (RPS, A1560/8/5) 
4. Abolition of Mass Act (1560)    (RPS, A1560/8/6) 
5. Act Concerning Religion (1567)     (RPS, 1567/4/6) 
6. Papal Jurisdiction Act (1567)     (RPS, A1567/12/1) 
7. Repeal of Acts in Support of Papacy Act (1567)   (RPS, A1567/12/2) 
8. The Confession of Faith Act (1567)    (RPS, A1567/12/3) 
9. Abolition of Mass Act (1567)     (RPS, A1567/12/4) 
10. Church Act (1567)      (RPS, A1567/12/5). 
11. Thirds of Benefices Act (1567)     (RPS, A1567/12/6). 
12. Coronation Oath Act (1567)     (RPS, A1567/12/7). 
13. Holders of Public Office Act (1567)    (RPS, A1567/12/8). 
                                                             
89 RPS, 1581/10/20.  
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14. Ministers Act (1567)      (RPS, A1567/12/9). 
15. School Teachers Act (1567)     (RPS, A1567/12/10). 
16. Church Jurisdiction Act (1567)     (RPS, A1567/12/11). 
17. College Bursaries Act (1567)     (RPS, A1567/12/12). 
18. Fornication Act (1567)      (RPS, A1567/12/13). 
19. Incest Act (1567)       (RPS, A1567/12/14). 
20. Marriage Act (1567)      (RPS, A1567/12/15). 
21. Church Act (1571)      (RPS, 1571/8/3). 
22. Church Property Act (1573)     (RPS, A1573/1/4) 
23. Pardon to Rebels Act (1573)     (RPS, A1573/1/5) 
24. Manses and Glebes Act (1573)     (RPS, A1573/1/6) 
25. Act anent Bulls Fraudulently Obtained (1573)   (RPS, A1573/1/10) 
26. Benefices Act (1573)      (RPS, A1573/1/11) 
27. Parish Church Act (1573)     (RPS, A1573/1/13) 
28. Church Act (1578)      (RPS, 1578/7/3) 
29. Glebes Act (1578)      (RPS, 1578/7/6) 
30. Church Act (1579)      (RPS, 1579/10/21) 
31. Church Jurisdiction Act (1579)     (RPS, 1579/10/22) 
32. Sundays Act (1579)      (RPS, 1579/10/23) 
33. Converts to Papacy Act (1579)     (RPS, 1579/10/24) 
34. Bibles Act (1579)      (RPS, 1579/10/25) 
35. Beggars and Poor Act (1579)     (RPS, 1579/10/27) 
36. Church Act (1581)     (RPS, 1581/10/20) 
37. General Assembly Act (1592)    (RPS, 1592/4/26) 
38. Act Ratifying the Confession of Faith and  
Settling Presbyterian Church Government (1690)  (RPS, 1690/4/43) 
39. Act of Security (1706)     (RPS, 1706/10/251) 
 
There were, of course, various other statutory provisions made in favour of Scottish 
Protestantism not expressly ratified by the Act of Security (1706), such as the Act for 
Settling the Quiet and Peace of the Church (1693) – also called the Ministers Act 
(1693) – which enjoined the Scottish Privy Council and “all other magistrates, judges 
and officers of justice give all due assistance for makeing the sentences of the church 
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and judicatures thereof to be obeyed”.90 And in addition Article II of the Treaty of 
Union itself limited the line of succession to the British Crown to the Protestant heirs 
of the body of Queen Anne, whom failing, the Protestant heirs of the body of Sophia, 
Electress of Hanover, thereby granting a general protection against Catholicism to the 
Protestant Reformed religion within the United Kingdom of Great Britain. 
 
From the 39 statutes of the pre-Union Scottish Parliament incorporated into the Union 
Agreement, a reasonable understanding of what was meant by the “true Protestant 
religion” in Scotland “as established by the laws of this kingdom”91 may be sketched 
at the time of the Union.  
 
The Scots Confession of Faith and the Westminster Confession of Faith were 
acknowledged in law as a true statement of the Protestant religion in Scotland. Papal 
jurisdiction was abrogated, the Mass and other Catholic sacraments outlawed, and 
episcopal government within the Scottish Church abolished in favour of 
Presbyterianism.  
 
By virtue of the Church Act (1567) “the reformed kirks of this realm” were declared 
“to be the only true and holy kirk of Jesus Christ within this realm”, and by the 
Coronation Oath Act (1567) the sovereign was obliged to swear to “maintain the true 
religion of Jesus Christ, [and] the preaching of his holy word and due and right 
administration of the sacraments now received and preached within this realm”. The 
Church Jurisdiction Act (1567), in reference to “the true kirk and immaculate spouse 
of Jesus Christ”, declared there to be: 
 
no other face of kirk nor other face of religion than is presently, by the favour 
of God, established within this realm; and that there be no other jurisdiction 
ecclesiastical acknowledged within this realm other than that which is, and 
shall be, within the same kirk.  
 
The Church Act (1579) declared: 
                                                             
90 RPS, 1693/4/89. 
91 This phrase being used in the Act of Security (1706). 
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the ministers of the blessed evangel of Jesus Christ, whom God of his mercy 
has now raised up amongst us, or hereafter shall raise, agreeing with them that 
now live in doctrine and administration of the sacraments, and the people of 
this realm that professes Jesus Christ as he is now offered in his evangel, and 
do communicate with the holy sacraments as in the reformed kirks of this 
realm are publicly administered, according to the Confession of the Faith, to 
be the only true and holy kirk of Jesus Christ within this realm. 
 
In respect of endowments, various of these statutes made provisions in respect of the 
medieval benefice system to provide ministers with benefices and to fund 
scholarships for candidates for the ministry in Scotland’s universities. The Church 
Property Act (1573) made provision for the levying of a local tax for the repair and 
maintenance of parish churches. 
 
By virtue of the Holders of Public Office Act (1567) only those persons who 
professed “the purity of religion and doctrine now presently established” were to be 
admitted to public office. The Act of Security (1706) ordained that all future 
sovereigns of Great Britain must: 
 
swear and subscribe that they shall inviolably maintain and preserve the 
foresaid settlement of the true Protestant religion with the government, 
worship, discipline, right and privileges of this church as above established by 
the laws of this kingdom, in prosecution of the Claim of Right. 
 
The Claim of Right (1689) was the Scottish equivalent of the English Bill of Rights 
(1688/9), whereby Roman Catholics were expressly disqualified from the line of 
succession to the Scottish and English, and, following the Union, British crowns. The 
application of this religious test to the line of succession had been confirmed by the 
English Act of Settlement (1700), which 1700 Act had been incorporated into Article 
II of the Treaty of Union. 
  
By virtue of the School Teachers Act (1567), only those persons who had been tried 
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by the “superintendents or visitors of the kirk” were to be admitted to charges within 
Scotland’s schools and universities. The Act of Security (1706) went further, and 
ordained that all  
 
professors, principals, regents, masters or others bearing office in any 
university, college or school within this kingdom...shall acknowledge and 
profess and shall subscribe to the foresaid Confession of Faith as the 
confession of their faith, and that they will practise and conform themselves to 
the worship presently in use in this church, and submit themselves to the 
government and discipline thereof... 
 
By virtue of the Converts to Papacy Act (1579), students passing abroad to study had 
to be licenced so to proceed, and were to be examined as to their continued adherence 
“to the true and Christian religion preached and by law established within this realm” 
upon their return. 
  
The Sundays Act (1579) imposed various Sabbatarian measures concerning Sunday 
trading, and provided for the punishment of those persons who wilfully failed to 
attend services in parish kirks on Sundays. The Bibles Act (1579) ordained that all 
persons within the kingdom enjoying a specified level of wealth were “to have a bible 
and psalm book in vulgar language in their houses for the better instruction of 
themselves and their families in the knowledge of God”. 
  
This sketch of historical legislation concerning Scottish Protestantism and the Church, 
or indeed ‘kirks’, in Scotland following the Reformation provides a reasonable outline 
of the types of privileges enjoyed in law by the official religion in Scotland at the time 
of the Anglo-Scottish Union in 1707. Various questions now fall to be considered – 
has legislation bound up with the Treaty of Union been repealed in the past, and may 
it still be repealed today? Can various statutory provisions made in favour of Scottish 
Protestantism be considered to have fallen in desuetude (i.e. to have ceased to be law) 
without having been formally repealed? And what today remains of this statutory 
legacy in Scots law? 
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2.5  Repeal and Desuetude (or disuse) of historical Scottish Acts 
 
2.5.1  Desuetude 
Generally speaking, Acts of the pre-Union Scottish Parliament may fall into 
desuetude, and as such may cease to be a source of Scots law without being formally 
repealed.92 Nevertheless, Acts of the pre-Union Scottish Parliament embedded into 
the constituting documents of the United Kingdom of Great Britain in 1707 fall into a 
special category of historical Scottish statutes which may not fall into desuetude, but 
rather require to be repealed by the British Parliament. This exemption to the general 
rule of desuetude arises from the fact that the Scottish Union with England Act 
(1707) was subsequently ratified by the pre-Union English Parliament, which brought 
that Act, and the historical Scottish Acts ratified by the same, within the purview of 
the English constitutional tradition. Acts of the pre-Union English Parliament are not 
subject to desuetude, which is a feature of Scots, but not English, law, but rather 
remain in force until such time as they are repealed.93 The extent to which the Scottish 
and English Acts by which the Treaty of Union was ratified in 1707 may be repealed 
by the British Parliament is the subject of dispute. The Scottish constitutional tradition 
tends towards the view that the constituting documents of the United Kingdom of 
Great Britain limit the sovereignty of the British Parliament, which as such may not 
repeal aspects of the Union with England Act (1707) and Acts ratified therein.94 The 
English constitutional tradition tends toward the view that the sovereignty of the 
British Parliament is unlimited, as was the sovereignty of the pre-Union English 
                                                             
92 “A statute may also be impliedly repealed by falling into desuetude, with the result that if appealed 
to, the courts will decline to give effect to it. This rule, probably, is only applicable to Scots Acts; at 
least there is no case where a statute passed since 1707 has been held to have fallen into desuetude, and 
no analogous rule is recognised in England.” (Gloag and Henderson: The Law of Scotland, 13th edition, 
ed. H. L. MacQueen and Lord Eassie, 1.34). 
93 “...it has never been doubted that the legislation of the United Kingdom Parliament is like that of the 
English Parliament in that desuetude has no bearing upon its validity.” (Stair Memorial Encyclopaedia, 
vol. 22, part 1(3)(c), para. 133). 
94 For example see T. B. Smith’s contribution to the Stair Memorial Encyclopaedia, volume 5, 
Fundamental Law, in the original 1987 edition; see also David M. Walker, ‘The Union and the Law’ in 
The Journal of the Law Society of Scotland, 18 June 2007. For further discussion of the Scottish view 
see Michael Upton, ‘Marriage vows of the elephant: the Constitution of 1707’ in Law Quarterly 
Review (1989), 105 (Jan), 79-103, esp. at p. 79 were references are provided for the ideas of the three 
Scottish law Professors, T. B. Smith, J. D. B. Mitchell and D. N. MacCormick. 
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Parliament.95  This second view appears to have prevailed in practice, in that some 
aspects of the Union Agreement of 1707 have been expressly repealed by the British 
Parliament.  
 
2.5.2 Oaths 
A further potential source of constitutional difficulty in repealing aspects of the Union 
Agreement, or aspects of the religious settlement within the United Kingdom, attaches 
to the accession oath and coronation oath taken by the British sovereign, or the oath 
of office taken by a Regent. The sovereign’s accession oath is thought to be no bar, as 
the Irish Church Act 1869 and the Catholic Emancipation Act 1829 are held to 
demonstrate that the aspect of this oath “protecting ecclesiastical interests is without 
legal importance”.96 On the other hand Regents are expressly prohibited by statute 
from assenting “to any Bill for changing the order of succession to the Crown or for 
repealing or altering an Act of the fifth year of the reign of Queen Anne made in 
Scotland entitled ‘An Act for Securing the Protestant Religion and Presbyterian 
Church Government’.”97 No such prohibition attached to the sovereign, as per the 
repeal of certain aspects of this Act of Security 1706 by the Universities (Scotland) 
Act 1853 discussed in 2.5.3 below.  
  
The sovereign’s accession oath concerns the Protestant succession to the British 
throne, and runs: 
 
I [monarch's name] do solemnly and sincerely in the presence of God profess, 
testify and declare that I am a faithful Protestant, and that I will, according to 
the true intent of the enactments which secure the Protestant succession to the 
Throne of my Realm, uphold and maintain the said enactments to the best of 
                                                             
95 This distinction was famously noted by Lord President Cooper in MacCormick v. Lord Advocate 
(1953 S.L.T. 255), in which he expressed the opinion that “The principle of the unlimited sovereignty 
of Parliament is a distinctively English principle which has no counterpart in Scottish constitutional 
law...Considering that the Union legislation extinguished the Parliaments of Scotland and England and 
replaced them by a new Parliament, I have difficulty in seeing why it should have been supposed that 
the new Parliament of Great Britain must inherit all the peculiar characteristics of the English 
Parliament but none of the Scottish Parliament, as if all that happened in 1707 was that Scottish 
representatives were admitted to the Parliament of England. That is not what was done.” 
96 Lyall, Of Presbyters and Kings, p. 80, n. 215. 
97 Regency Act 1937, c. 16, s. 4(2). 
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my powers according to law.98  
 
The sovereign is also required at his or her accession, by virtue of the Act of Security 
1706 to: 
 
swear and subscribe that they shall inviolably maintain and preserve the 
foresaid settlement of the true Protestant religion with the government, 
worship, discipline, right and priviledges of this church as above established 
by the laws of this kingdom [of Scotland], in prosecution of the Claim of 
Right.99 
 
The sovereign’s coronation oath, as taken in 1953, ran: 
 
Archbishop. Will you to the utmost of your power maintain the Laws of God 
and the true profession of the Gospel? Will you to the utmost of your power 
maintain in the United Kingdom the Protestant Reformed Religion established 
by law? Will you maintain and preserve inviolably the settlement of the 
Church of England, and the doctrine, worship, discipline, and government 
thereof, as by law established in England? And will you preserve unto the 
Bishops and Clergy of England, and to the Churches there committed to their 
charge, all such rights and privileges, as by law do or shall appertain to them 
or any of them? Queen. All this I promise to do.100 
 
It will be noted that the coronation oath does not refer to the Church of Scotland as 
such. The full constitutional significance of these oaths is difficult to determine, 
although it should be noted that it has been recently argued that they may prohibit the 
sovereign from assenting to a Bill which seeks to abolish the Protestant succession to 
the British throne. This principle has been explicitly raised in the House of Lords as 
recently as 2013, by Lord James of Blackheath in respect of the Succession to the 
                                                             
98 Accession Declaration Act 1910. 
99 Act of Security 1706. For further details concerning these oaths see House of Commons Library 
Standard Note SN/PC/00435 http://www.parliament.uk/briefing-papers/SN00435/the-coronation-oath  
100http://www.royal.gov.uk/ImagesandBroadcasts/Historic%20speeches%20and%20broadcasts/Corona
tionOath2June1953.aspx 
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Crown Act 2013.101 This 2013 Act avoided removing the religious test governing the 
succession to the British Crown as per the Act of Settlement (1700) embedded into 
Article II of the Treaty of Union, presumably because of the implications for the 
Church of England: until such time as the Church of England itself moves to be 
disestablished, it is difficult to see how the sovereign can be expected to assent to a 
bill which undermines the coronation oath in respect of the Church of England. The 
position in relation to any “established” status claimed by the “national” Church of 
Scotland is far more nebulous and difficult to determine. 
 
2.5.3 Repeal of aspects of the Union Agreement 
The best known example of the British Parliament repealing an aspect of the Union 
Agreement is to be found in the Universities (Scotland) Act 1853, c. 89, s.1 whereby 
it was enacted that:  
 
It shall not be necessary for any person who shall have been or shall be 
elected, presented, or provided to the office of professor, regent, master, or 
other office in any of the universities or colleges in Scotland, such office not 
being that of principal or a chair of theology, to make and subscribe the 
acknowledgment or declaration mentioned in an Act passed in the fourth 
session of the first Parliament held in Scotland by her Majesty Queen Anne, 
intituled “Act for Securing the Protestant religion and Presbyterian Church 
Government.” 
 
In this the requirement for professors etc at Scotland’s four ancient universities to 
subscribe the Westminster Confession of Faith before a Presbytery prior to admission 
to university office as contained in the Act of Security (1706) was for the most part 
set aside, seemingly with a minimum of constitutional fuss. 
 
                                                             
101 “...we are being given a delegation of the prerogative of the Crown, which puts the burden on us to 
decide whether this is in breach of the coronation oath. I submit that it is, and therefore that any noble 
Lord who votes for the Bill now should walk through the Lobby and out of the front door and should 
never return, because we will all have automatically disqualified ourselves under our oath of allegiance 
to support the monarch in the discharge of their obligations under the coronation oath.” 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201213/ldhansrd/text/130214-0001.htm ; see under 
1.46pm. 
66 
 
A second example may be found in respect of the 1706 Act of Security’s stipulation 
that any person bearing office in a school in Scotland should subscribe the 
Westminster Confession of Faith and submit themselves the government and 
discipline of the Church of Scotland. This provision reinforced a similar provision 
contained in the Act for settling the quiet and peace of the church (1693) (RPS, 
1693/4/89), which declared that “all schoolmasters and teachers of youth in schools 
are and shall be liable to the trial, judgment and censure of the presbyteries of the 
bounds for their sufficiency, qualifications and deportment in the said office.” While 
the 1693 Act formed no part of the Union Agreement, the principle of the Church of 
Scotland’s right to apply a religious test to those to be appointed as schoolteachers, 
and the requirement that such persons submit themselves to the jurisdiction of the 
Kirk, was protected by the Act of Security (1706). Nevertheless, the Parochial and 
Burgh Schoolmasters (Scotland) Act 1861, s. 9: 
 
abolished the right of Presbyteries to examine teachers, and gave their 
functions to Boards of Examiners appointed by the Courts of the Scottish 
Universities. Section 12 [of the 1861 Act] abolished the requirement of 
subscription of the [Westminster] Confession [of Faith], and replaced it 
with a simple declaration to be made by the parochial school teacher that he 
would never attempt to subvert Westminster doctrines or the Church of 
Scotland. Burgh schoolmasters did not even have to undertake such an 
obligation.102  
 
Subsequently the Education (Scotland) Act 1872, c.62, s. 23, abolished the 
jurisdiction of presbyteries or other church courts over any public school in 
Scotland,103 all parochial schools having been nationalised by the same section of 
the1872 Act. At the same time “the requirement of the declaration under s.12 of the 
1861 Act vanished”.104 In this, the abolition of the jurisdiction of the courts of the 
Church of Scotland in respect of Scottish schools, together with the repeal of the 
                                                             
102 Francis Lyall, Of Presbyters and Kings (1980), p. 117. 
103 “all jurisdiction, power, and authority possessed or exercised by presbyteries of other church courts 
with respect to any public schools in Scotland are hereby abolished.” 
104 Francis Lyall, Of Presbyters and Kings (1980), p. 118. 
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statutory requirement for schoolteachers to subscribe the Westminster Confession of 
Faith would appear to have been an example of the British Parliament repealing an 
aspect of the Act of Security (1706), albeit not so clear an example as provided by 
the Universities (Scotland) Act 1853, c. 89, s.1. 
 
A third, and perhaps most far ranging, example of the repeal of legislation protected 
by the Union Agreement is to be found in the Statute Law Revision (Scotland) Act 
1906, c.38, which repealed any mention of Church Act (1581) from the General 
Assembly Act 1592.105 This apparently minor alteration to the 1592 Act meant that 
30 of the 31 historical Acts directly ratified by the Church Act (1581), together with 
the four extant Acts of the Reformation Parliament ratified by several of the said 30 
Acts, ceased to form a part of the Union Agreement, and as such became ordinary 
historical Scottish Acts capable of falling into desuetude. Only the Church Act 
(1567) continued to form part of the Union Agreement, as this had been ratified not 
only by the Church Act (1581), but also by the Church Act (1579). 
 
A final example of the sovereignty of the British Parliament in respect of the Treaty 
of Union concerns two Acts passed in 1711, both of which are considered to have 
been contrary to the Act of Security. These are the Scottish Episcopalians Act 1711, 
which granted toleration to a church outside of the official Presbyterian Church of 
Scotland, and the Church Patronage (Scotland) Act 1711.106 The former remains in 
force, while the latter was repealed by the Church Patronage (Scotland) Act 1874 
following the deeply divisive effect of lay patronage in the “Established” Church of 
Scotland at the time of the Disruption.  
 
The effect of the removal of the ratification of the Church Act (1581) from the 
General Assembly Act 1592 may be observed in Brown v. Magistrates of Edinburgh 
(1931 S.L.T. 456), wherein the Lord Ordinary entered into a detailed discussion of the 
Statute Law Revision (Scotland) Act 1906, historical Scottish Acts concerning the 
                                                             
105 According to the amended version of the General Assembly Act 1592 provided at 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/aosp/1592/8/paragraph/p1 , although the 1906 Act has not been 
consulted. 
106 R. King Murray, ‘The Constitutional Position of the Church of Scotland’ in Public Law (1958), pp. 
155-162, at pp. 159-160. 
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Sabbath, and desuetude. In Brown, it was held that the Sunday Act 1579 had fallen 
into at least partial desuetude, particularly in respect of the punishment of those 
persons who wilfully failed to attend services in the parish kirks of the Church of 
Scotland on Sundays. 
 
2.5.4  The status of Historical Scottish Acts 
From the third example above, only the following statutes continue to be incorporated 
into the constituting documents of the United Kingdom of Great Britain, all others 
therefore being capable of falling into desuetude: 
 
10. Church Act (1567)   
30. Church Act (1579) 
37. General Assembly Act (1592) 
38. Act Ratifying the Confession of Faith and Settling Presbyterian Church 
Government (1690) 
39. Act of Security (1706) 
 
The Records of the Parliament of Scotland website, maintained by the University of 
St Andrews, maintains, with the assistance of the Scottish Law Commission, a list of 
those Acts of the pre-Union Scottish Parliament which are still in force, for which see 
here.107 
 
Of the 39 Acts listed above, the following are still deemed to be in force (hyperlinks 
to the most recent versions of these Acts have been provided where different from 
those found on the RPS website): 
 
1. Confession of Faith Act (1560) 
2. Papal Jurisdiction Act (1560) 
[10. Church Act (1567) - not stated explicitly, but see 30. below] 
12. Coronation Oath Act (1567) 
16. Church Jurisdiction Act (1567)   
                                                             
107 http://www.rps.ac.uk/static/statutes_inforce.html 
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30. Church Act (1579) (which includes the text of the Church Act (1567)) 
31. Church Jurisdiction Act (1579) 
37. General Assembly Act (1592), as amended. 
38. Act Ratifying the Confession of Faith and Settling Presbyterian Church 
Government (1690) 
39. Act of Security (1706) 
 
Of these, only items 10, 30, 37, 38, and 39 are at present incapable of falling into 
desuetude, but rather would need to be directly repealed by the British legislature, 
although simply repealing direct mention of item 38 in item 39 would render all the 
others capable of falling into desuetude. It ought to be noted that various parts of 
items 10, 31, 37, 38 and 39 have already been repealed by the Statute Law Revision 
(Scotland) Act 1906 (c. 38).108 In addition, the Union with England Act 1707 of 
course remains in force, and as such the succession to the British Crown is still 
governed by a religious test in favour of Protestantism. 
 
It therefore follows that, at the present time, there remains only a rump of statutory 
provisions in favour of Scottish Protestantism and the “the worship, discipline and 
government of the church of this kingdom, as now by law established”, when 
compared to the time of the Union. While the constitutional and legal construct of the 
“Established” Church of Scotland has its critics, it is certainly the case that the 
present-day Church of Scotland asserts in its 1921 constitution (i.e. the Articles 
Declaratory) that it is in continuity with the Church “for whose security provision was 
made in the Treaty of Union of 1707”. To what extent those statutes still incorporated 
into the Union Agreement continue to have anything more than constitutional, rather 
than practical significance, and to what extent those other historical Scottish Acts 
considered still to be in force have in fact fallen into desuetude, is a point of some 
interest. What is also of interest is the extent to which the present-day Church of 
Scotland has laid claim to the benefits bestowed by any such Acts, and to what extent 
such a claim is reflected in its current position within Scots law and the British 
constitution. 
                                                             
108 According to the versions provided at www.legislation.gov.uk 
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2.6 Presbyterian re-union and the status of the present-day Church of 
Scotland 
 
The Church of Scotland Act 1921 was primarily concerned with paving the way to the 
reunification of the vast majority of presbyterians in one denomination. It followed a 
difficult case of reunion, and was designed to obviate major legal problems. The 
previous case was in 1900 when the United Presbyterian Church, which rejected the 
principle of “establishment” and supported dis-endowment of the state church, united 
with the Free Church of Scotland whose constitution upheld the principle that it was 
the duty of the state to “maintain and support an establishment of religion”. At that 
union, a small remnant of the Free Church of Scotland (located mostly in the 
Highlands and Hebrides) laid claim to the entire endowments of the predecessor Free 
Church of Scotland, which were held in trust, on the ground that the remnant 
remained faithful to the establishment principle as found in the Free Church’s 
constitution. This claim was tested before the Court of Session in 1902 and in the 
House of Lords in 1904,109 the House of Lords finding in favour of the residual Free 
Church of Scotland. This led to the bizarre situation of a tiny denomination , 
comprising only 24 Free Church ministers, was given ownership of the massive 
property portfolio - churches, church halls, manses, and church college - taken by the 
large United Free Church (with around 1,076 ministers).110 The House of Lords came 
to this manifestly unjust conclusion by virtue of the principle that church property 
followed those who kept to the same church constitution.  Very unusually, parliament 
was obliged to intervene in 1905 to overturn this judgement and make provision for a 
Commission to allocate the endowments of the Free Church on a more equitable 
footing.111 
                                                             
109 Bannatyne and Others (General Assembly of the Free Church) v Baron Overtoun and Others (i.e. 
The Free Church Case), (1904) 12 S.L.T. 297.  
110 T. M. Taylor, ‘Church and State in Scotland’ in Juridical Review 23 (1957), pp. 121-137, 129ff. 
111 By virtue of a Commission appointed by the Church (Scotland) Act 1905. On this case, see Allan 
Neil, The Free Church Case (William Hodge, Glasgow and Edinburgh, 1904); Alexander Stewart and 
J Kennedy Cameron, The Free Church of Scotland: The Crisis of 1900 (Edinburgh, Knox Press, 1910, 
1989); Kenneth R Ross, Church and Creed in Scotland: Free Church Case, 1900-04, and Its Origins 
(Edinburgh, Rutherford House, 1988); and F.A. Cranmer, 'Christian Doctrine and Judicial Review: the 
Free Church Case Revisited', Ecclesiastical Law Journal  6 (2002), pp. 203–216. 
71 
 
 
So, the Church of Scotland Act 1921 was part of the process of ensuring the same did 
not happen again. The "Established" Church of Scotland intended to dis-endow and in 
effect disestablish its parish system in the run up to re-union with the United Free 
Church in 1929, and it was necessary to transfer the endowments, revenues, and 
properties of each Church of Scotland parish from the statutory Boards of Heritors of 
each parish to the Church of Scotland General Trustees. This meant giving the Church 
of Scotland a clear, lawful and amendable constitution for the first time.  
 
Hence, the Church of Scotland Act 1921 does not betoken establishment, but ought 
rather to be understood both in respect of Scottish trust law and in respect of the 
negotiations surrounding 1920’s plans of Presbyterian re-union. That said, the 
legislature did not object to the tenor of the Articles Declaratory, nor are these 
Articles to be understood by reference to historical legislation, the 1921 Act enacting 
that: 
any statute and law affecting the Church of Scotland in matters spiritual in 
present in force...shall be construed in conformity [with the Declaratory 
Articles] and in subordination thereto, and all such statutes and law in so far as 
they are inconsistent with the Declaratory Articles are hereby repealed and 
declared to be of no effect.   
 
The acknowledgement as lawful of the constitution of the old “Established” Church 
of Scotland by the UK legislature does not necessarily infer that parliament accepts 
the tenor of the statements contained in the constitution as either law, or as binding 
upon the British State. Rather, in acknowledging the Articles Declaratory of the 
constitution as lawful, the constitution of the Church of Scotland and the right of the 
general assembly to alter the same, is put beyond legal challenge within the context of 
trust law. The problem in the Free Church case of 1904 was that the Free Church of 
Scotland had no mechanism by which is could abandon its commitment to the 
principle of “establishment” ahead of union with the United Free Church in 1900, 
with the, at the time, dire consequences that the property held in trust for the Free 
Church of Scotland could not be diverted to the use of the United Free Church into 
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which the vast majority of the ministers and members of the Free Church of Scotland 
had been united.  
 
2.6.1 Property of the Church of Scotland 
The need, then, for the constitution of the old “Established” Church of Scotland to be 
both lawful and capable of alteration required little explanation in 1921. Having 
adopted this constitution, and with a view to entering into a union with the United 
Free Church, which still rejected the establishment principle, it was necessary for the 
material and financial fabric of the parishes of the old “Established” Church of 
Scotland to be extricated from the control of boards of heritors, the court of teinds, 
and Scottish civil ecclesiastical law. In order to achieve this end, in 1921 Parliament 
confirmed a Provisional Order issued by the Secretary of State for Scotland in 1899 
by which the Church of Scotland General Trustees had been incorporated. Parliament 
then enacted the Church of Scotland (Properties and Endowments) Act 1925, which 
made provision for all ecclesiastical property held in trust for congregations by 
parochial heritors, including church buildings, manses, and glebe lands,112 to be 
transferred to the Church of Scotland General Trustees.113 This process was overseen 
by Scottish Ecclesiastical Commissioners, appointed by the 1925 Act, whose 
decisions were both final and indeed enjoyed the force of statute. At the same time the 
link between stipend and teinds was broken.114 Through this programme of reform, 
the Church of Scotland was effectively disestablished in respect of property and 
endowments, and became entirely independent of direct lay control in such matters. 
The subsequent transfer of such parochial assets came in time to render obsolete the 
                                                             
112 Historically, glebe lands were four Scots acres of land in the immediate vicinity of the manse and 
parish church which the parish minister either farmed or leased out. Following their transfer to the 
General Trustees, glebe lands tended to be sold, the capital from such sales being invested for income, 
thus in effect converting glebe lands into perpetual endowments. 
113 “The ecclesiastical buildings belonging to congregations are held for them by trustees. These may 
be the General Trustees, or local trustees...Buildings formerly vested in the heritors were transferred to 
the General Trustees, set up under the Church of Scotland (Properties and Endowments) Act, 1925. 
Other congregations have an option to transfer their buildings from local trustees to the General 
Trustees...” (Weatherhead, Constitution and Laws, p. 141). 
114 Black and Christie state that the Church of Scotland (Property and Endowments) Act (1925) meant 
that teinds were no longer linked to ministers’ stipends, and that as such teinds were no longer the 
province of ecclesiastical law (despite their ecclesiastical providence) and were rather “merely...a 
particular estate in land...but which, were it still exists as a separate estate, will for the future be merely 
a sum payable to a titular... whose enjoyment of the estate will no longer be qualified by any reference 
to duties towards the Church”.114 This in effect meant that teinds became nothing more than a title to 
certain revenues, which revenues were no longer to be burdened by any stipend. 
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function of heritors and the court of teinds,115 and was to lead to the eventual abolition 
of teinds116 and the desuetude of the entire branch of Scots law by which parochial 
finances had been governed.117  
 
Through this process, the old “Established” Church of Scotland obtained direct 
control over its own material fabric and finances, as the expense of the established 
parochial states of the old Church of Scotland.118 Such a programme of parochial 
disestablishment was presumably deemed to be a justified measure against the 
prospect of full union with the United Free Church, which was brought to pass in 
1929. So, in effect, the old “Established” Church of Scotland, in adopting the 
constitution set forth in the Church of Scotland 1921 Act, became “a national church” 
and during the course of the 1920s fell heir to a portion of the property and financial 
endowments of the old parish states of the “Established” Church, the remainder going 
largely to local authorities. This Church then united with the United Free Church, and 
thereby formed the present-day Church of Scotland, whose constitution still consists 
of that set forth in the Church of Scotland Act 1921. In so doing, despite the 
confusions this chapter has discussed, the United Free Church was led sufficiently to 
believe that they were in 1929 rejoining a now-disestablished Church of Scotland. 
 
2.6.2  Royal recognition of the present day Church of Scotland 
                                                             
115 The Court of Teinds still technically exists, because it is the Court of Session (“since the Act of 
1707 the Court of Teinds is nothing but the Court of Session under another name” (Stair Memorial 
Encyclopaedia, volume 6, 4.2.921, per Lord Kinnear in 1900)), but it is difficult to see how it could 
still have any business which might competently be brought before it. 
116 Teinds were abolished by the Abolition of Feudal Tenure etc. (Scotland) Act 2000, section 56 (1): 
“The provisions of Part 3 [anent the extinction of feuduties] of this Act shall apply as regards ground 
annual, skat, teind, stipend, standard charge, dry multures...” 
117 There has been a natural and precipitous decline in interest among Scots lawyers in ecclesiastical 
law since the publication of William George Black’s and James Roberton Christie’s The Parochial 
Ecclesiastical Law of Scotland as modified by the Church of Scotland Acts 1921 and 1925 (Edinburgh: 
Wm Hodge and Company, 1928) because of the consequences of the Church of Scotland (Property and 
Endowments) Act (1925). As a result of the 1925 Act all historical financial links between the Church 
of Scotland, heritors, and teinds have been broken, as a result of which ecclesiastical parochial law has 
effectively ceased to be a unique branch of Scots civil law relating to the financial affairs of the Church 
of Scotland. Rather, the finances of the Church of Scotland are now ultimately under the control of the 
General Assembly of the Church of Scotland. 
118 Callum G. Brown, ‘The Myth of the Established Church’ in The Scottish Churches and the Union 
Parliament, 1707-1999, ed. James Kirk (Edinburgh, Scottish Church History Society, 2001), pp. 48-74. 
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The present-day Church of Scotland therefore clearly inherited much of the property 
and financial endowments of the old parish states of the “Established” Church. What 
else, then, did it inherit from the old “Established” Church? The argument implicitly 
put forward by those who argue that the present-day Church of Scotland has fallen 
heir to the historical Scottish legislation passed in favour of Reformed Protestantism 
is that the claim advanced in the Church’s constitution to be “...in historical continuity 
with the Church of Scotland which was reformed in 1560, whose liberties were 
ratified in 1592, and for whose security provision was made in the Treaty of Union of 
1707” is valid, and that as such any provisions made in law in favour of the “Church 
of Scotland” since 1560 onwards have been inherited by the present-day Church of 
Scotland. 
 
The historical continuity of the post-1929 Church of Scotland with the earlier 
“Established" Church of Scotland was countenanced by the British monarchy. The 
British sovereign continues to appoint a Lord High Commissioner to the General 
Assembly of the Church of Scotland,119 and in 2000 the Prince of Wales, acting as 
Lord High Commissioner, remarked that the office was a “symbol of the long history 
which has bound together Church and Sovereign for nearly 450 years”.120 The British 
sovereign also appoints an Ecclesiastical Household in Scotland, which consists of the 
Dean of the Chapel Royal, the Dean of the Order of the Thistle (both of which offices 
are in the gift of the Crown121), ten Chaplains in Ordinary, and a Domestic Chaplain 
at Balmoral, all of whom are appointed out of the ministry of the Church of 
Scotland.122 The British sovereign worships in the Church of Scotland when in 
Scotland, particularly when resident at Balmoral. When the general assembly is in 
session, the Lord High Commissioner ranks in the General Precedence in Scotland 
after The Prince Philip, Duke of Edinburgh, as is to be expected of a person directly 
representing the person of the sovereign. The Moderator of the General Assembly of 
                                                             
119 The Lord High Commissioner receives an allowance out of moneys provided by Parliament as 
determined by Scottish Ministers by virtue of the Lord High Commissioner (Church of Scotland) Act 
1974. 
120 Fergusson, Church, State and Civil Society, p. 183. 
121 Stair Memorial Encyclopaedia, volume 3, 1.3.1151 anent Ecclesiastical Dignitaries 
122 For which see Burke’s Landed Gentry of Great Britain, 19th edn (Delaware: Burke’s Peerage and 
Gentry LLC , 2001), vol. 1, The Kingdom in Scotland, p. lxxiv. 
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the Church of Scotland also ranks in the General Precedence, after the Lord 
Chancellor of Great Britain, and above the Keeper of the Great Seal of Scotland, 
which office is vested in the First Minister.123 In this, there are clearly ongoing 
relations between the British monarchy and the Church of Scotland: such relations 
provide the Church of Scotland with unique royal acknowledgment and recognition 
by the head of the British State, but it is not clear that they amount to a form of 
establishment. Indeed, it can be argued that the functions of the Lord High 
Commissioner embody a division of Church and State in Scotland,124 while the other 
arrangements between the sovereign and the ministry of the Church of Scotland can 
be argued to be a matter of ongoing custom and to some extent a reflection of the 
Protestant faith of the sovereign, rather than signifying an established status enjoyed 
by the Church of Scotland. Unlike the Church of England, the Church of Scotland 
enjoys no formal relations with the Houses of Parliament and the British Government, 
and nor for that matter does it enjoy any formal relations with the Scottish Parliament 
or the Scottish Government. In this regard, the Church of Scotland enjoys unique 
recognition by the Crown.  
 
2.6.3 Historical legislation 
As already noted, the present-day Church of Scotland lays claim in its constitution to 
be in historical continuity with the Church whose “liberties were ratified in 1592, and 
for whose security provision was made in the Treaty of Union in 1707”. This has been 
understood to mean that historical Scottish Acts passed in favour of the historical 
Church of Scotland apply to the present-day Church of Scotland and, as such, various 
statutory provisions originating from a period when the Church of Scotland could be 
argued to have been more recognisably established are understood to still be in force 
today. The Church of Scotland’s own constitution may be presumed to make 
reference to the General Assembly Act 1592 and the Act of Security appended to the 
Treaty of Union in 1707. Other historical Scottish Acts which are either embedded 
directly or indirectly into the Act of Security, or are presently deemed to still be in 
force, have been discussed and listed above in Section 2.4. The question, then, is what 
                                                             
123 Burke’s Landed Gentry of Great Britain, 19th edn (Delaware, Burke’s Peerage and Gentry LLC, 
2001), vol. 1, p. lx. 
124 Weatherhead, Constitution and Laws, p. 189. 
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is the substance of the consequences of these statutory provisions, and do they amount 
to establishment? 
  
To begin with, let us consider the Scots Confession of Faith Act 1560 and the 
Confession of Faith Act 1690. The latter is directly cited in the Act of Security, while 
the former is still held to be in force. As to a statement of the official Protestant 
religion of the Kingdom of Scotland, or of the Kingdom of Great Britain in Scotland, 
both Acts may be taken as definitive. While the Westminster Confession of Faith has 
historically underpinned the common law offence of blasphemy in Scotland,125 and 
while they accord with the general tenor of the sovereign’s coronation oath to 
“maintain in the United Kingdom the Protestant Reformed Religion established by 
law”, it is not clear that they are exclusively in favour of the present-day Church of 
Scotland. The constitution of the Church of Scotland makes no reference to the Scots 
Confession of Faith, but in Article II declares: 
 
The principal subordinate standard of the Church of Scotland is the 
Westminster Confession of Faith approved by the General Assembly of 1647, 
containing the sum and substance of the Faith of the Reformed Church. 
 
 Nevertheless, the constitution of the Church of Scotland allows the General 
Assembly to interpret the Westminster Confession of Faith. For example 1986 Act 5 
of the General Assembly declared that the Church of Scotland no longer affirmed 
various anti-Catholic clauses of the Westminster Confession of Faith, disassociating 
itself from the same, and no longer requiring its office bearers to believe them.126 That 
the relevant sections of the Confession of Faith Act 1690 have not accordingly been 
repealed suggest that there is no direct link between the 1690 Act and the present-day 
Church of Scotland. Indeed the 1690 Act could be understood as favouring the beliefs 
of those Presbyterian churches in Scotland which still adhere to the Westminster 
Confession of Faith more fully, such as the Free Presbyterian Church of Scotland, the 
governing Synod of which in the 1980s famously “excommunicated” the then Lord 
                                                             
125 See separate chapter 6 on Blasphemy. 
126 http://www.churchofscotland.org.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0014/1823/1986_act_05.pdf  
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Chancellor of Great Britain, The Lord Mackay of Clashfern, for having attended 
requiem Masses for two deceased colleagues. 
 
2.6.4  Church government 
Next, we may turn to those statutory provisions which historically have been enacted 
by the pre-Union Scots Parliament in order to provide security for the Presbyterian 
government of the historical Church of Scotland. This legislation has usually been 
enacted against the background of a perceived threat of Episcopal government being 
imposed upon the Church of Scotland by either the Stewart monarchs of Scotland and 
England, or by the British Parliament. These Acts include the General Assembly Act 
1592, the Confession of Faith Act 1690 and the Act of Security 1706. The 1592 Act 
formally approved for the first time the Presbyterian government of the Church of 
Scotland. The Act referred to the “trew and hally kirk presentlie establishit within this 
realme”, but appeared to accept that General Assemblies were “appoyntit be the said 
kirk” that synods and provincial assemblies were “haldin be the said kirk and 
ministrie” and that presbyteries and kirk session were “appointit be the said kirk”; the 
ecclesiastical jurisdiction of this hierarchy of church courts was also set forth in detail 
following agreement reached between ministers of the Kirk and James VI. The 1690 
Act expressed the intention of parliament “to settle and secure the true Protestant 
religion...and also the Government of Christ’s Church within this Nation”, confirmed 
the abolition of episcopal government, “ratified and established” the Westminster 
Confession of Faith, and “ratified and confirmed” the “Government of the Church by 
kirk sessions, presbyteries, provinciall synods and Generall assemblies” as ratified by 
the General Assembly Act 1592. The 1690 Act went on to declare that “the Church 
Government be established in the hands of and exercised by these presbyterian 
ministers...”. In both the 1592 Act and the 1690 Act it is clear that the Presbyterian 
courts of the Church of Scotland did not enjoy any direct jurisdiction in respect of the 
temporal wealth of the Church, but rather enjoyed an ecclesiastical jurisdiction 
consisting of the right to suspend and depose ministers, to discipline the moral lives of 
parishioners, and to uphold sound preaching and the proper administration of the 
sacraments, and so forth. Both these Acts tend to suggest that presbyterian church 
government was the choice of the Church of Scotland itself, and that statutory 
recognition of Presbyterianism was a means of attempting to limit state interference 
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through Episcopal government. The Act of Security, however, did not reflect this 
view, and adopted a narrative suggestive of the establishment of presbyterian church 
government within the Church of Scotland by statute. This Act began by stating that 
the Commissioners for the Treaty of Union should not consider “alteration of the 
worship, discipline or government of the Church of this Kingdom as now by law 
established”, before going on to “establish and confirm the said true Protestant 
religion and the worship, discipline, and government of this Church, to continue 
without any alteration to the people of this land in all succeeding generations”. In this 
the Act of Security has been understood as establishing the Church of Scotland, 
including its presbyterian government, de novo in 1707.127 While the language used in 
the Act of Security may have been a novelty, and while it may have reflected the 
influence of the English commissioners, it was law, and insofar as it described the 
“church of this kingdom” as established by law, including its presbyterian supra-
parochial government, it provided full justification for the succeeding description of 
the Church of Scotland as the Established Church of Scotland before Scottish courts 
and the House of Lords. It has been suggested above (at section 2.2) that the 
presbyterian church government which was chosen by the Scottish Church in 1689 in 
preference to the established episcopalian hierarchy of the British Stewarts 
represented a kind of disestablishment; but if the Union Agreement established 
presbyterianism de novo in 1707, then it became cogent for Scots law to hold the 
Church of Scotland entirely to have been established, whatever the historical realities 
of seventeenth-century Scottish church history tending against that view.  
 
Yet, if the Union Agreement is to be understood as establishing General Assembly, 
Synod, Presbytery and Kirk Session as the polity of the Church of Scotland, and if the 
present-day Church of Scotland claims to be the successor Church to the Church for 
whose security provision was made in 1707, it would follow that the present-day 
Church of Scotland cannot alter its own polity without recourse to parliament. This 
however, is patently not the case. The constitution of the Church of Scotland as 
contained in the Church of Scotland Act 1921 plainly states that: 
 
                                                             
127 R. King Murray, ‘The Constitutional Position of the Church of Scotland’ in Public Law (1958), pp. 
155-162, at p. 159. 
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the Lord Jesus Christ has appointed a government in the hands of Church 
office-bearers, [and] receives from Him, its Divine King and Head, and from 
Him alone, the right and power subject to no civil authority to legislate, and to 
adjudicate finally, in all matters of doctrine, worship, government, and 
discipline in the Church, including...the constitution and membership of its 
Courts...Recognition by the civil authority of the separate and independent 
government and jurisdiction of this Church in matters spiritual, in whatever 
manner such recognition be expressed, does not in any way affect the 
character of this government and jurisdiction as derived from the Divine Head 
of the Church alone... (Article IV).  
 
The right of the Church of Scotland to alter its government without recourse to 
parliament was demonstrated in 1992 when the General Assembly abolished 
Synods.128 As Weatherhead has noted, since Synods are specifically mentioned in the 
Act of Security, it was wondered at the time of the General Assembly’s abolition of 
Synods “whether Parliament would have to be asked to amend [the Act of Security], 
but the Church took the view that the terms of the 1921 Act made this 
unnecessary”.129 
 
The 1992 abolition of Synods raises the following problem for those who would still 
argue that the present-day Church of Scotland is established. If the government of the 
Church of Scotland is held to have been established by law in 1707, then by law must 
it be reformed. If this view is maintained, then it would have to be argued either that 
the General Assembly acted ultra vires in abolishing Synods contrary to the Act of 
Security, or that the constitution of the Church of Scotland permits the General 
Assembly to alter the government of that Church without recourse to parliament, and 
that legislative Acts of the General Assembly thereby have the power to over-ride the 
sovereignty of the British Parliament, and to de facto amend, repeal, and alter 
fundamental aspects of the Union Agreement in respect of the Act of Security.   
 
                                                             
128 As per Act of the General Assembly, V, 1992 (Weatherhead, Constitution and Laws (1997), p. 54). 
129 Weatherhead, Constitution and Laws, p. 17. 
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The simpler view is more historically coherent, namely that Presbyterianism 
represented a rejection of established Episcopalian government in the Church of 
Scotland, and the interference of royal government and parliament in the religious life 
of the Church which this entailed. From this perspective, statutory recognition of 
Presbyterianism was a device by which the civil power acknowledged the right of the 
Church of Scotland to appoint its own system of government for the regulation of the 
religious life of the Church. Statutory recognition of ecclesiastical autonomy and 
independence is clearly not statutory establishment of church government. 
Notwithstanding the peculiarities of statutory language employed in the Act of 
Security, the intention of that Act was either to limit the sovereignty of the British 
Parliament in respect of the Church of Scotland, or to acknowledge that there was an 
inherent limit to the sovereignty of parliament within the Kingdom of Great Britain in 
Scotland. The former is a more English view of sovereignty, the latter accords more 
with the Scottish constitutional tradition. The Scottish view appears to predominate in 
the constitution of the Church of Scotland, wherein the appointment of the 
government of the Church of Scotland is held to be divine (Article IV), while the 
authority of the “civil magistrate”, that is to say secular or temporal government, is 
held to be a matter of “divine appointment” also. These are very old categories of 
constitutional thought, which vest absolute sovereignty neither in the State, nor the 
Church, but in Christ, who apportions his sovereign authority to both the State and the 
Church in different measure according to their differing qualities and purpose. Such 
thoughts would have been readily understood in late-medieval and early modern 
Scotland, and contradict the Anglican tradition of vesting both secular and spiritual 
authority in the person of the sovereign. At this point the peculiarities of joining two 
distinct medieval sovereign kingdoms, both with their own distinct constitutional 
traditions and Protestant settlements in a single United Kingdom, begin to become 
apparent. The enigma of the Church of Scotland may lie in the fact that it has been an 
historical hybrid of establishment and a rejection of establishment embedded within 
an independent constitutional tradition itself conjoined into a hybrid with another 
constitutional tradition which emphasised the principle of the unlimited sovereignty 
of the State. In practice, this appears to mean that historical Scottish Acts concerning 
the Presbyterian government of the Church of Scotland bind or limit or admit the 
limitations of the State from interfering in the government of the Church of Scotland, 
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but thereby do not limit the capacity of the Church of Scotland to alter its own polity 
and government.  
 
This view is given further weight by the opinion of a former Principal Clerk of the 
General Assembly, James Weatherhead, in his Constitution and Laws of the Church 
of Scotland as published by the Church of Scotland’s Board of Practice and Procedure 
in 1997. There, Weatherhead, having drawn the basic legal distinction between 
fundamental and expedient law, suggests that Presbyterian church government could 
fall within the latter category, and therefore be altered by the Church: “In church 
terms, it could be argued that a basic rule is that a Church must have some sort of 
discipline; but whether this is presbyterian or episcopal is a choice of expediency”.130 
This at least suggests that the General Assembly could theoretically re-adopt 
Episcopal government within the Church of Scotland, and the example of the 
abolition of Synods without recourse to Parliament at least suggests that such a move 
would in theory not be de-barred by the Act of Security. In this, statutory recognition 
of the government of the Church of Scotland cannot be said to have established the 
government of the Church of Scotland, but to have recognised the right of the Church 
to be sovereign in such matters. 
 
In conclusion, the Articles Declaratory of 1921 appear to be in agreement with the 
tenor of Acts of the pre-Union Scots Parliament in acknowledging church government 
to be a matter for the Church of Scotland, not parliament, whatever the intervening 
legal and constitutional constructs generated by the phrasing of the Act of Security. In 
this, can it be argued that the “national” Church of Scotland enjoys any particular 
practical advantages in law when compared to voluntary associations? One salient 
example would be the government of the Roman Catholic Church in Scotland, which 
is not subject to alteration by the British State, despite the fact that this form of church 
government apparently directly contravenes the Papal Jurisdiction Act of 1560, which 
is supposed to still be in force.131 
 
2.6.5  Church courts 
                                                             
130 Weatherhead, Constitution and Laws, p. 7. 
131 For a brief comment on which see Lyall, Of Presbyters and Kings (1980), p. 87. 
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This brings the discussion on to the next of the historical statutory legacies enjoyed by 
the Church of Scotland by virtue of its claim to be in continuity with the Church of 
Scotland as found standing within Scotland in 1560, 1592 and 1707. The 
ecclesiastical jurisdiction of the Church of Scotland has enjoyed statutory recognition 
since the passage of the Church Jurisdiction Act in 1567. The statutory provisions 
contained in the 1567 Act were repeated in the Church Jurisdiction Act 1579, and 
both Acts are still held to be in force. Both Acts stated that the pre-Union Scots 
Parliament had 
  
declared and granted jurisdiction to the kirk, which consists and stands in 
preaching of the true word of Jesus Christ, correction of manners and 
administration of holy sacraments, and declares that there is no other face of a 
kirk nor other face of religion than is presently, by the favour of God, 
established within this realm, and that there be no other jurisdiction 
ecclesiastical acknowledged within this realm other than that which is, and 
shall be within the same kirk, or that which flows therefrom....  
 
While these Acts have been taken as acknowledging the ecclesiastical jurisdiction of 
the courts of the Church of Scotland, neither Act defined the extent and scope of that 
jurisdiction, but rather appointed commissions to consider and report on “what other 
special points or clauses should pertain to the jurisdiction, privilege and authority of 
the said kirk.” Neither commission appears to have reached a determination in these 
matters and, as such, the full scope of the ecclesiastical jurisdiction of the courts of 
the Church of Scotland was not defined by statute. 
 
The General Assembly Act 1592 did not add significantly to the statutory definition 
of the jurisdiction of the courts of the Church of Scotland. Nevertheless, the 1592 Act 
clearly stated the system of courts to which the ecclesiastical jurisdiction pertained, 
namely General Assembly, Synod (Provincial Assembly), Presbytery and Kirk 
Session – an important development as the 1567 Act could not have referred to 
presbyteries, no such court existing within the Church of Scotland at that time. As to 
the ecclesiastical jurisdiction, the 1592 Act stated that Synods, or Provincial 
Assemblies, had the power to depose office bearers within the Church, and also 
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exercised the collective jurisdiction of the elders by which such Synods may happen 
to be constituted. Presbyteries were to ensure that kirks were kept in good order, were 
to correct the lives of “naughty and ungodly persons” and had the power of 
excommunication. The jurisdiction of the eldership of the Church was also defined, as 
consisting of ensuring that the word of God was purely preached, the sacraments 
rightly administered and discipline maintained. Kirk Sessions enjoyed “power and 
jurisdiction in their own congregations in matters ecclesiastical”, which may be taken 
to include the right to discipline the moral lives of parishioners. The jurisdiction of the 
Presbyterian Church of Scotland in respect of taking trial of ministers and removing 
them from office was confirmed by the Confession of Faith Act 1690.  
 
The Act of Security 1706 added significantly to the jurisdiction of Presbyteries, in 
that all “professors, principalls, regents, masters or others bearing office, in any 
university, colledge or school within this kingdom” were obliged as a condition of 
office to “practise and conform themselves to the worship presently in use in this 
church, and submit themselves to the government and discipline therof”. This in 
effect extended the disciplinary jurisdiction of church courts to all office holders in 
Scotland’s four ancient Universities, and also within all Scottish schools, although the 
latter could be argued to have been an aspect of Scots law since the School Teachers 
Act (1567). 
 
The ecclesiastical jurisdiction of the hierarchy of Presbyterian church courts by which 
the religious life of the Church of Scotland was governed concerned spiritual, rather 
than temporal, matters. Nevertheless, the disciplinary jurisdiction of these courts 
extended well beyond the religious beliefs and moral lives of ministers, university 
office bearers, and parochial schoolmasters, and included the moral lives of 
parishioners. Correcting morals and addressing public scandals gave the courts of the 
Church a clear ecclesiastical jurisdiction over what would now be called the personal 
or private lives of Scots of comparable scope to the criminal and civil jurisdictions of 
the Scottish legal system. In this, the understanding that the courts of the Church of 
Scotland were part of the Scottish legal system must have given the idea of the 
“Established Church of Scotland” a substantial resonance in the minds of Scots, 
subject as they were to the moral discipline of that Church’s courts. Yet it may 
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nevertheless be wondered to what extent the courts of the Church of Scotland were 
part of the Scottish legal system by virtue of having been established by the State. As 
the position of the courts of the Catholic Church in Scotland prior to the Reformation 
demonstrate, an independent system of spiritual courts established by a Church could 
gain full recognition within the Scottish legal system and become part of the Scottish 
legal system while being entirely independent of both sovereign and parliament. 
Within the Presbyterian context, the status of the courts of the Church of Scotland is 
tied up with the status of the Presbyterian system of church government in Scotland – 
was it established by the Church and recognised by and protected against 
encroachment by the State, or was it established by the State de novo in 1707? This 
report tends towards the former, rather than the latter view. 
 
The constitution of the Church of Scotland as per the Church of Scotland Act 1921 
also tends to support the conception that the State recognises the government and 
jurisdiction of the Church of Scotland, but has not established it. Thus in Article IV it 
is stated that: 
 
recognition by civil authority of the separate and independent government and 
jurisdiction of this Church in matters spiritual, in whatever manner such 
recognition be expressed, does not in any way effect the character of this 
government and jurisdiction as derived from the Divine Head of the Church 
alone... 
 
The jurisdiction of the Presbyterian courts of the Church of Scotland still consists of 
an ecclesiastical jurisdiction which concerns “all matters of doctrine, worship, 
government, and discipline in the Church” (Article IV). Yet, in claiming succession to 
the historical Church of Scotland, it is not clear that any significant historical 
privileges are enjoyed by the present-day courts of the Church of Scotland.  
 
The requirement for office holders in the four ancient Scottish Universities to submit 
themselves to the jurisdiction of the Church was abolished in 1853, while the 
jurisdiction of Presbyteries in respect of schools was abolished in 1872. Such reforms 
directly contravened provisions contained in the Act of Security 1706, and are 
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suggestive of a kind of disestablishment, or at the least a major derogation of the 
jurisdiction of the courts of the Church of Scotland. In addition, while the legislature 
acknowledges the disciplinary jurisdiction of the Church of Scotland, it does not 
define it, and as such it may be understood that the disciplinary jurisdiction of the 
Church of Scotland was and is dependent upon the laws and practice of the Church. 
At the present time, it certainly appears as though much of the historical disciplinary 
jurisdiction of the Church has fallen into desuetude, and is exercised only in the 
context of the trial by libel of ministers.  
 
Nevertheless, there are some lingering aspects of the statutory recognition of the 
courts of the Church of Scotland. As “courts of the land”, the records and registers 
produced by the courts of the Church of Scotland are held to be res extra 
commercium, that is to say they cannot be bought and sold, but remain perpetually 
public records in the ownership of the Church. This principle was last demonstrated in 
Presbytery of Edinburgh v University of Edinburgh  (1890, 28 S.L. Rep. 567)132 and 
insofar as the courts of the present-day Church of Scotland succeeded to those of the 
old “Established” Church of Scotland the same principle may be presumed to apply. 
In a similar manner the Church of Scotland’s courts may petition sheriff courts to 
have their summonses enforced by warrant, although the principle was last 
demonstrated in Presbytery of Lewis v. Fraser (1874, 1 R. 888).133 There can today be 
few, if any, circumstances in which a court of the Church of Scotland would have 
recourse to such measures, saving perhaps certain situations involving the trial of 
ministers by libel, although anecdotal evidence suggests that no such example has 
occurred in recent times. 
 
In practical terms it may be wondered to what extent the courts of the Church of 
Scotland differ from the courts or tribunals of voluntary associations, particularly of 
other Presbyterian churches in Scotland. In respect of the latent right of the courts of 
the Church of Scotland to have their summonses enforced by the civil courts, it does 
                                                             
132 The compilers of this report are grateful to a doctoral candidate at the University of Strathclyde, 
Jonathan Brown, LLB, LLM, for bringing this to their attention. 
133 Cf I.D. Macphail (ed.), Sheriff Court Practice (Edinburgh: Thomson/W. Green, 2006, Third edition 
ed. T. Welsh), 26.04; Weatherhead, Constitution and Laws, p. 44. 
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not appear to be a unique right compared to voluntary associations, in that it was 
stated obiter by Lord Ardmillan in The Reverend the Presbytery of Lews v The 
Reverend Roderick Fraser: 
 
that the aid of the civil Court to enforce the attendance of witnesses may be 
given, and ought to be given, when craved and required, even in causes within 
Churches not established—that is, within a voluntarily constituted jurisdiction. 
This is well illustrated by the case of arbitration. The interposition by the civil 
Court to compel a witness to attend and depone before an arbiter has been 
frequently exercised, and authoritatively recognised. On this point there are 
decisions from time to time between 1690 and 1860, and the practice has been 
accordingly.134  
 
In respect of the proceedings of a court or tribunal of a voluntary association, it is the 
case that Scottish civil courts  
 
will not interfere with the judgments of an ecclesiastical tribunal, unless the 
tribunal has acted clearly beyond its constitution and has affected the civil 
rights and patrimonial interests of a church member, or its proceedings have 
been grossly irregular or contrary to natural justice.135 
 
As such, Scottish civil courts are unwilling to interfere with the judgments of 
religious courts when those courts act in accordance with their own constitution and 
procedures, unless such courts act: (i) ultra vires, that is to say beyond the courts 
constituted powers; (ii) against natural justice, that is to say a person accused of some 
fault must be given fair notice of the charge made against them, together with an 
opportunity to offer a defence against the charge. In respect of ministers of religion, 
they usually subscribe to some sort of formula at the time of their ordination, to the 
effect that they accept the constitution and laws of the religious body in which they 
are to serve. This element of consent to religious constitutions and law, and the 
judicatories and “jurisdictions” to which they can give rise, can be extended to 
                                                             
134 (1874) 1R 888 at p. 894. 
135 Gloag and Henderson, The Law of Scotland, 13th edition, 47.04. 
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members of such religious bodies. This position has been summarised by the Lord 
Justice-Clerk, Lord Ross, in the Inner House decision Brentnall v Free Presbyterian 
Church of Scotland (1986 S.L.T. 471). 
 
In the Church of Scotland, ministers can be considered to voluntarily submit 
themselves to the jurisdiction of the Church’s courts in much the same way as occurs 
in some religious voluntary associations.136 Ministers of the Church of Scotland are 
questioned prior to ordination or admission to a charge. The fourth question runs:  
 
Do you acknowledge the Presbyterian Government of this Church to be 
agreeable to the Word of God; and do you promise to be subject in the Lord to 
this Presbytery and to the superior Courts of the Church, and to take your due 
part in the administration of its affairs? 
 
The minister then signs a formula, which states among other heads that “I 
acknowledge the Presbyterian government of this Church to be agreeable to the Word 
of God, and promise that I will submit thereto and concur therewith.” Elders in the 
Church of Scotland also sign the same formula, and while members do not subscribe 
to such formula, they are held to be subject to the law of the Church of Scotland by 
virtue of their having become members.137  
 
In this, it is difficult to argue that the courts of the Church of Scotland enjoy 
jurisdiction over its ministers, elders and members on anything other than a voluntary 
basis, which appears to make them indistinguishable from religious voluntary 
associations. For example,  
 
Scots law regards the judicatories of the Roman Catholic Church, like those of 
the other non-established churches, as having privative jurisdiction within the 
limits of their own constitution in questions affecting individual members. 
                                                             
136 Formula are certainly used in the Free Presbyterian Church of Scotland (as per Brentnall v Free 
Presbyterian Church of Scotland (1986, S.L.T., p. 471). 
137 Weatherhead, Constitution and Laws, 164-165, 10-11: cf James T. Cox’s Practice and Procedure in 
the Church of Scotland, ed. D.F.M. MacDonald (Edinburgh: The Committee of General Administration 
of The Church of Scotland, 1976), p. 574). 
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Members are treated as persons who have voluntarily undertaken to submit 
themselves to, and to abide by, the constitution of the Church. The civil courts 
will interfere with the judgments of Church courts and tribunals only where 
the court or tribunal has acted beyond its constitution; or where its 
proceedings have been grossly irregular or contrary to natural justice; or where 
the judgment affects the civil rights or patrimonial interests of the member .138  
 
Frank Cramner has stated that the courts of the Church of Scotland are unique in that 
their judgments are not subject to judicial review by the civil courts.139 This view, 
however, is nevertheless contradicted by the Stair Memorial Encyclopaedia which 
states that the courts of the Church of Scotland “are themselves open to judicial 
review by the civil courts if they exceed their jurisdiction”.140 This appears self-
evident, in that should the courts of the Church of Scotland act beyond their powers, 
or act contrary to natural justice, it would be reasonable for the civil courts to 
intervene. Such a scenario is, however, highly unlikely. On the one hand, the courts of 
the Church of Scotland employ highly developed procedures which accord with the 
dictates of natural justice. On the other hand, the Church appoints its own procurators, 
often from among the judges of the Court of Session, who consider ecclesiastical 
cases before they are brought before the courts of the Church of Scotland, thereby 
guarding against the Church’s courts taking cognisance of matters falling outwith 
their competence, and thus consequently beyond their powers. Hence, there appears to 
be little or no practical difference between the courts of the Church of Scotland 
exercising their jurisdiction in matters spiritual, and the courts or tribunals of religious 
voluntary associations governing their own internal religious affairs. As to non-
religious voluntary organisations, Gloag and Henderson, The Law of Scotland, 13th 
edition, 47.01 states that: 
 
The court does not take any concern with the actions or resolutions of 
associations except for the following matters: the court’s exercise of their 
                                                             
138 Stair Memorial Encyclopaedia, volume 3, para 1658. 
139 Frank Cramner, ‘Church State relations in the United Kingdom: a Westminster view’ in 
Ecclesiastical Law Journal (2001) 6(29), pp. 111-121, at p. 117. 
140 Stair Memorial Encyclopaedia, 3.2.1505. 
89 
 
supervisory jurisdiction to review any ultra vires decisions and the court’s 
right to provide a remedy for the loss of associations’ members’ patrimonial 
interests or civil rights (such as, for example, unwarranted loss of status or 
infringement of the requirements of natural justice). Unless these matters are 
involved, an action for determining questions between a member and the 
association will not be entertained. 
  
In this, it does not appear that there is substantial, if any, difference between religious 
voluntary organisations and any other type of voluntary organisation, in that all 
voluntary organisations may in effect create their own jurisdictions in respect of the 
admission and expulsion of members and office holders. Religious voluntary 
organisations may perhaps be said to be unusual in that the older religions – i.e. 
Judaism, Islam, Roman Catholicism, Anglicanism and Presbyterianism – often create 
their own formal legal systems by virtue of their constitutions, but this is presumably 
open to any voluntary organisation to do if it so wished. In general it may be observed 
that non-religious voluntary organisations, such as clubs and societies, tend to admit 
and remove members and office holders at their Annual General Meetings. 
 
The interaction between the spiritual and civil jurisdiction has been highlighted in a 
series of recent cases concerning the status of ministers and other clergy as office 
holders, employees or workers. This is a complex area of law not least because these 
are distinctions of status which can be very difficult to draw and to justify consistently 
in terms of general employment law, even without the added complications of a 
possibly separate spiritual jurisdiction. Traditionally, it has been accepted that 
members of the clergy are office holders rather than employees and, as a result, they 
are not governed by the normal rules of employment law.  
 
A series of recent cases have questioned this assumption that ministers and other 
holders of ecclesiastical office are not employees or workers. Depending on the facts 
and circumstances of each individual case, they may be workers and possibly 
employees and as such entitled to benefit from relevant employment law. These cases 
have also raised the issue of distinction between civil and spiritual jurisdiction. The 
issues are not limited to the Church of Scotland although the leading case in Scotland 
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did indeed concern a minister of the Church of Scotland.141 Other cases in other parts 
of the UK have highlighted, for example, the additional complications which may 
arise from internal organisation, structure and governance of different religious 
organisations.142 
 
What is evident from these decisions is that distinctions can be drawn, in respect of a 
minister, between issues which fall within the jurisdiction of the church, or other 
organisation, and issues which fall within the civil jurisdiction. In the Scottish case of  
Percy v Church of Scotland Board of National Mission, which concerned a claim by a 
minister of sex discrimination, Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead explained the distinction 
as follows: 
 
A sex discrimination claim would not be regarded as a spiritual matter even 
though it is based on the way the church authorities are alleged to have 
exercised their disciplinary jurisdiction. The reason why a sex discrimination 
claim would not be so regarded is that the foundation of the claim is a contract 
which, viewed objectively, the parties intended should create a legally-binding 
relationship. The rights and obligations created by such a contract are, of their 
nature, not spiritual matters. They are matters of a civil nature as envisaged by 
section 3. In respect of such matters the jurisdiction of the civil courts remains 
untouched. 
 
This is not to usurp the Church's exclusive jurisdiction in the exercise of its 
disciplinary powers … Rather it is to recognise … that by entering into a 
contract of employment binding under the civil law the parties have 
deliberately left the sphere of matters spiritual in which the church courts have 
jurisdiction and have put themselves within the jurisdiction of the civil court 
…143 
                                                             
141 Percy v Church of Scotland Board of National Mission [2005] UKHL 73. 
142 There is an excellent summary and overview of these cases published by the Churches’ Legislation 
Advisory Service, Case law on Churches, Religion and Employment, 2015: accessible at 
http://www.churcheslegislation.org.uk/files/publications/Employment_of_church_workers_June_2015.
pdf.  
143 Percy v Church of Scotland Board of National Mission [2005] UKHL 73, at paras 40-41. 
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In conclusion, the value of historical Scottish Acts concerning the ecclesiastical 
jurisdiction of the Church of Scotland may be questioned in view of the Church of 
Scotland Act 1921. The right of the Church of Scotland to govern its own religious 
affairs, to admit and remove members and to appoint and suspend office holders, 
cannot be said to be a privilege compared to the activities of voluntary associations, 
who are free to constitute their own courts should they so wish, and to deal with 
members and office holders within the confines of matters concerning internal 
government, so long as such dealings be in accordance with natural justice and do not 
conflict with other legislation (such as human rights or employment law) that may 
take precedence. 
 
2.6.6  The Church of Scotland and the four ancient Scottish Universities 
Relations between the “national” Church of Scotland and the four ancient Scottish 
Universities of St Andrews, Glasgow, Aberdeen, and Edinburgh represent a hybrid of 
the interests of the old “Established” Church and the “new” colleges of the Free 
Church and later United Free Church of Scotland. The Act of Security made provision 
for these four ancient universities to “continue within this Kingdom forever” and the 
influence of the Church of Scotland over these institutions was guaranteed by 
obliging office holders both to subscribe the Westminster Confession of Faith and to 
submit themselves to the jurisdiction of Presbyteries. To the general control of the 
religious and moral lives of those holding office within these universities may be 
added the fact that the ministry of the Church of Scotland received their academic 
training within these universities, which gave the Church of Scotland a special and 
particular interest in the chairs of divinity. Thus when the general requirement of the 
Act of Security in respect of office holders in the ancient universities was abolished 
by the Universities (Scotland) Act 1853, s.1, those offices relating to the training of 
the ministry were specifically exempted, “such office not being that of principal or a 
chair of theology”. Section 6 of the 1853 Act provided the following interpretation: 
“The words ‘chair of theology’ shall for the purposes of this Act mean the chairs of 
divinity, church history, or Biblical criticism, and Hebrew, in any of the said 
universities or colleges.” This position was confirmed by the Churches (Scotland) Act 
1905, section 5 – which gave the right of prescribing the formula of subscription to be 
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used in respect of such chairs to the General Assembly – with the added detail that the 
office of Principal of St Mary’s College, St Andrews, was specifically covered by the 
provision.  
 
For the part of the United Free Church, the colleges of New College, Edinburgh, 
Trinity College, Glasgow, and Christ’s College, Aberdeen were independently 
endowed theological colleges established in the first instance for the training of the 
ministry of the Free Church of Scotland. Following the union of the United Free 
Church of Scotland and the old “Established” Church of Scotland in 1929, these 
colleges were in effect absorbed into the Universities of Edinburgh, Glasgow and 
Aberdeen respectively.144 The transfer of the old endowed colleges of the Free Church 
to the ancient universities was the subject of specific agreements between the 
“United” or “national” Church of Scotland and those universities: although the 
specific details of these processes and agreements have not been researched in detail 
here, it is suffice to say that the universities were not averse to obtaining libraries, 
property and endowments in return for a commitment to continue to make provision 
for the training of candidates for the ministry of the “united” Church of Scotland.  
 
The on-going statutory provisions concerning subscription of the Westminster 
Confession of Faith in respect of the “chairs of theology” at the ancient universities 
were abolished by the Universities (Scotland) Act 1932. The 1932 Act also 
transferred the sovereign’s right of appointment to the “chairs of theology” in the 
ancient Scottish universities to the courts of each respective University. Nevertheless, 
section 2(1)(a) of the 1932 Act prescribed that University Courts would make 
appointments to “any theological chair founded prior to the passing of this Act” upon 
the recommendation of boards of nomination, which boards would be “composed of 
representatives elected in equal numbers by the University Court and by or under the 
authority of the General Assembly [of the Church of Scotland] or otherwise in such 
manner as may be agreed on by the University Court and the General Assembly”. In 
section 6 of the 1932 Act, anent Interpretation of the Act, “theological chair” is 
defined as “the chair of any professor who for the time being is included as a 
                                                             
144 R. D. Kernohan, Our Church: A Guide to the Church of Scotland (Edinburgh, St Andrews Press, 
1985), pp. 88-89. 
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professor in the faculty of theology or divinity in any of the Scottish Universities”. 
Francis Lyall notes that a modified agreement along the lines of this statute was 
reached between the courts of the Scottish Universities and the Church of Scotland in 
1950-1, and was “registered in the Books of Council of Session on 28 March 
1951”.145   
 
In this the present-day position of the Church of Scotland in respect of the 
Universities of St Andrews, Glasgow, Aberdeen and Edinburgh can be seen as a 
hybrid of, on the one hand, the legacy of the endowed theological colleges of the Free 
Church of Scotland, and, on the other hand, the pre-1932 “chairs of theology” once 
governed by the Act of Security 1706, the Universities (Scotland) Act 1853 and the 
Churches (Scotland) Act 1905, but now governed by the Universities (Scotland) Act 
1932 and by agreements reached between the Church of Scotland and the ancient 
universities. In this, the present-day Church of Scotland clearly enjoys various 
historical advantages in respect of the ancient universities, but it is arguable whether 
such ongoing advantages are a hallmark of establishment. Other denominations are 
free to enter into agreements with these universities, such as that currently enjoyed by 
the Roman Catholic Church and the University in Glasgow in respect of the training 
of teachers for employment in those denominational schools carried on in the interests 
of the Hierarchy of the Roman Catholic Church in Scotland.146 
 
2.6.7  The Church of Scotland and Scottish state-funded schools 
The place of the Church of Scotland in respect of Scottish non-denominational 
schools in contemporary Scotland is discussed at length in Chapter 4 of this Report. 
Nevertheless, it may be noted here that while there remains a statutory obligation for 
non-denominational schools to provide “religious observance”, this requirement is 
broadly construed by the Scottish government, so as to allow a range of approaches to 
this obligation to occur in practice and, as such, the position of the Church of Scotland 
is in effect linked to the maintenance of ongoing local customs in its favour, which 
customs may be continued or modified at the discretion of headteachers. In this, non-
denominational schools may have long-standing customary arrangements with local 
                                                             
145 Lyall, Of Presbyters and Kings (1980), pp. 122 & fn. 331. 
146 See Chapter 4 on Education. 
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parish ministers in respect of religious observance, and may appoint ministers as 
chaplains. But there are no statutory obligations placed upon non-denominational 
schools to appoint chaplains, nor to favour the ministry of the Church of Scotland in 
relation to religious observance. Nevertheless, Scotland’s 32 local education 
authorities, by which non-denominational schools are run, do appoint advisory 
education committees and the Church of Scotland enjoys direct statutory recognition 
in respect of these education committees, by virtue of the Local Government 
(Scotland) Act 1973, s.124, whereby one place on each such committee is expressly 
reserved for a representative of the Church of Scotland as nominated by the General 
Assembly. Other denominations also enjoy places on these education committees, 
most notably the Catholic Church, although only the Church of Scotland enjoys a 
prescribed place on all such committees.147  
 
This 1973 development appears at first to be an example of a new privilege or 
recognition extended to the Church of Scotland. However, the Local Government 
(Scotland) Act 1973 fundamentally re-organised local government in Scotland into 
new areas or regions, and also created the new education committees. In this, the 
position of the Church of Scotland in respect of non-denominational schools was 
granted exceptional and increased authority which had not held between 1929 and the 
1973 Act.148    
 
2.6.8  The Church of Scotland and Scottish Prisons 
Ministers or licentiates of the Church of Scotland are automatically appointed to all 
Scottish prisons. This provision is found at least as far back as the Prisons (Scotland) 
Act 1877, s.10, and is repeated in the Prisons (Scotland) Act 1952, s.3(2), and in the 
present Prisons (Scotland) Act 1989, s. 3 (2): “The Secretary of State shall appoint to 
each prison a chaplain being a minister or licentiate of the Church of Scotland”. 
Chaplains from other denominations may be appointed to Scottish prisons relative to 
                                                             
147 For which see the Local Government (Scotland) Act 1973, s. 124(4). The wording of section 124 
was altered by the Local Government etc. (Scotland) Act 1994 c. 39 Pt I c.6 s.31, although little if any 
practical differences were thereby occasioned. 
148 The influence of the Church of Scotland remained de facto in place following the Education 
(Scotland) Act 1872 through the election of its representatives to dominate most statutory school 
boards 1873-1919 and Ad Hoc Education Authorities 1919-29. From 1919 to 1973, the churches had 
only advisory functions to Education Committees of Local Authorities.  
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the religious beliefs of prisoners, and such chaplains may have access only to those 
prisoners who are of the same religion. 
 
The appointment of ministers or licentiates of the Church of Scotland to Scottish 
prisons mirrors similar arrangements in England and Wales, where priests of the 
Church of England are appointed to English prisons, and priests of the Church in 
Wales are appointed to Welsh prisons. In this there is a degree of ambiguity, in that 
while there can be no doubt that the Church of England is established, the Church in 
Wales was disestablished from 1914.149 In this, the situation in Scotland is not 
necessarily conclusive evidence that the Church of Scotland enjoys establishment 
status, although it is clearly an aspect of the official recognition of the pre-1920s 
“Established” Church of Scotland which continues to be enjoyed by the “United” or 
“national” Church of Scotland. 
 
2.6.9  The Church of Scotland and the Solemnisation of Regular Marriage 
The Church of Scotland enjoys unique recognition in the statutory regulations 
surrounding the contracting of regular marriage in Scotland. This unique status has 
been attributed to the “national church” status of the Church of Scotland by the 
Scottish Government as recently as 2014.150 The historical reasons for the place of the 
Church of Scotland in the Marriage (Scotland) Act 1977 are discussed at more length 
in the section of this report concerning religion and marriage in Scotland. That the 
Church of Scotland continues to enjoy unique recognition is clear but, compared to 
the era when the only way in which marriage could be regularly solemnised in 
Scotland was for banns to be proclaimed in the parish churches of the old 
“Established” Church of Scotland, even when the marriage ceremony was to be 
conducted by a minister or priest of another denomination, the present-day situation 
does not clearly suggest establishment. 
 
                                                             
149 Frank Cramner, ‘Paying the Piper? Public Funding and Supervision of Religion in a Secularized 
Society’ in Francis Messner (ed.) Public Funding of Religion in Europe (Farnham: Ashgate, 2015), 
171-198, at 191. 
150 “the Church of Scotland, reflecting its national church status, is authorised to solemnise opposite sex 
marriages through the Marriage (Scotland) Act 1977” (Marriage and Civil Partnership (Scotland) Act 
2014, The Qualifying Requirements: An Initial Paper, para 9, 
http://www.gov.scot/Topics/Justice/law/17867/samesex/qualifying-requirements-discussion-paper). 
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2.7  Conclusions 
The present-day statutory recognition of the Church of Scotland in respect of 
education committees, prisons and the solemnisation of marriage represents the 
continuation of customs and statutory provisions dating back at least to the nineteenth 
century. If a theory is required to explain such provisions, then it may be best to look 
no further than the constitution of the Church of Scotland as contained in the 1921 
Act. Article VI sets forth a conception of the relation between Church and State each 
acting in their appointed spheres:  
 
The Church and State owe mutual duties to each other, and acting in their 
respective spheres may signally promote each other’s welfare. The Church and 
State have the right to determine each for itself all questions concerning the 
extent and the continuance of their mutual relations in the discharge of these 
duties and obligations arising therefrom.  
 
While no part of the Articles Declaratory define the obligations of the State towards 
“the Church”, and while no such obligations, even generally conceived, are in any 
sense legally binding upon the State, the general construction of this Article is that it 
is really a matter for the Church of Scotland and the State to decide how they continue 
to regulate their ongoing relations. There appears to be no obvious legal impediment 
to the State ceasing to give particular recognition to the Church of Scotland and, 
indeed, it may be wondered why the current arrangements continue to be perpetuated 
in view of the declining influence of the Church of Scotland. On the one hand, the 
Church of Scotland understands its own predicament only too well, and the General 
Assembly has recently considered whether it is still appropriate for the Church of 
Scotland’s constitution to continue to maintain that it “a national church 
representative of the Christian Faith of the Scottish people”.151 On the other hand, it 
might reasonably be asked whether the somewhat miscellaneous collection of legal 
recognitions which the Church of Scotland presently enjoy really make any difference 
to its life and mission. The level of differentiation between the Church of Scotland 
                                                             
151 Fergusson, Church, State and Civil Society, 186; cf The Report of the Special Commission Anent the 
Third Article Declaratory of the Constitution of the Church of Scotland in Matters Spiritual, 2010 
(http://www.churchofscotland.org.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0014/3470/ga10_reports_specarticle.pdf). 
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and other denominations is often not great even in principle, and it could well be 
argued that the practical realities of how the Church of Scotland functions in law and 
society are no different to any other religious, or indeed belief, body in Scotland.   
Yet nevertheless, it remains the case that the “national” Church of Scotland continues 
to enjoy direct formal recognition by the British monarchy as the official Church in 
Scotland, and stands in a long line of organised Reformed Protestant religion in 
Scotland dating from the mid-sixteenth century - factors which are considered to give 
the Church of Scotland a degree of influence in Scotland. Those wishing to reform the 
place of Protestantism within the British constitution and the recognition of the 
Church of Scotland may find it to be a case of, on the one hand, pressing for the 
passage of a Statutory Revision Act which tackles various aspects of the Act of 
Security and, on the other, the more nebulous task of trying to disentangle formal 
relations between the monarchy and the Church of Scotland - an area of the 
constitution not obviously governed by written law. 
 
  
98 
 
 
Chapter 3  
Marriage in Scots Law 
 
Chapter 3 Marriage  
3.1 Introduction 
3.2 Religious to civil 
3.2.1 Jurisdiction in matrimonial disputes 
3.2.2 Law making  
3.2.3  Legal definitions of marriage  
3.3 Solemnisation of marriage: historical contexts and twentieth century 
developments 
3.3.1 Regular and irregular marriage 
3.3.2 The Marriage (Scotland) Act 1939: civil registration 
3.3.3 The Marriage (Scotland) Act 1977: religious or civil marriage 
3.4 Twenty-first century developments 
3.4.1 Religious or belief ceremonies 
3.4.2 Civil partnership ceremonies 
3.4.3 Same sex marriage 
3.4.4 Legal protections 
3.5 Ceremony and consent: a doubt? 
3.5.1 Form and substance 
3.5.2 “Husband and wife” or “marriage”? 
3.6 Conclusions 
 
3.1 Introduction 
From an historical perspective, the present day place of religion in Scots marriage law 
appears much diminished. Over the past century, there has been extensive reform and 
to a great extent the law relating to marriage is now set out in statute. In the recent 
reforms of marriage, particularly the extension of marriage to same sex couples,1 
                                                             
1 Marriage and Civil Partnership (Scotland) Act 2014. 
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there is a clear trend away from a religious to a secular relationship model. That is not 
to say, however, that religion is not still acknowledged within Scots marriage law 
both in respect of the regulations governing the solemnisation of valid regular 
marriage and, perhaps, in respect of the concept of matrimonial consent.  
 
There has been such extensive reform of marriage law during the twentieth and now 
into the twenty first century that it may seem unnecessary to look at historical 
development. Key insights, however, can be gained from looking to the past and 
tracing the path of reform. While pre-nineteenth century developments are dealt with 
in relative haste, more space is given to nineteenth-century developments, and yet 
more space to twentieth- and twenty-first-century developments. Most of these 
developments are fairly straightforward. One such development concerns the laws 
governing regular marriage as Scotland passed from a nation dominated by one 
religion, firstly Catholicism, then Reformed Protestantism, to a nation with a plurality 
of religious beliefs, and now more recently non-religious systems of belief. Another 
major development, the triumph of regular over irregular marriage, also presents a 
fairly straightforward topic. More complexity is encountered around the issue of 
consenting to marriage, and the Scots common law definition of what marriage is: 
here the main problem surrounds the relative lack of statutory definitions.  
 
This chapter will look at marriage from various perspectives. It begins by highlighting 
three aspects of marriage regulation in which the declining place of religion is 
relatively clear: jurisdiction in matrimonial disputes, law making in respect of 
marriage and legal meanings of marriage. During the twentieth century, the key focus 
of reform related to solemnisation of marriage and legal recognition, which is dealt 
with in the second section of this chapter. The Scots law of marriage is now 
principally concerned with the regulations governing the contracting of valid regular 
marriages, and some historical explanations as to how Scots law arrived at this 
position are variously offered. Finally, the chapter will conclude by focusing on the 
recent reforms of the twenty-first century. 
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3.2 Religious to civil 
3.2.1 Jurisdiction in matrimonial disputes 
Prior to the Scottish Reformation, the Catholic Church in Scotland, which was the 
established religion, enjoyed exclusive legal jurisdiction in all matters concerning the 
formation, regulation and dissolution of marriage, as well as all matters concerning 
legitimacy. This “spiritual” – as distinct from civil and criminal – jurisdiction of the 
Catholic Church, was enforced in Scotland through a system of Catholic church 
courts.2 These courts formed an independent part of the legal system in Scotland, and 
were subject to Scottish episcopal and papal authority and jurisdiction. Thus any Scot 
who wished to have their marriage acknowledged as valid; to have a valid marriage 
annulled; to have their deserting spouse compelled to adhere; to be legally separated 
from their spouse or to have the status of their children in respect of legitimacy 
declared, had to bring legal proceedings before a Catholic church court.3 Rights of 
appeal lay from courts of first instance to St Andrews or Glasgow, and from thence to 
Rome. Scottish civil and criminal courts were excluded from interfering with such 
matters, and indeed fully acknowledged the jurisdiction of the Catholic Church in 
matrimonial causes. 
 
At the time of the Reformation, the matrimonial jurisdiction passed to both the early 
courts of the Church of Scotland and the Court of Session. From the latter, 
matrimonial jurisdiction was in effect transferred to newly erected Commissary 
Courts from 1563/4, and the matrimonial jurisdiction of the Church of Scotland was 
suppressed.4 The jurisdiction of the Commissary Courts was variously regarded as 
royal, or civil, from the era of the Reformation to 1610, and again from 1638 to 1660. 
During the periods 1610 to 1638, and 1660 to 1689, the Commissary Courts were 
subject to the Scottish episcopate, and as such were seen as episcopal, or spiritual 
courts, somewhat akin to the ecclesiastical courts found south of the border. Yet with 
the Glorious Revolution and the final triumph of Presbyterianism over 
                                                             
2 For which see Simon Ollivant, The Court of the Official in Pre-Reformation Scotland (Edinburgh: 
The Stair Society, 1982). 
3 For the extant decisions of these church courts in matrimonial causes see Liber Officialis Sancti 
Andree, ed. Cosmo Innes (Edinburgh: Abbotsford Club, 1845). 
4 For a full account of which see Thomas Green, The Consistorial Decisions of the Commissaries of 
Edinburgh, 1564 to 1576/7 (Edinburgh: The Stair Society, 2014). 
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Episcopalianism within the Church of Scotland, the matrimonial jurisdiction of the 
Commissary Courts became fixedly civil. The Commissary courts were deconstructed 
during the early to mid-nineteenth century, and their jurisdictions passed to sheriff 
courts and the Court of Session.5 This remains the situation today and, as such, 
litigation concerning marriage is held by Scots law to be an exclusively civil matter, 
with no place given to religious jurisdictions in respect of marriage.  
 
There is nevertheless some acknowledgement given to the fact that a married couple 
may be seeking a divorce before a Scottish civil court and a religious court at the 
same time, insofar as the Family Law (Scotland) Act 2006, section 15, inserted a new 
section (section 3A) into the Divorce (Scotland) Act 1976, by which Scottish civil 
courts were authorised to assist divorce proceedings before them upon application, in 
cases where a party to such a case was capable of removing a religious impediment to 
remarriage on the part of the applicant. That is to say, for example, should a Jewish 
man be pursuing his wife before a Scottish civil court for divorce under Scots law, but 
will not present his wife with a bill of divorce in accordance with Jewish law, the 
Scottish civil court may postpone decree of divorce until such time as the husband 
presents his wife with a religious bill of divorce.  
 
3.2.2 Law making  
Prior to the Reformation the Canon law of marriage of the Catholic Church was the 
marriage law of Scotland, in respect of the formation, regulation and dissolution of 
marriage, and in respect of legitimacy. The majority of the marriage law was therefore 
directly legislated by virtue of papal legislative competence, usually manifested 
through final judgments, or decreetals, of the bishops of Rome in matrimonial causes. 
Papal jurisdiction was rejected in Scots law by the Papal Jurisdiction Act 1560, as 
ratified in 1567, which Act still remains part of the statute law of Scotland. In this, 
Catholicism is unique in that it is the only religion in Scotland whose jurisdiction is 
expressly prohibited by statute from every being formally recognised in Scots law, in 
the way in which the jurisdiction of the Church of Scotland is still recognised. 
 
                                                             
5 For a brief account of which see Guide to the National Archives of Scotland (Edinburgh: The 
Stationary Office & The Stair Society, 1996), p. 154. 
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Following the Reformation, while much marriage law in Scotland remained the pre-
Tridentine Canon law of the medieval church by virtue of the case law of the 
Commissary Courts, the Scottish Parliament assumed legislative competence in 
respect of marriage law in Scotland for the first time. Initially, Parliament limited 
itself to incorporating what early Scottish Protestants held to be the “law of God” 
directly into Scottish marriage law (for which see the Marriage Act 1567). While this 
statutory acknowledgment of the “law of God” in Scots marriage law no longer 
applies, it may be noted that the Incest Act of 1567, which incorporated the 18th 
chapter of the book of Leviticus into Scots criminal law, remained in force in 
Scotland until 1986,6 and has been interpreted and enforced by the High Court of 
Justiciary as recently as 2008.7  
 
It may be argued that the Scottish Parliament first assumed full direct legislative 
competence in respect of Scottish marriage law while enacting the Divorce for 
Malicious Desertion Act 1573. While the statute was couched in religious language of 
a general nature, no attempt was made simply to acknowledge the “law of God” as 
being the law of Scotland, but rather Parliament in effect prescribed the law.8 Yet 
despite the development of the competence of Parliament in respect of Scots marriage 
law during the era of the Reformation, much of the marriage law of Scotland 
continued to be based upon case law, which case law retained many aspects of the 
pre-Reformation Canon law of marriage. In this, Scottish marriage law was an 
admixture of Canon law, the “law of God” and some Scottish statute law for much of 
the modern age in Scotland, and as such both medieval theological ideas about 
marriage (although formally rejected) as well as Protestant understandings of 
marriage based on scripture, found direct expression in the law of marriage in 
Scotland from the Reformation until the twentieth-century.9 Nevertheless, with the 
                                                             
6 The Incest Act 1567 was repealed by the Incest and Related Offences (Scotland) Act 1986, which was 
itself repealed by the Criminal Justice and Licensing (Scotland) Act 2010 asp13. Nevertheless, between 
1986 and 2010, the Criminal Law (Consolidation) (Scotland) Act 1995, section 1, defined incest in 
terms of a table of incestuous relations, and is still in force today. 
7 For which see HM Advocate v. L (2008), 2009 S.L.T. 127, 2009 S.C.L. 311. The case involved the 
Incest Act 1567 because the incest in the case had occurred prior to 1986. 
8 See Green, Court of the Commissaries of Edinburgh (2010), 143 ff; Green, Consistorial Decisions 
(2014), xlv, lxii ff. 
9 For a recent discussion of which see Thomas Green, ‘The Sources of early Scots Consistorial Law: 
Reflections on Law, Authority and Jurisdiction during the Scottish Reformation’ in A. Mark Godfrey 
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expansion of the legislative activity of the British Parliament during the nineteenth 
and twentieth centuries,10 marriage law in Scotland was systematically purged of its 
Canon law and Scottish Protestant elements and today it would be difficult to argue 
that any vestiges of either Catholic or Protestant theology and belief still find direct 
correlation in Scots law in respect of matters like the duties and obligations of 
conjugal relations – such as the historical requirement of adherence – or in the area of 
the cases involving sham marriages indicating that participation in a valid marriage 
ceremony is not sufficient in and of itself to form a valid marriage, but rather the 
exchange of matrimonial consent, or consent to enter into marriage, is required.11 This 
raises the problem for Scots law of what is understood by “matrimonial consent” as it 
is not a concept which has been considered in recent times but rather falls back on 
definitions of marriage drawn from the Scottish institutional writers, or later 
authorities such as Lord Fraser. Their definitions were clearly influenced by 
historical, and therefore in part religious, definitions of husband and wife. 
 
The authority and eventual dominance of statute law in respect of Scots marriage law 
raises the question of the degree of influence of religious bodies, particularly the 
Church of Scotland, upon the legislature. In the post-Reformation period, the Church 
of Scotland often held its General Assemblies immediately prior to the assembly of 
the three estates in parliament so as to exert maximum influence over that legislature. 
Legislation such as the Marriage Act 1567 was a direct result of Protestant influence 
over the pre-Union Scots Parliament. Such indirect influence over Scots marriage law 
proved to be an enduring feature of the Protestant ascendancy in Scotland: eighteenth- 
and nineteenth-century attempts to abolish irregular marriage in Scots law floundered 
at least in part due to the opposition of the Church of Scotland to such reforms.12 In 
more recent times, however, it has been argued that: 
                                                                                                                                                                              
(ed.), Law and Authority in British Legal History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016), 
[chapter 6]. 
10 In respect of Scots marriage law “The process of statutory reform, begun in the nineteenth century, 
has been carried on and extended by the Scottish Law Commission and now the Scottish Executive to 
the extent that the law relating to marriage is almost entirely contained within legislation.” (Jane Mair, 
‘A Modern Marriage?’ in Edinburgh Law Review, 10(3), pp. 333-351, at p. 333). 
11 Discussed further below at 3.5. 
12 Brian Dempsey, ‘Making the Gretna Blacksmith Redundant: Who Worried, Who Spoke, Who was 
Heard on the Abolition of Irregular Marriage in Scotland’ in The Journal of Legal History (2009) 30.1 
pp. 23-52, 28-29. 
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the views of the Kirk, in Assembly or otherwise, carry no more greater weight 
than any other minority pressure group, and perhaps much less. The Kirk is 
known to be weaker than its formal statistics of membership might suggest, 
and its internal organisation is not such as to permit it to reflect broad opinion 
within Scotland any more.13  
 
The general decline of the Church of Scotland over the Scottish legislature post 
devolution would appear to be confirmed in respect of recent reforms in Scottish 
marriage law: the introduction of marriage between persons of the same sex was 
opposed by the Church of Scotland – as well for that matter as numerous other 
religious bodies in Scotland – but such opposition proved insufficient for the purposes 
of preventing such reform. Rather, the opposition of religious bodies to such reform 
had the limited effect of introducing a number of procedural complications and 
“safeguards” into Scots law in respect of the solemnisation of marriages between 
persons of the same sex in religious and belief ceremonies. Yet on the other hand, it 
might be argued that the influence of religious groups is not entirely absent from the 
political progress: the original proposals concerning the reduction of the periods of 
non-cohabitation for divorce to six months with consent and one year without consent 
contained in the Family Law (Scotland) Bill introduced at Holyrood in 2005, were 
subsequently amended to one year without consent and two years with consent 
following strong opposition from various religious groups and individuals.14   
 
3.2.3  Legal definitions of marriage  
In respect of the definition of marriage in Scots law, it would be difficult to argue that 
religion continues to influence how marriage is understood in law. That is to say, it is 
difficult to see how religious beliefs and doctrines still influence the Scots law 
definition of marriage as an objective concept, and the consequences of such a 
concept in terms of who may contract marriage, how marriages may be ended through 
                                                             
13 Francis Lyall, Of Presbyters and Kings: Church and State in the Law of Scotland (Aberdeen: 
Aberdeen University Press, 1980), p. 115. 
14 For detailed analysis of these issues see E Gillan, Influencing Family Policy in Post-Devolution 
Scotland, unpublished PhD thesis, University of Edinburgh (2008), available at 
https://www.era.lib.ed.ac.uk/handle/1842/2584; J Mair, “Belief in Marriage” (2014) 5 International 
Journal of the Jurisprudence of the Family 63. 
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divorce, and so forth. For example, during the Catholic ascendancy in Scotland, the 
law forbade divorce and remarriage as would now be understood, on the ground that 
marriage was a sacrament of the Church, and thus subject to theological 
considerations which dictated that a validly contracted marriage could only be 
terminated by death.15 Even when divorce and remarriage, as might be understood 
today, was introduced into Scots law during the Reformation, the only grounds of 
divorce were adultery and malicious desertion, and both these grounds were fault-
based grounds.16 The basic doctrine that divorce could only proceed on the basis of 
the fault of one of the contracting parties to a marriage was finally removed from 
Scots law by the Divorce (Scotland) Act 1976, which made irretrievable breakdown 
of marriage the sole ground for divorce.17 Other features of historical Scottish 
marriage law which could be argued to have been founded on religious 
considerations, such as the principles of adherence and legitimacy, have also been 
removed.18 In this, it might be argued that Scots law long compelled married couples 
to cohabit, because it held married couples to their marriage promises and held it to be 
in the public interest to avoid scandal by compelling husband and wife to cohabit, 
unless there were grounds for separation, such as cruelty, or for divorce. Likewise the 
principle of the legitimacy of issue could also be argued to have had strong religious 
                                                             
15 For the pre-Reformation law of marriage in Scotland see generally William Hay’s Lectures on 
Marriage, trans. & ed. John C. Barry (Edinburgh, The Stair Society, 1967). 
16 Divorce on the ground of adultery was introduced into Scots law by the courts of the Church of 
Scotland during the period 1559 to 1563 (Green, Court of the Commissaries of Edinburgh (2010), 114 
ff). Divorce for malicious desertion was introduced into Scots law by the Divorce for Malicious 
Desertion Act 1573 (RPS, A1573/4/2). These two faults remained the only grounds for divorce in 
Scotland until the Divorce (Scotland) Act 1938, which added the grounds of cruelty, incurable insanity, 
sodomy and bestiality. 
17 Divorce (Scotland) Act 1976, section 1. Adultery ceased to be a fault, and became a means, along 
with unreasonable behaviour and non-cohabitation, by which irretrievable breakdown of marriage 
could be established.  
18 Actions for adherence were finally abolished by the Law Reform (Husband and Wife) (Scotland) Act 
1984, section 2 (1): “No spouse shall be entitled to apply for a decree from any court in Scotland 
ordaining the other spouse to adhere”. All children were declared to be legitimate in Scots law 
regardless of the circumstances of their birth by the Law Reform (Parent and Child) (Scotland) Act 
1986, section 1: “The fact that a person's parents are not or have not been married to one another shall 
be left out of account in establishing the legal relationship between the person and any other person; 
and accordingly any such relationship shall have effect as if the parents were or had been married to 
one another.” This subsection has been amended by the Family Law (Scotland) Act 2006, s. 21 so as to 
now read: “No person whose status is governed by Scots law shall be illegitimate; and accordingly the 
fact that a person's parents are not or have not been married to each other shall be left out of account in 
- (a) determining the person's legal status; or (b) establishing the legal relationship between the person 
and any other person.”  
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underpinnings, in that all extra-marital sexual intercourse was deprecated as immoral 
and sinful, from which it followed that the issue of such relations should not enjoy all 
the benefits of issue born within marriage. It may also be noted that the traditional law 
of property in respect of marriage has been thoroughly reformed, so that marriage 
now has few automatic consequences for the property rights of husbands and wives.19  
 
In all these respects it is difficult to see any correlation between Catholic or Scottish 
Protestant belief and doctrine and current Scots marriage law, which indicates that the 
Scots common law of marriage has been systematically reformed during the course of 
the twentieth century by statute so as to remove all vestiges of such correlations. 
Within this context, it could be argued that Scots law’s long insistence that same-sex 
couples were impeded from contracting marriage was the final vestige of both 
historical Catholic and Scottish Protestant influence over Scots law, and that this too 
has now been reformed. 
 
3.3 Solemnisation of marriage: historical contexts and twentieth and twenty-first 
century developments 
 
The Scots law of marriage is now principally concerned with the processes by which 
marriage may be validly contracted in Scotland.20 In this, Scots law is intimately 
involved in regulating the formation of valid regular marriages. But what marriage 
actually means in terms of the behaviour of married couples is not now closely 
defined in Scots law and, as such, what marriage actually entails in terms of conjugal 
behaviour now appears to be an increasingly private matter, left almost entirely at the 
discretion of married couples themselves. In this respect Scots law no longer regulates 
matters such as the cohabitation of a couple, their sexual relations,21 and the pooling 
                                                             
19 The principle that marriage in itself has no effect on the property or legal capacity of spouses is set 
out in s. 24 of the Family Law (Scotland) Act 1985. For the reform of the historical Scots law position 
of communal property between husband and wife with the right of administration vested in the 
husband, see Jane Mair, ‘A Modern Marriage?’ in Edinburgh Law Review, 10(3), pp. 333-351, 335 ff. 
20 “Contemporary family legislation principally regulates the process of formation and then retreats 
until the point when marriage comes to an end, through death or divorce” (Jane Mair, ‘A Modern 
Marriage?’ in Edinburgh Law Review, 10(3), pp. 333-351, at p. 333). 
21 Sexual relations were not closely regulated in Scots law, although Lord Fraser held the essence of 
desertion to be ‘wilful abstinence’ (Fraser, Treatise on Husband and Wife (1876-8), ii, 1209).  
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of resources and assets. Only at the point at which a marriage is determined to have 
irretrievably broken down do questions of property come clearly into view, and here 
there is now a degree of congruence in the way Scots law treats both married couples 
and cohabiting couples who have lived “as if they were husband and wife”,22 although 
the rights of cohabiting couples remain a very limited version of the rights granted to 
spouses and civil partners. 
 
3.3.1 Regular and irregular marriage 
From an historical perspective, the present-day emphasis in Scots law on the regular 
formation of marriage appears almost a novelty. Solemnisation of regular marriage 
has of course been a feature of marriage law in Scotland since the medieval period, 
but it is only since 2006 that regularly solemnising a marriage has been the only way 
to contract marriage in Scotland. From 1215, the Canon law, in conformity with 
canon 51 of the Fourth Lateran Council of the Catholic Church, prescribed that all 
marriages throughout western Christendom ought to be contracted regularly, and 
entered into with due solemnity in facie ecclesiae, or as the Scots had it, in the face of 
holy kirk. What this meant in practice is that from 1215, Scots intending to marry 
were to give in their names to the priest, or priests, of the parish, or parishes, in which 
the parties were domiciled, so that the couple’s banns might be proclaimed on three 
separate Sundays, at a time when the parishioners of the parish or parishes in question 
might have prior intimation of a couple’s intention to marry. The due proclamation of 
banns was the essential feature of the contracting of a regular marriage, following 
which a couple exchanged promises of marriage in the present tense (sponsalia per 
verba de praesenti) in the “face of the church” with due solemnity. Regular 
solemnisation of marriage ordinarily took the form of an exchange of promises before 
a priest in the presence of at least some of the parishioners from the parish or parishes 
in which a couple was domiciled. The precise location of such solemnisation of 
regular marriage was not prescribed, and while there is much evidence of such 
ceremonies taking place within churches, it was a common custom among the Scots 
to marry at the door of their local parish church. In general, the pattern of regular 
marriage introduced into Scotland from 1215 still resonates with the current Scots law 
                                                             
22 Family Law (Scotland) Act, 2006, s. 25(1)(a). 
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procedures for contracting regular marriage. Although the proclamation of banns was 
discontinued in Scots law by the Marriage (Scotland) Act 1977, section 3(1) - which 
prescribed that all couples intending to marry in Scotland submit a notice of intention 
to marry to a district registrar - the basic function of both the proclamation of banns 
and the submission of a notice of intention to marry is the same, namely to take all 
reasonable steps to determine whether or not some impediment to an intended 
marriage exists before it is contracted. 
 
The role of the priest as celebrant of regular marriages during the Catholic ascendancy 
continued after the Reformation, with the role of celebrant in regular marriages falling 
to the ministry of the Church of Scotland. Between the Reformation and 1834, regular 
marriage could only be contracted in the Church of Scotland. Bearing in mind that 
civil marriage was only introduced into Scotland by the Marriage (Scotland) Act 
1939,23 it might be wondered how couples not belonging to the established Church 
married between 1560 and 1834.  
 
The answer is relatively straightforward in that, despite the insistence of the Fourth 
Lateran Council that couples marry regularly, Canon law continued to acknowledge 
two other ways in which marriage might be contracted. These forms of marriage were 
designated irregular marriages, and could be formed in two ways. The first was by 
declaration per verba de praesenti. The exchange of promises of marriage in the 
present tense between a couple (i.e. “I take you to be my wife” etc) resulted in the 
contracting of marriage, wheresoever such promises were exchanged. There was no 
need for any religious element whatsoever, and indeed no need for witnesses to be 
present. The second form of irregular marriage was marriage by engagement with 
subsequent sexual intercourse (sponsalia per verba de futuro cum copula 
subsequente). In this, the promises of future marriage, exchanged by a couple at the 
time of their engagement (i.e. “I will take you to be my wife” etc), were deemed to 
have become words of the present tense at the moment an engaged couple had sexual 
intercourse. Again, engagements did not need to have any religious content, and did 
not need to be entered into before witnesses, although witnesses were of course 
                                                             
23 This 1939 Act is not presently available at www.legislation.gov.uk. 
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preferable. Both of these forms of irregular marriage were abolished by the Council of 
Trent in 1563 but, since the Scottish Reformation began in 1559, the reforms of Trent 
were never introduced into Scotland via the Canon law. Rather, Scots marriage law 
retained the “pre-Tridentine” Canon law irregular marriages until abolished by the 
Marriage (Scotland) Act 1939. Not only did Scots law long retain Canon law irregular 
marriages but, at some point prior to the early nineteenth century, Scots law also 
developed a further native category of irregular marriage, namely marriage by 
cohabitation with habit and repute, which is discussed presently in more detail.  
 
So, despite the exclusive privilege of the Church of Scotland between the 
Reformation and 1834 as the only body entitled to solemnise regular marriages, all 
other types of marriage services held outside the established Church nevertheless gave 
rise to technically legally valid, albeit irregular, marriages. Although legally valid, 
such religious marriage services held outwith the established Church were subject to 
severe penalties, particularly for Roman Catholics, by virtue of the Act Against 
Clandestine and Unlawful Marriages 1661 and the Act Against Clandestine and 
Irregular Marriages 1698. This is because in both pre-Tridentine Canon law and in 
post-Reformation Scots law, the exchange of consent between the couple contracting 
marriage was the essential element in the formation of a valid marriage, whether 
regular or irregular. The anomaly of limiting the contracting of regular marriages to 
the Church of Scotland was remedied by the Marriage (Scotland) Act 1834 (4 & 5 W. 
4, c. 28),24 the long title of which was “An Act to amend the Laws relative to 
Marriages celebrated by Roman Catholic Priests and Ministers not of the Established 
Church in Scotland”, section 2 reading: 
 
It shall be lawful to all persons in Scotland, after due proclamation of banns 
there, to be married by priests or ministers not of the Established Church, and 
also for such priests or ministers to celebrate marriages, without being subject to 
any punishment, pains, or penalty whatever; any thing in the said recited Acts,25 
or in any other Acts or Parliament, to the contrary notwithstanding. 
                                                             
24 This 1834 Act is not presently available online. 
25 Namely the Act Against Clandestine and Unlawful Marriages 1661 (RPS, 1661/1/302), which 
prescribed that “no marriage be celebrated but according to the laudable order and constitution of this 
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Yet despite the introduction of tolerance for the priests and ministers of non-
established churches in Scotland in 1834, so that the same might solemnise marriage 
without fear of any form of punishment, it still remained the case that regularity 
required the prior proclamation of banns. The anomaly here is that even after the 1834 
Act, banns could only be proclaimed in the Church of Scotland, and not in any other 
church. Given that there was no civil procedure in Scotland by which the legal effect 
of the proclamation of banns might be replicated until the Marriage Notice (Scotland) 
Act 1878,26 between 1834 and 1878 any couple wishing to marry regularly outwith 
the Church of Scotland still had to have their banns proclaimed in the Church of 
Scotland.27  
 
The 1878 Act introduced a civil procedure of marriage notices into Scots law for the 
first time. The procedure was simple and inexpensive, and consisted of a couple 
wishing to marry submitting a notice of intention to marry to the registrar of the 
parish or district in which they lived (or two such notices to two respective registrars 
if resident in difference parishes or districts) together with the sum of 1s-6d. The 
registrar then entered the particulars contained in the notice in a marriage notice book 
kept for that purpose, and publicly displayed a corresponding notice of the intended 
marriage.28 If no objections to the intended marriage were submitted during the 
subsequent seven days, the registrar was to issue a “registrar’s certificate” in respect 
of the intended marriage upon the payment of a fee of 1s.29 Such certificates were to 
be “of the same force and effect as a certificate granted by a session clerk...of the due 
                                                                                                                                                                              
kirk, and by such persons as are by the authority of this kirk warranted to celebrate the same”, with 
heavy pecuniary pains attached to all those who presumed to contract marriage in ceremonies 
conducted by celebrants not of the Church of Scotland, and with the penalty of perpetual banishment 
attached to such celebrants, and the Act Against Clandestine and Irregular Marriages 1698 (RPS, 
1698/7/114), of similar tenor.  
26 This 1878 Act is not presently available online. 
27 As noted in the Report of the Departmental Committee Appointed to Enquire into the Law of 
Scotland Relating to the Constitution of Marriage (London: HMSO, 1937), p. 6, section (4) in which 
the Morison Committee recommended that the law be altered so as to permit the proclamations of 
banns outwith the Church of Scotland, a recommendation not adopted by the legislature. 
28 Marriage Notice (Scotland) Act 1878, sections 7 and 8. 
29 Marriage Notice (Scotland) Act 1878, section 9. 
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proclamation of banns of marriage”.30 Section 11 of the Act declared that “a 
certificate from a session clerk of the due publication of banns, and a registrar’s 
certificate granted under this act, shall be of equal authority in authorising a minister, 
clergyman, or priest in Scotland to celebrate a regular marriage, and such marriages 
may be celebrated upon the production either or a certificate...of due proclamation of 
banns, or of a registrar’s certificate” provided that “no minister of the Church of 
Scotland shall be obliged to celebrate a marriage not proceeded by due proclamation 
of banns”. Nevertheless, regular marriages could still only be contracted in a religious 
ceremony until 1940. This meant that any couple who wished to marry in Scotland 
outwith the context of a religious ceremony had to contract an irregular marriage.  
 
The 1878 Act was a best attempt at encouraging regular marriage in Scotland, within 
the context of various previous failed attempts to abolish irregular marriage in 
Scotland. At the time of the abolition of irregular marriage in England by the 
Marriage Act 1753 (Lord Hardwicke’s Act), there was some move to abolish such 
marriages north of the border, although the Marriage (Scotland) Bill of 1755 to that 
effect made no progress at Westminster. There were further attempts to abolish 
irregular marriage in Scotland during the 1840s through the introduction of various 
Bills, all of which failed, there being strong opposition from the Church of Scotland. 
In 1868 a Royal Commission on the laws and registration of marriage in the United 
Kingdom “recommended the abolition of irregular marriage in Scotland and the 
introduction of marriage by civil registrars” but this too failed to gain traction.31 In 
view of the apparent impasse in attempts to abolish irregular marriages in Scotland, 
the legislature adopted the alternative strategy by which couples might be encouraged 
to contract marriage regularly in Scotland via the Marriage Notice (Scotland) Act 
1878, as already discussed. Indeed, the full title of the 1878 Act was “An Act to 
Encourage Regular Marriages in Scotland”. 
 
                                                             
30 Marriage Notice (Scotland) Act 1878, section 6.  
31 See Brian Dempsey, ‘Making the Gretna Blacksmith Redundant: Who Worried, Who Spoke, Who 
was Heard on the Abolition of Irregular Marriage in Scotland’ in The Journal of Legal History (2009) 
30.1 pp. 23-52, from p. 27. 
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While the two forms of irregular marriage retained in post-Reformation Scotland from 
medieval Canon law were abolished by the Marriage (Scotland) Act 1939, as has been 
briefly noted above Scots law had developed its own unique form of irregular 
marriage at some point between the Reformation and the early nineteenth century.32 
This was known as marriage by cohabitation with habit and repute (i.e. of marriage) 
and was abolished by the Family Law (Scotland) Act 2006, section 3. Nevertheless, it 
is still possible for all three types of irregular marriage to be of some bearing on cases 
involving historical irregular marriages, although instances of the two Canon law 
types are now rare.33 The long survival of irregular forms of marriage in Scots law 
directly suggests that Scots law has always regarded marriage as an objective concept 
which is ultimately independent of the ceremonies surrounding the contracting of 
regular marriages. 
 
The 1937 Report of the Departmental Committee Appointed to Enquire into the Law 
of Scotland Relating to the Constitution of Marriage (“The Morison Report”) 
recommended that the native Scots irregular marriage of marriage by cohabitation 
with habit and repute ought to be abolished along with marriage by declaration and 
marriage by engagement with subsequent copulation,34 but in the event only the last 
two were abolished by the Marriage (Scotland) Act 1939. But the main point in hand 
arising from the 1939 Act in respect of understanding the current day Scots law of the 
contracting of marriage is the fact that the abolition of the two principal forms of 
irregular marriage in Scotland brought with it the problem of how couples not 
belonging to either the Church of Scotland or any of the other religious bodies which 
had been recognised from 1834 onwards as being able to celebrate regular marriages, 
might marry regularly. The solution contained in the 1939 Act was to introduce into 
Scots law for the first time a civil procedure by which Scots could marry regularly. 
                                                             
32 The development of this aspect of Scots consistorial law is still not known in detail: certainly it was 
not known during the era of the Reformation, but was certainly the law of Scotland by the early 
nineteenth century (Green, Consistorial Decisions (2014), pp. xlix-l). 
33 Provision is still made for these marriages, if contracted before 1940, in the Marriage (Scotland) Act 
1977, s.21. 
34 Report of the Departmental Committee Appointed to Enquire into the Law of Scotland Relating to 
the Constitution of Marriage (London: HMSO, 1937), p. 16, recommendation IV. It is possible that the 
recommendation to abolish ‘marriage by habit and repute’ was not accepted because the Report had not 
clearly distinguished marriage by cohabitation with habit and repute from the legal presumption in 
favour of an irregular marriage by habit and repute (i.e. see p. 12, section 5(d)). 
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3.3.2 The Marriage (Scotland) Act 1939: civil registration 
The 1939 Act35 came into force on 1 July 1940, at which point regular marriages 
could be either contracted as per the law hitherto in force, that is to say in a ceremony 
conducted by the Church of Scotland or in a ceremony conducted by another 
recognised religious body, or in a new form of civil registration conducted by a 
registrar appointed by the Registrar General for Scotland. Yet a noteworthy feature of 
1939 Act is that it nowhere used the term “civil marriage”. This is particularly 
striking, as the Morison Report had used the phrase “new form of regular civil 
marriage”36, while section (8) of the Report - “Provisions for a New Civil Marriage” – 
recommended “the institution of a civil form of marriage which should have, before 
the law, an equal status with regular marriages as at present constituted”. 37 
 
The key points of the Marriage (Scotland) Act 1939 were:  
 
Section 1(1): “Any two persons who desire to be married to each other in 
Scotland, may contract a marriage in the office of an authorised registrar in 
accordance with the following provisions: 
(i) on production to an authorised registrar of valid certificates of due 
publication under the Marriage Notice (Scotland) Act 1878, of notice of the 
intended marriage, or of a valid certificate of such publication, applicable to 
both parties, the registrar shall supply a copy of the First Schedule to this Act 
[in effect a marriage certificate], and shall, so far as possible, fill up the same 
according to the information supplied by the parties to the best of their 
knowledge and belief; 
(ii) the persons shall thereafter, in the presence of the registrar and of two 
persons of the age of sixteen years and upwards as witnesses, declare that they 
know of no legal impediment to their marriage, and that they accept each other 
as husband and wife: 
                                                             
35 As already noted above, this 1939 Act is not presently available online. 
36 Report of the Departmental Committee Appointed to Enquire into the Law of Scotland Relating to 
the Constitution of Marriage (London: HMSO, 1937), p. 13, section (6). 
37 Report of the Departmental Committee Appointed to Enquire into the Law of Scotland Relating to 
the Constitution of Marriage (London: HMSO, 1937), p. 14, section (8). 
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(iii) the registrar shall then complete the filling up of the copy of the aforesaid 
Schedule and it shall be signed by the parties, the registrar and the witnesses.” 
 
Section 1(4): “Any marriage contracted in accordance with the foregoing 
provisions of this section shall, unless there be a legal impediment thereto, be a 
valid and regular marriage in all respects” 
 
Section 5: “No irregular marriage by declaration de presenti [sic] or by promise 
subsequente copula contracted after the commencement of this Act shall be 
valid.”  
 
In this, it appears that the 1939 Act did not seek to create the new category of “civil” 
as opposed to “religious” marriage, but rather was still concerned with the principal 
distinction made in marriage law in Scotland from 1215 to the Second World War, 
namely the distinction between “regular” and “irregular” marriage. Rather, the 
civil/religious distinction appears to have been between religious ceremonies and civil 
ceremonies, both of which were lawful contexts for the solemnisation of regular 
marriage. And within the context of the intention of Parliament  not to abolish 
marriage by cohabitation with habit and repute, it is clear that Scots law continued to 
lay some stress on the fact that it was still consent which made marriage, and not 
outward ceremony or procedure. In this it might be argued that Scots law continues to 
hold marriage to be formed by consent alone, but that, since the abolition of marriage 
by cohabitation with habit and repute in 2006, it will only acknowledge those 
instances of matrimonial consent which occur within the regulatory framework 
created by positive law in the interests of clarity and order. From this perspective, 
reference to the categories of civil and religious marriage in any substantial sense is 
misleading: in Scots law it is the case that there is fundamentally only valid regular 
marriage.  
 
Both civil and religious procedures concerning prior public intimation of intention to 
marry were retained by Scots law after 1939, and remained in place until the abolition 
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of the proclamation of banns and the reform of the civil procedures governing the 
lawful registration of marriages in Scotland by the Marriage (Scotland) Act 1977.38  
 
3.3.3 The Marriage (Scotland) Act 1977: religious or civil marriage 
From 1977 the only procedure by which the regular marriage requirement of prior 
intimation of marriage can be achieved has been a civil procedure. This civil 
procedure is still governed by the 1977 Act as amended, sections 3 to 6, and 15, and 
consists in effect of the submission of a notice of intention to marry to a district 
registrar, the engrossing of the same into a marriage notice book and list of intended 
marriages, the public display of a list of intended marriages, due time (now 28 days) 
for formal objections to an intended marriage to be received, and, failing objections, 
the issuing of a Marriage Schedule. For marriages which are to be solemnised in a 
religious, or from 2014, religious or belief ceremony, the Marriage Schedule must 
specify the time and place of the intended ceremony, and any deviation from these 
particulars necessitates the issuing of a new Schedule. A marriage having been 
solemnised in a religious or belief ceremony, the Marriage Schedule is signed by the 
parties to the marriage, the two witnesses to the exchange of consent, and the 
celebrant, and returned to the issuing registrar within three days for registration.  
 
The Marriage (Scotland) Act 1977, as originally enacted, introduced into statutory 
language, possibly for the first time, an explicit reference to “religious” and “civil” 
marriage. Thus sections 9 to 16 fell under the heading “religious marriages”, while 
sections 17 to 20 fell under the heading “civil marriages”. Yet a consideration of the 
text of the Act makes it clear that what was being distinguished were religious and 
civil ceremonies. Section 8 (1) of the Act makes it clear that “A marriage may be 
solemnised by and only by: (a) [the four categories of celebrants approved in respect 
                                                             
38 Although the proclamation of banns in the Church of Scotland were abolished in respect of Scots 
marriages by the Marriage (Scotland) Act 1977, section 27, banns may still be proclaimed in respect of 
any persons usually resident in Scotland who requires the banns to be proclaimed in order to be 
married outwith Scotland (Frank Cranmer, "Calling the banns in Scotland: a curiosity for canon law 
anoraks" in Law & Religion UK, 14 August 2012, 
http://www.lawandreligionuk.com/2012/08/14/calling-the-banns-in-scotland-a-curiosity-for-canon-
law-anoraks/). Although this procedure is therefore still possible, the Church of England recommends 
that a common marriage licence be obtained in such cases, rather than having the banns proclaimed in a 
parish church of the Church of Scotland (Frank Cranmer, "Calling the banns in Scotland? – on 
reflection, maybe not" in Law & Religion UK, 16 January 2015, 
http://www.lawandreligionuk.com/2015/01/16/calling-the-banns-in-scotland-on-reflection-maybe-not/) 
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of religious ceremonies]; or (b) a person who is a district registrar or assistant 
registrar appointed under section 17 of this Act.” Section 8(2) then goes on to define 
how a marriage solemnised in a religious ceremony as mentioned in section 8(1)(a) is 
to be referred to, namely a “religious marriage” and how a marriage solemnised in a 
civil ceremony as per section 8(1)(b) is to be referred to, namely a “civil marriage”. 
As such, in the 1977 Act as originally enacted, these terms are merely a form of 
shorthand, which refer not to some fundamental distinction within the context of 
regular marriage, but rather to the differing quality of the ceremonies used.   
 
In this, regardless of the type of ceremony used to solemnise marriage, it would 
appear that Parliament intended it to be understood that in Scots law there is only 
“marriage” but that it may be solemnised in either a religious or civil ceremony. This 
is surely the case, for if Scots law meant something deeper by ‘civil’ and ‘religious’ 
marriage, then it might be expected that Scots law would also distinguish between 
‘civil’ and ‘religious’ divorce. This is clearly not the case for, if it were, the Scottish 
courts would be obliged to divorce couples who had contracted a ‘civil’ marriage 
according to Scots law, and those who had contracted a ‘religious’ marriage according 
to the law of the religion in question. In practice, even if some couples who marry in a 
religious ceremony are of the opinion that their interaction with the state surrounding 
the solemnisation of their marriage is simply a matter of paper work, and that it is 
their own faith’s beliefs and laws about marriage which are of significance, and that, 
in the event of marital difficulties or breakdown, it is to the tribunals and laws of their 
own religion that they will turn in the first instance, it is simply not the case that 
Scottish courts would countenance religious law in place of Scots law, although 
religious law can influence considerations about consent in specific circumstances.39  
 
It ought to be noted that the same approach to defining “religious marriage” and “civil 
marriage” is retained in the 1977 Act, as amended by the Marriage and Civil 
Partnership (Scotland) Act 2014, but with the obvious reform in respect of  “belief 
marriage”. Thus section 8 (2)(a) and (b) of the 1977 Act now in effect reads “a 
marriage solemnised by an approved celebrant is referred to as a “religious or belief 
                                                             
39 See further the discussion below concerning matrimonial consent. 
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marriage”; a marriage solemnised by an authorised registrar is referred to as a “civil 
marriage”.”40 But stress is still laid upon the fact that what is being solemnized is 
“marriage”, regardless of the ceremony being used.  
 
 
3.4 Twenty-first century developments 
 
The Marriage and Civil Partnership (Scotland) Act 2014 introduced three notable 
reforms into Scots law, namely (i) the replacement of the category of ‘religious  
ceremonies’ with a new category of ‘religious or belief ceremonies’; (ii) extended the 
range of ceremonies within which civil partnerships might be validly contracted, by 
permitting civil partnerships to be entered into in religious or belief ceremonies, in 
addition to the traditional civil ceremony; and (iii) introduced same-sex marriage.  
 
3.4.1 Religious or belief ceremonies 
The Scots law distinction between solemnisation of regular marriage in either a 
religious or a civil ceremony, both being governed by civil procedures, has been 
significantly altered by replacing ‘religious’ ceremonies with ‘religious or belief’ 
ceremonies. In this sense, there are not three categories of ceremony, namely ‘civil’, 
‘religious’ and ‘belief’, but rather two, namely ‘civil’ and ‘religious or belief’, 
although continued recognition of the Church of Scotland’s ceremonies in their own 
right may suggest a latent survival of the older category of ‘religious’ marriage. 
Nevertheless, it must still be understood that regardless of whether a couple solemnise 
marriage in a ‘religious or belief’ or a ‘civil’ ceremony, they consent to the same 
thing in Scots law, namely an objective concept of marriage as defined by Scots 
common law. 
 
The recognition and introduction of religion or belief ceremonies in Scots law may be 
readily explained. The Marriage (Scotland) Act 1977 made various provisions by 
which religious bodies could register with the state as ‘approved bodies’ for the 
                                                             
40 At the present time, July 2015, the latest version of the 1977 Act available on 
www.legislation.gov.uk has not been updated to incorporate the amendments and reforms introduced 
by the 2014 Act. 
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purposes of solemnising marriages in religious ceremonies, or by which religious 
bodies could nominate individual celebrants to act on their behalf. Such 
‘authorisation’ by the Registrar General for Scotland could be on a permanent or a 
temporary basis. In 2005 the then Humanist Society of Scotland (now Humanist 
Society Scotland) petitioned the Registrar General under the provisions of the 1977 
Act for temporary authorisation for their named celebrants to solemnise marriages. 
Although Scots law at that time only recognised religious and civil ceremonies, the 
Humanist Society of Scotland successfully argued that, although not a body holding 
religious beliefs, it was nevertheless a body of people with shared beliefs who met 
together regularly for the promotion of the same, and that as such they ought to be 
treated equally with religious bodies and authorised by the Registrar General for 
certain of their named members to lawfully solemnise regular marriages in humanist 
ceremonies. The Registrar General granted this request but since he was not 
authorised to alter Scots law in respect of the distinction between civil and religious 
ceremonies, but was authorised only to grant or deny requests from previously un-
authorised groups to be so authorised, humanist celebrants were designated as 
‘religious celebrants.’ So between 2005 and the Marriage and Civil Partnership 
(Scotland) Act 2014, non-religious belief bodies began to lawfully solemnise 
marriages in what Scots law designated religious ceremonies. This anomaly has now 
been remedied by the 2014 Act, which has replaced the old category of religious 
ceremonies with the new category of religious or belief ceremonies. 
 
3.4.2 Civil partnership ceremonies 
In respect of reforms introduced into the Civil Partnership Act 2004 by the 2014 Act, 
it is curious to note that while civil partnerships have not been extended to opposite-
sex couples,41 which may be considered as a failure to follow through the logical 
dictates of the equality imperative, the range of contexts in which civil partnerships 
may be validly entered into has been expanded so as to include religious or belief 
ceremonies.42 The apparent transferal of state functions to religious and belief bodies 
in respect of the registration of civil partnerships appears to be an odd precedent to 
                                                             
41 At the time of writing, the Scottish government was consulting on whether to reform the law relating 
to civil partnership. 
42 i.e. see the Civil Partnership Act 2004, ss. 85 and 93A 
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have set but it was one which appears to have been driven by equality and choice.43 
Be that as it may, it has no effect upon Scots marriage law, and indeed, just as it may 
be argued that marriage is marriage in Scots law regardless of the ceremony used, 
civil partnerships will remain civil partnerships in Scots law regardless of the 
ceremony used.  
 
When civil partnerships were first introduced into Scots law by the Civil Partnership 
Act 2004, their principal purpose was to provide same-sex couples with a mechanism 
by which they could obtain almost all of the legal aspects of marriage, without 
actually being married. This curious arrangement was reached in part because of 
continued opposition, particularly among religious bodies, to the principle of same-
sex marriage. As such, civil partnerships were in effect a compromise, which on the 
one hand granted rights similar to marriage to same-sex couples, while attempting to 
maintain some kind of differentiation between such unions and marriage as it then 
stood in law, even although the dividing line between the two types of union was 
more a matter of semantics than of substantial legal differences.44  
 
Any consensus which existed around the arrangements reached in 2004 in respect of 
civil partnerships appears to have subsequently broken down. On the one hand there 
was a growing desire for the state to grant equality to same-sex couples by making 
provision for the solemnisation of regular same-sex marriages. On the other hand, 
there were a number of religious bodies within Scotland (e.g. the Religious Society of 
Friends and the United Reform Church), whose religious beliefs led them to support 
same-sex marriage. Within this context, Scots law was in effect prohibiting these 
religious groups from following their own beliefs in respect of same-sex marriage, by 
prohibiting such groups from facilitating the lawful solemnisation of regular same-sex 
marriages in religious ceremonies, since any marriage contracted in Scotland between 
persons of the same-sex was then in law void ab initio.  
                                                             
43 This alteration appears to have come about on the ground that it increased freedom and choice, while 
those opposed to it were not in favour of the dividing line between religious and civil ceremonies being 
altered (according to the SPICe briefing paper concerning the Marriage and Civil Partnership 
(Scotland) Bill, although it should be noted that the comments found on page 22 on this aspect of the 
legislation are brief). 
44 Although there were some differences between marriage and civil partnerships, particularly in 
respect of pensions. 
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3.4.3 Same sex marriage 
In respect of marriage between persons of the same sex, the Marriage and Civil 
Partnership (Scotland) Act 2014 reformed Scots law so as remove the requirement 
that couples contracting marriage must be of the opposite sex. For policy reasons, 
Parliament decided to introduce a high degree of elaboration into the procedures set 
out in the Marriage (Scotland) Act 1977 in respect of religious ceremonies or rather, 
to be exact, to religious or belief ceremonies as introduced by the 2014 Act. While the 
four main procedures contained in the 1977 Act by which bodies and celebrants, other 
than civil registrars, might be authorised to conduct ceremonies in which marriages 
could be regularly solemnised, were retained, a repeated distinction between 
“marriage between persons of different sexes” and “marriage between persons of the 
same sex” has been made. 
 
Section 8 of the Marriage (Scotland) Act 1977, as amended by the 2014 Act,45 
therefore appears fairly complex and, in effect, splits or duplicates the four old 
procedures into two parallel sets of procedures, one relating to “marriage between 
persons of different sexes” and the other to “marriage between persons of the same 
sex”. 
 
The first of the old procedures is still relatively straight forward, in that in respect of 
“marriage between persons of the different sexes”, the ministers (with the new 
addition of deacons) of the Church of Scotland continue to enjoy the inherent 
capacity, enjoyed since the Reformation, to solemnise regular marriages [s. 
8(1)(a)(i)]. Then, in respect of “marriage between persons of the same sex”, the 
Church of Scotland is not mentioned in the corresponding subsections of section 8 
where it would presumably have appeared [see s. 8(1B)(a)(i)], because the Church of 
Scotland presently maintains its historical position that marriage may be solemnised 
only between persons of the opposite sex. 
 
                                                             
45 At the time of writing, i.e. August 2015, these amendments have yet to be incorporated into the 1977 
Act on www.legislation.gov.uk, and as such no hyperlinks have been added to the text. 
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The second of the old procedures concerns celebrants of approved religious, and now 
religious or belief, bodies, and the old procedure has been split into two parallel 
procedures, “marriage between persons of different sexes” being dealt with under s. 
8(1)(a)(ii), and “marriage between persons of the same sex” being dealt with under s. 
8(1B)(a)(i).46 Religious or belief bodies not already approved under these subsections 
may petition Scottish ministers to be so approved under s. 8 (1A) in respect of 
“marriage between persons of different sexes”, and under s. 8 (1C) in respect of 
“marriage between persons of the same sex”. In effect such bodies already authorised 
to solemnise marriage between persons of different sexes must specifically and in 
addition apply to be authorised to solemnise marriages between persons of the same 
sex. 
 
The third of the old procedures concerns the nomination of members of religious, and 
now belief, bodies not approved under the foregoing subsections, to be approved and 
registered as celebrants, as per s. 9 of the Act, either under the provisions of s. 9 (1) 
for “marriage between persons of different sexes”, or s. 9 (1A) for “marriage between 
persons of the same sex”. 
 
The fourth of the old procedures concerns the temporary authorisation of persons 
belonging to a religious or belief body to solemnise marriage, as per s. 12 of the Act, 
under which section authorisation may be granted in relation to “only marriages 
between persons of the different sexes” “only marriages between persons of the same 
sex”, or both.   
 
Despite this relative procedural complexity, it does not appear that the legislature 
wished to introduce any distinction into Scots law in respect of the objective 
definition of marriage in Scots law, but rather introduced the distinction between 
marriage between persons of differing sexes and marriage between persons of the 
same sex within the strict confines of the procedures regulating the contracting valid 
regular marriages, in much the same way as the distinction between ‘civil’ and 
‘religious or belief’ can be understood as pertaining only to the manner of ceremonies 
                                                             
46 The failure of correspondence between the roman numerals being occasioned by the absence of the 
Church of Scotland from the same-sex marriage procedure as already noted. 
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in which regular marriages are contracted, rather than making a distinction within the 
objective definition of marriage in Scots law. 
 
This observation may perhaps be confirmed by section 17 of the 1977 Act, in that it 
remains as originally enacted, still reading:  
For the purpose of affording reasonable facilities for the solemnisation of civil 
marriages throughout Scotland, the Registrar General—  
(a) shall appoint such number of district registrars as he thinks 
necessary; and 
(b) may, in respect of any district for which he has appointed a district 
registrar under paragraph (a) above, appoint one or more assistant 
registrars, as persons who may solemnise marriages.  
 
Thus, although s. 8 (1)(b) reads “Subject to section 23A of this Act, a marriage 
between persons of different sexes may be solemnised by and only by a person who is 
a district registrar or assistant registrar appointed under section 17 of this Act”, and 
while s. 8(1B)(b) reads “Subject to section 23A of this Act, a marriage between 
persons of the same sex may be solemnised by and only by a person who is a district 
registrar or assistant registrar appointed under section 17 of this Act”, it is clear that 
this repetition has been occasioned by the complexity surrounding religious or belief 
ceremonies, and since both subsections refer to section 17, it is clear that the Act as 
amended makes no distinction as to sex where a marriage is solemnized in a civil 
ceremony. 
 
This observation would appear to be confirmed by section 26(2) of the 1977 Act, as 
amended, concerning interpretation, which states that: “‘marriage’ means marriage 
between persons of different sexes and marriage between persons of the same sex.”  
This suggests that Parliament intended the Scots law concept of an objective, single, 
definition of marriage to hold good, and that the terms ‘civil’ and ‘religious or belief’ 
marriage, and the terms ‘marriage between persons of different sexes’ and ‘marriage 
between persons of the same sex’ are to be understood in respect of the regulations 
surrounding the solemnisation of regular marriage in Scotland only. Two possible 
objections to this interpretation arise from the fact that impotence remains a ground 
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for nullity only in respect of marriages between persons of different sexes,47 and the 
fact that adultery remains defined in relation to heterosexual intercourse only. This 
might suggest that the distinction between opposite sex marriages and same sex 
marriages transcends the context of regulations concerning the solemnisation of 
marriage: while it cannot be said that ‘religious or belief’ or ‘civil’ marriages gives 
rise to any differences in the substantive law of marriage in respect of voidable 
marriages, ‘opposite sex’ and ‘same sex’ marriages appear so to do. 
 
3.4.4 Legal protections 
One further line of inquiry in respect of the Marriage and Civil Partnership (Scotland) 
Act 2014 concerns the so called “protections” whereby religious or belief bodies or 
their celebrants may not be compelled by law to solemnise marriages between persons 
of the same sex. These protections are intended to allay any apprehensions on the part 
of religious or belief bodies that they or their celebrants may be compelled by law 
against their own beliefs to solemnise a marriage between persons of the same sex. In 
general it is difficult to see how this could occur in any event, since Scots law holds 
religious or belief ceremonies to be nothing more than a type of ceremony within 
which couples may validly contract a regular marriage. In this, participation in a 
religious or belief ceremony is simply permitted in Scots law, but participation is 
voluntary and optional, certainly on the part of couples wishing to marry, and it is 
difficult to see how it is not also optional on the part of religious and belief celebrants, 
as what we are dealing with are voluntary associations, with the exception of the 
Church of Scotland. But even in the case of the Church of Scotland, it appears from 
the report on the place of the Church of Scotland in Scots law that the present-day 
Church of Scotland continues to be recognised within the British constitution and 
within Scots law as enjoying its own exclusive spiritual jurisdiction, which 
jurisdiction is acknowledged as not being derived from any civil source of 
sovereignty or authority. In this, it is difficult to see how either the Church of 
Scotland or a voluntary association could be compelled by Scottish civil courts to 
perform any form of ceremony against its own wishes.  
 
                                                             
47 Marriage and Civil Partnership (Scotland) Act 2014, s. 5(1). 
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The other obvious line of thought in this respect is that a Scottish civil court has never 
been known to compel a religious or belief body to solemnise the marriage of persons 
of different sexes. This may seem obvious, but it must be the case that, for example, 
Catholic priests or ministers of the Free Church of Scotland sometimes decline to 
solemnise the marriage of a person who had already been married and divorced. The 
decision of whether to agree to perform a ceremony to solemnise a marriage must be 
analogous to decisions made by voluntary associations in respect of admitting and 
removing members and appointing and removing office holders.  
 
Nevertheless, the 2014 Act does contain certain so called safeguards in this respect. 
The somewhat torturous parallel procedures for obtaining approval from Scottish 
Ministers to solemnise valid regular marriages in Scotland has already been noted: a 
religious or belief body must explicitly apply and subsequently be authorised to 
solemnise marriage between persons of the same sex as distinct to persons of different 
sexes. This in itself provides some degree of protection against compulsion, because a 
same-sex couple could not procure a Marriage Schedule from a registrar in respect of 
a body or celebrant not previously authorised to solemnise marriage between persons 
of the same sex. In this, should a religious or belief celebrant not so authorised decide 
to conduct a ceremony for a same sex couple anyway, the resulting marriage would be 
irregular, and therefore null ab initio. In addition to this procedural arrangement 
intended to preclude compulsion, the Marriage (Scotland) Act 1977, s. 8 (1D)(a)-(c) 
states in effect, and for the avoidance of doubt, that no duty is imposed by virtue of 
the Act upon any religious or belief body to in any way apply for authorisation to 
solemnize marriages between persons of the same sex. And for good measure s. 8 
(1D)(d) states that the Act in no way “imposes a duty on any person who is an 
approved celebrant in relation to marriages between persons of the same sex to 
solemnise such marriages”. It is not clear that this section really says anything new, 
although it is admittedly only for the avoidance of doubt. 
 
3.5 Ceremony and consent: a doubt? 
 
There has been extensive statutory reform of marriage law over the past hundred 
years or so but to a considerable extent this reform has concentrated on the 
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solemnisation of marriage: the formal procedures by which parties may constitute a 
valid legal marriage. Much less focus has been placed upon the notion of the consent 
which parties exchange. Here there is less certainty and less transparency as to the 
role, if any, which religion continues to play. When a couple exchange consent to be 
husband and wife or to be married, what does that mean? Do they consent to adopt 
spousal roles and enter into a relationship entirely of their own creation and 
construction or do they consent to enter into some objectively defined concept? And 
does the type of ceremony, in the context of which they exchange consent, have any 
relevance? 
 
These are questions which have been very rarely considered in recent legal review of 
marriage but they were at the centre of the judgment of the Inner House of the Court 
of Session in SH v KH.48 This was a case concerning an allegedly sham marriage, 
entered into by the man to obtain immigration benefits, in which the court was being 
asked to declare the marriage null on the basis of tacit mental reservation; that is that 
the parties, despite exchanging outward consent, did not in fact consent to be married. 
In looking at this case, there are a number of points to bear in mind. The law has since 
changed and it is no longer possible to argue that a marriage is void on the basis of 
unilateral mental reservation.49 Further, the decision is situated within the wider 
policy context of immigration and concerns about sham marriage and it may not be 
appropriate to draw wider conclusions from its specific circumstances. Nonetheless it 
offers a rare and interesting insight into judicial understanding of marriage and the 
legal significance of compliance with procedural and ceremonial requirements. Set 
against extensive statutory reform, which is almost all about procedure and ceremony, 
and against social expectations about the individual highly personal nature of the 
marriage relationship, it is a decision which at least gives rise to a doubt.  
 
3.5.1 Form and substance 
                                                             
48 SH v. KH (2005), 2006 S.C. 129, 2005 S.L.T. 1025, 2005 Fam. L.R. 80. See also Jane Mair, 
‘Marriage: legal status or personal relationship?’ in Edinburgh Law Review (2007), 11(1), 117-120. 
49 As per the Marriage (Scotland) Act 1977, s. 20A(4), which section was inserted into the 1977 Act by 
the Family Law (Scotland) Act 2006, s.2. It may be noted that a marriage is still void if a party to a 
marriage is found incapable of “understanding the nature of marriage” (Marriage (Scotland) Act 1977, 
s.20A(3)(b)), which is distinct from any problems concerning defining the “nature of marriage” in law. 
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In SH v KH, Lord Penrose considered, from paragraph 29 of his judgment, “whether 
in Scots law marriage has become a matter of form, effected where prescribed 
procedures are followed, including the use of appropriate language, with all the 
consequences the law provides, or involves matters of substance that go to the root of 
the marriage relationship that may be absent notwithstanding formal compliance with 
the prescribed procedural requirements.”  
 
He began by noting that a notice of intention to marry contains the solemn declaration 
that “I and the person named in Part F intend to be married on the date and place 
entered.” (para 30). Next, Penrose observed that “neither the Act50 nor the 
regulations51 defined marriage”, but that rather “the 1977 Act and the regulations 
made under it are, with the exception of the declaration of intent in the marriage 
notice, concerned wholly with procedural regularity.” Penrose continued: “The Act 
followed on the recommendations of the Kilbrandon Committee on The Marriage 
Law of Scotland (Cmnd 4011), which was set up to inquire into requirements, both 
fundamental and formal, for the constitution of marriage in Scotland. The omission of 
a prescriptive definition of the essentials of marriage was no doubt deliberate.” (para 
31).  
 
Lord Penrose (at para 34) then turned to a consideration of the most recent authority 
on the law of husband and wife in Scotland, namely the fourth edition of Eric Clive’s 
Husband and Wife in the Law of Scotland (1997), in an attempt to obtain a clear 
definition of what Scots law actually holds marriage to be. Having considered the 
most relevant passages of that work, Lord Penrose concluded that “one can, therefore, 
infer that, in Professor Clive’s view, in Scots law marriage remains the voluntary 
union of one man and one woman, for an indefinite period, ending with death or 
earlier dissolution, to the exclusion of all others, that involves legal rights and 
obligations and confers the legal status of husband and wife. That is what is 
                                                             
50 i.e. The Marriage (Scotland) Act 1977. 
51 i.e. the regulations concerning the forms to be used in the civil procedures surrounding the 
solemnisation of regular marriage as contained in the Marriage (Prescription of Forms) (Scotland) 
Amendment Regulations 1995 (SI 1995/3156), and in the Registration of Births, Still Births, Deaths 
and Marriages (Prescription of Forms) (Scotland) Amendment Regulations 1995 (SI 1995/3157).  
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necessarily implied in the expression “accept each other as husband and wife” in s 
9(3) of the [1977 Marriage (Scotland)] Act.  
 
Counsels’ arguments were summarised, and provide helpful outlines of the main 
parameters of the problem under consideration. In paragraph 41, Lord Penrose 
summarised counsel for the pursuer:  
For the pursuer, counsel argued that the Lord Ordinary had failed to make a 
finding that on 22 June 1998 the parties had exchanged positive matrimonial 
consent for the purpose of being husband and wife. Without such a finding, 
there was no justification in law for the conclusion he arrived at. In Scots law, 
present consent to enter into the conjugal state must be mutually exchanged. 
That was how marriage was created. The Lord Ordinary appeared to entertain 
the notion that there were two institutions: civil marriage and religious 
marriage. There was only one marriage. It might be performed in various 
ways. But the essence of all forms was consent to enter the conjugal state. 
That was not a mere matter of words. The words were at best evidence of what 
was in the parties’ minds. The essence of the conjugal state was consent to live 
together, to offer mutual support, in most cases to share exclusive sexual 
relations, and generally to be husband and wife: Stair’s Institutions, I iv 1, on 
“Conjugal Obligations”. Consent to be united as a couple in conjugal society 
for the foreseeable future was of the essence of marriage. 
 
Counsel for the defender argued against this, albeit in the event unsuccessfully, that: 
the only irreducible minimum in Scots law was consent to enter into the legal 
relationship of marriage and an intention to be regarded as husband and wife 
from that point. Given the infinite range of human relationships, and the scope 
for change in perceptions over time it was both undesirable and impossible to 
prescribe any form or forms of behaviour or ways of living in characterising 
marriage. Marriage could mean different relationships to different people and 
at different times. It was a relationship of indefinite legal and practical 
content. It could only be understood as the creation of a legal relationship 
between two people and between them and society as a whole. The irreducible 
minimum was consent to what the law required of married people from time to 
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time. Marriage could be contracted without the prospect of cohabitation at all. 
In the modern world contemplation of sexual relationships is not essential. 
The parties can contract out of financial obligation. For each couple, the 
content of marriage is a matter of particular agreement, not only initially but 
from time to time during the subsistence of the relationship. The future cannot 
be predicted, and the nature of the relationship may undergo radical change 
over time. In this case, on the Lord Ordinary’s findings, cohabitation was to be 
deferred. But that was irrelevant. The parties agreed to enter into a legal 
relationship, and that was marriage. (para 42) 
 
In effect, Lord Penrose rejected the argument that marriage was merely a matter of 
form, and maintained that a couple who consented to marriage were consenting to 
something which was not defined by the procedural regulations surrounding the 
solemnisation of regular marriage in Scots law. The problem of defining what 
marriage therefore was, required recourse to older Scottish authorities in the matter, 
Lord Penrose quoted with approval (at para 46) from Patrick Fraser’s Law of Husband 
and Wife According to the Law of Scotland (1876-78). 
One source of error as to the legal character of marriage has arisen from the 
misapplication of the maxim, that consent and not coitus makes marriage. This 
has been interpreted to mean, that consent, in whatever mode given, makes 
marriage … The doctrine merely amounts to this, that consent being given to 
marriage as the law directs, that is sufficient. The matrimonial consent passing 
between parties makes a marriage in Scotland and England, and everywhere 
else, whatever the forms and ceremonies necessary to constitute a marriage 
may be, because it must be understood that the matrimonial consent is consent 
to marriage, expressed in the form and manner that the law requires. The 
contract is constituted by consent alone; but it must be consent to marriage; 
and the law determines what shall import such consent, and what shall be 
sufficient expression of consent to bind parties.52  
 
Lord Penrose maintained that for a marriage to be valid under Scots law, the 
“essential requirement” is “that the parties exchange consent to become husband and 
                                                             
52 Fraser, Husband and Wife, i, pp. 170-1. 
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wife, that is to marry in the sense described by Fraser and adopted into the cases 
referred to [in paragraphs 48 to 51]” (para 52).53 It is not enough that a couple 
participate in a registry office ceremony which they understand to be a formal 
marriage, rather the “critical question” is whether or not such a couple “intend to 
become husband and wife” (para 53). In considering what it meant to be husband and 
wife, Lord Penrose referred to the English case of Sheffield County Council v. E (para 
54) and accepted that certain of the judge’s (i.e. Munby J’s) considerations of 
marriage in that case were helpful. This included Lord Penzance’s definition of 
marriage in Hyde v. Hyde as “the voluntary union for life of one man and one woman, 
to the exclusion of all others” a definition cited by both Patrick Fraser and Eric Clive. 
Munby J’s own definition is then added, in which marriage “confers on the parties the 
status of husband and wife, the essence of the contract being an agreement between a 
man and a woman to live together, and to love one another as husband and wife, to 
the exclusion of all others. It creates a relationship of mutual and reciprocal 
obligations, typically involving the sharing of a common home and a common 
domestic life and the right to enjoy each other’s society, comfort and assistance.” 
(para 55). This statement was deemed by Lord Penrose to be “a helpful statement of 
the position for the purposes of Scots law”, while noting that not all marriages would 
contain all these characteristics. The Inner House did not need to attempt to delineate 
the point at which a relationship dis-conformed to these definitions to such an extent 
as to no longer be regarded as marriage, because for the purposes of the case the 
couple in question had never acted in any sense as husband and wife following their 
civil ceremony. 
 
Lords Macfadyen and Marnoch concurred with Lord Penrose, and as such the 
marriage of the litigants was in effect declared to be null ab initio.54  
 
Since the Marriage (Scotland) Act 1977 as amended explicitly defines “civil 
marriage” and “religious or belief marriage” to be nothing more than shorthand ways 
to refer to “a marriage solemnised” in either a civil or a religious or belief ceremony, 
                                                             
53 It could be argued that this involves an implicit rejection of the Lord Ordinary’s distinction between 
religious and civil marriage as being two different types of marriage. 
54 All citations for SH v. KH are from 2005, S.L.T., 1025. 
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and since Scottish common law as defined by case law holds Scots law to regard valid 
consent to be married as consent to an objective, and single or unitary, concept of 
marriage, regardless of which type of ceremony provides the context within which 
consent to marriage is exchanged, the central question is what does Scots law hold 
marriage to be as an objective concept. While the definitions offered by Lord Penrose 
were sufficient for the purposes of determining SH v. KH in 2005, it must be asked to 
what extent these definitions are still serviceable in light of the Marriage and Civil 
Partnership (Scotland) Act 2014. Yet howsoever marriage ought now to be defined, it 
is clear that the definition falls to be made by Scots law, primarily by either the courts 
or the legislature, and not to any form of religious conception of marriage; in this 
respect there is no such thing in Scots law as substantive “religious marriage”. Yet, 
that said, until such time as a clear and robust legal definition of what marriage is in 
law is settled upon, religious and belief conceptions of individual marriages may 
continue to have a bearing upon cases heard by the courts, particularly sham marriage 
cases.  
 
3.5.2 “Husband and wife” or “marriage”? 
The Inner House’s qualified reliance on Fraser in SH v KH has already been noted: “I 
conceive that marriage … may for this purpose be defined as the voluntary union for 
life of one man and one woman, to the exclusion of all others.” This definition must 
now be considered in light of the amendments made to section 9 of the Marriage 
(Scotland) Act 1977, in respect of the appropriate form to be used in marriage 
ceremonies, by the Marriage and Civil Partnership (Scotland) Act 2014.  
 
Section 9(3) refers to marriage between persons of different sexes, 9(3A) refers to 
marriages between persons of the same sex: 
 
For the purposes of subsection (2)(b) above, a marriage ceremony for marriage 
between persons of different sexes is of an appropriate form if it includes, and is 
in no way inconsistent with— 
(a) a declaration by the parties, in the presence of each other, the celebrant and 
two witnesses— 
(i) that they accept each other as husband and wife; 
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(ii) that they accept each other in marriage; or 
(iii) either or both of sub-paragraphs (i) and (ii); 
and 
(b) a declaration by the celebrant, after the declaration mentioned in paragraph 
(a) of this subsection— 
(i) that the parties are then husband and wife; 
(ii) that the parties are then married; or 
(iii) either or both of sub-paragraphs (i) and (ii).” 
 
Section 9(3A) provides that: 
 
For the purposes of subsection (2)(b) above, a marriage ceremony for marriage 
between persons of the same sex is of an appropriate form if it includes, and is 
in no way inconsistent with— 
(a) a declaration by the parties, in the presence of each other, the celebrant and 
two witnesses, that they accept each other in marriage; 
(b) a declaration by the celebrant, after the declaration mentioned in paragraph 
(a), that the parties are then married. 
 
How should these subsections be construed, or how might they come to be construed? 
The sense of 9(3) would appear to be that “husband and wife” and “marriage” are 
synonymous, reference to “either or both” being sufficient to contract marriage in 
Scotland. The sense of 9(3A) is that it is sufficient to refer to “marriage” only, a direct 
reference to “husband and wife” being excluded. In this, reference to “husband and 
wife” is clearly not essential to contracting a valid regular marriage in Scotland.  
 
How then does this sit with Lord Penrose’s observations in SH v KH concerning the 
definition of marriage? It may be speculated that the 2014 Act tends to suggest that 
the courts may no longer adopt Lord Penrose’s general approach of turning to 
historical Scots law definitions of husband and wife in attempting to define the 
objective Scots law definition of marriage to which couples may be presumed to some 
extent to consent during a valid marriage ceremony. This in turn would suggest that 
although the Scots law doctrine of consent to marriage being an internal consent to an 
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objective principle not necessarily present in any valid marriage ceremony still holds 
good, it may no longer be possible to determine what that objective principle is. From 
this, it may follow that for all practical purposes a marriage contracted through 
participation in a valid marriage ceremony in Scotland cannot now be annulled on the 
ground of lack of consent to the Scots law conception of objective marriage. And if 
so, it follows that conformity with the regulations surrounding the valid contracting of 
a regular marriage in Scots law may have become de facto sufficient for the 
contracting of regular marriage in Scots law. This line of thought is of course 
speculative, but if the forgoing were correct, then it would follow that marriage in 
Scots law is effectively not for any practical purposes an objective principle, but 
rather, as counsel for the defence in SH v KH put it, marriage in Scots law can now 
“only be understood as the creation of a legal relationship between two people and 
between them and society as a whole. The irreducible minimum [is] consent to what 
the law required of married people from time to time.” If marriage in Scots law is 
therefore for all practical purposes now purely a legal relationship, it cannot be said 
that religion has any continuing bearing on the matter. Presumably a general danger 
of defining marriage as a legal relationship only, for the valid contracting of which 
participation in an approved ceremony is sufficient, is that it becomes difficult to 
detect sham marriages: the very point of a sham marriage is to obtain some legal right 
accorded to married couples, but if marriage is only a collection of such legal rights, 
without any corresponding and definable pattern of behaviour between a married 
couple, it is difficult to see how sham marriages may be detected, if indeed such a 
concept can remain legally meaningful within such a context. 
 
Against this speculative line of thought, however, it may be the case that Parliament 
intended the Scots law objective definition of marriage still to be pegged to a 
historical definition of husband and wife.55 For example, the Marriage and Civil 
Partnership (Scotland) Act 2014, section 4, which concerns “the meaning of marriage 
and related expressions in enactments and documents”, appears to peg the definition 
of marriages between persons of the same sex to the concept of husband and wife. 
                                                             
55 This does appear to have been the intention of Parliament as per the Scottish Government’s notes on 
the Marriage and Civil Partnership (Scotland) Bill: “3.27 The draft Bill also makes provision, at section 
4 so that the concept of marriage in the common law is taken as meaning both opposite sex and same 
sex marriage and spouses.” (http://www.gov.scot/Publications/2012/12/9433/272395). 
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Thus section 4(2)(b) reads “Subsection (3) applies to references (however expressed) 
in any enactment to two people who are (or were) living together as if they were 
husband and wife” while 4(3) reads “The references include two people of the same 
sex who are (or were) not married to, nor in civil partnership with, each other but who 
are (or were) living together as if they were married to each other”. This appears to 
say that those references to persons of the same sex who were neither married nor in 
civil partnership, but who nevertheless lived together as married may be defined “as if 
they were husband and wife”. In this respect the concepts considered in SH v. KH 
may still be relevant for married same-sex couples, since it may be possible for the 
courts to treat such marriages in law as if marriages between husband and wife. 
 
3.6 Conclusions 
 
Religion no longer enjoys any place in the Scots law of marriage in respect of 
legislative competence or jurisdiction, and there is little evidence of ongoing direct 
religious influence in terms of statutory provisions. Nevertheless, it could conceivably 
be argued that the Scots law doctrine of the objectivity of marriage in common law is 
itself a vestige of medieval Canon law, and that although the actual definition of 
objective marriage in Scots law is vague, attempts to formulate a definition have 
tended to look backwards to a time when Scotland was more obviously a Protestant 
country. That is to say, it would appear that both Scots common law and Scots statute 
law continue to place reliance upon the concept of husband and wife in defining 
objective marriage, whether that be in respect of opposite sex couples consenting to 
be married as husband and wife, or same-sex couples consenting to be married as if 
husband and wife. But even in this, it is difficult to see that the concept of husband 
and wife in Scots law still retains any of the historical features of Scots marriage law 
which may be argued to have enjoyed a religious provenance.  
 
Be that as it may, the only prominent place still occupied by religion is in respect of a 
number of authorised ceremonial options within which a couple may validly contract 
a regular marriage in Scots law. The type of ceremony used, be it religious or 
otherwise, has no effect on the Scots law understanding of regular marriage – all 
competent ceremonies produce regular marriage. A religious marriage ceremony does 
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not produced a distinctly ‘religious marriage’ in Scots law, but rather valid regular 
marriage is always valid regular marriage, regardless of the approved ceremony used; 
however difficult it may be for Scots law to define exactly what ‘valid regular 
marriage’ means. Just as Scots law makes procedural distinctions between ‘religious 
or belief’ and ‘civil’ in respect of ceremonies, without extending such distinctions 
beyond the regulations surrounding the contracting of regular marriage, so too are 
Scots law distinctions about ‘opposite-sex’ marriage and ‘same-sex’ marriage 
confined almost exclusively to procedural regulations. Put another way, Scots law 
now acknowledges three distinct types of ceremonies within which valid regular 
marriages may be contracted: religious and belief opposite sex ceremonies; religious 
and belief same-sex ceremonies; and civil ceremonies: but all three types of 
ceremonies are intended to give rise to Scots law valid regular marriages. To this 
might be added a fourth kind of ceremony, namely ‘Church of Scotland’, as it not yet 
entirely clear if ceremonies conducted by ministers and deacons of the Church of 
Scotland are ‘religious’ ceremonies, or ‘religious or belief’ ceremonies in law, but in 
any event the Church of Scotland’s ceremonies also give rise to Scots law valid 
regular marriages. 
 
On a more speculative note, it might be wondered whether or not religious or belief 
ceremonies should continue to play a part in the solemnisation of regular marriages 
for the purposes of Scots law. Certainly the statutory regulations surrounding 
marriage ceremonies would be much simplified if only civil ceremonies were on 
offer. Such a reform would not preclude those couples who adhere to a particular 
religion or system of belief from participating in a religious or belief ceremony 
subsequent to a civil ceremony. In terms of bars to such a reform, the most obvious 
must be the position of the Church of Scotland within the context of the British 
constitution and Scots law. As has been discussed above, the current shape of the 
Scots law regulations governing marriage ceremonies is predicated upon the historical 
position of the Church of Scotland in respect of regular marriage and the subsequent 
development of a model of ceremonial pluralism surrounding regular marriage since 
1834. The 1977 Marriage Act, as amended, still reflects historical developments 
within Scots law as to authorisation to solemnise marriage. While civil marriage 
ceremonies have the potential to replace all other forms of marriage ceremony in 
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Scotland, the place and status of the Church of Scotland is still thought to be 
guaranteed by the constituting documents of the British state, or, even should it be 
argued that the Church of Scotland has voluntarily surrendered its Established Church 
status, by its “national Church” status as per the Church of Scotland Act 1921.56  
 
It may also be speculated that the Scottish legislature ought to offer a definition of 
objective marriage, so that it is clear to all couples marrying in Scotland what it is that 
they are consenting to. This would be of particular value to the courts in determining 
which marriages are well intentioned, and which are sham. As things presently stand, 
it would fall to the Court of Session to formulate what the common law definition of 
marriage in Scots law now is in the light of the Marriage and Civil Partnership 
(Scotland) Act 2014, so as to be able to distinguish marriages entered into in good 
faith from sham marriages. Although the law has been reformed to the extent that a 
marriage is no longer void simply on the basis of a tacit mental reservation, it is clear 
that as a matter of policy and particularly in the context of immigration, governments 
wish to be able to distinguish between ‘proper’ and ‘sham’ marriage.  
 
Finally, a more general observation may be offered about the relation between 
religion and law in respect of the Scots law position concerning the objectivity of 
marriage and of the general reticence of Scots law to define the same. In this, prior to 
the Reformation there was in effect no Scots law of marriage, but rather the Canon 
law of marriage: within the context of the Catholic ascendancy, marriage was defined 
as a supra-legal reality defined by Catholic doctrine as one of the seven sacraments of 
the Church, and within this context the doctrine of irregular marriage, as long 
maintained in Scots law, was developed. At the Reformation both the idea of marriage 
as sacrament was rejected, and Scots marriage law first came into being. From the 
Reformation on, Scots law has undoubtedly enjoyed the inherent right to define its 
own objective conception of marriage but, within the context of the Scottish 
                                                             
56 In this respect it ought to be noted that the place of the Church of Scotland in respect of the 
regulations governing marriage ceremonies in Scotland has been attributed by the Scottish Government 
to the Kirk’s “national church” status as recently as 2014 (“the Church of Scotland, reflecting its 
national church status, is authorised to solemnise opposite sex marriages through the Marriage 
(Scotland) Act 1977” (Marriage and Civil Partnership (Scotland) Act 2014, The Qualifying 
Requirements: An Initial Paper, para 9, 
http://www.gov.scot/Topics/Justice/law/17867/samesex/qualifying-requirements-discussion-paper)). 
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Protestant ascendancy, Scottish Protestant customs and beliefs surrounding marriage 
almost certainly provided a seemingly self-evident definition of marriage for Scots 
law. In this, religion defined marriage through custom and Scots law passively 
accepted that definition. Within the context of same-sex marriage, Scots law has for 
the first time since the Reformation defined marriage in a way which is directly at 
variance with the old Protestant marriage customs. Historical religious marriage 
customs can no longer be seen as an automatic point of reference for Scots law, from 
which it follows that the Marriage and Civil Partnership (Scotland) Act 2014 may 
well have made explicit for the first time the Scots law rejection of at least the 
historical role of religion in Scotland in defining objective marriage.   
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4.1 Introduction 
 
4.1.1 The legal foundations 
The present-day place of religion in schools in Scotland is principally governed by the 
Education (Scotland) Act 1980 (c 44).1 The contents of this Act in respect of 
religion reflect the two main phases of nationalisation of church schools in Scotland. 
Nevertheless, in respect of non-denominational schools, arrangements concerning 
religious observation are not prescribed in detail in law, but are often a matter of 
general government guidance, local authority policy, head teachers’ discretion, and 
local custom. 
 
The first phase of nationalisation occurred in respect of the schools of the old 
“Established” Church of Scotland and the Free Church of Scotland by virtue of the 
Education (Scotland) Act 1872 (c 62). The 1872 Act formally abolished the 
jurisdiction of the presbyteries of the old “Established” Church of Scotland over 
Scottish schools, and transferred the oversight of the schools nationalised in 1872 to 
parochial school boards. These schools were known as non-denominational schools. 
Although formal legal ties between the Protestant churches and the nationalised non-
denominational schools were severed, those churches continued to exercise a strong 
degree of control over the transferred schools by virtue of their de facto presence on 
school boards, and by virtue of the statutory recognition of the ongoing custom of 
religious observance and instruction in such schools. Within the context of a strongly 
Presbyterian country, it was presumably felt that more formal statutory rights were 
not required on the part of the Protestant churches in order to guarantee the ongoing 
Protestant character of such schools. There was no statutory obligation in respect of 
religious observance imposed upon non-denominational schools until the passage of 
the Education (Scotland) Act 1946 (c 72). It would also appear that the Church of 
                                                             
1 Where legislation is available online, links are included. Otherwise, where there is no open access 
version readily available, key sections have been quoted in the text. 
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Scotland and other denominations enjoyed no statutory right to representation on 
school boards, nor on the 36 local education authorities by which such boards were 
replaced by the Education (Scotland) Act 1918 (c 48). Only when local government 
was re-organised by the Local Government (Scotland) Act 1973 (c 65) were 
advisory local education committees created on which the Church of Scotland and 
other denominations enjoyed a statutory right of representation. 
 
The second phase of nationalisation of church schools in Scotland occurred with the 
passage of the Education (Scotland) Act 1918, by virtue of which the schools of the 
Roman Catholic Church in Scotland were transferred to the then newly created 36 ad 
hoc local education authorities. The statutory language used in the 1918 Act did not 
refer explicitly to the schools of the Roman Catholic Church, but rather to schools run 
by denominations which had not previously been nationalised. In this, while the vast 
majority of schools nationalised by the 1918 Act were Catholic, these schools were 
designated “denominational” schools, and it was possible for any school run by any 
denomination to be transferred to the state under the terms of the 1918 Act. 
Denominational schools were subject to a markedly different arrangement in respect 
of religious observance and instruction when compared to the non-denominational 
schools. In the latter, the Presbyterian churches relied upon the maintenance of the 
customs of what had been their old church schools, whereas in the former, the 
denomination in whose interests a denominational school was run by a local authority 
enjoyed substantial statutory controls over religious aspects of such schools. In 
practice this usually meant that the Hierarchy of the Catholic Church in Scotland 
enjoyed the right to examine appointees to teaching posts within Catholic 
denominational schools as to their religious beliefs and character, to appoint un-
remunerated chaplains to such schools, and to determine the religious education 
curriculum. Denominational schools run by local authorities in the interests of other 
denominations, such as the Scottish Episcopal Church, were subject to similar 
controls by virtue of the neutral statutory language employed in the 1918 Act. Various 
denominations continue to enjoy statutory rights over denominational schools which 
are not afforded to the Church of Scotland in respect of the non-denominational 
schools, following the abolition of the “educational” jurisdiction of Church of 
Scotland presbyteries in 1872. 
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4.1.2 Structure of the chapter 
The main focus of this chapter is on the legal framework which underpins the distinct 
categories of denominational (4.3) and non-denominational schools (4.4) and the 
development of the concepts of religious education and religious observance. In 
addition, the chapter also highlights specific aspects of the legal regulation of 
education where religion features: the rights of parents and children in respect of 
education (4.5); the place of representatives of religious organisations in the structure 
of governance (4.6); the training and employment of teachers (4.7) and the role of 
chaplains (4.8). 
 
4.2 Non-denominational public schools 
 
4.2.1 The Education (Scotland) Acts 1872 and 1980 
The Education (Scotland) Act 1872 created a temporary Board of Education for 
Scotland,2 charged with overseeing the creation of elected School Boards in every 
parish and burgh throughout Scotland.3 These school boards were bodies corporate,4 
in which were to be vested “the parish and other schools which have been established 
and now exist in any parish under the recited Acts [see Preamble to 1872 Act], or any 
of them, together with teachers’ houses and land attached thereto”.5 At the same time 
“all jurisdiction, power, and authority possessed or exercised by presbyteries or other 
church courts with respect to any public schools in Scotland” was abolished.6 All 
schools vested in the newly created elected School Boards were declared to be public 
schools,7 and were to be funded by means of a local rate.8 
 
Section 68 of the 1872 Act prescribed that: 
Every public school, and every school subject to inspection and in receipt of 
any public money as herein-before provided, shall be open to children of all 
                                                             
2 Education (Scotland) Act, 1872 (c 62), s3. 
3 Education (Scotland) Act, 1872 (c 62), s8ff. 
4 Education (Scotland) Act, 1872 (c 62), s22. 
5 Education (Scotland) Act, 1872 (c 62), s23. 
6 Education (Scotland) Act, 1872 (c 62), s23. 
7 Education (Scotland) Act, 1872 (c 62), s25. 
8 Education (Scotland) Act, 1872 (c 62), s44. 
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denominations, and any child may be withdrawn by his parents from any 
instruction in religious subjects and from any religious observance in any such 
school: and no child shall in any such school be placed at any disadvantage 
with respect of the secular instruction given therein by reason of the 
denomination to which such child or his parents belong, or by reason of his 
being withdrawn from any instruction in religious subjects. 
The requirement for public schools to make provision for religious instruction and 
religious observance was contained in the Preamble to the 1872 Act:  
Whereas it has been the custom in the public schools of Scotland to give 
instruction in religion to children9 whose parents did not object to the 
instruction so given, but with liberty to parents, without forfeiting any of the 
other advantages of the schools, to elect that their children should not receive 
such instruction, and it is expedient that the managers of public schools shall 
be at liberty to continue the said custom.10 
 
Detailed regulations concerning the frequency of religious observance and instruction 
were not laid out in the 1872 Act, but rather were remitted to the Scotch Education 
Department,11 defined by the Act as “the Lords of any Committee of the Privy 
Council appointed by Her Majesty on Education in Scotland”.12 
 
The key features of the 1872 Act in relation to non-denominational public schools are 
substantially retained in the current Education (Scotland) Act 1980, as amended. They 
have passed through various statutes, notably the Education (Scotland) Act 1946, with 
minor reforms of language and scope, but broadly, the principles of the 1872 Act 
remain the basis of the contemporary law concerning religious observance and 
instruction in non-denominational public schools: the custom of religious instruction 
                                                             
9 This clause in the Preamble to the 1872 Act was subsequently replaced in section 8 of the Education 
(Scotland) Act 1946 by the clause “for religious observance to be practiced and for instruction in 
religion to be given to pupils”, which remains the wording used in section 8(1) of the Education 
(Scotland) Act 1980. To what extent the clause “to give instruction in religion to children” in the 1872 
Act was interpreted in the light of section 68 of the 1872 Act, which makes explicit reference to 
“instruction in religious subjects” and to “religious observance” has not here been determined.  
10 It may be noted that this clause was repeated word for word in the Education (Scotland) Act 1918, 
s7, with the additional words “subject to the provisions of section 68 (Conscience Clause) of the 
Education (Scotland) Act 1872”. 
11 Education (Scotland) Act, 1872 (c 62), s68. 
12 Education (Scotland) Act, 1872 (c 62), s1. 
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has continued, albeit expanded to include explicit reference to religious observance 
and religious instruction; the conscience clause concerning withdrawal of children 
from the same has been retained; the frequency and content of religious observance 
and instruction remains a matter of policy, not legislation. Specifically, the following 
should be noted: 
 
The Education (Scotland) Act 1980, section 8(1) retained a lightly revised version of 
the Preamble to the 1872 Act, which revised version had been first used in the 
Education (Scotland) Act 1946, section 8, in respect of the custom of public schools 
to give instruction in religion to children: 
 
Whereas it has been the custom in the public schools of Scotland for religious 
observance to be practised and for instruction in religion to be given to 
pupils13 whose parents did not object to such observance or instruction14, but 
with liberty to parents, without forfeiting any of the other advantages of the 
schools, to elect that their children should not take part in such observance or 
receive such instruction15, be it enacted that education authorities16 shall be at 
liberty to continue the said custom, subject to the provisions of section 9 of 
this Act17[emphasis added] 
 
But whereas the 1872 Act had simply granted liberty for the custom of Scottish public 
schools in relation to religious instruction to be continued, the 1980 Act, section 8(2), 
imposes a statutory obligation – first introduced 192918 and subsequently repeated in 
the Education (Scotland) Act 1946, section 8 (2) – on education authorities to 
continue with the provision of religious observance and instruction. At the same time 
the 1980 Act retains the mechanism, first introduced in 1929 and subsequently 
repeated in the 1946 Education Act, by which education authorities might discontinue 
                                                             
13 “to give instruction in religion to children” in 1872 Act. 
14 “the instruction so given” in the 1872 Act. 
15 “receive such instruction” in the 1872 Act. 
16 “and it is expedient that the managers of public schools” in the 1872 Act. 
17 There was no similar cross-reference to s68 of the 1872 Act in the 1946 Act, although this too was a 
“conscience clause”. 
18 John Stevenson, "Securing religious education in non-denominational schools 1872-1972: church 
and school. A policy of co-operation", Records of the Scottish Church History Society vol. 44 (2015), 
pp. 74-102. 
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the same via a local election. Thus the Education (Scotland) Act 1980, section 8 
provides: 
(2) It shall not be lawful for an education authority to discontinue religious 
observance or the provision of instruction in religion in terms of subsection (1) 
above, unless and until a resolution in favour of such discontinuance duly 
passed by the authority has been submitted to a poll of the local government 
electors for the education area taken for the purpose, and has been approved 
by a majority of electors voting thereat. 
 
(3) A poll under subsection (2) above shall be by ballot and shall be taken in 
accordance with rules to be made by the Secretary of State, which rules may 
apply with any necessary modifications any enactments relating to 
parliamentary or local government elections. 
The wording of both these subsections was taken directly from the Education 
(Scotland) Act 1946, section 8 (2) and (3), as also retained by the Education 
(Scotland) Act 1962, section 8 (2) and (3). 
  
The conscience clause contained in the 1872 Act (section 68) is repeated almost word 
for word in section 9 of the 1980 Act, and in this the 1980 Act follows section 9 of the 
Education Acts of 1946 and 1962: 
Every public school [and every grant-aided school]19 shall be open to pupils20 
of all denominations, and any pupil21 may be withdrawn by his parents from 
any instruction in religious subjects and from any religious observance in any 
such school; and no pupil22 shall in any such school be placed at any 
disadvantage with respect to the secular instruction given therein by reason of 
the denomination to which such pupil23 or his parents belong, or by reason of 
his being withdrawn from any instruction in religious subjects. [emphasis 
added] 
                                                             
19 Words substituted by Standards in Scotland’s Schools etc. Act 2000 asp 6 (Scottish Act) Sch.2 para. 
3(3). These words read “and every school subject to inspection and in receipt of any public money as 
herein-before provided” in section 68 of the 1872 Act. 
20 “children” in the 1872 Act. 
21 “child” in the 1872 Act. 
22 “child” in the 1872 Act. 
23 “child” in the 1872 Act. 
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Just as the 1872 Act had left the formulation of detailed regulations concerning the 
frequency of religious observance and instruction to the Scotch Education 
Department,24 detailed provisions as to the meaning of the statutory obligation in 
respect of religious observance and instruction, imposed by the 1980 Act, continues to 
be a matter of policy, rather than statutory regulation. As the Stair Memorial 
Encyclopaedia, Education (Re-issue), para 310 concerning “requirement for religious 
instruction and observance”, notes, “religious observance and instruction in schools is 
the subject of guidance by the Scottish Ministers”. 
 
4.2.2 Religious Observance in Non-denominational Schools 
In 1991 the then Scottish Office Education Department issued SOED Circular 6/91 
stating that “all primary pupils ‘should take part in religious observance not less than 
once a week’ and that all secondary pupils ‘should take part in religious observance at 
least once a month and preferably with greater frequency’”, and stating that “in ‘non-
denominational schools’ religious observance should be of a ‘broadly Christian 
character’”.25  
 
Following Scottish devolution, Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Education issued a 
report stating that many non-denominational schools were failing to provide time for 
religious observance as set out in SOED Circular 6/1991.26 In the wake of this report, 
the then Minister for Education, Europe and External Affairs, Jack McConnell, 
established a Religious Observance Review Group, which Group issued its findings in 
2004.27 The findings contained in The Report of the Religious Observance Review 
Group (Edinburgh: The Scottish Executive, 2004) were accepted by the then Scottish 
Executive (a Labour-Liberal Democrat coalition) and informed that administration’s 
Scottish Executive Education Department Circular 1/2005 concerning the Provision 
of Religious Observance in Scottish Schools. The findings of the 2004 Report were 
                                                             
24 Education (Scotland) Act, 1872 (c 62), s68. 
25 The Report of the Religious Observance Review Group (Edinburgh: The Scottish Executive, 2004), 
4. 
26 The Report of the Religious Observance Review Group (Edinburgh: The Scottish Executive, 2004), 
1. 
27 The Report of the Religious Observance Review Group (Edinburgh: The Scottish Executive, 2004), 
1. 
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also subsequently accepted by the Scottish Government in 2011 (an SNP minority 
government) and informed that administration’s Learning Directorate’s 2011 Circular 
‘Curriculum for Excellence – Provision of Religious Observation in Schools’. The 
2005 and 2011 Circulars are close as to tenor and content. 
 
Turning to the 2004 Report of the Religious Observance Review Group the following 
ought to be noted. Perhaps most importantly, the Report adopted a definition of the 
phrase “religious observance” as found in the Education (Scotland) Act 1980, which 
definition was explicitly accepted in the 2005 and 2011 Scottish 
Executive/Government Circulars concerning Religious Observance. The definition of 
“religious observance” as far as the Scottish Government is concerned is therefore 
“community acts which aim to promote the spiritual development of all members of 
the school community and express and celebrate the shared values of the school 
community”.28 The 2004 Report also offered definitions of the aims of religious 
observance, and of the term “spiritual development”;29 although these aspects of the 
Report have not been explicitly accepted by Scottish ministers in either 2005 or 2011. 
 
The consultation paper upon which the 2004 Report was founded made a distinction 
between “religious observance” and “organised acts of worship”, stating that “an 
organised act of worship is based upon the assumption that those present share 
[various elements concerning ‘focus of worship’, ‘desire to worship said focus of 
worship’, ‘commitment to life stances related to focus of worship’]. Religious 
observance does not assume these elements”. Nevertheless, the Report at the same 
time also allowed that “whilst religious observance as defined in the consultation 
paper is not an act of organised worship, it does not preclude the possibility of 
worship as the free response of individuals to the stimulus offered”.30 This is 
explained by reference to the fact that some school communities are continuous with a 
faith community, in which cases “that community’s faith in ‘the focus of worship’ 
may be assumed and worship may be considered to be appropriate as part of the 
                                                             
28 The Report of the Religious Observance Review Group (Edinburgh: The Scottish Executive, 2004), 
12; cf SOED Circular 1/2005, para. 6; cf 2011 Circular “Curriculum for Excellence – Provision of 
Religious Observation in Schools”, para. 7. 
29 The Report of the Religious Observance Review Group (Edinburgh: The Scottish Executive, 2004), 
p. 12. 
30 Ibid., pp. 15-16. 
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formal activity of the school.” The Report then added that “where, as in most non-
denominational schools, there is a diversity of beliefs and practices, the Review 
Group believes that the appropriate context for an organised act of worship is within 
the informal curriculum as part of the range of activities offered for example by 
religions, groups, chaplains, and other religious leaders”.31 
 
In this, the 2004 Report maintained that the statutory obligation imposed by the 1980 
Education Act anent “religious observation” did not mean that “organised acts of 
worship” were part of the statutory obligation. Rather, the Report allowed for a 
diversity of approaches depending upon the relation between the school and local 
community. On the one hand, it might be presumed that in some schools on, for 
example, the Isle of Lewis, children, parents, and teachers might for the most part 
happen to be Presbyterians, in which case “religious observance” would probably 
involve acts of Presbyterian worship. On the other hand, a school in, for example, 
suburban Edinburgh might choose to remove acts of worship from religious 
observance, preferring rather to permit pupils and parents belonging to the same faith 
group to participate in their own organised acts of worship as part of “the informal 
curriculum” of a school. 
 
In addition to these various distinctions, the 2004 Report also distinguished religious 
observance from religious and moral education (RME). The report went on to define 
RME within the context of both non-denominational and denominational schools, but 
for the present position on this head it is best to consult the Scottish Government 
Circulars issued in 2011 along with the ‘Curriculum for Excellence – Provision of 
Religious Observation in Schools’, namely Education Scotland’s ‘Curriculum for 
Excellence – Provision of religious and moral education in non-denominational 
schools and religious education in Roman Catholic schools’. The contents of this 
Circular are discussed further, below. 
 
As to the frequency of religious observance in non-denominational schools, the 2004 
Report recommended that, while the Scottish Office Education Department Circular 
                                                             
31 The Report of the Religious Observance Review Group (Edinburgh: The Scottish Executive, 2004), 
p. 16. 
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6/91 stated that religious observance should occur weekly in primary and monthly in 
secondary schools, “every school should provide opportunities for religious 
observance at least six times in a school year in addition to traditional celebrations 
central to the life of the school community”.32 This recommendation was accepted by 
the Scottish Executive in 2005, and by the Scottish Government in 2011.33 
 
Determining the content of religious observance is a matter firmly devolved to 
individual schools, with general support from education authorities. In the 2011 
Circular Curriculum for Excellence – Provision of Religious Observation in Schools, 
para. 11, it was stated that “The precise form of religious observance will be 
determined by each school’s policy within the local authority’s framework, but these 
might include opportunities for class, year, stage or whole school observance as well 
as involvement by pupils and other, including school chaplains and other faith 
leaders, in planning and presentation”.34 
 
In respect of the involvement of chaplains in the life of schools, this is also a matter 
devolved to schools, specifically to head teachers. Both Circular 1/2005, para. 16, and 
the 2011 Circular Curriculum for Excellence – Provision of Religious Observation in 
Schools, para. 18, contain the same provision: “Scottish Government Ministers value 
the important and varied contributions that chaplains and other faith group leaders 
make to the life of the school, for example in their involvement in religious 
observance, acts of worship, religious and moral education and a broader pastoral 
role. Head teachers are encouraged to engage in full discussion with chaplains and 
other faith group leaders in the planning and implementation of religious observance.” 
The appointment and place of chaplains in non-denominational and denominational 
schools is discussed at 4.7, below.  
 
                                                             
32 The Report of the Religious Observance Review Group (Edinburgh: The Scottish Executive, 2004), 
p. 18. 
33 SOED Circular 1/2005, para. 12; 2011 Circular “Curriculum for Excellence – Provision of Religious 
Observation in Schools”, para. 13. Both used the following sentences: “Every school should provide 
opportunities for religious observance at least six times in a school year, in addition to traditional 
celebrations central to the life of the school community, a preferably with greater frequency. We 
recognise that many primary schools value weekly religious observance as part of their regular 
assembly programme and will wish to continue with this. The school community should be involved in 
making decisions about frequency.” 
34 This clause was taken word for word from Circular 1/2005, para. 9. 
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In respect of organised acts of worship in schools, this too is a matter devolved to 
schools, principally to head teachers. Both the 2005 and 2011 Circulars accept the 
recommendations of the 2004 Report of the Religious Observance Review Group 
anent distinguishing religious observance and organised acts of worship, without 
precluding the latter being part of the former, and state that “Members of the school 
community, including pupils, parents and representatives of faith groups and 
communities, may wish to have opportunities for organised acts of worship within the 
informal curriculum of the school. [Scottish Government] Ministers would encourage 
head teachers to consider these requests positively and make suitable arrangements if 
appropriate support arrangements can be provided”.35  
 
Generally then, the statutory duty imposed upon local authorities to provide religious 
observance in Scottish non-denominational public schools by the Education 
(Scotland) Act 1980 is still in force today, but the definition of that duty, and the ways 
in which it may be discharged by local authorities and schools, has been given a broad 
interpretation by Scottish Government policy in conformity with the 2004 Report of 
the Religious Observance Review Group. Central to this policy is a continuation of 
the fact that both the 1872 and 1980 Education Acts state that “religious observance” 
is based upon “custom”, without defining what that custom, or customs, were or are. 
In this, broad scope has been given to local authorities and schools to continue with 
and evolve their own customs in respect of religious observance, and thereby to fulfil 
their statutory duty. As the Stair Memorial Encyclopaedia, Education (Re-issue), 
paragraph 310, notes, “the ‘custom’ of modern education may no longer reflect the 
‘custom’ referred to in the legislation”. 
  
4.2.3 Religious and Moral Education in Non-denominational Schools 
The Education (Scotland) Act 1980, section 8, continues to impose a statutory 
obligation on local authorities in respect of religious instruction, as well as religious 
observance, as first introduced by section 8 of the Education (Scotland) Act 1946. In 
non-denominational schools, religious instruction presently takes the form of 
“religious and moral education”. The curriculum content for RME is not a matter 
                                                             
35 2011 Circular “Curriculum for Excellence – Provision of Religious Observation in Schools”, para. 
21: cf SOED Circular 1/2005, para. 18. 
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dealt with by the 1980 Act, but is, like the content of religious observance, a matter of 
government policy, which policy tends to be devolved to education authorities and 
schools. The most recent Scottish Government Circular on the subject of RME in both 
non-denominational and denominational schools, was issued in 2011, at the same time 
as the 2011 circular anent religious observance. The 2011 “religious instruction” 
Circular, ‘Curriculum for Excellence – Provision of religious and moral education in 
non-denominational schools and religious education in Roman Catholic schools’, 
makes a distinction between “religious and moral education” in non-denominational 
schools (RME), and “religious education” in Roman Catholic schools (RERC). The 
distinction is a little misleading, since although the majority of denominational 
schools in Scotland are Roman Catholic, there are three Episcopal and one Jewish 
denominational schools in Scotland. 
 
Nevertheless, the 2011 Circular treats of RME and RERC separately. Thus, in respect 
of religious instruction in non-denominational schools (RME) the following may be 
noted, at paragraph 11: 
In order to meet statutory requirements and the principles and practices of 
Curriculum for Excellence, schools should plan and deliver religious and 
moral education as both a specific subject discipline and one which 
contributes to high quality interdisciplinary learning, as they do with each of 
the eight curriculum areas. Every child and young person can expect their 
education to provide them with a broad general education, and within 
religious and moral education this includes well planned experiences and 
outcomes across Christianity, world religions and developing beliefs and 
values… Religious and moral education should also contribute to learning and 
development through the other contexts for learning, that is the ethos and life 
of the school community and the opportunities provided for personal 
achievement. Schools and local authorities will have policies detailing their 
rationale and practices for the delivery of religious and moral education which 
are available and shared with parents, learners and the wider community. 
[Emphasis added] 
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4.3 Denominational public schools 
 
4.3.1 The Education (Scotland) Acts 1918 and 1980 
The Catholic Church in Scotland, which historically ran its own system of voluntary 
schools,36 declined to transfer its schools to the state in 1872, possibly because the 
Catholic Church in Scotland was still not at ease with the British State; and perhaps 
also because of the pronounced anti-Catholic traditions within Scottish 
Presbyterianism,37 with attendant unease at entrusting the education of Catholic 
children to a public school system still strongly influenced by Presbyterianism, 
notwithstanding the Conscience Clause contained in the Education (Scotland) Act 
1872. Historically, following the Scottish Reformation, Roman Catholics had been 
subject to various civil and penal disabilities and sanctions; in respect of education, 
seventeenth-century Scottish legislation had forbidden Roman Catholics from sending 
their children abroad for a Catholic education, and had prohibited Catholics from 
educating their own children.38 While Catholic emancipation had been a marked 
feature of nineteenth-century Catholic-British State relations, the Catholic Church in 
Scotland appears to have been still sufficiently wary of the British State in Scotland in 
1872 to persist in the maintenance of its own system of voluntary schools in Scotland.  
 
Despite the Catholic Church in Scotland’s persistence in maintaining its own system 
of schools outwith the public school system created by the 1872 Act, it became clear 
that educational outcomes for Scottish children were better in the state schools than in 
the underfunded voluntary Catholic schools39 and, as such, the Education (Scotland) 
                                                             
36 There were more than 200 voluntary Catholic schools in Scotland by 1918 (Alex Salmond, Cardinal 
Winning Lecture, 2008, http://www.scotland.gov.uk/News/Speeches/Speeches/First-
Minister/cardwinlecture). 
37 I.e. only in 1986 did the General Assembly of the Church of Scotland issue a declaratory act by 
which it ceased to affirm the anti-Catholic clauses of the Westminster Confession of Faith (General 
Assembly 1986 Act 5, Declaratory Act Anent the Westminster Confession of Faith, 
http://www.churchofscotland.org.uk/about_us/church_law/acts). 
38 Stair Memorial Encyclopaedia, volume 3, para. 1660, citing the Perverts to Papacy Act 1609 (RPS, 
1609/4/16) and the Mass Act 1661 (“Likewise his majesty, considering how dangerous it is that 
children are educated by persons popishly affected, do therefore, conforming to former acts of 
parliament, appoint that children under popish parents, tutors or curators shall be taken from them and 
committed to the education of some well-affected and religious friend, at the sight and by order of his 
majesty’s privy council”, RPS, 1661/1/56).  
39 Some examples of the discrepancies between private Catholic schools and Scottish public schools 
were highlighted in 2008 by the then First Minister, Alex Salmond: “What did such inequalities of 
funding mean in practice? A graphic picture was painted during a Commons “Supply Day Debate” on 
Scottish finances in August 1917. We are indebted to figures provided by Mr Boland - the MP for 
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Act 1918 made extensive provision for the transferral of these voluntary Catholic 
schools to the public school system.40 This scheme was not compulsory, but any such 
school not availing itself of the provisions of the Act within two years would lose any 
state funding in which it had been in receipt via the provision of education grants 
from the state.41 In order to satisfy both the Catholic Church and the trustees of the 
various voluntary Catholic schools in Scotland, the 1918 Act contained various 
guarantees for state-funded Catholic schools as to ethos, the vetting of teachers, and 
religious observance and instruction. This arrangement has been described by the 
former First Minister of Scotland, Alex Salmond, as “an unprecedented concordat 
between church and state in the provision of education”.42  
 
This, then, was the main historical context in which denominational state schools 
(hereafter denominational schools) were first created in Scotland. Nevertheless, one 
of the striking features of the 1918 Act, and the subsequent legislative provisions to 
which it has given rise concerning denominational schools, is that it contains neutral 
statutory language, and was not passed explicitly in favour of the Catholic Church. 
Rather the statutory language used refers to “denominational schools” and the 
churches or denominations in whose favour such schools are run. Thus, while the 
majority of schools nationalised by the 1918 Act were Roman Catholic, the provisions 
of the 1918 Act and its successor legislation may be applied to any “church or 
                                                                                                                                                                              
South Kerry. Which in itself is a reminder of the certainty of political change. I know there are some 
local Headteachers here so let me give you the Glasgow figures. The salary for a “board school” 
Headteacher was £366 (that’s per annum, not per week). Meanwhile for a Headteacher in a voluntary 
Catholic school, the figure was £181. A child at a Glasgow board school had £3 and 16 shillings per 
annum spent on their education. A child at a Catholic school, less than half of that. At the end of that 
Commons debate Robert Munro, the Secretary for Scotland (the post wasn’t elevated to Secretary of 
State until some years later) asked whether Scotland’s Catholic community was: “willing to bring 
schools under public control, subject to suitable safeguards both in the matter of the choice of teachers 
and religious instruction, and so enjoy the benefit of rate aid?' If so, Munro went on to say, ‘the 
position of the schools would in every particular, immediately improve.’ He wasn’t wrong!” 
 (Alex Salmond, Cardinal Winning Lecture, 2008, 
http://www.scotland.gov.uk/News/Speeches/Speeches/First-Minister/cardwinlecture). 
40 The 1918 Act in fact replaced the elected school boards created by the 1872 Act with education 
authorities, to which new education authorities voluntary denominational schools were to be 
transferred. 
41 Education (Scotland) Act 1918, section 18(5): “After the expiry of two years from the passing of this 
act no grant from the Education (Scotland) Fund shall be made in respect of any school to which this 
section applies unless the school shall have been transferred to the education authority, and as from the 
expiry of that period the Education (Scotland) Act, 1897, shall cease to have effect: Provided, That the 
department may extend the said period in any case where, in the opinion of the department, further 
time is required for the completion of a transfer.” 
42 Cardinal Winning Lecture, 2008, http://www.scotland.gov.uk/News/Speeches/Speeches/First-
Minister/cardwinlecture 
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denominational body” in Scotland. This term “church or denominational body” has 
been given a sufficiently broad definition to allow creation of a Jewish 
denominational primary school in Scotland. How far this definition may be construed 
or reformed is considered further, below.  
 
In respect of voluntary schools transferred to the education authorities created by the 
Education (Scotland) Act 1918, c 48, section 18(3) made provision for teachers in 
denominational schools to be approved by representatives of the churches or 
denominational bodies in whose interest a denominational school was being 
conducted by an education authority:  
the education authority... shall have in respect thereto the sole power of 
regulating the curriculum and of appointing teachers : Provided, That –  
(ii) All teachers appointed to the staff of any such school by the 
education authority shall in every case be teachers who satisfy the 
department as to qualification, and are approved as regards their 
religious belief and character by representatives of the church or 
denominational body in whose interest the school has been conducted.  
 
Section 18(3)(iii) made provision for  religious observance and instruction in public 
denominational schools in the following terms:  
Subject to the provisions of section 68 (conscience clause) of the Education 
(Scotland) Act, 1872, the time set apart for religious instruction or observance 
in any such school shall not be less than that so set apart according to the use 
and wont of the former management of the school, and the education authority 
shall appoint as supervisor without remuneration of religious instruction for 
each such school, a person approved as regards religious belief and character 
as aforesaid, and it shall be the duty of the supervisor so appointed to report to 
the education authority as to the efficiency of the religious instruction given in 
such schools. The supervisor shall have the right of entry to the school at all 
times set apart for religious instruction or observance. The education authority 
shall give facilities for the holding of religious examinations in every such 
school.  
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In respect of the creation of new denominational schools by education authorities, 
section 18(8) of the 1918 Act stated that: 
In any case where the department are satisfied, upon representations made to 
them by the education authority of any education area, or by any church or 
denominational body acting on behalf of the parents of children belonging to 
such church or body, and after such inquiry as the department deem necessary, 
that a new school is required for the accommodation of children whose parents 
are resident within that education area, regard being had to the religious belief 
of such parents, it shall be lawful for the education authority of that area to 
provide a new school, to be held, maintained, and managed by them subject to 
the conditions prescribed in subsection (8) of this section, so far as those 
conditions are applicable ; the time set apart for religious instruction in the 
new school being not less than that so set apart in schools in the same 
education area which have been transferred under this section.  
 
In respect of the discontinuation of denominational schools by education authorities, 
section 18(9) of the 1918 Act stated that: 
If at any time after the expiry of 10 years from the transfer of a school under 
this section or from the provision of a new school as aforesaid, the education 
authority by whom the school is maintained are of opinion that the school is 
no longer required, or that, having regard to the religious belief of the parents 
of the children attending the school, the conditions prescribed in subsection 
(3) of this section ought no longer to apply thereto, the authority may so 
represent to the department, and if the department, after such inquiry as they 
deem necessary, are of the same opinion and so signify, it shall be lawful for 
the education authority thereafter to discontinue the school, or, as the case 
may be, to hold, maintain, and manage the same in all respects as a public 
school, not subject to those conditions: Provided, That in the case of any 
school which has been transferred to an education authority under this section, 
that authority shall in either of those events make to the trustees by whom the 
school was transferred, or to their successors in office or representatives, such 
compensation (if any) in respect of the school or other property so transferred 
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as may be agreed, or as may be determined, failing agreement, by an arbiter 
appointed by the department upon the application of either party. 
 
These principal features of the Education (Scotland) Act 1918, section 18 – 
concerning the transfer, creation, and discontinuation of denominational schools to 
and by Scottish education authorities, with rights to denominations to approve both 
teachers and unremunerated supervisors of religious education in such schools as to 
religious belief and character, and with guarantees that the time set apart for religious 
observance and instruction in such schools would conform to the customs of such 
schools prior to their transfer to education authorities – are still in effect retained 
today by virtue of various sections of the Education (Scotland) Act 1980, as amended 
by the Education (Scotland) Act 1981. The provisions of the 1918 Act were not 
interpolated directly into the 1980 Act, but rather were transmitted through various 
sections of the Education (Scotland) Acts of 1946 and 1962, with various additions.43 
  
The most relevant sections of the Education (Scotland) Act 1980, as amended, in 
relation to denominational schools are as follows: 
 
Section 16 –The transference of denominational schools to education 
authorities 
16 (1) It shall be lawful for the person or persons vested with the title of any 
school established after 21st November 1918, to which section 18 of the Act 
of 1918 would have applied had the school been in existence at that date, with 
the consent of the trustees of any trust upon which the school is held and of 
the Secretary of State, to transfer the school together with the site thereof and 
any land or buildings and furniture held and used in connection therewith, by 
sale, lease or otherwise, to the education authority, who shall be bound to 
accept such transfer, upon such terms as to price, rent, or other consideration 
as may be agreed, or as may be determined, failing agreement, by an arbiter 
appointed by the Secretary of State upon the application of either party. 
 
                                                             
43 The history of the development of statutory provisions concerning denominational schools from the 
1918 Act, through the 1946 and 1962 Acts, to the 1980 Act has not been researched in any detail for 
this report. 
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Section 17 – Provision, maintenance and equipment of schools and other 
buildings 
 (2) In any case where an education authority are satisfied, whether upon 
representations made to them by any church or denominational body acting on 
behalf of the parents of children belonging to such church or body or 
otherwise, that a new school is required for the accommodation of children 
whose parents are resident within the area of the authority, regard being had to 
the religious belief of such parents, it shall be lawful for the education 
authority to provide a new school.44 
 
In respect of this provision, it should be noted that new denominational schools are 
subject to section 21(1) – (4) of the 1980 Act, which subsections govern 
denominational schools already in existence (as per section 21(5)), with the proviso 
that the time set aside for religious observance and instruction is not less than that in 
other denominational schools within the education authority, rather than being 
governed by the “use and wont” clause governing these matters in voluntary schools 
transferred to education authorities. 
 
In respect of the process for approving the religious belief and character of teachers to 
be appointed to denominational schools, section 21 provides: 
21(2) Subject to subsections (2A) and (2C) below, in any such school the 
education authority shall have the sole power of regulating the curriculum and 
of appointing teachers: 
(2A) A teacher appointed to any post on the staff of any such school by the 
education authority shall satisfy the Secretary of State as to qualification, and 
shall be required to be approved as regards his religious belief and character 
by representatives of the church or denominational body in whose interest the 
school has been conducted; 
(2B) Where the said representatives of a church or denominational body refuse 
to give the approval mentioned in subsection (2A) above they shall state their 
reasons for such refusal in writing. 
                                                             
44 S. 17(2) substituted by the Education (Scotland) Act 1981 (c. 58), s. 7(1), Sch. 8 
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(2C) subject to the provisions of section 9 of this Act,45 the time set apart for 
religious instruction or observance in any such school shall not be less than 
that so set apart according to the use and wont of the former management of 
the school.46  
 
In respect of section 21(2A), the procedure whereby a teacher may satisfy the 
Catholic Church as to religious belief and character is set out on the website of the 
Scottish Catholic Education Service. Roman Catholics must obtain a reference from 
their parish priest, while non-Catholics must provide the details of a ‘suitable 
professional person’ willing to provide a reference as to religious belief and 
character.47 
 
In respect of the appointment of supervisors of religious instruction, section 21(3) 
provides:  
For each such school the education authority shall appoint as supervisor of 
religious instruction, without remuneration, a person approved as regards 
religious belief and character as aforesaid, and the supervisor so appointed 
shall report to the education authority as to the efficiency of the religious 
instruction given in such school, and shall be entitled to enter the school at all 
times set apart for religious instruction or observance. 
 
Section 22 – Discontinuance and moves of educational establishments 
22(4) If at any time after the expiry of ten years from the transfer of a school 
under section 16 of this Act, or from the provision of a new school under 
section 17(2) of this Act, the education authority by whom the school is 
maintained are of opinion that the school is no longer required, or that, having 
regard to the religious belief of the parents of the children attending the 
                                                             
45 Section 9 being the Conscience Clause in respect of withdrawal of pupils from religious observance 
and instruction. In this respect the Scottish Government Circular issued in 2011 “Curriculum for 
Excellence – Provision of Religious Observation in Schools”, para. 17 noted that “Where a parent 
chooses a denominational school for their child’s education, they choose to opt in to the school’s ethos 
and practice which is imbued with religious faith and religious observance. In denominational schools, 
it is therefore more difficult to extricate a pupil from all experiences which are influenced by the 
school’s faith character.” 
46 It should be noted that this section of the Act as it appears here has been variously amended and 
expanded by the Self-Governing Schools etc. (Scotland) Act 1989 (c.39). 
47 http://www.sces.uk.com/approval.html 
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school, the conditions prescribed in subsections (1) to (4) of section 21 of this 
Act or in the said subsections so far as applicable and having effect by virtue 
of subsection (5) of that section, as the case may be, ought no longer to apply 
thereto, it shall, subject to sections 22C and 22D of this Act and the Schools 
(Consultation) (Scotland) Act 2010 (asp 2),48 be lawful for the education 
authority thereafter to discontinue the school, or, as the case may be, to hold, 
maintain and manage the same in all respects as a public school not subject to 
those conditions: 
Provided that— 
(i) in the case of any school which has been transferred as aforesaid to 
an education authority, that authority shall in either of those events 
make to the trustees by whom the school was transferred, or to their 
successors in office or representatives, such compensation (if any) in 
respect of the school or other property so transferred as may be agreed, 
or as may be determined, failing agreement, by an arbiter appointed by 
the Secretary of State upon the application of either party; and 
(ii) if before the expiry of ten years from the transfer of any such 
school, the education authority are of opinion as aforesaid and so 
represent, and the trustees by whom the school was transferred, or their 
successors in office or representatives, formally intimate to the 
authority that they concur with the authority in their opinion as 
represented, then in such case, it shall, subject to sections 22C and 22D 
of this Act and the Schools (Consultation) (Scotland) Act 2010 (asp 2), 
be lawful for the education authority forthwith to discontinue or to 
hold, maintain or manage the school as aforesaid, subject to the like 
provision with respect to compensation.  
 
Note that in respect of the payment of compensation in section 22(4)(i), the Stair 
Memorial Encyclopaedia comments that when denominational schools transferred to 
education authorities are discontinued “compensation must be paid to the trustees, or 
                                                             
48 Which concerns the requirement of local authorities to consult in respect of a range of proposals, 
including changing a denominational school into a non-denominational school etc. 
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their successors or representatives, by whom the school was transferred.”49 
  
In respect of any proposal put forward by an educational authority by which a 
denominational school may be changed so as to remove the possibility of religious 
observance and instruction for the children of parents of religious faith at the school 
in question, it is provided that: 
Section 22C - Consent for certain changes affecting denominational 
schools. 
(1) An education authority shall submit to the Secretary of State for his 
consent any proposal of theirs to which this section applies and shall not 
implement such a proposal without his consent. 
(2) A proposal to which this section applies is one which— 
(a) relates to a school transferred to an education authority under 
section 16(1) or provided by them under section 17(2) of this Act; and 
(b) will, if implemented, have the effect that all or some of the pupils 
who attend the school will no longer receive school education in a 
school of the kind referred to in paragraph (a) above or that all or some 
of the children who would, but for the implementation of the proposal, 
have been likely to attend it will not be likely to receive such education 
in a school of that kind. 
(3) The Secretary of State shall not grant consent under this section unless he 
is satisfied that adequate arrangements have been made for the religious 
instruction of pupils and children who would, as a result of implementation of 
the proposal, no longer receive or be likely to receive school education in a 
school of the kind referred to in paragraph (a) of subsection (2) above. 
(4) In granting consent under this section the Secretary of State may impose 
such conditions as he thinks fit with regard to the religious instruction of the 
pupils and children referred to in paragraph (b) of subsection (2) above and to 
related matters and conditions imposed by the Secretary of State under this 
section may be revoked or amended by him at any time. 
(5) Any question which may arise— 
(a) whether a proposal is one to which this section applies; 
                                                             
49 Stair Memorial Encyclopaedia, volume 3, para. 1665. 
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(b) as to the implementation of a proposal to which the Secretary of 
State has consented under this section; 
(c) as to the fulfilment or observation of any conditions upon his 
consent imposed under subsection (4) above shall be determined by the 
Secretary of State and the education authority shall perform their 
duties under this Act in accordance with any such determination. 
(6) In this section, the reference to section 16(1) or 17(2) of this Act shall 
include a reference to the corresponding provision of the Act of 1918, the Act 
of 1946 and the Act of 1962. 
 
In respect of the consent of Secretary of State for Scotland required for any proposal 
put forward by an educational authority by which a denominational school may be 
discontinued, amalgamated with another school, moved to another site, have its 
admissions arrangements altered, or be changed into a non-denominational school, in 
those cases where agreement has not been reached by the education authority and the 
representatives of the church or denomination in whose interest the school is 
conducted, it is provided: 
Section 22D - Further provisions relating to denominational schools 
(1) An education authority shall submit to the Secretary of State for his 
consent any proposal of theirs to which this section applies and shall not 
implement such a proposal without his consent. 
(2) A proposal to which this section applies is one— 
(a) which relates to a school transferred to an education authority under 
section 16(1) or provided by them under section 17(2) of this Act; 
(b) to— 
(i) discontinue the school or a part of it; 
(ii) amalgamate the school or a part of it with another school; 
(iii) change the site of the school; 
(iv) change the arrangements for admission to the school; or 
(v) disapply to the school the conditions prescribed in 
subsections (1) to (4) of section 21 of this Act or in the said 
subsections so far as applicable and having effect by virtue of 
subsection (5) of that section; and 
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(c) in relation to which the Secretary of State, having consulted any 
education authority affected by it, is satisfied, upon written 
representations made, in the case of any church or denominational 
body in whose interest the school is conducted other than the Roman 
Catholic Church, by a person authorised for that purpose by that 
church or denominational body and, in the case of the Roman Catholic 
Church, by the Scottish Hierarchy of that Church, that –  
(i) if implemented, it will have any of the results specified in 
subsection (3) below; and 
(ii) the education authority submitting the proposal under 
subsection (1) above  and the church, denominational body or 
Hierarchy, as the case may be, have, after discussion, failed to 
reach agreement that it should be implemented. 
(3) The results referred to in subsection (2)(c)(i) above are— 
(a) a significant deterioration for pupils belonging to the area of the 
education authority submitting the proposal under subsection (1) 
above; or 
(b) a significant deterioration for pupils belonging to the area of any 
other education authority; or 
(c) where neither paragraph (a) nor paragraph (b) above applies, such a 
deterioration for pupils as mentioned in the said paragraph (a) and 
pupils belonging to the area of another education authority as, taken 
together, amounts to a significant deterioration, in the provision, 
distribution or availability of school education in schools of the kind 
referred to in subsection (2)(a) above compared with such provision, 
distribution or availability in other public schools. 
(5) The Secretary of State shall not grant consent under this section in relation 
to a school unless he is satisfied that adequate arrangements have been made 
for the religious instruction of the children who will no longer receive or be 
likely to receive school education in a school of the kind referred to in 
subsection (2)(a) above. 
(6) In granting consent under this section in relation to a school the Secretary 
of State may impose such conditions as he thinks fit with regard to the 
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religious instruction of the children who will no longer receive or be likely to 
receive school education in a school of the kind referred to in subsection (2)(a) 
above and to related matters and, in doing so, he shall have regard to the duties 
imposed by section 21 of this Act on education authorities in relation to 
schools of that kind, and conditions imposed by the Secretary of State under 
this section may be revoked or amended by him at any time. 
(7) Any question which may arise— 
(a) whether a proposal is one to which this section applies; 
(b) as to the implementation of a proposal to which the Secretary of 
State has consented under this section; 
(c) as to the fulfilment or observation of any conditions upon his 
consent imposed under subsection (6) above shall be determined by the 
Secretary of State and the education authority shall perform their 
duties under this Act in accordance with any such determination. 
(8) In this section the reference to section 16(1) or 17(2) of this Act shall 
include a reference to the corresponding provision of the Act of 1918, the Act 
of 1946 and the Act of 1962. 
 
The provisions made by section 22 of the Education (Scotland) Act 1980 in respect of 
the discontinuation of denominational schools by a local authority were considered by 
the House of Lords in an appeal from the Inner House of the Court of Session in 
1987, namely Scottish Hierarchy of the Roman Catholic Church v Highland Regional 
Council. Highland Regional Council proposed to discontinue two Roman Catholic 
primarily schools within the region, and obtained the consent of the Secretary of State 
for Scotland to that effect. The Hierarchy of the Roman Catholic Church petitioned 
the Court of Session for judicial review of the Secretary of State for Scotland’s 
decision in the matter, on the ground that the Secretary had acted ultra vires. This 
argument was rejected by both the Inner and Outer House, and eventually by the 
House of Lords. Nevertheless, Lord Mackay of Clashfern’s judgment in the House of 
Lords provides a helpful summary of section 22 of the 1980 Act thus: 
My Lords, the judges in the Court of Session and counsel before your 
Lordships were agreed that in these provisions Parliament had not described 
its intentions with conspicuous clarity. However, in my opinion, it is clear that 
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the legislature intended, by the amendments introduced in 1981 to s. 22, to 
authorise education authorities generally to use the powers affected by the 
amendments without reference to the Secretary of State. On the other hand, 
Parliament appreciated that certain proposals to exercise these powers might 
have particular consequences which make it expedient that the Secretary of 
State’s consent to such proposals should be required before they could be 
implemented. I take the example of the power to close a school which is in 
issue in the present case. Ordinarily the authority, after the necessary 
consultation prescribed under s. 22A, could give effect to the proposal without 
recourse to the Secretary of State. If, however, the school proposed for closure 
had a primary department and the nearest primary school was more than five 
miles away the authority could not give effect to that proposal without the 
consent of the Secretary of State. If the school was a denominational school 
and its closure meant that some or all of its pupils would no longer be 
educated at such a school its closure required the consent of the Secretary of 
State. If the school was a denominational school and its closure involved a 
significant deterioration in the provision by the education authority of 
denominational schools as compared with non-denominational schools its 
closure would require the consent of the Secretary of State. The criteria 
established under s. 22B and s. 22C are relatively clear cut. Whether or not a 
significant deterioration would result under s. 22D is very much a matter of 
opinion and therefore called for a preliminary ruling whether the proposal did 
involve such a significant deterioration. If it does, the consent of the Secretary 
of State is required.50 
 
In addition, the case reveals various interesting details in respect of the conditions the 
Secretary of State for Scotland can attach to the giving of his consent for a 
denominational school to be discontinued. In the instance of one of the two 
denominational schools, which the Secretary gave his consent to the local authority’s 
proposal to discontinue, the following conditions were applied. Since the pupils who 
had formally attended the denominational school were to be transferred to a non-
denominational school, a teaching position was guaranteed in that school for a teacher 
                                                             
50 Scottish Hierarchy of the Roman Catholic Church v Highland Regional Council, 1987 S.L.T. 708. 
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approved by the Hierarchy of the Catholic Church, provision was made for the 
transferred pupils to receive religious instruction four times a week from a 
representative (i.e. chaplain) appointed by the Hierarchy, and one hour a week of 
religious observance. From this, it may be the case that various non-denominational 
schools in Scotland have specific provisions made by virtue of decisions made by 
former Secretaries of State for Scotland by which they are rendered in effect quasi-
denominational schools. 
  
While the specific arrangements reached in Scotland in respect of faith schools have 
been driven, historically and principally, by the situation of the Catholic Church, 
statutory provisions are couched in terms of “churches and denominational bodies” 
and, as such, faith schools may be provided by the state for any religious group. At 
present “Scotland has 370 state-funded faith schools - 366 Catholic, one Jewish and 
three Episcopalian”.51  
  
At present, the regulations governing the creation of new denominational schools 
make no explicit provision for belief bodies. This may be because no belief body has 
petitioned a local authority to the effect that a “denominational” school be established 
and carried on in its interests. Nevertheless, it is unlikely that a local authority would 
reject a petition from a belief body in such a case on the ground that the petitioning 
body was not a denomination or religious body. It is already well established in the 
jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights that the term “religion” should 
be interpreted broadly, so as to include non-religious belief and there are specific 
examples in Scots law of this approach being applied: Scots marriage law52 and Scots 
charity law53 hold belief bodies and non-religious forms of belief to be directly 
analogous with and equal to religious bodies and religious belief. 
 
4.3.2 Admissions Policies for Denominational Schools 
Admissions policies for denominational schools are a matter for individual local 
authorities, and as such are not determined by the Scottish Government or by 
individual schools. Local authorities may alter their admission policies in respect of 
                                                             
51 http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Topics/Education/Schools/FAQs  
52 i.e. Marriage (Scotland) Act 1977, s. 8(1)(a)(ii). 
53 Charities and Trustee Investment (Scotland) Act 2005, s. 7(3)(f). 
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denominational schools, but must only do so following a public consultation,54 and 
with the consent of the Secretary of State for Scotland.55 In effect, local authorities 
may tighten or relax admission procedures depending upon the capacity and 
occupancy levels of denominational schools within its jurisdiction. So, if Catholic 
schools are oversubscribed, admission policies may be tightened so as to permit the 
admission to denominational schools only of those children in possession of a valid 
baptismal certificate.56 Conversely, admission policies presumably may be relaxed 
where there are declining numbers of Catholic families within a school catchment 
area.  
 
The admissions policies of local authorities in respect of denominational schools may 
not directly discriminate against potential pupils not of the religion in whose interests 
the schools in question are carried on, but they may prioritise potential pupils who are 
of the religion in question. The selection of pupils for admission to denominational 
schools by having regard to their or their parents’ religion is not considered to be 
unlawfully discriminatory under the terms of the Equality Act 2010. So, the Equality 
Act 2010, s. 85 (1) and (2) (a) to (d) states that: 
(1) The responsible body of a school to which this section applies must not 
discriminate against a person— 
(a) in the arrangements it makes for deciding who is offered admission 
as a pupil; 
(b) as to the terms on which it offers to admit the person as a pupil; 
(c) by not admitting the person as a pupil. 
(2) The responsible body of such a school must not discriminate against a 
pupil— 
(a) in the way it provides education for the pupil; 
(b) in the way it affords the pupil access to a benefit, facility or service; 
(c) by not providing education for the pupil; 
                                                             
54 Conform to the Schools (Consultation) (Scotland) Act 2010. 
55 Education (Scotland) Act 1980, s. 22D(2)(iv). The Secretary of State for Scotland must consult the 
representatives of the denominations in whose interests denominational schools are being carried on 
within the local authority in question prior to giving his consent, as per s. 22D(2)(c). In granting such 
consent, the Secretary of State for Scotland may impose certain conditions, as per s. 22D(6).  
56 For example see the recent consultation undertaken by Falkirk Council in this respect at 
http://www.falkirk.gov.uk/services/council-democracy/consultations-surveys/previous-
consultations/schools-admissions-policy.aspx  
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(d) by not affording the pupil access to a benefit, facility or service; 
 
Notwithstanding that, Scottish denominational schools are exempt from these 
provisions by virtue of schedule 11, paragraph 5 to the same Act, concerning religion 
or belief-related discrimination, which states that the section just cited: 
so far as relating to religion or belief, does not apply in relation to— 
(c) a school transferred to an education authority under section 16 of 
the Education (Scotland) Act 1980 (transfer of certain schools to 
education authorities) which is conducted in the interest of a church or 
denominational body; 
(d) a school provided by an education authority under section 17(2) of 
that Act (denominational schools). 
 
The UK Government’s Department of Education 2014 The Equality Act 2010 and 
Schools advice document, pages 12 to 13, offers a discussion of a faith school’s 
admissions policies and the Equality Act 2010. Although this document concerns 
English, rather than Scottish, schools, the discussion of the provisions and exemptions 
contained in the 2010 Act is nevertheless helpful: 
Schools with a religious character  
2.3 Schools with a religious character (commonly known as faith schools) 
have certain exceptions to the religion or belief provisions which allow them 
to discriminate because of religion or belief in relation to admissions and in 
access to any benefit, facility or service.  
 
Admissions  
2.4 Schools with a religious character may give priority in admissions to 
members of their own religion. The Admissions Code provides that this may 
only be done when a school is oversubscribed – schools subject to the Code 
are not permitted to refuse admission to pupils not of their faith if they have 
unfilled places. 
 
For example, a Muslim school may lawfully give priority to Muslim pupils 
when choosing between applicants for admission. However, the Admissions 
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Code will not allow it to refuse to accept pupils of another or no religion 
unless it is oversubscribed.  
 
The exception is not in fact confined to preferring children of the school’s own 
faith. It would, for example, allow a Church of England school to allocate 
some places to children from Hindu or Muslim families if it wanted to ensure 
a mixed intake reflecting the diversity of the local population. It would not, 
however, allow the school to base this selection on ethnic background rather 
than faith.  
 
Benefits facilities and services  
2.5 In addition to the admissions exception, schools with a religious character 
also have exceptions for how they provide education to pupils and in the way 
they allow access to other aspects of school life which are not necessarily part 
of the curriculum. For example:  
A Jewish school which provides spiritual instruction or pastoral care from a 
rabbi is not discriminating unlawfully by not making equivalent provision for 
pupils from other religious faiths.  
A Church of England school which organises visits for pupils to sites of 
particular interest to its own faith, such as a cathedral, is not discriminating 
unlawfully by not arranging trips to sites of significance to the faiths of other 
pupils.  
A child of a different faith could not claim, for example, that they were being 
treated less favourably because objects symbolic of a school’s faith, such as 
the Bible, were give a special status in the school.  
 
What is not permissible  
2.6 These exceptions allow such schools to conduct themselves in a way 
which is compatible with their religious ethos. But the Equality Act does not 
permit less favourable treatment of a pupil because they do not (or no longer) 
belong to the school’s religion. For example, it would be unlawful for a 
Catholic school to treat a pupil less favourably because he rejected the 
Catholic faith and declared himself to be a Jehovah’s Witness or an atheist.  
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2.7 Nor does it allow them to discriminate on religious grounds in other 
respects, such as excluding a pupil or subjecting a pupil to any other 
detriment. It also does not permit them to discriminate in relation to other 
protected characteristics, for example a school with a religious character 
would be acting unlawfully if it refused to admit a child because he or she was 
gay – or their parents were.' 
 
4.3.3 Religious Education in Denominational Schools 
As noted above, the Scottish Government makes a distinction between religious 
instruction in non-denominational schools (RME) and religious instruction in 
denominational, or as the 2011 Circular somewhat misleadingly designates them, 
Roman Catholic schools (RERC). In respect of Roman Catholic schools, the Scottish 
Government’s 2011 Circular on religious instruction differentiates between 
“Religious and Moral Education and Religious Education in Roman Catholic Schools 
within Curriculum for Excellence” (paras. 4. to 8.) and “Religious Education in 
Roman Catholic Schools” (paras. 12. to 14.). 
 
In respect of the former the following extracts in particular may be noted: 
Paragraph 4 mentions views which are independent of religious belief, but 
also uses explicitly theological language: [RERC] increases children and 
young people’s awareness of the spiritual dimension of human life through 
exploring the world’s major religions and views, including those which are 
independent of religious belief, and considering the challenges posed by those 
beliefs and values... Specifically, the process of learning in religious education 
in Roman Catholic schools assists children and young people to make an 
informed mature response to God’s call to relationship. This encourages 
children and young people to act in accordance with an informed conscience 
in relation to matters of morality through developing their knowledge and 
understanding of significant aspects of Catholic Christian faith. 
  
Paragraph 6: In Roman Catholic schools the experiences and outcomes should 
be delivered in line with the guidance provided by the Scottish Catholic 
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Education Service. 
 
Paragraph 7: Under section 9 of the Education (Scotland) Act 1980, the 
conscience clause advises that parents have a statutory right to withdraw 
children from participation in religious and moral education and religious 
education in Roman Catholic schools. 
 
Paragraph 8: An additional factor which parents should consider is that in 
choosing a denominational school for their child’s education, they choose to 
opt in to the school’s ethos and practice which is imbued with religious faith 
and it is therefore more difficult to extricate a pupil from all experiences 
which are influenced by the school’s faith character. 
 
In respect of the latter the following may be noted: 
Paragraph 12: All Catholic schools are expected by the Bishops’ Conference 
of Scotland to follow guidelines established by the Catholic Education 
Commission on the provision of adequate time for religious education within 
the school curriculum. These guidelines indicate a requirement for a minimum 
of 2.5 hours per week in primary school and 2 hours per week in all stages of 
secondary school. In all secondary stages this minimum time allocation is 
expected by the Commission to be provided through 2 periods of religious 
education classes per week and enriched by additional activities throughout 
the school year.' 
 
Paragraph 13 concerning the relevant legislation on the management of 
denominational schools in Scotland states that: 
A teacher appointed to any post on the staff of any such school by the 
education authority shall be required to be approved as regards religious belief 
and character by representatives of the church or denominational body in 
whose interest the school has been conducted. For those teaching posts which 
impact on the teaching of religious education, teachers will, in addition, be 
expected to have obtained an appropriate teaching qualification in Catholic 
Religious Education.' 
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Paragraph 14: The role of the wider parish community plays an important part 
in the delivery of religious education. Active learning approaches to learning 
and teaching, including collaborative learning, will encourage children and 
young people to discuss and share ideas, experiences and moral challenges in 
a variety of ways. Such opportunities are not only provided by the teacher but 
by parents and families and in local parish and community settings. Schools 
are encouraged to use the rich resources available from the local, national and 
global community when planning their programmes of study. 
 
4.4 Rights to education 
 
Both parents and their children have various rights in respect of education: 
international and European human rights and legal rights set out in domestic 
legislation. To some extent these rights take account of religion, although generally 
subject to restrictions which recognise the overriding requirements of providing 
efficient instruction and training and avoiding unreasonable public expenditure.57 
Equality rights also operate to protect against discrimination between different 
religions and beliefs and these are relevant in moves towards greater diversity of 
beliefs in the context of education. A detailed exploration of these various areas of 
law is beyond the scope of this review58 and what this section aims to do is simply to 
outline the key provisions and protections which exist and to highlight some of the 
issues to which they may give rise.  
 
4.4.1 The European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) 
The European Convention on Human Rights, First Protocol, Article 2 states that:  
 
No person shall be denied the right to education. In the exercise of any 
functions which it assumes in relation to education and teaching, the State 
shall respect the right of parents to ensure such education and teaching is in 
                                                             
57 Human Rights Act 1998, Sched 3.  
58 See for further detail R Reed and J Murdoch, A Guide to Human Rights Law in Scotland (3rd ed) 
Bloomsbury, 2008, 6.153 – 6.157 and for discussion of children’s rights and education law in Scotland, 
L-A Barnes, “The Child’s Right to Education” in A Cleland and EE Sutherland, Children’s Rights in 
Scotland (3rd ed), W Green, 2009, 209-231. 
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conformity with their own religious and philosophical convictions. 
 
The European Court of Human Rights has stated that the second sentence of Article 2 
aims in short at safeguarding the possibility of pluralism in education, which 
possibility is essential for the preservation of the “democratic society as conceived by 
the Convention. In view of the power of the modern State, it is above all through State 
teaching that this aim must be realised.” 59 
 
It is clear that the right to respect for religious and philosophical convictions belongs 
to the parents of a child and not to the child or to any religious organisation or 
association.60 This approach is followed in Scots domestic law, as set out below. It fits 
well with the general tenor of respect for private and family life.61  
 
At the time of ratification of the treaty, the United Kingdom made a reservation to the 
effect that the obligation under Article 2 only applies in so far as “it is compatible 
with the provision of efficient instruction and training, and the avoidance of 
unreasonable public expenditure”.62 In X and Y v United Kingdom,63 it was made clear 
that the Article did not place an obligation on a state to establish or support any 
establishment supporting any particular set of religious or other beliefs. The right 
operates in respect of access to the education which is being provided rather than 
requiring a state to make special educational provision in respect of particular 
religious or other beliefs. 
 
4.4.2 The UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC) 
While the ECHR sets out general human rights, the UN Convention on the Rights of 
the Child is a specialised set of rights designed specifically for children. Articles 28–
30 of the UN CRC all deal with aspects of education, which can overlap in various 
ways with religion. Education as a fundamental developmental right is set out in 
Article 28 and further elaboration of the aims of education is set out as follows in 
Article 29: 
                                                             
59 Kjeldsen, Busk Madsen and Pedersen v Denmark (1976), (1979-80) 1 E.H.R.R. 711. 
60 Jordebo Foundation of Christian Schools and Jordebo v Sweden (1987) DR 51. 
61 Art 8 
62 Human Rights Act 1998, Sched 3. 
63 (1982) DR 31, 210. 
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1. States Parties agree that the education of the child shall be directed to 
(a) the development of the child’s personality, talents and mental and 
physical abilities to their fullest potential; 
(b) the development of respect for human rights and fundamental 
freedoms, and for the principles enshrined in the Charter of the United 
Nations; 
(c) the development of respect for the child’s parents, his or her own 
cultural identity, language and values, for the national values of the 
country in which the child is living, the country from which he or she 
may originate, and for civilisations different from his or her own; 
(d) the preparation of the child for responsible life in a free society, in the 
spirit of understanding, peace, tolerance, equality of sexes and 
friendship among all peoples, ethnic, national and religious groups and 
persons of indigenous origin; … 
 
The religious rights of children in minority communities have specific protection in 
terms of Article 30. In contrast to the individual focus of many of the other Articles, 
Article 30 highlights in particular the right of the child “in community with other 
members of his or her group … to profess and practise his or her own religion.” 
Although the CRC sets out individual rights for children, it proceeds on the basis that 
children are best situated within families and again there is clear respect for parents 
within the context of education. Article 5 provides that: 
States Parties shall respect the responsibilities, rights and duties of parents or, 
where applicable, the members of the extended family or community as 
provided for by local custom, legal guardians or other persons legally 
responsible for the child, to provide, in a manner consistent with the evolving 
capacities of the child, appropriate direction and guidance in the exercise by 
the child of the rights recognized in the present Convention. 
 
4.4.3 Domestic law 
The provisions of Scots law in respect of the right to education and rights in respect of 
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religious education are largely consistent with these various human rights.  
 
Section 28(1) of the Education (Scotland) Act 1980 provides that: 
In the exercise and performance of their powers and duties under this Act, the 
Secretary of State and education authorities shall have regard to the general 
principle that, so far as is compatible with the provision of suitable instruction 
and training and the avoidance of unreasonable public expenditure, pupils are 
to be educated in accordance with the wishes of their parents. 
 
In keeping with the idea that the state provision of religious education is a benefit for 
religious parents rather than an independent right for children,64 it is the parents who 
have the right to remove their child from religious education in school. The view of 
the Scottish Government is that “there is an intrinsic value in learning about religion 
as well as learning from religion” and that religious and moral education should not 
be simply about the delivery of information but should also allow for “the idea of 
‘personal search’” and the “development of a child or young person’s own beliefs and 
values”.65 Section 9 of the Education (Scotland) Act 1980 provides, in what is termed 
the “conscience clause”, that: 
Every public school [and every grant-aided school] shall be open to pupils of 
all denominations, and any pupil may be withdrawn by his parents from any 
instruction in religious subjects and from any religious observance in any such 
school; and no pupil shall in any such school be placed at any disadvantage 
with respect to the secular instruction given therein by reason of the 
denomination to which such pupil or his parents belong, or by reason of his 
being withdrawn from any instruction in religious subjects. 
 
The first part of this provision fits very closely with the human rights protections for 
individual belief and conscience set out above and the second part reflects the 
contemporary legal framework of equality which aims to protect against 
                                                             
64 For further discussion, see e.g. S. Grover, “Children’s right to be educated for tolerance: minority 
rights and inclusion” (2007) 19(1) Education and the Law 59. 
65 Scottish Government, Curriculum for excellence: religious and moral education principles and 
practice, 2012, available at www.curriculumforexcellencescotland.gov.uk. In Scotland there is 
provision for both religious education and religious observance, with the latter involving practising 
religion or participating in some other form of “reflection”..  
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disadvantage. Section 85(2)(a)-(d) of the Equality Act 2010 imposes a duty on the 
“responsible body” of a school not to discriminate: 
(a) in the way it provides education for the pupil;  
(b) in the way it affords the pupil access to a benefit, facility or service;  
(c) by not providing education for the pupil;  
(d) by not affording the pupil access to a benefit, facility or service 
 but such a duty  
so far as relating to religion or belief, does not apply in relation to anything 
done in connection with acts of worship or other religious observance 
organised by or on behalf of a school (whether or not forming part of the 
curriculum)66 
 
There is relatively little case law relating to these provisions in the context of 
religious discrimination and in particular there is little that is specific to Scotland. 
Therefore although we have a relatively detailed statutory framework it has rarely 
been tested. 
 
4.5 Governance and representation on education bodies 
Provision is made for representation of churches and religious bodies in various ways 
in the structure for governance of education in Scotland. The following provisions 
show how this is legally regulated and the extent to which there is special provision 
for certain denominations, in particular the Church of Scotland. 
 
4.5.1 Representatives of churches and denominational bodies on education 
committees appointed by education authorities 
When local government was re-organised in Scotland by the Local Government 
(Scotland) Act 1973, section 124 made provision for each of the new 32 local 
authorities to appoint advisory education committees. Although the wording of 
section 124 was subsequently re-phrased by the Local Government etc (Scotland) Act 
1994 (c 39), section 31, its tenor remained effectively the same. Section 124(4) is 
concerned with the appointment of representatives of churches and denominational 
bodies on education committees, whereby one place on each such committee is 
                                                             
66 Equality Act 2010, s89(12). 
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expressly reserved for a representative of the Church of Scotland as nominated by the 
General Assembly. Other denominations also enjoy places on these education 
committees, most notably the Catholic Church, although only the Church of Scotland 
enjoys a prescribed place on all such committees. This provision remains in force at 
the present time. 
 
Section 124 - Membership of committees appointed by education 
authorities. 
(1) Where an education authority appoint a committee whose purposes 
include— 
(a) advising the authority on any matter relating to the discharge of 
their functions as education authority; or 
(b) discharging any of those functions of the authority on their behalf, 
the members of such committee shall, notwithstanding the provisions 
of section 57(3) and (4)(a) 67 of this Act, be appointed in accordance 
with this section. 
(2) Subject to the provisions of section 5968 of this Act, an education authority 
who appoint a committee such as is mentioned in subsection (1) above shall 
secure that— 
(a) at least half of the persons appointed by them to be members of 
such committee are members of the authority; and 
(b) the persons appointed by them to be members of such committee 
shall include the three persons mentioned in subsection (4) below. 
(3) Subject to the provisions of subsection (2) above, an education authority 
may appoint persons who are not members of the authority to be members of a 
committee such as is mentioned in subsection (1) above. 
                                                             
67 Section 57(3) runs: 'A committee appointed under subsection (1) above, other than a committee for 
regulating and controlling the finance of the local authority or of their area may, subject to section 59 
below, include persons who are not members of the appointing authority or authorities or, in the case of 
a sub-committee, the authority or authorities of whom they are a sub-committee, but at least two-thirds 
of the members appointed to any such committee (other than a sub-committee) shall be members of 
that authority or those authorities, as the case may be.' Section 57 (4)(a) runs: '(4) A local authority 
may appoint a committee, and two or more local authorities may join in appointing a committee, to 
advise the appointing authority or authorities on any matter relating to the discharge of their functions, 
and any such committee— (a) may consist of such persons (whether members of the appointing 
authority or authorities or not) appointed for such term as may be determined by the appointing 
authority or authorities'. 
68 Which section concerns disqualification from membership of committees. 
175 
 
(4) The three persons mentioned in subsection (2)(b) above (who shall not be 
members of the education authority appointing such committee) are— 
(a) one representative of the Church of Scotland, nominated in such 
manner as may be determined by the General Assembly of the Church; 
(b) in the case of the education authority for each area other than 
Orkney Islands, Shetland Islands and Western Isles, one representative 
of the Roman Catholic Church, nominated in such manner as may be 
determined by the Scottish Hierarchy of the Church;69 and 
(c) one person or in the case of the education authorities for Orkney 
Islands, Shetland Islands and Western Isles, two persons, in the 
selection of whom the authority shall have regard (taking account of 
the representation of churches under paragraphs (a) and (b) above) to 
the comparative strength within their area of all the churches and 
denominational bodies having duly constituted charges or other 
regularly appointed places of worship there. 
(5) Where two or more authorities appoint a joint committee whose purposes 
include discharging any of the functions of those authorities as education 
authorities on their behalf, section 57(3) of this Act shall apply to such a joint 
committee as if for the words 'two-thirds' there were substituted the words 
'one-half'. 
 
4.5.2 The General Teaching Council for Scotland 
The General Teaching Council contains religious representatives under the Public 
Services Reform (General Teaching Council for Scotland) Order 2011/215 (Scottish 
SI), schedule 2 [membership of the General Teaching Council for Scotland], para.3, 
the 11 members of the GTC are to include one “nominated by the Church and Society 
Council of the General Assembly of the Church of Scotland” and one “nominated by 
the Scottish Hierarchy of the Roman Catholic Church”. 
  
                                                             
69 This did not represent an alteration of the 1973 provision as originally enacted, since the Catholic 
Church enjoyed prescribed places only in the case of those education authorities constituted 'for the 
area of a region', s.1(2) of the 1973 Act stating that 'Scotland (other than Orkney, Shetland and the 
Western Isles) shall be divided into local government areas to be known as regions'. 
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4.5.3 Parent Councils and Combined Parent Councils 
Parent councils in denominational schools include religious representatives. Under  
the Scottish Schools (Parental Involvement) Act 2006 asp 8, section 7, 
denominational schools “must provide for at least one of the council’s members to be 
so co-opted and to be a person nominated by the church or denominational body in 
whose interest the school is conducted”. Under section 16(13 &14) of the same Act, 
where a: 
Combined Parent Council is being established and one or more of the 
represented schools is a denominational school, the constitution of the 
Combined Parent Council must provide for (a) the church or denominational 
body in whose interest a represented school is conducted, or (b) where there is 
more than one such church or denominational body, each church or body, to 
nominate at least one person to be a co-opted member of the council. 
4.6 Teacher training and Universities 
 
4.6.1 University teachers of Christian theology and divinity 
Under the Universities (Scotland) Act 1932, the appointment of professors of 
theology in faculties of divinity or theology in Scottish universities was transferred 
from the Crown and other bodies to the University Courts with special provision for 
the approval for appointments by the General Assembly of the Church of Scotland 
(and special provision for professors at former United Free Church Colleges, which 
Church united with the Church of Scotland in 1929). Section 4 of the Act, a provision 
entitled “Anent Scottish Universities entering into agreements with Churches and 
Associations”, stipulated that: 
Nothing in this Act contained shall restrict any University Court from entering 
into agreements with any Christian Church or Association of Christians 
whereby teachers of theology may be admitted to University status or 
privileges.  
 
Separate provisions were enacted for named positions in the Universities of Aberdeen 
and St Andrews. Provision was made also to ensure specific bursaries remained used 
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for theology students. This Act effectively created, or regularised, the appointment by 
Universities of theology and divinity professors acceptable to churches or associations 
of Christians which bodies traditionally recognised, and to this day still recognise, 
specific university qualifications for appointment of graduates in the work of 
Christian churches or associations. This could in principle be used to ensure, for 
example, that teaching of Christian theology may only be undertaken by Christians. 
However, this provision only applies to faculties of theology or divinity, and not to 
faculties of education which train school teachers. 
 
4.6.2 Catholic Teacher Training in Scotland  
In order to supply Catholic schools with suitably qualified teachers, Notre Dame 
College of Education, Bearsden, Glasgow, was set up in 1895 and Craiglockhart 
College, Edinburgh, opened in 1919. These Catholic teacher training colleges were 
merged into St Andrew’s College of Education in 1981, which was designated as a 
Catholic Institute of Higher Education, and its qualifications were validated by the 
Council for National Academic Awards. This Council was discontinued in 1993, from 
which time, St Andrew’s College of Education’s qualifications were validated by the 
University of Glasgow.  On 11 April 1999 St Andrew's College of Education merged 
with Glasgow University and formed the main part of a new University Faculty of 
Education (renamed School of Education upon the University of Glasgow re-
structuring in 2010).70 The teacher training of Catholic teachers for employment in 
Scotland’s denominational Catholic state-funded schools is presently carried on under 
the auspices of the St Andrew’s Foundation for Catholic Teacher Education within 
the University of Glasgow’s School of Education.71 This arrangement may be 
considered as analogous to the position of the Church of Scotland in relation to the 
Schools of Divinity at Scotland’s four ancient universities. 
 
4.7 Chaplains 
 
The role of chaplains in Scotland’s state funded schools is relatively straightforward 
for denominational schools, but rather more complex for non-denominational schools, 
                                                             
70 Historical information taken from http://www.gashe.ac.uk:443/public_docs/isaar/C0738.htm  
71 http://www.gla.ac.uk/schools/education/standrewsfoundation/  
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the latter taking up the majority of this section.   
 
4.7.1 Denominational schools 
In denominational schools, the Education (Scotland) Act 1980, s.21(3) states that: 
For each such [i.e. denominational] school the education authority shall 
appoint as supervisor of religious instruction, without remuneration, a person 
approved as regards religious belief and character as aforesaid,72 and the 
supervisor so appointed shall report to the education authority as to the 
efficiency of the religious instruction given in such school, and shall be 
entitled to enter the school at all times set apart for religious instruction or 
observance. 
 
 In this, chaplains to denominational schools are effectively presented by the 
denomination in whose interests a school is run (usually, but not always, the Catholic 
Church), rather than selected by a school’s head teacher, which is in marked contrast 
to practice in non-denominational schools. 
  
4.7.2 Non-denominational schools 
In non-denominational schools, the fulfilment of the statutory obligation concerning 
religious observance is a matter for head teachers, acting within the general 
frameworks set out in Scottish and Local Government policy documents, and with a 
view to local custom. In this, non-denominational schools may have long-standing 
customary arrangements with local parish ministers in respect of religious observance, 
and may also appoint ministers as chaplains. But there are no statutory obligations 
placed upon non-denominational schools to appoint chaplains, nor to favour the 
ministry of the Church of Scotland in relation to religious observance, and it appears 
from anecdotal evidence that at least some non-denominational schools do not appoint 
chaplains at all. 
  
The fact that the appointment of chaplains is a matter for head teachers, whose 
decisions may reflect local customary arrangements, may explain why Freedom of 
                                                             
72 That is 'approved as regards his religious belief and character by representatives of the church or 
denominational body in whose interest the school has been conducted' (Education (Scotland) Act, s. 
21(2A)). 
179 
 
Information requests to local authorities in Scotland as to which chaplains etc have 
access to non-denominational schools have not previously received satisfactory 
answers. Such requests may in effect have been seeking information which local 
authorities did not possess, as local authorities have not historically compiled such 
information. As is discussed below, South Lanarkshire Council certainly now appear 
to be compiling such information annually.  
  
That said, local authorities are supposed to produce policy guidance for head teachers 
within their authority in respect of religious observance. While a systematic search 
has not been made in respect of the chaplaincy policies of Scotland’s 32 local 
authorities, various insights have been obtained from Glasgow City Council’s 2009 
Religious Observance Policy document, and also from Argyll and Bute Council’s 
2010 Education Management Circular No 1.43 concerning the role of chaplains in 
non-denominational schools. To this evidence may be added the Guidance for 
Schools Regarding Chaplains and Chaplaincy Teams in Non denominational Schools, 
recently approved by the Education Resources Committee of South Lanarkshire 
Council.  
  
Various aspects of these documents are cited below, and these policy documents 
clearly provide various examples of good practice. The appointment of chaplains to 
Catholic schools is in the hands of members of the Hierarchy of the Catholic Church, 
and it may be presumed that parents who send their children to such schools have 
enjoyed a relatively clear understanding of what the religious aspects of such schools 
are likely to be. The appointment of chaplains to non-denominational schools remains 
in the hands of individual head teachers, and it would appear that, as traditional 
customs have altered, greater clarity and transparency surrounding chaplains and their 
roles in non-denominational schools has been required. The guidance issued by South 
Lanarkshire Council provides an example of best practice, and has been welcomed by 
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the Scottish Secular Society,73 by the Presbytery of Hamilton (Church of Scotland),74 
and by the Free Church of Scotland.75  
 
4.7.3 Some examples of policy 
What follows is a sample of key provisions from three recent Policy documents. 
 
Glasgow City Council’s 2009 Religious Observance Policy 
This policy document confirms that in non-denominational schools, head teachers are 
responsible for the content of religious observance in their own schools. Glasgow City 
Council recommend at page 15 that: 
Schools should establish a Religious Observance Planning Group, which 
would be remitted to consider the following: 
School Policy development and review 
School Religious Observance Annual Programme of Events 
Developing good practice and identifying / delivering appropriate 
training 
 
Such a group may include within its membership, staff members (including 
Senior Staff members with Religious Observance remit), chaplains, children 
and young people and parents / carers. The school’s Pupil Council may also be 
engaged in leading and / or developing good practice in Religious Observance. 
 
Detailed guidance is also provided concerning the “Role of Chaplaincy” (pp. 20-23). 
(i) Appointment of Chaplains 
In Roman Catholic schools, chaplains are appointed by the Archbishop of 
Glasgow, whilst in the non-denominational sector they are invited to 
participate in school life by the Headteacher. (p. 20). 
 
(ii) Role of Chaplains in non-denominational schools (Religious Observance) 
                                                             
73 http://www.scottishsecularsociety.com/south-lanarkshire-education-resources-committee-
implements-the-ssss-recommendations-in-full/  
74 http://www.presbyteryofhamilton.co.uk/news/2015/02  
75 https://theweeflea.wordpress.com/2015/01/23/response-to-guidelines-issued-by-south-lanarkshire-
council-on-chaplains-and-religious-observance/  
181 
 
Chaplaincy teams are a core resource for schools...The chaplaincy may of 
course support a wide range of curricular areas in the school including 
Religious and Moral Education and Personal and Social Developments. 
Consequently it is the expectation of the authority that all schools will have a 
chaplaincy in place. (p. 20). 
The Headteacher should discuss with the chaplain(s) how Religious 
Observance should be planned in light of the above advice to address the 
needs of the whole school community...Amongst the appropriate functions of 
the chaplaincy are the following: assisting with curricular delivery within 
particular units or courses; membership of the school’s Religious Observance 
Planning Group. (p. 20). 
 
Chaplains may or may not be involved in Religious Observance in the non-
denominational sector depending on the programme approved by the Head 
Teacher. In the denominational sector the chaplaincy will of course play a key 
role. The role of chaplains in both sectors is to add further substance to the 
agreed national definition of religious observance. 
 
An approach seeking to convert an audience to one faith group or another is 
not appropriate in the non-denominational sector, however [sic] it is important 
that Christian clergy are able to participate with integrity in an religious 
observance experience when invited to do so by the Headteacher. The 
opportunities for this will be explored as part of the programme of Chaplains’ 
meeting organised by the Authority. 
 
Within the context of organised acts of worship within schools, the chaplain 
will be addressing members of their own faith communities. In this context a 
confessional approach is appropriate. (p. 21). 
 
(iii) The Pastoral Role of the Chaplaincy 
As an integral part of the chaplaincy’s involvement with the shared 
community values of the school, the chaplaincy exists to benefit and support 
all staff, children and young people and their families... 
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Chaplains may be invited to support school excursions, events and 
celebrations out with the assumed context of chaplaincy involvement (pp. 21-
22). 
 
 
(iv) Curricular Support 
Chaplains can be useful contacts to enable schools to form relationships with 
local religious communities. Visits to churches and religious buildings can 
complement the study of religious belief in school and the involvement of the 
chaplaincy and local churches or religious buildings in developing anti-
sectarianism or an understanding of ecumenism can similarly add to greater 
understanding of key concepts for children and young people. (p. 22). 
 
(v) Chaplaincy Teams 
To deliver a quality input into the educational sector a team chaplaincy 
approach would be the favoured option in terms of constructing a school 
chaplaincy... 
Many schools have chaplaincy teams which include representatives from a 
range of traditions who cooperate with other members of staff and young 
people in the planning, preparation and presentation of acts of Religious 
Observance. 
 
 
Argyll and Bute Council’s 2010 Education Management Circular No 1.43 concerning 
the role of chaplains in non-denominational schools 
 
(i) Appointment of Chaplains 
Chaplains to non-denominational schools are appointed at the invitation of the 
head teacher / campus principle and endorsed by the education authority. Not 
all chaplains need be Christian or of one Christian denomination. A school can 
decide to appoint a chaplaincy team if this is considered appropriate...When a 
chaplaincy changes the head teacher / campus principle must inform the 
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Executive Director of Community Services. Standard disclosure procedures 
must be followed; see education management circular 1.56. (p.1). 
 
(ii) Chaplains and Religious Observance 
There are many different ways in which schools make arrangements for 
religious observance. Normally this will be at a school assembly, but not all 
assemblies need be occasions for religious observance. Religious observance 
and the assembly are the responsibility of the head teacher/campus principal 
and the school staff. Where this is appropriate provision may be made for 
religious observance of faiths other than Christianity. Chaplains are not always 
necessarily involved. Where chaplains are involved the extent of their 
involvement varies greatly... 
 
Through religious observance (and possibly through the religious and moral 
education programme) schools should offer chaplains the opportunity to speak 
about their faith and the search it initiates; to speak about their own 
experience; to tell of other faith explorers; and to counter religious 
stereotypes, whether they be of Christian, Jewish or any other faith 
community. 
 
Chaplains should acknowledge that religious observance should be inclusive 
and should safeguard at all times the freedom of conscience of pupils, parents 
and staff... (p. 2). 
 
(iii) Chaplains as a resource 
 Visits to churches 
The chaplain is very likely to be the minister of a local church and so visits to 
that church can be arranged. Where there is a team of chaplains of different 
denominations, visits to their different places of worship might be encouraged. 
It would be useful if Christian chaplains could not only explain the difference 
among the various branches of the Church in, for example, catholic, 
presbyterian and orthodox traditions, but also ensure that they emphasise what 
is held in common. In particular they might demonstrate how Christians of 
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different denominations can work and worship together. (p.3) 
 
Chaplains and RME 
Whereas in the primary sector all teachers have to teach religious and moral 
education and may also assist with religious observance and school 
assemblies, in secondary schools the religious education department has its 
own specialist teachers who may have little or no responsibility for religious 
observance. Unless the chaplain is a trained teacher and currently registered 
with the GTC, they should not be asked to teach a class without the presence 
of the class teacher. However, the chaplain does have an unique range of other 
experiences in the field of religious education which can make a positive 
contribution to the quality of classroom learning, so there is merit in exploring 
the possibility of the chaplain sharing in the work of the class on a team 
teaching basis for certain units of work. (pp. 3-4). 
 
(iv) Chaplains as representative of denominational bodies 
The chaplain enters the school as the representative of religious organisations 
in the area. 
 
In certain areas where the church is strongly identified with the local 
community, the chaplain may also represent the community and its interest in 
the school. 
 
This interest may be expressed by the school chaplain participating in events 
which affect both the school and the community, e.g. prize giving, displays 
and ceremonies. In a different way the chaplain may also help the school with 
its role in the wider community. (p.5). 
 
South Lanarkshire Council’s 2015 Guidance for Schools Regarding Chaplains and 
Chaplaincy Teams in Non-denominational Schools  
 
1.5 Chaplains in South Lanarkshire Council schools 
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The head teacher is responsible for the composition and size of the chaplaincy 
team. Chaplains are in school by invitation of the head teacher. As with all 
visitors to establishments, the head teacher must know who is in their 
establishment and what their role and function is. Chaplains for each school 
will be drawn from local places of worship and faith groups. 
 
Head teachers must inform the parent council, as representatives of the parent 
forum, in decisions about the composition and size of the chaplaincy team. 
Information about who is in the chaplaincy team and of what they do in school 
must be provided annually to parents. 
 
For formal approval, schools are required to notify South Lanarkshire Council 
annually as to the composition of their Chaplaincy Team, using the South 
Lanarkshire Council pro forma. 
 
1.6 Child Protection/ PVG 
All members of the Chaplaincy Team must have full PVG.76  
 
Chaplains’ roles will vary from school to school: present at assemblies, 
leading religious observance, visiting classes, engaging with small groups or 
any other activity agreed with the head teacher. 
 
During visits to classes and small groups at least one member of the teaching 
staff must be present. 
 
If a chaplain is delivering an extra curricular activity under the auspices of the 
school, such as Scripture Union, with no members of school staff present then 
parental permission is required. 
 
 1.7 The role of the chaplain 
                                                             
76 PVG refers to ‘Protecting Vulnerable Groups’ via Disclosure Scotland background checks, for which 
see here. 
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The chaplain’s key function is to assist the establishment in the delivery of 
religious observance / time for reflection. The role of the chaplain can be a 
diverse one and may include:  
 assisting the school to help support and develop the religious 
observance calendar of events;  
 providing pastoral care and support for staff, pupils and their 
families, where appropriate;  
 having a key role during times of extreme difficulty or crisis;  
 supporting school community events;  
 visiting classes at the invitation of teachers and / or head 
teacher to complement the curriculum;  
 contributing to extracurricular clubs in consultation with the 
head teacher;  
 leading or helping pupil groups with a particular religious, 
moral or citizenship interest;  
 participating in school trips;  
 providing a link between the school and local community;  
 any other activity agreed between the head teacher and the 
chaplain.  
 
The role of the chaplain may differ from school to school depending on the 
school community, the chaplain’s particular interests and the time available. 
  
1.8 Engagement with parents 
Annually schools must inform their parent council about the composition of 
the chaplaincy team. This information must be updated in the school 
handbook each year. 
 
Parents must be informed about the times and subject of planned activities 
which will be delivered by the chaplaincy team. 
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Under the terms of the Education (Scotland) Act 1980, parents / carers have 
the right to ask for their children to be withdrawn from religious observance 
and / or religious and moral education. A statement to this effect must be 
included in the school handbook. In addition, parents must be reminded on an 
annual basis of their right to withdraw. This should be done through the 
school’s first newsletter. 
 
1.9 Religious and moral education and chaplaincy 
The chaplaincy team has no function to ensure that religious and moral 
education is carried out. The programme of religious and moral education and 
its delivery remains the responsibility of the head teacher and the teaching 
staff of the school. However, schools may involve the chaplaincy team, as a 
resource, in religious and moral education planning and delivery. 
 
4.7 Conclusions 
 
Education stands out rather distinctively in our review of religion in Scots law. For 
the most part, in other areas, the general trend has for some time been towards the 
secularisation of the law. By this we mean that in general, there has been a strong drift 
towards the diminution of statutory support for religion and religious influence. The 
major exception to this is Education. Education is an area in which the influence of 
religion has changed its form, but has in many ways been increasing.  There is no 
question that education in the school classroom and the university lecture theatre has 
been secularising for some considerable time, and is continuing to do so. But this is in 
contrast to changes in curricular and governance structures which have not 
diminished, but rather strengthened, the place of religion. As education has been 
secularising in some ways, the Church of Scotland, the Roman Catholic Church and 
other religious bodies have increased the legal safeguards for their former rights and 
privileges and greater explicit protection for what they have perceived as their place 
in the overall system of education.  
 
The general effect of this has been to increase the statutory protection for religion and 
church interests in education.  A recent article by John Stevenson has demonstrated 
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how this applies in the area of religious education in non-denominational schools.77 
The author shows how the legislative framework for religious education was actually 
extremely thin when state schooling was created in 1872; the legislation was 
permissive on religious instruction, and the first attempt by the Church of Scotland to 
make religious instruction compulsory failed in 1918. But from 1929, it required a 
plebiscite to remove it from the curriculum of schools.78 After 1945, there was a move 
to the universal adoption of a unified RE curriculum in non-denominational schools 
designed by the churches and overseen by new regulations. In addition, church 
influence in the management of education by local authorities, which was abandoned 
in 1929, was given a new statutory framework only in 1973, and persists to this day. 
 
We must add an important caveat here. The firming up of these statutory protections 
does not imply that the content of teaching in schools or universities has in some 
sense become more religious, or more militant, or more fundamentalist. Indeed, there 
has been considerable evidence for some decades that the teaching of religion in non-
denominational schools and in university theology departments has become strongly 
influenced by secularising trends; including teaching on multiple faiths, the 
liberalisation of theology, and more recently the discussion of non-religious belief 
positions. There have been instances where conservative Christians have reputedly 
influenced religious observance and teaching in Scottish schools; but instances of 
liberalisation and even the decay of religious observance abound, and have done so 
since the 1960s.  
 
While to some extent the place of religion in education has become more explicitly 
protected through statutory reform, the twin notions of "custom" and of "use and 
wont" continue to determine much about the place of religion in the school lives of 
young people, principally in non-denominational schools. Though "custom" and "use 
and wont" may have been subtly different, in practice they both tended to devolve 
control of religious instruction or education in schools to local administration: initially 
to school boards and education authorities, later to local authorities and, increasingly 
                                                             
77 John Stevenson, "Securing religious education in non-denominational schools 1872-1972: church 
and school. A policy of co-operation", Records of the Scottish Church History Society vol. 44 (2015), 
pp. 74-102. 
78 Ibid., p. 74. 
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through the twentieth century, to the head teacher. This, it might be argued was 
facilitated, and is still facilitated, by reliance on the undefined concept of custom and 
the absence of clear legislative control of religious education in schools.  
 
Other issues have been highlighted concerning religion in the education system.  
Firstly, while parents have the right, currently in terms of the 1980 Act, to withdraw 
their children from religious observance and religious instruction, there is no 
comparable right for the child to undertake this for her/himself. While this Scottish 
approach is consistent with human rights documents, and it must be considered within 
the broader context of family law, which provides both for the exercise of parental 
responsibilities for the benefit of the child and for children to be consulted on major 
decisions and more generally to “be heard”, the position of the rights of the child 
versus the responsibilities of the parent is nonetheless an area of education law which 
might attract further attention in the future.  
 
Secondly, since 1872 it has been a principle in non-denominational schools that 
religious observance and religious education should be separated in the timetable 
from other subjects. Thus, it is not permissible for these to intrude, for example, into 
science classes. Of course, there are shades of grey in this area, and things may not be 
clear cut in practice, especially in early years of primary schooling, but the quality of 
enforcement of this separation of religious from secular subjects might be an area 
worth scrutiny for those concerned with the preservation of this longstanding 
principle. 
 
Thirdly, provision has been made since 1929, reinforced in 1946, for the setting aside 
of the statutory obligation to teach religious education, if a majority of electors within 
a local authority vote in favour of discontinuation of this obligation. As far as is 
known, such a plebiscite has never been called, nor even considered, by a Scottish 
local authority but it may be an opportunity to be considered.  
 
Fourthly, the appointment, or not, of school chaplains and the nature and frequency of 
religious observance, are areas where there is relatively little or no statutory 
regulation, but, instead, considerable discretion rests with head teachers. 
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Nevertheless, as local customs have altered with time, some local authorities have 
begun to issue more detailed guidance and this may be an area where there is potential 
for further reform.  
 
Fifthly, it is interesting to note how few explicit guarantees, for the Church of 
Scotland in particular, were included in the early legislation. The fact that three places 
on each local authority education committee are reserved to the Church of Scotland, 
the Roman Catholic Church and a third representing the largest church group in the 
area, is, for example, a curiously late addition to legal governance of education in 
Scotland. This lack of explicit guarantees, together with the effect of contemporary 
equality provisions, may be seen as creating opportunities for belief organisations and 
others to seek recognition and a stronger place within education law and governance.  
 
Sixthly, the terms of the 1918 nationalisation of Catholic schools and its successor 
legislation was framed in neutral statutory language, with the result that any 
denomination or religious body in Scotland may potentially have a denominational 
school or schools carried on in its interests by a local authority. Any denomination or 
religious body may petition a local authority to establish and carry on a 
denominational school. While, to our knowledge, no belief body has petitioned a local 
authority for a school, this may be a possibility.  
 
So, education has in many ways bucked the trend towards the general secularisation 
of legislation in Scotland since the nineteenth century. The story of the last 140 years 
has been one of a move from permissive, devolved attitudes to religious observance, 
religious education and church schools, towards increasing control and regulation, 
with RME and RO becoming in effect compulsory inclusions in the school timetable, 
and with church participation in the governance of local authority schools and 
education re-instituted in 1973 exactly 100 years after it was, in the main, abandoned. 
At the same time, there is religious adaptation going on. One is the recently developed 
argument that children require religious literacy79 - not merely of other religions, but 
of different faith conditions such as spirituality. This has become a reason to sustain 
the compulsory status of RME, but is not necessarily one in which non-belief 
                                                             
79 See for example the website http://www.religiousliteracy.org.uk/ 
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positions have attained parity in the curriculum. There are, however, potential new 
roles for non-religious belief bodies - in conducting their own state-funded schools, or 
drawing attention to ways to transfer schools from denominational status. Still, 
education remains a sector in which the churches continue to inject considerable 
effort to retain a foothold in a society which is otherwise secularising rapidly.   
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
192 
 
Part III 
A General Audit 
 
 
In Part 2 of the Report, we traced in detail the changing place of religion within 
three areas of Scots law. There, our aim was to explore in depth the current law 
in force and to trace back its historical origins, highlighting areas of uncertainty 
or controversy. In Part 3, our coverage is much broader but at the same time 
much less detailed. We have looked at a wide range of areas of Scots law with a 
view to charting the extent to which religion, and associated concepts, are 
acknowledged, protected, privileged or otherwise recognised in current 
legislation.  
 
In each of these areas, we set out key statutory provisions and we have tried to 
highlight any emergent issues or themes. This is a very “general” audit of the 
law; it does not claim to be exhaustive, and it looks primarily at legislation as 
contained in Acts of the UK and Scottish Parliaments. The starting point was 
searching on Westlaw using a number of search terms including religion, 
religious, belief, church, conscience, conscientious, Protestant, Catholic, Jew and 
Jewish. We have made some reference to case law but this is limited, both by the 
fact that there is little Scottish case law in these areas and by the practical 
limitations of time. In a relatively short research project, we cannot explore all 
areas in the same depth as we sought to achieve in the case studies in Part 2. 
Instead, our aim in Part 3 is to provide an overview of the legal landscape and to 
highlight issues which may merit further future exploration. 
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Chapter 5 Armed services law 
 5.1 Introduction 
 5.2 Equality 
 5.3 Religiously aggravated offences 
 5.4 Accommodating religion 
 5.5 Oaths 
 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter brings together a number of provisions which deal with religion or belief 
within the specific context of the law regulating the armed services. Members of the 
armed services are generally excluded from, for example, employment law and 
whereas other workplaces are regulated by the Equality Act 2010 separate but similar 
protection is provided for those in the services. Much of the legislation, therefore, 
which governs the armed services is simply a specialized version of existing 
provisions. 
 
5.2 Equality 
Those subject to service law may not be discriminated against on the grounds of 
religion or belief, along with other characteristics such as race or sexual orientation. 
Thus the general protection of the Equality Act is replicated within the context of the 
armed services and provision is made for a specific complaint system.  This can be 
seen in the following provisions:  
 
Armed Forces (Service Complaints Commissioner) Regulations 
2007/3352, reg. 2 
(1) For the purposes of section 338(1) of the Act, a person has been wronged 
in a prescribed way if he has been the subject of: 
(a) discrimination; 
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... 
(2) In this regulation “discrimination” means— 
(a) discrimination or victimisation on the grounds of colour, race, 
ethnic or national origin, nationality, sex, gender re-assignment, status 
as a married person or civil partner, religion, belief or sexual 
orientation; and … 
 
Armed Forces Act 2006, s. 338(1) 
(1) This section applies where the Service Complaints Commissioner (“the 
Commissioner”) considers that any communication made to him contains an 
allegation that a person named in such a communication– 
(a) is subject to service law and has been wronged in a prescribed way; or 
(b) was wronged in such a way while he was so subject.” 
 
Armed Forces (Service Complaints Commissioner) Regulations 
2007/3352, reg. 2 
(1) For the purposes of section 338(1) of the [Armed Forces] Act [2006], a 
person has been wronged in a prescribed way if he has been the subject of: 
(a) discrimination; 
(b) harassment; 
(c) bullying; 
(d) dishonest, improper or biased behaviour. 
(2) In this regulation “discrimination” means— 
(a) discrimination or victimisation on the grounds of colour, race, 
ethnic or national origin, nationality, sex, gender re-assignment, status 
as a married person or civil partner, religion, belief or sexual 
orientation; … 
 
Armed Forces (Redress of Individual Grievances) Regulations 2007/3353, 
reg. 9 
(1) A service complaint panel shall include one independent member in any 
case in which the service complaint: 
(a) alleges discrimination; 
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... 
(3) In this regulation, “discrimination” means discrimination or victimisation 
on the grounds of colour, race, ethnic or national origin, nationality, sex, 
gender re-assignment, status as a married person or civil partner, religion, 
belief or sexual orientation, and less favourable treatment of part-time 
employees.” 
 
5.3 Religiously aggravated offences 
 
As, in 5.2 above, the general protection against discrimination is applied in the 
specific context of the armed services, so too the general criminal law approach to 
religious aggravation is reflected in specific provision for offences committed by 
service personnel. This can be seen in the Armed Forces Act 2006, section 240 which 
provides that: 
 
(1) This section applies where a court or officer dealing with an offender for a 
service offence (other than an offence mentioned in subsection (3)) is 
considering the seriousness of the offence. 
(2) If the offence was racially or religiously aggravated the court or officer– 
(a) must treat that fact as an aggravating factor; and 
(b) must state in open court that the offence was so aggravated. 
 
5.4 Accommodating religion 
 
In service custody premises, detainees must be afforded such provisions as to permit 
them to practise their religion in much the same manner as provision is made in civil 
prisons and young offenders’ institutions. Non-working on Sundays is protected in 
such premises in a way that no longer happens for work generally. The various 
provisions designed to accommodate religious obligation and to allow detainees to 
continue to practise their religion are set out below: 
 
Service Custody and Service of Relevant Sentences Rules 2009/1096, part 
3, rules 12, 28, 29, 30 & 31 
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12. (1) On Sundays and public holidays a detainee within rule 11(2)(a) or (b) 
shall not carry out work or training except work which is necessary for the 
service of the service custody premises in which he is detained. 
(2) Such a detainee whose recognised day of religious observance falls on a 
day other than a Sunday— 
(a) shall not be required to carry out any more work or training on that 
day than other detainees are required to do on a Sunday; and 
(b) may be required to do work or training on Sundays. 
 
28. So far as practicable, the commandant shall make available for the use of 
every detainee in service custody premises such books of religious observation 
or instruction as are recognised as such by his denomination or religion and 
are approved by the Secretary of State for use in service custody premises. 
 
29. The commandant of service custody premises shall afford facilities to the 
chaplain and other ministers of religion to have access to detainees at times 
approved by the commandant, but not less than weekly, for the purpose of 
visiting them or giving them religious instruction. 
 
30. (1) Where the chaplain is of the same denomination as a detainee, he shall 
visit him as soon as practicable after his admission, at regular intervals during 
his sentence, and shortly before his release. 
(2) Where there is a minister of religion who regularly attends service custody 
premises and who is of the same faith as a detainee in those premises, he shall 
visit him as soon as reasonably practicable after his admission, at regular 
intervals during his sentence, and shortly before his release. 
(3) Where there is no such chaplain or minister of religion, the commandant 
shall ask the detainee on admission if he would like one to visit him; and if the 
detainee wishes to be so visited, the commandant shall, if it is reasonably 
practicable, arrange for such a visit to take place. 
(4) The commandant shall make available to chaplains and other ministers of 
religion on the occasion of their visits to service custody premises a list of 
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detainees who are sick or undergoing punishment under these Rules, if the 
chaplain or minister so requests. 
(5) A detainee may request a visit from a chaplain or minister of religion at 
any time, and the commandant shall, if it is reasonably practicable, arrange for 
such a visit to take place. 
 
31. (1) Whenever reasonably practicable, the chaplain shall conduct religious 
services in service custody premises on Sundays, other customary days and on 
such other convenient occasions approved by the commandant as the chaplain 
may decide. 
(2) The commandant shall make such provision for religious services to be 
conducted by other ministers of religion as he thinks appropriate from time to 
time. 
(3) A detainee who is in cellular confinement may only attend religious 
services with the commandant's permission. 
 
There is also specific provision in relation to headgear worn for religious reasons in  
the Armed Forces Act 2006, section 72: 
  
(2) Nothing in section 70 or 71 authorises anyone to require an arrested person 
to remove any of his clothing in public other than an outer coat, jacket, 
headgear or gloves. 
(3) The reference in subsection (2) to headgear does not include headgear 
worn for religious reasons. 
 
5.5 Oaths 
 
Service law contains many detailed provisions concerning the administration of oaths 
in service courts across the Armed Forces. Religious oaths may be tailored to the 
religious beliefs of those taking such oaths as seen in the Armed Forces (Service 
Inquiries) Regulations 2008/1651, schedule 1, para. 3: 
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If none of the forms of oath provided in this Schedule is appropriate to the 
religious beliefs of the person taking the oath, an oath may be administered in 
such form and manner as the person taking the oath declares to be binding on 
his conscience in accordance with his religious beliefs. 
 
This same clause is also used in: 
Courts-Martial (Royal Navy) Rules 2007/3443, schedule 4, part 1, para. 3; 
Naval Custody Rules 2000/2367, schedule 4, part 1, para. 3; 
Summary Appeal Court (Navy) Rules 2000/2370, schedule 5, part 1, para. 3; 
Summary Appeal Court (Air Force) Rules 2000/2372, schedule 5, part 1, para. 
3; 
Administration of Oaths (Summary Appeal Court) (Navy) Order 2000/2376, 
schedule 1, para. 3; 
Administration of Oaths (Summary Appeal Court) (Air Force) Order 
2000/2378, schedule 1, para. 3; 
Armed Forces (Powers of Stop and Search, Search, Seizure and Retention) 
Order 2009/2056, schedule 2, para.3; 
Courts-Martial (Royal Air Force) Rules 2007/3444, schedule 4, part 1, para. 3. 
 
Service policemen are directed to take oaths while holding a New Testament, or an 
Old Testament should they be of the Jewish religion (Item 49b). As provided in the 
Armed Forces (Powers of Stop and Search, Search, Seizure and Retention) Order 
2009/2056, schedule 2, paras. 1 & 5: 
 
1. The service policeman taking the oath shall hold the New Testament, or if a 
Jew the Old Testament, in his uplifted hand and shall say, or repeat after the 
person administering it, the oath provided in paragraph 5 of this Schedule. 
 
5. The oath shall be sworn in the following form: 
“I swear by Almighty God that I shall truthfully answer any questions I am 
asked.” 
 
This same clause as found in para. 1 above is also used in: 
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Armed Forces (Service Inquiries) Regulations 2008/1651, schedule 1, para. 1; 
Courts-Martial (Royal Navy) Rules 2007/3443, schedule 4, part 1, para. 1; 
Courts-Martial (Royal Air Force) Rules 2007/3444, schedule 4, part 1, para. 1; 
Naval Custody Rules 2000/2367, schedule 4, part 1, para. 1; 
Summary Appeal Court (Navy) Rules 2000/2370, schedule 5, part 1, para. 1; 
Summary Appeal Court (Air Force) Rules 2000/2372, schedule 5, part 1, para. 
1; 
Administration of Oaths (Summary Appeal Court) (Navy) Order 2000/2376, 
schedule 1, para.1; 
Administration of Oaths (Summary Appeal Court) (Air Force) Order 
2000/2378, schedule 1, para.1. 
 
Solemn affirmations may be substituted for religious oaths as can be seen in the 
following examples: 
 
Armed Forces (Powers of Stop and Search, Search, Seizure and 
Retention) Order 2009/2056, part 2, art. 11: 
(1) Before a judge advocate asks any question which a service policeman 
would be required under article 8(6) to answer on oath, an oath shall be 
administered to the service policeman. 
(2) If— 
(a) a service policeman required under article 8(6) to answer on oath 
objects to being sworn, or 
(b) it is not reasonably practicable without inconvenience or delay to 
administer an oath to a service policeman in the manner appropriate to 
his religious belief, 
he shall be required to make a solemn affirmation instead of taking an oath. 
(3) An oath or affirmation required to be administered under this Order shall 
be administered in the form and manner set out in Schedule 2 by the judge 
advocate or by another person acting on his behalf. 
 
Armed Forces (Service Inquiries) Regulations 2008/1651, reg. 11(8) 
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(8) Where the president would, apart from this paragraph, require a witness to 
give oral evidence on oath and— 
(a) the witness objects to taking an oath; or 
(b) it is not reasonably practicable without inconvenience to, or 
without delaying the proceedings of, the panel to administer an oath to 
a witness in the manner appropriate to his religious belief, 
he must be required to make a solemn affirmation instead of taking an oath.” 
 
Courts-Martial (Royal Navy) Rules 2007/3443, part 9, rule 56 
(3) If— 
(a) a person required to take an oath for the purposes of proceedings 
before the court objects to being sworn, or 
(b) it is not reasonably practicable to administer an oath to such a 
person as aforesaid in the manner appropriate to his religious belief, 
he shall be permitted to make a solemn affirmation instead of taking an oath. 
 
A similar provision is to be found in: 
Courts-Martial (Royal Air Force) Rules 2007/3444, part 9, rule 59 
Summary Appeal Court (Navy) Rules 2000/2370, part v, rule 31(4) 
Naval Custody Rules 2000/2367, part v, rule 27(2) 
Summary Appeal Court (Air Force) Rules 2000/2372, part v, rule 31(4) 
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Chapter 6 Blasphemy 
6.1 Overview of blasphemy 
6.2 Historical development 
6.3 The most recent cases 
6.4 Conclusions 
 
6.1 Overview of blasphemy 
 
The crime of blasphemy is not unlike the crime of heresy in historical Scots law, in 
that both presupposed an established church whose doctrines are formally 
acknowledged in law. That is to say, blasphemy, like heresy, is a crime relative to a 
fixed set of beliefs to which people are obliged to adhere under pain of criminal 
sanctions. In this, what could be classed as blasphemous or heretical during the pre-
Reformation period can often be distinguished from what was classed as blasphemous 
or heretical during the Scottish Protestant ascendancy. From this perspective, even if 
it may be argued that the crime of blasphemy lingers on in Scots law, it is difficult to 
see how it could be coherently enforced within a plural religious context.  
 
6.2 Historical development 
 
The crime of blasphemy in post-Reformation Scotland did enjoy a statutory basis by 
virtue of statutes enacted during the reigns of Charles II1 and William II,2 but both 
these Acts “were repealed by the Act of 1813 (53 Geo. III, c. 160)” following which 
time the crime of blasphemy has existed “...only at common law...”.3 That the Scots 
                                                             
1 Act against the crime of blasphemy, RPS, 1661/1/264 . 
2 Act against blasphemy, RPS, 1695/5/117 . 
3 G. Maher, ‘Blasphemy in Scots Law’ 1977 S.L.T. (News), 257-260, at 259. 
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law of blasphemy no longer enjoys a statutory basis, but is rather a lingering feature 
of common law, is also maintained by the Stair Memorial Encyclopaedia. 
 
The criminal common law offence of blasphemy is categorised by the Stair Memorial 
Encyclopaedia as a crime against public order and decency, along with mobbing, 
breach of the peace, violation of sepulchres, public indecency, and bigamy.4 Under 
the specific entry for blasphemy it is argued that the law of blasphemy remains part of 
Scots law at common law, although no case has been reported on this head since 
1843. Consequently, it can be stated that blasphemy is no longer prosecuted in 
Scotland. Although not in desuetude, any such prosecution would probably 
contravene the European Convention on Human Rights, and as such would probably 
fail. To this it may be added from another source that the common law penalties for 
blasphemy appear to have been mitigated in 1825.5 
 
6.3 The most recent cases 
 
The last reported cases of blasphemy to be heard before the High Court of Justiciary 
occurred on 9 November 1843, namely Thomas Paterson (1843, 1 Broun 629) and 
Henry Robinson (1843, 1 Broun 643). The judges were the Lord Justice-Clerk (Lord 
Hope), together with the Lords Mackenzie, Medwyn, Moncrieff, and Cockburn. 
 
In both cases the pannels were accused of selling printed works in Edinburgh of a 
blasphemous tenor, although in Robinson the pannel had also been engaged in selling 
sexually obscene works which on occasion included engravings. Both cases have 
been briefly discussed in G. Maher “Blasphemy in Scots Law” 1977 SLT (News) 
257-260, from page 259b. Maher points out that the Lord Justice-Clerk held that “as 
the Scriptures and the Christian (Protestant) religion are part of the statute law of the 
land, then whatever vilified them was an infringement of the law”. Maher goes on: 
                                                             
4 Stair Memorial Encyclopaedia, Criminal Law (Reissue), section 17, Crimes Against Public Order and 
Decency, paragraph 419. 
5 “...the statutory law of blasphemy was repealed in 1813, and the common law penalties mitigated in 
1825...” (G. Campbell H. Paton, ‘The Eighteenth Century and Later’ in An Introduction to Scottish 
Legal History (Edinburgh: The Stair Society, 1958), 50-63, at 60).  
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“But we should note that Lord Hope was referring not to any statutes about denial of 
God or Christianity nor to the common law, but instead to such statutes as the Act of 
1690 (APS, ix, 133, c. 4) which established the presbyterian church in Scotland and 
ratified the [Westminster] Confession of Faith as the doctrinal basis of that church. 
And, as Lord Hope himself pointed out, the effect of so establishing certain doctrines 
was not to preclude taking or expressing other beliefs or views directly contrary to 
these doctrines – it rather protects the established doctrines from being brought into 
contempt”. 
 
Of the two reported cases of blasphemy before the High Court in 1843, Thomas 
Paterson is by far the more interesting, containing as it does a detailed discussion of 
the law of blasphemy in Scotland by the Lord Justice-Clerk, Lord Hope. As to what 
constituted blasphemy in Paterson, the Lord Justice-Clerk, in his charge to the jury, 
was at pains to point out that printed works which “deny the truth and authority of the 
Holy Scriptures and Christianity” were not in and of themselves blasphemous, but 
rather blasphemous works were those which were not “of fair and serious speculation 
or argument upon these sacred topics, but such as indicated an obvious intention to 
bring them into ridicule and contempt”.  As to the basis of the law of blasphemy in 
Scotland in 1843, the Lord Justice-Clerk stated that “the Holy Scriptures and 
Christian religion are part of the statute law of the land, and whatever vilifies them is, 
therefore, an infringement of the law”.  
 
In order to demonstrate this principle, which had already been accepted by the court 
in an interlocutor of relevancy, the Lord Justice-Clerk variously cited the Confession 
of Faith Ratification Act 1690, which Act confirmed and ratified the Westminster 
Confession of Faith. Specifically, the Lord Justice-Clerk quoted from part 1, ss. 1, 4, 
and 10, part 20, s. 4, and part 23, s. 3 of the Westminster Confession of Faith as found 
in the 1690 Act.  
 
It does not appear that the 1690 Act was quoted in order to establish the detailed 
parameters of the law of blasphemy, in terms of what constituted the offence, and 
how it was to be punished, which appear to be based, as Maher and the Stair 
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Memorial Encyclopaedia concur, on common law, but rather the Act was cited in 
order to establish that Scots law acknowledged a defined confession of faith.  
 
The crime of blasphemy tends to be the preserve of jurisdictions in which there is a 
prevailing religious ascendancy with clearly stated doctrinal beliefs – in Scotland’s 
case either the dogmas of the Catholic Church during the medieval period, or the 
Scots Confession of Faith and later the Westminster Confession of Faith during the 
early modern and modern periods. Presumably with this in mind, the Lord Justice-
Clerk quoted various parts of the Westminster Confession of Faith in order to 
determine what the standard of faith was against which blasphemy could occur, and in 
order also to determine to what extent the Confession permitted deviation in matters 
of religion. On the basis of his analysis of the Confession, the Lord Justice-Clerk 
concluded that “the law of Scotland, apart from all questions of Church Establishment 
or Church Government, has declared that the Holy Scriptures are of supreme 
authority. It gives every man the right of regulating his faith or not by the standard of 
the Holy Scriptures, and gives full scope to private judgment, regarding the doctrines 
contained therein; but it expressly provides, that all “blasphemies shall be supressed,” 
[Confession, part 23, s. 3] and that they who publish opinions “contrary to the known 
principles of Christianity,” [Confession, part 20, s. 4] may be lawfully called to 
account, and proceeded against by the civil magistrate. This law does not impose 
upon individuals any obligation as to their belief. It leaves free and independent the 
right of private belief, but it carefully protects that which was established as part of 
the law from being brought into contempt. Such being the law, the duty which you 
have to discharge is plain and easy. The questions to be determined are, whether the 
works which the pannel is charged with publishing, are of the character imputed to 
them - if they are, whether they were published by him wickedly and feloniously, that 
is, with the intention of promoting the purpose for which they were composed, 
namely, of vilifying the Holy Scriptures and Christian religion.” 
 
The jury found the charges against the pannel proven, and Thomas Paterson was 
sentenced to 15 months in prison. 
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6.4 Conclusions 
 
From the preceding discussion, it would appear that: (i) the crime of blasphemy is still 
a crime in Scotland at common law, and that (ii) the prerequisite for blasphemy, 
namely a standard of faith acknowledged by law as applying within Scotland is also 
still on the statute book, by virtue of the Confession of Faith Ratification Act 1690. 
This 1690 Act has never been repealed, nor may it be argued clearly that it has fallen 
in desuetude, notwithstanding that such argument may ordinarily be employed in 
respect of Acts of the pre-Union Scottish Parliament. The problems surrounding the 
1690 Act in terms of repeal or desuetude have already been noted in Chapter 1 on the 
Church of Scotland, where it is noted that this 1690 Act was ratified by the Act for 
securing of the Protestant Religion and Presbyterian church government (1707), 
which was in turn incorporated into the Scottish Parliament’s 1707 Act whereby the 
Treaty of Union was ratified, and as such is bound up with the constituting documents 
of the British State. 
 
Yet, despite the survival of the 1690 Act and the problems which attend it as to repeal 
or desuetude, it provides little more than the fixed point of doctrinal belief which is a 
fundamental prerequisite of the concept of blasphemy. It is the case that the statutory 
basis of the law of the crime of blasphemy has been repealed two centuries ago, and 
that what remains is a vestige of the common law, which has not been enforced for 
more than 170 years. It may be that the common law crime of blasphemy in Scots law 
could simply be abolished by statute, the common law offences of blasphemy and 
blasphemous libel having been abolished in England and Wales by the Criminal 
Justice and Immigration Act 2008 c. 4, s.79. 
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 7.1 Introduction 
 7.2 Broadcasting licences 
 7.3 Religious programmes 
 7.4 Protection against harm etc 
 7.5 Stirring up religious hatred 
 7.6 Conclusions 
 
7.1 Introduction 
 
The presence of religion in broadcasting and the prioritisation of religious views over 
other non-religious beliefs or of a particular religious view are issues which emerge 
from time to time in discussion of television and radio schedules and individual 
programme content. In this section of the Report, we set out various statutory 
provisions which regulate aspects of broadcasting and communications. These 
provisions are not specifically Scottish but apply on a UK basis. 
 
7.2 Broadcasting licences 
 
Religious organisations are variously not permitted to hold broadcasting licences in 
the United Kingdom. These restrictions are set out in the Broadcasting Act 1990 and 
were introduced as part of the regulation of independent broadcasting. Despite 
criticism and some parliamentary attempt to remove the restrictions, they continue to 
apply. The restrictions on licence holding are set out in part 2 of schedule 2 to the 
Broadcasting Act 1990 which provides in paragraph 2 that:  
 
(1) The following persons are disqualified persons in relation only to licences 
falling within sub-paragraph (1A)— 
(a) a body whose objects are wholly or mainly of a religious nature; 
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(b) a body which is controlled by a body falling within paragraph (a) or 
by two or more such bodies taken together; 
(c) a body which controls a body falling within paragraph (a); 
(d) a body corporate which is an associate of a body corporate falling 
within paragraph (a), (b) or (c); 
(e) a body corporate in which a body falling within any of paragraphs 
(a) to (d) is a participant with more than a 5 per cent. interest; 
(f) an individual who is an officer of a body falling within paragraph 
(a); and 
(g) a body which is controlled by an individual falling within 
paragraph (f) or by two or more such individuals taken together. 
(1A) A licence falls within this sub-paragraph if it is— 
(a) a Channel 3 licence; 
(b) a Channel 5 licence; 
(c) a national sound broadcasting licence; 
(d) a public teletext licence; 
(e) an additional television service licence; 
(f) a television multiplex licence; or 
(g) a radio multiplex licence. 
 
These restrictions on licence holding by religious bodies, among others, were 
however lessened to some extent by the Communications Act 2003, section 348. It 
provided that the disqualification would apply only to the listed types of licence and 
that religious bodies might apply for other forms of licence, not covered by the 
foregoing paragraph. Detailed Guidance is provided by Ofcom in respect of such 
applications.1 The Communications Act 2003, schedule 14, part 4, paragraph 15 
provides that: 
 
(1) A person mentioned in paragraph 2(1) of Part 2 of Schedule 2 to the 1990 
Act (religious bodies etc.) is not to hold a Broadcasting Act licence not 
mentioned in paragraph 2(1A) of that Part unless— 
                                                             
1 See http://licensing.ofcom.org.uk/tv-broadcast-licences/other-issues/religious-guidance.  
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(a) OFCOM have made a determination in his case as respects a 
description of licences applicable to that licence; and 
(b) that determination remains in force. 
 
7.3 Religious programmes 
 
Ofcom is under a general statutory obligation to oversee and review the nature and 
content of programming and to pay particular attention to various issues including the 
nature of religious programmes. This obligation is set out in section 319 of the 
Communications Act 2003, in the following terms: 
 
(1) It shall be the duty of OFCOM to set, and from time to time to review and 
revise, such standards for the content of programmes to be included in 
television and radio services as appear to them best calculated to secure the 
standards objectives. 
(2) The standards objectives are— 
... 
(e) that the proper degree of responsibility is exercised with respect to 
the content of programmes which are religious programmes 
 … 
(6) Standards set to secure the standards objective specified in subsection 
(2)(e) shall, in particular, contain provision designed to secure that religious 
programmes do not involve— 
(a) any improper exploitation of any susceptibilities of the audience for 
such a programme; or 
(b) any abusive treatment of the religious views and beliefs of those 
belonging to a particular religion or religious denomination. 
 
Religious and other beliefs are to be dealt with in a suitable range of programmes by 
public service broadcasters. Such programmes may deal with the history of different 
religions and other beliefs, and may show acts of worship as set out in the 
Communications Act 2003, section 264: 
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(6) A manner of fulfilling the purposes of public service television 
broadcasting in the United Kingdom is compatible with this subsection if it 
ensures— 
... 
(f) that those services (taken together) include what appears to 
OFCOM to be a suitable quantity and range of programmes dealing 
with each of the following, science, religion and other beliefs, social 
issues, matters of international significance or interest and matters of 
specialist interest; 
(g) that the programmes included in those services that deal with 
religion and other beliefs include— 
(i) programmes providing news and other information about 
different religions and other beliefs; 
(ii) programmes about the history of different religions and 
other beliefs; and 
(iii) programmes showing acts of worship and other ceremonies 
and practices (including some showing acts of worship and 
other ceremonies in their entirety) ... 
 
The contents of such programmes are subject to the general duty of Ofcom as set out 
in section 319 of the Communications Act 2003 (quoted above). In particular, 
religious programmes may not exploit any susceptibilities of audiences for which 
such programmes are intended,2 nor may they involve abusive treatment of the 
religious views and beliefs of adherents.3 
 
7.4 Protection against harm etc 
 
There are various provisions in the Communications Act 2003 which seek to prevent 
the promotion discrimination, incitement to religious hatred and general harm. These 
apply broadly to programmes, advertisements and various forms of broadcasting.  
                                                             
2 Communications Act 2003, s319(6)(a). 
3 Ibid, s319(6)(b). 
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Programmes and their contents, including product placements, may not promote 
discrimination on the grounds of religion or belief, nor incite religious hatred.  
 
  Communications Act 2003, s. 368E  
(1) An on-demand programme service must not contain any material likely to 
incite hatred based on race, sex, religion or nationality. 
 
Communications Act 2003, s. 368F 
(4) Advertising included in an on-demand programme service must not— 
(a) prejudice respect for human dignity; 
(b) include or promote discrimination based on sex, racial or ethnic 
origin, nationality, religion or belief, disability, age or sexual 
orientation ... 
 
Communications Act 2003, s. 368G 
(11) A sponsorship announcement must not— 
(a) prejudice respect for human dignity; 
(b) include or promote discrimination based on sex, racial or ethnic 
origin, nationality, religion or belief, disability, age or sexual 
orientation ... 
 
Communications Act 2003 c. 21, s. 368H 
(12) Condition F is that the way in which the product, service or trade mark, or 
the reference to it, is included in the programme by way of product placement 
does not— 
(a) prejudice respect for human dignity; 
(b) promote discrimination based on sex, racial or ethnic origin, 
nationality, religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation ... 
 
There is also provision in respect of video recordings where the objective is similarly 
protective, although here the language is slightly different and there is specific 
reference to protecting against “offence”. This is potentially a very broad protection, 
covering works which are either “intended” or “likely (to any extent)” to cause 
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offence. This legislation governs the distribution of video recordings and there is 
provision in section 2 for certain video games to be exempt from the statutory 
regulatory framework.  The exemptions include a work concerned with religion. 
Video Recordings Act 1984:  
 
s. 2(1A) Subject to subsection (2) or (3) below, a video game is for the 
purposes of this Act an exempted work if— 
(a) it is, taken as a whole, designed to inform, educate or instruct; 
(b) it is, taken as a whole, concerned with sport, religion or music; or 
(c) it satisfies one or more of the conditions in section 2A. 
 
There are however limitations to these exemptions as follows: 
 
(1ZA) A video work other than a video game is not an exempted work for 
those purposes if it does one or more of the following— 
... 
(o) it includes words or images that are intended or likely (to any 
extent) to cause offence, whether on the grounds of race, gender, 
disability, religion or belief or sexual orientation, or otherwise. 
 
7.5 Stirring up religious hatred 
 
The provisions above are all related to regulated broadcasting but there is also more 
general protection against stirring up religious hatred which applies to 
communication, defined broadly.  
 
There is specific provision in respect of incitement to religious hatred in the Public 
Order Act 1986, section 29F: 
 
(1) If a programme involving threatening visual images or sounds is included 
in a programme service, each of the persons mentioned in subsection (2) is 
guilty of an offence if he intends thereby to stir up religious hatred or hatred 
on the grounds of sexual orientation. 
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(2) The persons are– 
(a) the person providing the programme service, 
(b) any person by whom the programme is produced or directed, and 
(c) any person by whom offending words or behaviour are used. 
 
Although parts of the 1986 Act extend to Scotland, the part concerning religious 
hatred applies only to England and Wales, giving rise to a rather anomalous situation.4 
 
In 2012, a new Act, the Offensive Behaviour at Football and Threatening 
Communications (Scotland) Act 2012, was introduced in Scotland which, while 
focusing primarily on behaviour in the context of football matches also includes a 
much broader provision which sets out a new offence in respect of “threatening 
communications”. Section 6 provides that: 
 
(1) A person commits an offence if— 
(a) the person communicates material to another person, and 
(b) either Condition A or Condition B is satisfied. 
(2) Condition A is that— 
(a) the material consists of, contains or implies a threat, or an 
incitement, to carry out a seriously violent act against a person or 
against persons of a particular description, 
(b) the material or the communication of it would be likely to cause a 
reasonable person to suffer fear or alarm, and 
(c) the person communicating the material— 
(i) intends by doing so to cause fear or alarm, or 
(ii) is reckless as to whether the communication of the material 
would cause fear or alarm. 
(3) For the purposes of Condition A, where the material consists of or includes 
an image (whether still or moving), the image is taken to imply a threat or 
incitement such as is mentioned in paragraph (a) of subsection (2) if— 
                                                             
4 For discussion, see 
http://www.christian.org.uk/scotland_archive/religioushatred/kerrigan&addison_opinion.pdf. 
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(a) the image depicts or implies the carrying out of a seriously violent 
act (whether actual or fictitious) against a person or against persons of 
a particular description (whether the person or persons depicted are 
living or dead or actual or fictitious), and 
(b) a reasonable person would be likely to consider that the image 
implies the carrying out of a seriously violent act against an actual 
person or against actual persons of a particular description. 
(4) Subsection (3) does not affect the generality of subsection (2)(a). 
(5) Condition B is that— 
(a) the material is threatening, and 
(b) the person communicating it intends by doing so to stir up hatred 
on religious grounds. 
(6) It is a defence for a person charged with an offence under subsection (1) to 
show that the communication of the material was, in the particular 
circumstances, reasonable. 
(7) A person guilty of an offence under subsection (1) is liable— 
(a) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not 
exceeding 5 years, or to a fine, or to both, or 
(b) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 
12 months, or to a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum, or to 
both. 
 
7.6 Conclusions 
 
The regulation of media and broadcasting brings together many of the key issues in 
contemporary debates about religion in society. At the heart of the regulatory 
framework is the interplay among freedom of speech, protection against 
discrimination, provision for diversity and plurality and protection of human dignity. 
Some of the provisions perhaps reflect earlier traditions where religion and religious 
organisations had a more settled place in society – for example, the provision of 
religious programmes as part of public service broadcasting – whereas others reflect 
more recent trends towards protection of human rights and  preservation of human 
dignity. The language of the different provisions is in itself an indication of some of 
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the legal difficulties: is the law seeking to protect against intentional stirring up of 
religious hatred or against any offence, whether intentional or not, which may have 
been caused. 
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8.1 Introduction 
Charity may be argued to have specific roots within religion, but charity law in 
Scotland encompasses a much more broadly defined concept. It is important to draw a 
distinction between ideas of charity and charitable behaviour and the specific 
purposes required by law in order to satisfy the test for charitable status. “The term 
“charity” is an imprecise term that is used to refer to actions and programmes of a 
highly diverse kind. Within the sphere of charity law, … the expression is not used in 
its popular sense, but rather … it refers to a technical concept”1 and while religion has 
a place within that technical concept, it is now defined much more broadly in Scots 
law.  
 
8.2 Charity test 
Scots law sets out a statutory test for charitable status which requires the body 
concerned to show that it meets the relevant charitable purposes and that it provides 
public benefit. The test is set out in section 7 of the Charities and Trustee Investment 
(Scotland) Act 2005, in the following terms: 
 
(1) A body meets the charity test if– 
                                                             
1 MR Blanco, “Religion and the Law of Charities” (2006) 8 Ecclesiastical Law Journal 245 at 248. 
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(a) its purposes consist only of one or more of the charitable purposes, 
and 
(b) it provides (or, in the case of an applicant, provides or intends to 
provide) public benefit in Scotland or elsewhere. 
(2) The charitable purposes are– 
(a) the prevention or relief of poverty, 
(b) the advancement of education, 
(c) the advancement of religion, 
(d) the advancement of health, 
(e) the saving of lives, 
(f) the advancement of citizenship or community development, 
(g) the advancement of the arts, heritage, culture or science, 
(h) the advancement of public participation in sport, 
(i) the provision of recreational facilities, or the organisation of 
recreational activities, with the object of improving the conditions of 
life for the persons for whom the facilities or activities are primarily 
intended, 
(j) the advancement of human rights, conflict resolution or 
reconciliation, 
(k) the promotion of religious or racial harmony, 
(l) the promotion of equality and diversity, 
(m) the advancement of environmental protection or improvement, 
(n) the relief of those in need by reason of age, ill-health, disability, 
financial hardship or other disadvantage, 
(o) the advancement of animal welfare, 
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(p) any other purpose that may reasonably be regarded as analogous to 
any of the preceding purposes. 
(3) In subsection (2)– 
(a) in paragraph (d), “the advancement of health” includes the 
prevention or relief of sickness, disease or human suffering, 
(b) paragraph (f) includes– 
(i) rural or urban regeneration, and 
(ii) the promotion of civic responsibility, volunteering, the 
voluntary sector or the effectiveness or efficiency of charities, 
(c) in paragraph (h), “sport” means sport which involves physical skill 
and exertion, 
(d) paragraph (i) applies only in relation to recreational facilities or 
activities which are– 
(i) primarily intended for persons who have need of them by 
reason of their age, ill-health, disability, financial hardship or 
other disadvantage, or 
(ii) available to members of the public at large or to male or 
female members of the public at large, 
(e) paragraph (n) includes relief given by the provision of 
accommodation or care, and 
(f) for the purposes of paragraph (p), the advancement of any 
philosophical belief (whether or not involving belief in a god) is 
analogous to the purpose set out in paragraph (c). 
(4) A body which falls within paragraphs (a) and (b) of subsection (1) does 
not, despite that subsection, meet the charity test if– 
(a) its constitution allows it to distribute or otherwise apply any of its 
property (on being wound up or at any other time) for a purpose which 
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is not a charitable purpose, 
(b) its constitution expressly permits the Scottish Ministers or a 
Minister of the Crown to direct or otherwise control its activities, or 
(c) it is, or one of its purposes is to advance, a political party. 
(5) The Scottish Ministers may by order disapply either or both of paragraphs 
(a) and (b) of subsection (4) in relation to any body or type of body specified 
in the order. 
This provision is set out in full to show the wide range of charitable purposes and the 
place therein of “advancement of religion”. It is notable that, although there is a 
separate purpose for the advancement of any philosophical belief, there is an explicit 
link, in subsection (3)(f) to the advancement of religion. 
In order to satisfy the charity test, it must also be shown, that the organisation 
provides a public benefit. As set out in section 8, there is no presumption of benefit 
inherent in any of the purposes: 
(1) No particular purpose is, for the purposes of establishing whether the 
charity test has been met, to be presumed to be for the public benefit. 
(2) In determining whether a body provides or intends to provide public 
benefit, regard must be had to– 
(a) how any– 
(i) benefit gained or likely to be gained by members of the 
body or any other persons (other than as members of the 
public), and 
(ii) disbenefit incurred or likely to be incurred by the public, 
in consequence of the body exercising its functions compares 
with the benefit gained or likely to be gained by the public in 
that consequence, and 
(b) where benefit is, or is likely to be, provided to a section of the 
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public only, whether any condition on obtaining that benefit (including 
any charge or fee) is unduly restrictive. 
 
The Charities Act 2011, which sets out a similar charity test principally for 
application in England and Wales,2 states in section 1(1)(c) that “advancement of 
religion” is a charitable purpose, and defines “religion” as used in that subsection as 
including “(i) a religion which involves belief in more than one god, and (ii) a religion 
which does not involve belief in a god.”3  
 
8.3 A religious charity 
There is specific provision for designation as a “religious charity” in terms of section 
65 of the Charities and Trustee Investment (Scotland) Act 2005: 
 
(1) OSCR may designate as a designated religious charity a charity which 
appears to it to have– 
(a) the advancement of religion as its principal purpose, 
(b) the regular holding of public worship as its principal activity, 
(c) been established in Scotland for at least 10 years, 
(d) a membership of at least 3,000 persons who are– 
(i) resident in Scotland, and 
(ii) at least 16 years of age, and 
(e) an internal organisation such that– 
(i) one or more authorities in Scotland exercise supervisory and 
                                                             
2 Although it may also be of relevance to Scottish charities in terms of s7. 
3 Charities Act 2011, s3(2)(a). 
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disciplinary functions in respect of the component elements of 
the charity, and 
(ii) those elements are subject to requirements as to keeping 
accounting records and audit of accounts which appear to 
OSCR to correspond to those required by section 44. 
(2) OSCR may determine that subsection (1)(c) need not be satisfied in the case 
of a charity– 
(a) created by the amalgamation of 2 or more charities each of which, 
immediately before the amalgamation– 
(i) was a designated religious charity, or 
(ii) was, in OSCR's opinion, eligible for designation as such, or 
  (b) constituted by persons who have removed themselves from  
  membership of a charity which, immediately before the removal– 
(i) was a designated religious charity, or 
(ii) was, in OSCR's opinion, eligible for designation as such. 
(3) The provisions set out in subsection (4) do not apply to– 
(a) a designated religious charity, 
(b) any component element of a designated religious charity which is 
itself a charity (whether or not having as its principal purpose the 
advancement of religion). 
(4) Those provisions are– 
subsections (1) and (6) of section 16 (in so far as those subsections relate to 
any action set out in subsection (2)(b) to (d) of that section), 
section 28(3), 
section 31(4) and (6), 
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section 34(5)(c) to (e), 
section 69. 
(5) OSCR may, by notice served on a designated religious charity, withdraw the 
designation of the charity as such where– 
(a) it appears to OSCR that one or more of paragraphs (a) to (e) of 
subsection (1) is no longer satisfied in relation to the charity, or 
(b) in consequence of an investigation of any component element of 
the charity under section 28, OSCR has given a direction under section 
31(5) in relation to the component element and considers that it is no 
longer appropriate for the charity to be a designated religious charity.” 
 
8.4 OSCR 
Scottish charities are regulated by the Office of the Scottish Charity Regulator 
(OSCR). Decisions by OSCR as to charitable status are subject to appeal to the 
Scottish Charity Appeals Panel.  The Panel reports some of its decisions on its 
website. A noteworthy recent decision concerned the Scottish Charity Appeals Panel 
quashing an earlier decision of OSCR in respect of St Margaret’s Children and Family 
Care Society. The charity in question is a Glasgow based adoption agency run by the 
Roman Catholic Church in Scotland, and OSCR’s Direction required the adoption 
agency to “amend its external statements, internal guidance and procedures and 
practice so as to ensure that the criteria applied to decide whether those enquiring 
about assessment as adoptive parents will be accepted for full assessment: (i) are clear 
and transparent; (ii) comply fully with the requirements of The Equality Act 2010. A 
full “Note of Reasons” for the Panel’s decision is available online on their Register of 
Appeals, and a summary of the Panel’s decision may be found in that decision from 
line 1945. In short, the Panel held: that OSCR had discounted at an early stage of its 
deliberations that the objects of the charity in question was the advancement of 
religion; that the charity in question did discriminate indirectly “but that indirect 
discrimination is allowed in terms of The Equality Act because it is a proportionate 
means of achieving a legitimate aim”; that both the charities exception and the 
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religious exception contained in The Equality Act applied; that OSCR had erred in its 
application of the Public Benefit Test; and that the decision made by OSCR which 
was the subject of the appeal had been “a disproportionate regulatory measure”.
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9.1 Freedom of conscience 
 
Several statutory provisions might be brought together under the general heading of 
conscience and conscientious objection, all being provisions which permit 
individuals, in certain situations, to act or be excused from acting, in accordance with 
their religious belief. Some of these provisions are relatively long established whereas 
others have developed more recently.  
 
Rights to freedom of conscience are commonly associated with the European 
Convention on Human Rights which provides, in Article 9, that: 
 
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this 
right includes freedom to change his religion or belief and freedom, either 
alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his 
religion or belief, in worship, teaching, practice and observance. 
2. Freedom to manifest one’s religion or beliefs shall be subject only to such 
limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society 
in the interests of public safety, for the protection of public order, health or 
morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. 
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9.2 Conscientious objection 
 
9.2.1 Education 
The use of a conscience clause in legislation in respect of the parental withdrawal of 
pupils from religious observance and religious instruction in Scotland since 1872 has 
already been noted in the fuller section of the final report concerning Education. 
  
9.2.2 Military service 
Other than the use of the concept of conscience in the context of Scottish education, 
the only other place the concept appears to have been used in historical law is in 
relation to compulsory military service and conscientious objections. The National 
Service Act 1948, sections 17-22 was the last UK Act which dealt with compulsory 
national service in the British Armed Forces: dealing with conscientious objection to 
being registered in the military service register, or to performing military service, or 
to performing combatant duties. While neither conscription nor national service at 
present apply in the UK, the phrase “conscientious objection” is still used in respect 
of military service, as in the European Convention on Human Rights, Article 4(3)(b). 
 
9.2.3 Medical law 
While the principle of conscientious objection is not currently relevant in the UK in 
terms of military service, it is used in a different context; that of medical law. The 
phrase is found in the Abortion Act 1967 in respect of conscientious objection to 
involvement in procedures surrounding the procurement of lawful abortions and it is 
notable here that it is the principle of “conscientious objection” which is used rather 
than objection on the ground of religion or belief. Section 4 of the Abortion Act 1967 
provides that: 
 
(1) Subject to subsection (2) of this section, no person shall be under any duty, 
whether by contract or by any statutory or other legal requirement, to 
participate in any treatment authorised by this Act to which he has a 
conscientious objection: 
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Provided that in any legal proceedings the burden of proof of conscientious 
objection shall rest on the person claiming to rely on it. 
 
(2) Nothing in subsection (1) of this section shall affect any duty to participate 
in treatment which is necessary to save the life or to prevent grave permanent 
injury to the physical or mental health of a pregnant woman. 
 
(3) In any proceedings before a court in Scotland, a statement on oath by any 
person to the effect that he has a conscientious objection to participating in 
any treatment authorised by this Act shall be sufficient evidence for the 
purpose of discharging the burden of proof imposed upon him by subsection 
(1) of this section. 
 
A recent series of cases before the Outer and Inner Houses of the Court of Session, 
and ultimately before the United Kingdom Supreme Court, concerning two Roman 
Catholic midwives at the Southern General Hospital, Glasgow, and whether or not 
they might legitimately avoid being indirectly involved in certain provisions 
surrounding the procurement of legal abortions, ought to be particularly noted here. 
 
The principal preliminary event to these cases concerned a decision by Greater 
Glasgow and Clyde Health board to the effect that section 4(1) of the Abortion Act 
1967 did not confer upon two Roman Catholic midwives (who objected to abortion on 
the ground of conscientious objection) “any right to refuse to delegate to, supervise or 
support staff in the provision of nursing care to patients undergoing medical 
termination of pregnancy”. The midwives in question applied to the Court of Session 
for judicial review. The Outer House in Doogan v Greater Glasgow and Clyde Health 
Board1 held that Parliament did not intend “participate” to be broadly construed and, 
as such, since the midwives in question were not required to participate directly in 
abortions, dismissed the petition for judicial review. This decision was subsequently 
reversed by the Inner House of the Court of Session,2 who adopted a broad 
interpretation of section 4(1) of the 1967 Act, and held, among various other points, 
                                                             
1 2012 S.L.T. 1041. 
2 Doogan v Greater Glasgow and Clyde Health Board, 2013 S.L.T. 517. 
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that “the right of conscientious objection extended not only to the actual medical or 
surgical termination but to the whole process of treatment given for that purpose 
where it was not only the actual termination which was authorised by the Act for the 
purposes of s.4(1), but any part of the treatment given for that end purpose, and s.4(1) 
allowed an individual to object to participating in “any” treatment under the Act”. 
 
The decision of the Inner House was further appealed to the United Kingdom 
Supreme Court,3 who in the event allowed the appeal, thus setting aside the earlier 
judgment of the Inner House of the Court of Session. Specifically, the UK Supreme 
Court held that “(1) … the question for the court was purely one of statutory 
construction, namely the meaning of the words “to participate in any treatment 
authorised by this Act to which he has a conscientious objection”; (2) that the course 
of treatment to which the respondents might object was the whole course of medical 
treatment bringing about the termination of the pregnancy; (3) that a narrow meaning 
of the words “to participate in” was likely to have been in Parliament’s contemplation 
when passing the 1967 Act: it was unlikely that, in enacting the conscience clause, 
Parliament had in mind the host of ancillary, administrative and managerial tasks that 
might be associated with the acts made lawful in s.1 of the 1967 Act, and 
“participate” meant taking part in a hands on capacity; (4) that a necessary corollary 
of a healthcare professional’s duty of care towards a patient was an obligation, when 
failing to provide care due to conscientious objection, to refer that patient’s case to a 
professional who did not share the objection”  
 
The concept of conscientious objection is also found in other statutes dealing with 
medical law, such as the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990. Section 38 
of the 1990 Act provides that: 
 
(1) No person who has a conscientious objection to participating in any 
activity governed by this Act shall be under any duty, however arising, to do 
so. 
                                                             
3 Doogan v Greater Glasgow and Clyde Health Board, 2015 S.L.T. 25. 
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(2) In any legal proceedings the burden of proof of conscientious objection 
shall rest on the person claiming to rely on it. 
(3) In any proceedings before a court in Scotland, a statement on oath by any 
person to the effect that he has a conscientious objection to participating in a 
particular activity governed by this Act shall be sufficient evidence of that fact 
for the purpose of discharging the burden of proof imposed by subsection (2) 
above. 
 
National Health Service regulations concerning the provision of contraceptive 
services and abortion variously make reference to conscientious objection and attempt 
to define its reasonable accommodation. This can be seen in respect of the provision, 
by contractors in the National Health Service, of contraceptive services: 
 
National Health Service (General Medical Services Contracts) (Scotland) 
Regulations 2004/115, schedule 1, para. 3 
(1) A contractor whose contract includes the provision of contraceptive 
services shall make available to all its patients who request such services the 
services described in sub-paragraph (2). 
(2) The services referred to in sub-paragraph (1) are– 
... 
(d) the giving of advice about emergency contraception and where 
appropriate, the supplying or prescribing of emergency hormonal 
contraception or, where the contractor has a conscientious objection to 
emergency contraception, prompt referral to another provider of 
primary medical services who does not have such conscientious 
objections; 
(e) the provision of advice and referral in cases of unplanned or 
unwanted pregnancy, including advice about the availability of free 
pregnancy testing in the practice area and, where appropriate, where 
the contractor has a conscientious objection to the termination of 
pregnancy, prompt referral to another provider of primary medical 
services who does not have such conscientious objections; 
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National Health Service (Primary Medical Services Section 17C 
Agreements) (Scotland) Regulations 2004/116, schedule 3, para. 3 
(1) A provider whose agreement includes the provision of contraceptive 
services shall make available to all its patients who request such services the 
services described in sub-paragraph (2). 
(2) The services referred to in sub-paragraph (1) are– 
  (a) the giving of advice about the full range of contraceptive methods; 
(b) where appropriate, the medical examination of patients seeking 
such advice; 
(c) the treatment of such patients for contraceptive purposes and the 
prescribing of contraceptive substances and appliances (excluding the 
fitting and implanting of intrauterine devices and implants); 
(d) the giving of advice about emergency contraception and where 
appropriate, the supplying or prescribing of emergency hormonal 
contraception or, where the provider has a conscientious objection to 
emergency contraception, prompt referral to another provider (by any 
arrangement) of primary medical services who does not have such 
conscientious objections; 
(e) the provision of advice and referral in cases of unplanned or 
unwanted pregnancy, including advice about the availability of free 
pregnancy testing in the practice area, and, where appropriate, where 
the provider has a conscientious objection to the termination of 
pregnancy, prompt referral to another provider(by any arrangement) of 
primary medical services who does not have such conscientious 
objections; … 
 
 
National Health Service (General Medical Services Contracts) (Scotland) 
Regulations 2004/115, schedule 1, para. 7 
(1) A contractor whose contract includes the provision of maternity medical 
services shall provide– 
... 
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(c) all necessary maternity medical services to female patients whose 
pregnancy has terminated as a result of miscarriage or abortion or, where the 
contractor has a conscientious objection to the termination of pregnancy, 
prompt referral to another provider of primary medical services who does not 
have such conscientious objections. 
 
National Health Service (Primary Medical Services Section 17C 
Agreements) (Scotland) Regulations 2004/116, schedule 3, para. 7 
 
(1) A provider whose agreement includes the provision of maternity medical 
services shall provide– 
(a) to female patients who have been diagnosed as pregnant all 
necessary maternity medical services throughout the antenatal period; 
(b) to female patients and their babies all necessary maternity medical 
services throughout the postnatal period other than neonatal checks; 
(c) all necessary maternity medical services to female patients whose 
pregnancy has terminated as a result of miscarriage or abortion or, 
where the provider has a conscientious objection to the termination of 
pregnancy, prompt referral to another provider (by any arrangement) 
of primary medical services who does not have such conscientious 
objections. 
 
 
9.2.4 Jobseekers 
Beyond armed service law and medical law, the phrase “conscientious objection” also 
occurs, somewhat surprisingly perhaps, in 1996 regulations concerning jobseekers’ 
allowance, in which interestingly “sincerely held conscientious objection” is used 
alongside the phrase “sincerely held religious belief”. The Jobseekers’ Allowance 
Regulations 1996/207, part 2, regulation 13 provides that: 
 
(1) In any week a person may restrict his availability for employment in the 
following ways, if the circumstances set out apply. 
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(2) Subject to regulations 6, 7 and 9, a person may impose restrictions on the 
nature of the employment for which he is available by reason of a sincerely 
held religious belief, or a sincerely held conscientious objection providing he 
can show that he has reasonable prospects of employment notwithstanding 
those restrictions...  
 
9.3 Conclusions 
Freedom of conscience is a fundamental element of the protection of individual 
human rights in respect of religion and belief and the concept of conscientious 
objection has been a key aspect of the development of the jurisprudence of the 
European Court of Human Rights in this context. The concept is relatively little found 
in UK statute and it is of most significance in the context of abortion, the provision of 
contraception and assisted reproduction services. Here it is notable that there is no 
explicit link with religion although religion may lie behind the reason for the 
conscientious objection in individual cases.
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Chapter 10 
Criminal law and prisons 
 
Chapter 10 Criminal law and prisons 
10.1 Introduction 
10.2 Religious offences 
10.3 Regulation of prisons 
10.4 Religion and punishment 
10.5 Witness protection 
10.6 Jury service 
10.7 Conclusions 
 
10.1 Introduction 
 
Criminal law is an area of law where links with religion and morality are perhaps 
most obvious and there is much to be explored in terms of the values which underpin 
a system of criminal law. Ideas of guilt, evil and wickedness are fundamental to 
criminal law and they have clear echoes of religion and religious teaching. In the 
institutions of criminal law too there are constructs and images which reference 
organized religion: the bench, the robed judiciary, the penitent prisoner. The influence 
of values, religious or otherwise, throughout the development of common law crimes, 
is outwith the scope of this Report but may be an area for further consideration.1 The 
focus here is instead on statutory provisions which fall into two principal areas: 
specific criminal offences designed to tackle religiously aggravated behaviour and 
regulation of prisons and prison services. 
  
                                                             
1 See, for example, C. Kennedy, “Criminal Law and Religion in Post-Reformation Scotland” (2012) 
Edinburgh Law Review 178 – 197. 
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10.2 Religious offences 
 
One way of tackling religious prejudice in Scots law is by treating it as a form of 
aggravation of otherwise criminal behaviour; an approach which can be seen in the 
Criminal Justice (Scotland) Act 2003, section 74 which provides as follows: 
 
(1) This section applies where it is— 
(a) libelled in an indictment; or 
(b) specified in a complaint, 
and, in either case, proved that an offence has been aggravated by religious 
prejudice. 
(2) For the purposes of this section, an offence is aggravated by religious 
prejudice if— 
(a) at the time of committing the offence or immediately before or after 
doing so, the offender evinces towards the victim (if any) of the 
offence malice and ill-will based on the victim's membership (or 
presumed membership) of a religious group, or of a social or cultural 
group with a perceived religious affiliation; or 
(b) the offence is motivated (wholly or partly) by malice and ill-will 
towards members of a religious group, or of a social or cultural group 
with a perceived religious affiliation, based on their membership of 
that group. 
(2A) It is immaterial whether or not the offender's malice and ill-will is also 
based (to any extent) on any other factor. 
 … 
(4A) The court must— 
(a) state on conviction that the offence was aggravated by religious 
prejudice, 
(b) record the conviction in a way that shows that the offence was so 
aggravated, 
(c) take the aggravation into account in determining the appropriate 
sentence and 
233 
 
(d) state— 
(i) where the sentence in respect of the offence is different from 
that which the court would have imposed if the offence were 
not so aggravated, the extent of and the reasons for that 
difference, or 
(ii) otherwise, the reasons for there being no such difference. 
(5) For the purposes of this section, evidence from a single source is sufficient 
to prove that an offence is aggravated by religious prejudice. 
(6) In subsection (2)(a)— 
“membership”in relation to a group includes association with members of that 
group; and 
“presumed” means presumed by the offender. 
(7) In this section, “religious group” means a group of persons defined by 
reference to their— 
(a) religious belief or lack of religious belief; 
(b) membership of or adherence to a church or religious organisation; 
(c) support for the culture and traditions of a church or religious 
organisation; or 
(d) participation in activities associated with such a culture or such 
traditions. 
 
Although not explicit in the 2003 Act, the motivating concern in Scotland is often 
sectarianism and, in particular, sectarian behaviour associated with football. There are 
now several specific offences which apply in that context. The Police, Public Order 
and Criminal Justice (Scotland) Act 2006, section 56 makes provision in respect of 
“football banning orders”.  It provides as follows: 
 
… (2) “Violence” means violence against persons or intentional damage to 
property and includes— 
(a) threatening violence; and 
(b) doing anything which endangers the life of a person. 
(3) “Disorder”includes— 
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(a) stirring up hatred against a group of persons based on their 
membership (or presumed membership) of a group defined by 
reference to a thing mentioned in subsection (5), or against an 
individual as a member of such a group; 
(b) using threatening, abusive or insulting words or behaviour or 
disorderly behaviour; 
(c) displaying any writing or other thing which is threatening, abusive 
or insulting. 
(4) In subsection (3)(a), “presumed” means presumed by the person doing the 
stirring up. 
(5) The things referred to in subsection (3)(a) are— 
(a) colour; 
(b) race; 
(c) nationality (including citizenship); 
(d) ethnic or national origins; 
(e) membership of a religious group or of a social or cultural group 
with a perceived religious affiliation; 
(f) sexual orientation; 
(g) transgender identity; 
(h) disability … 
 
The concept of “a religious group or of a social or cultural group with a perceived 
religious affiliation” is defined in accordance with section 74(7) of the 2003 Act, 
quoted above. 
 
This continued link between religious affiliation and football was further highlighted 
in new legislation, introduced by the Scottish Parliament in 2012, expressly to tackle 
offensive behaviour which is often associated with sectarian behaviour at football 
matches.  The Offensive Behaviour at Football and Threatening Communications 
(Scotland) Act 2012 introduced a new statutory offence in section, as follows: 
 
(1) A person commits an offence if, in relation to a regulated football match— 
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(a) the person engages in behaviour of a kind described in subsection 
(2), and 
(b) the behaviour— 
(i) is likely to incite public disorder, or 
(ii) would be likely to incite public disorder. 
(2) The behaviour is— 
(a) expressing hatred of, or stirring up hatred against, a group of 
persons based on their membership (or presumed membership) of— 
(i) a religious group, 
(ii) a social or cultural group with a perceived religious 
affiliation, 
(iii) a group defined by reference to a thing mentioned in 
subsection (4), 
(b) expressing hatred of, or stirring up hatred against, an individual 
based on the individual's membership (or presumed membership) of a 
group mentioned in any of sub-paragraphs (i) to (iii) of paragraph (a), 
(c) behaviour that is motivated (wholly or partly) by hatred of a group 
mentioned in any of those sub-paragraphs, 
(d) behaviour that is threatening, or 
(e) other behaviour that a reasonable person would be likely to 
consider offensive. 
(3) For the purposes of subsection (2)(a) and (b), it is irrelevant whether the 
hatred is also based (to any extent) on any other factor. 
(4) The things referred to in subsection (2)(a)(iii) are— 
(a) colour, 
(b) race, 
(c) nationality (including citizenship), 
(d) ethnic or national origins, 
(e) sexual orientation, 
(f) transgender identity, 
(g) disability. 
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(5) For the purposes of subsection (1)(b)(ii), behaviour would be likely to 
incite public disorder if public disorder would be likely to occur but for the 
fact that— 
(a) measures are in place to prevent public disorder, or 
(b) persons likely to be incited to public disorder are not present or are 
not present in sufficient numbers. 
(6) A person guilty of an offence under subsection (1) is liable— 
(a) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not 
exceeding 5 years, or to a fine, or to both, or 
(b) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 
12 months, or to a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum, or to 
both. 
 
“Religious group” is again defined2 in accordance with section 74(7) of the Criminal 
Justice (Scotland) Act 2003.   
 
This new statutory offence may have been devised in response to a very particular 
type of behaviour but the words of the statute are broad and as was commented in a 
key decision under the Act, “[i]n enacting s.1(1) the Parliament created a criminal 
offence with an extremely long reach”.3 
 
Although the 2012 Act has specifically associated with organised football, it also 
creates a separate offence in respect of threatening communications which applies 
independently of the football environment. This new offence is set out in section 6 as 
follows: 
 
(1) A person commits an offence if— 
(a) the person communicates material to another person, and 
(b) either Condition A or Condition B is satisfied. 
... 
                                                             
2 Offensive Behaviour at Football and Threatening Communications (Scotland) Act 2012, s4(2)(c). 
3 MacDonald v Cairns, 2013 SLT 929 at 933. 
 
237 
 
(5) Condition B is that— 
(a) the material is threatening, and 
(b) the person communicating it intends by doing so to stir up hatred 
on religious grounds… 
 
Section 8(4) of the 2012 Act defines hatred on religious grounds thus: 
 
(4) “Hatred on religious grounds” means hatred against— 
(a) a group of persons based on their membership (or presumed 
membership) of— 
(i) a religious group (within the meaning given by section 74(7) 
of the Criminal Justice (Scotland) Act 2003 (asp 7)), 
(ii) a social or cultural group with a perceived religious 
affiliation, or 
(b) an individual based on the individual's membership (or presumed 
membership) of a group mentioned in either of sub-paragraphs (i) and 
(ii) of paragraph (a). 
 
As with the section 1 offence, this new provision is far reaching and while it is 
intended to tackle problems associated with sectarianism as understood in the Scottish 
context, it is set out in broad terms. Clearly it gives rise to concerns about freedom of 
expression; concerns which Parliament sought to address in section 7:  
 
(1) For the avoidance of doubt, nothing in section 6(5) prohibits or restricts— 
(a) discussion or criticism of religions or the beliefs or practices of 
adherents of religions, 
(b) expressions of antipathy, dislike, ridicule, insult or abuse towards 
those matters, 
(c) proselytising, or 
(d) urging of adherents of religions to cease practising their religions. 
(2) In subsection (1), “religions” includes— 
(a) religions generally, 
(b) particular religions, 
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(c) other belief systems. 
 
10.3 Regulation of prisons 
 
In respect of Scottish prisons and young offenders’ institutions, a loss of liberty as a 
result of conviction for a criminal act does not entail a loss of freedom to practise 
religion.  
 
Governors of Scottish prisons and young offenders’ institutions must seek to 
eliminate discrimination, harassment and victimisation against prisoners on the 
grounds of “religion or belief” as well as a range of other characteristics such as race 
and sexual orientation.  This obligation reflects the general protection against 
discrimination which is set out in the Equality Act 2010.  It is provided in the Prisons 
and Young Offenders Institutions (Scotland) Rules 2011/331, part 1, rule 6 that: 
 
Subject to the provisions of these Rules or of any direction made for any 
purpose specified in these Rules, the Governor must seek to eliminate within 
the prison discrimination, harassment and victimisation against prisoners on 
the grounds of— 
(a) age; 
(b) disability; 
(c) gender reassignment; 
(d) marriage and civil partnership; 
(e) pregnancy and maternity; 
(f) race; 
(g) religion or belief; 
(h) sex; 
(i) sexual orientation; or 
(j) other status. 
 
Details about prisoners’ “religion, belief, or non-belief” must be recorded by Scottish 
prisons, and such information must be passed to prison chaplaincy teams, but only if a 
prisoner has so wished to intimate such information about themselves. It is provided 
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as follows in the Prisons and Young Offenders Institutions (Scotland) Rules 
2011/331, part 2, rule 13 that: 
 
(1) Details about a prisoner's religion, belief or non-belief must be recorded by 
the Governor in accordance with this rule. 
(2) A prisoner is to be treated as having a particular religion, belief or non-
belief for the purposes of these Rules if he or she has declared this upon 
reception at the prison or at any other time. 
(3) A prisoner is not obliged to give any information about having a particular 
religion, belief or non-belief at reception or at any other time. 
(4) Any information provided in accordance with paragraph (2) must be 
recorded and passed to the chaplaincy team. 
 
Where a prisoner has a particular dietary requirement arising from their religion, such 
requirements must be accommodated. Prisons and Young Offenders Institutions 
(Scotland) Rules 2011/331, part 4, rule 35 provides that: 
 
(3) The Governor must ensure that every prisoner is provided with food which 
takes into account, so far as practicable, the prisoner's age, health and 
religious, cultural, dietary or other requirements. 
 
In general, prisoners must be free to practise their own religion, including the 
possession of religious books and items, attendance at religious services, and contact 
with prison chaplains were so desired. It is provided in the Prisons and Young 
Offenders Institutions (Scotland) Rules 2011/331, part 6, rule 44 that: 
 
  (1) Subject to the provisions of the Act, these Rules and any direction made 
 under these Rules, every prisoner is entitled to— 
(a) observe the requirements and engage in the practices of their 
religion or belief; 
(b) possess religious books, items and materials for their own personal 
use which are appropriate to their religion or belief; 
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(c) attend religious services or meetings arranged by members of the 
chaplaincy team; and 
(d) make a request to the Governor to see, or to speak to, an 
appropriate member of the chaplaincy team. 
(2) The Governor must— 
(a) inform every prisoner of the facilities or arrangements which exist 
or may be made for the purposes of this rule; 
(b) provide such literature and other materials as the Governor 
considers appropriate for the purposes of paragraph (1)(a) and (b); and 
(c) as soon as practicable after a request made by a prisoner under 
paragraph (1)(d), notify the appropriate member of the chaplaincy 
team of the prisoner's request. 
(3) The Governor may prevent a prisoner from attending a religious service or 
meeting arranged by the chaplaincy team if the Governor considers it is 
necessary to do so— 
(a) for the maintenance of good order and discipline within the prison; 
(b) in the interests of the safety of any person within the prison; or 
(c) for the protection of the health of any person within the prison. 
(4) Any visit to a prisoner by a member of the chaplaincy team must be held 
outwith the sight and hearing of an officer except where— 
(a) the member or prisoner concerned requests otherwise; or 
(b) the Governor considers it would be prejudicial to the interests of 
security or safety for an officer not to be present. 
 
Prisoners are entitled to observe days of rest or of religious observance so far as 
reasonably practicable, as provided in the Prisons and Young Offenders Institutions 
(Scotland) Rules 2011/331, part 9, rule 83: 
 
(3) A prisoner who has declared himself or herself to belong to a particular 
religion or religious denomination is entitled, as far as reasonably 
practicable— 
(a) to take the weekly rest day specified in paragraph (2) on any 
recognised weekly day of religious observance; and 
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(b) to be excused from work or from undertaking an educational class 
or counselling, arranged in terms of rule 84, on such other days in a 
year as are recognised days of religious observance and are specified in 
a direction made by the Scottish Ministers. 
 
All Scottish prisons are expected to appoint a minister or licentiate of the Church of 
Scotland as a chaplain, the nomination of whom is the duty of the Secretary of State 
for Scotland. This is required in terms of the Prisons (Scotland) Act 1989, section 
3(2): 
 
The Secretary of State shall appoint to each prison a chaplain being a minister 
or a licentiate of the Church of Scotland. 
 
Chaplains from other denominations may be appointed, and may receive 
remuneration, at the discretion of the Secretary of State for Scotland in terms of the 
Prisons (Scotland) Act 1989, section 9: 
1) Where in any prison the number of prisoners who belong to a religious 
denomination other than the Church of Scotland is such as in the opinion of 
the Secretary of State to require the appointment of a minister of that 
denomination, the Secretary of State may appoint such a minister to that 
prison. 
(2) The Secretary of State may pay a minister appointed under the foregoing 
subsection such remuneration as he thinks reasonable. 
(3) The Secretary of State may allow a minister of any denomination other 
than the Church of Scotland to visit prisoners of his denomination in a prison 
to which no minister of that denomination has been appointed under this 
section. 
(4) No prisoner shall be visited against his will by such a minister as is 
mentioned in the last foregoing subsection; but every prisoner not belonging to 
the Church of Scotland shall be allowed, in accordance with the arrangements 
in force in the prison in which he is confined, to attend chapel or to be visited 
by the chaplain. 
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(5) The governor of a prison shall on the reception of each prisoner record the 
religious denomination to which the prisoner declares himself to belong, and 
shall give to any minister who under this section is appointed to the prison or 
permitted to visit prisoners therein a list of the prisoners who have declared 
themselves to belong to his denomination; and the minister shall not be 
permitted to visit any other prisoners.” 
  
The general model of permitting prisoners to continue to practise their religion is 
replicated in UK detention centres, including any in Scotland. The provisions are set 
out in the Detention Centre Rules 2001/238, part 2, rules 13, 14, 20-25, as follows: 
 
13. Food 
(1) Subject to any directions of the Secretary of State, no detained person shall 
be allowed, except as authorised by the medical practitioner to have any food 
other than that ordinarily provided. 
(2) No detained person shall be given less food than is ordinarily provided, 
except with his written consent and upon the written recommendation of the 
medical practitioner. 
(3) The food provided shall: 
(a) be wholesome, nutritious, well prepared and served, reasonably 
varied, sufficient in quantity and 
(b) meet all religious, dietary, cultural and medical needs. 
14. Alcohol 
No detained person shall be allowed to have any intoxicating liquor except:— 
(a) by written order of the medical practitioner, specifying the quantity 
and the name of the detained person and the medical reason for the 
order; or 
(b) for the observance of religious festivals, and for sacraments, with 
the prior agreement of the manager. 
20. Diversity of religion 
The practice of religion in detention centres shall take account of the diverse 
cultural and religious background of detained persons. 
21. Religious denomination 
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If a detained person wishes to declare himself to belong to a particular 
religion, the manager shall upon that person's reception at the detention centre 
record the religion to which the detained person wishes to belong. 
22. Manager of religious affairs and ministers of religion 
(1) Every detention centre shall have a manager of religious affairs whose 
appointment shall be approved by the Secretary of State. 
(2) Where in any detention centre the number of detained persons who belong 
to a particular religion is such as in the opinion of the Secretary of State to 
require the appointment of a minister of that religion, the Secretary of State 
may appoint such a minister to that detention centre. 
(3) The manager of religious affairs shall make arrangements for a minister of 
religion to meet with every detained person of his religion individually soon 
after the detained person's reception into the detention centre if the detained 
person so wishes. 
(4) A minister of religion shall visit daily all detained persons of his religion 
who are sick, under restraint, in temporary confinement, or undergoing 
removal from association, as far as he reasonably can and to the extent that the 
detained person so wishes. 
23. Regular visits by ministers of religion 
(1) The manager shall make arrangements for a minister of religion to visit 
detained persons of his religion as often as he reasonably can and to the extent 
that the detained person so wishes. 
(2) Where a detained person belongs to a religion for which no minister of 
religion has been appointed the manager will do what he reasonably can, if so 
requested by the detained person, to arrange for him to be visited by a minister 
of that religion as often as he reasonably can and to the extent that the detained 
person so wishes. 
24. Religious services 
The manager shall make arrangements for ministers of religion to conduct 
religious services for detained persons of their religions at such times as may 
be arranged. 
25. Religious books 
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There shall, so far as reasonably practicable, be available for the personal use 
of every detained person such religious books recognised by his religion as are 
approved by the Secretary of State for use in detention centres. 
 
10.4 Religion and punishment 
 
A person who is in possession of an offensive weapon or blade in a Scottish prison 
commits an offence, although such a person may relevantly argue in his defence that 
he was in possession of such an item for religious purposes. This is provided in the 
Criminal Law (Consolidation) (Scotland) Act 1995, section 49C: 
 
(1) Any person who has with him in a prison– 
(a) an offensive weapon, or 
(b) any other article which has a blade or is sharply pointed, 
commits an offence. 
(2) It is a defence for a person charged with an offence under subsection (1) to 
show that the person had a reasonable excuse or lawful authority for having 
the weapon or other article with him in the prison. 
(3) A defence under subsection (2) includes, in particular, a defence that the 
person had the weapon or other article with him in prison– 
(a) for use at work, 
(b) for religious reasons, or 
(c) as part of any national costume. 
 
There is some provision made to take account of religious beliefs and practices in the 
context of non-custodial sentences. Community payback orders and work orders must 
not conflict with the religious beliefs of those subject to them.  This can be seen in the 
Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995, section 227E: 
 
(1) In imposing a community payback order on an offender, the court must 
ensure, so far as practicable, that any requirement imposed by the order 
avoids— 
(a) a conflict with the offender's religious beliefs, … 
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There is further provision in section 303ZA of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 
1995 as follows: 
 
 (9) Where a work order is made, the supervising officer shall— 
(a) determine the nature of the work which the alleged offender 
requires to perform; 
(b) determine the times and places at which the alleged offender is to 
perform that work; 
(c) give directions to the alleged offender in relation to that work; 
(d) provide the procurator fiscal with such information as the 
procurator fiscal may require in relation to the alleged offender's 
conduct in connection with the requirements of the order. 
(10) In giving directions under subsection (9)(c) above, a supervising officer 
shall, so far as practicable, avoid— 
(a) any conflict with the alleged offender's religious beliefs; 
 
10.5 Witness protection 
 
Religious belief may be taken into account in determining whether a witness requires 
protection, or if a witness is vulnerable. The Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 
1999, section 46 provides that: 
 
(4) In determining whether a witness is eligible for protection the court must 
take into account, in particular— 
(a) the nature and alleged circumstances of the offence to which the 
proceedings relate; 
(b) the age of the witness; 
(c) such of the following matters as appear to the court to be relevant, 
namely— 
(i) the social and cultural background and ethnic origins of the 
witness, 
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(ii) the domestic and employment circumstances of the witness, 
and 
(iii) any religious beliefs or political opinions of the witness; 
(d) any behaviour towards the witness on the part of— 
(i) the accused, 
(ii) members of the family or associates of the accused, or 
(iii) any other person who is likely to be an accused or a 
witness in the proceedings. 
 
In respect of identifying vulnerable witnesses, the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 
1995, section 271(2)(f)(iv) provides that: 
 
(2) In determining whether a person is a vulnerable witness by virtue of 
subsection (1)(b) above, the court shall take into account– 
(a) the nature and circumstances of the alleged offence to which the 
proceedings relate, 
(b) the nature of the evidence which the person is likely to give, 
(c) the relationship (if any) between the person and the accused, 
(d) the person's age and maturity, 
(e) any behaviour towards the person on the part of– 
(i) the accused, 
(ii) members of the family or associates of the accused, 
(iii) any other person who is likely to be an accused or a 
witness in the proceedings, and 
(f) such other matters, including– 
(i) the social and cultural background and ethnic origins of the 
person, 
(ii) the person's sexual orientation, 
(iii) the domestic and employment circumstances of the person, 
(iv) any religious beliefs or political opinions of the person, and 
(v) any physical disability or other physical impairment which 
the person has, 
as appear to the court to be relevant. 
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10.6 Jury service 
 
Ministers, priests, and those who have taken religious vows so as to live in religious 
communities, such as monks or nuns, are excused from rendering jury service in 
criminal trials, as provided in the Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) (Scotland) 
Act 1980, schedule 1, part 3. Such persons are excusable as of right in the following 
terms:  
 
(401) Members of certain religious bodies 
In respect of jury service in any criminal proceedings, practising members of 
religious societies or orders the tenets or beliefs of which are incompatible 
with jury service. 
 
(5) Ministers of religion etc. 
(a) persons in holy orders; 
(b) regular ministers of any religious denomination; and 
(c) vowed members of any religious order living in a monastery, 
convent or other religious community. 
  
10.7 Conclusions 
 
The provisions highlighted in this section demonstrate a broad range of reasons why 
religion may feature in legislation. The provisions regulating prisons and detention 
centres are simply a specialised application of the obligations and protections already 
applied in society in terms of equality and anti-discrimination legislation. In these 
provisions, religion is one of a list of protected characteristics. Some of the other 
provisions, for example those relating to exemption from jury duty, can be seen as an 
attempt to accommodate the particular beliefs and religious obligations of certain 
individuals in the context of their wider civic obligations. Perhaps of most interest are 
the new criminal offences being introduced to tackle sectarianism and religious 
hatred. These provisions are not without controversy: they have been justified on the 
strength of the need to tackle an apparently deep rooted and very specific Scottish 
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problem but the offences are broadly defined and open to wide application. While 
arguments can be made in favour of tackling offensive and threatening behaviour, the 
new statutory offences potentially threaten freedom of expression. While the trend 
through much of Scots law is towards the disappearance of religion as a factor, this is 
one area where its presence is growing. 
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11.1 Introduction 
 
Much of the focus on religion in recent legal debate and analysis has been within the 
context of equality law. Here the legal provisions are UK, European or international 
in scope and there is little evidence of specific issues in a Scottish context. The 
provisions are generally well known and therefore we have not sought to include 
detailed examination or discussion of the law in this report.1 Instead, what follows is 
simply a collection of the key provisions.  
 
11.2 European context 
 
The key provision of the European Convention on Human Rights in respect of 
religion and belief is Article 9, which provides that: 
                                                             
1 A comprehensive review by P Edge and L Vickers was published in October 2015 by the Equality 
and Human Rights Commission: Review of equality and human rights law relating to religion or 
belief: accessible at 
http://www.equalityhumanrights.com/sites/default/files/publication_pdf/RR97_Review%20of%20equa
lity%20and%20human%20rights%20law%20relating%20to%20religion%20or%20belief.pdf 
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1. Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this 
right includes freedom to change his religion or belief and freedom, either 
alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his 
religion or belief, in worship, teaching, practice and observance. 
2. Freedom to manifest one’s religion or beliefs shall be subject only to such 
limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society 
in the interests of public safety, for the protection of public order, health or 
morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. 
 
It is further provided in Article 14, that all rights under the Convention are to be 
enjoyed without discrimination, as follows: 
 
The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this Convention shall be 
secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, 
language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, 
association with a national minority, property, birth or other status. 
 
Non-discrimination on the ground of religion is also found in European Union law in, 
for example, the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union: 
 
Article 10 
In defining and implementing its policies and activities, the Union shall aim to 
combat discrimination based on sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, 
disability, age or sexual orientation. 
 
Power to adopt further legislation within this area is set out in: 
 
Article 19  
Without prejudice to the other provisions of the Treaties and within the limits 
of the powers conferred by them upon the Union, the Council, acting 
unanimously in accordance with a special legislative procedure and after 
obtaining the consent of the European Parliament, may take appropriate action 
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to combat discrimination based on sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion or 
belief, disability, age or sexual orientation. 
 
This power was used to adopt the Framework Directive for equal treatment in 
employment,2 the purpose of which is set out in Article 1 as being: 
 
… to lay down a general framework for combating discrimination on the 
grounds of religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation as regards 
employment and occupation, with a view to putting into effect in the Member 
States the principle of equal treatment. 
 
Building on jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights, it is notable that 
the term “religion”, used in the ECHR, has been replaced in EU and UK provisions by 
the term “religion or belief” and this is characteristic of equality law in general where 
the trend has been to extend protection.  
 
11.3 Domestic equality law: general framework 
 
The rights guaranteed by the ECHR are given effect within the UK by means of the 
Human Rights Act 1998, section 1: 
 
(1) In this Act “the Convention rights” means the rights and fundamental 
freedoms set out in— 
(a) Articles 2 to 12 and 14 of the Convention, 
(b) Articles 1 to 3 of the First Protocol, and 
(c) Article 1 of the Thirteenth Protocol, 
as read with Articles 16 to 18 of the Convention. 
(2) Those Articles are to have effect for the purposes of this Act subject to any 
designated derogation or reservation... 
 
                                                             
2 EU Directive 2000/78/EC. 
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The other main source of equality law within the UK is the Equality Act 2010. The 
EU Framework Directive was initially implemented in the UK by means of the 
Employment Equality (Religion or Belief) Regulations 2003 but was subsequently 
consolidated into the 2010 Act. The legislation operates by setting out a list of 
protected characteristics and defining a range of prohibited conduct in respect of the 
protected characteristics. 
 
11.3.1 Prohibited conduct 
The 2010 Act establishes forms of prohibited conduct in Chapter 2. Direct 
discrimination is defined in section 13 as follows: 
 
(1) A person (A) discriminates against another (B) if, because of a protected 
characteristic, A treats B less favourably than A treats or would treat others. 
 
While direct discrimination is limited in that it requires overt reliance on a protected 
characteristic, its great strength lies in the absence of justification. Indirect 
discrimination has a potentially greater reach but it does permit the possibility of a 
defence. The concept of indirect discrimination is set out in section 19 as follows: 
 
(1) A person (A) discriminates against another (B) if A applies to B a 
provision, criterion or practice which is discriminatory in relation to a relevant 
protected characteristic of B's. 
(2) For the purposes of subsection (1), a provision, criterion or practice is 
discriminatory in relation to a relevant protected characteristic of B's if— 
(a) A applies, or would apply, it to persons with whom B does not 
share the characteristic, 
(b) it puts, or would put, persons with whom B shares the characteristic 
at a particular disadvantage when compared with persons with whom 
B does not share it, 
(c) it puts, or would put, B at that disadvantage, and 
(d) A cannot show it to be a proportionate means of achieving a 
legitimate aim. 
(3) The relevant protected characteristics are— 
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age; 
disability; 
gender reassignment; 
marriage and civil partnership; 
race; 
religion or belief; 
sex; 
sexual orientation. 
 
A third type of prohibited conduct is provided for in section 26 in the form of 
harassment: 
 (1) A person (A) harasses another (B) if— 
(a) A engages in unwanted conduct related to a relevant protected 
characteristic, and 
(b) the conduct has the purpose or effect of— 
(i) violating B's dignity, or 
(ii) creating an intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating or 
offensive environment for B. 
 … 
(4) In deciding whether conduct has the effect referred to in subsection (1)(b), 
each of the following must be taken into account— 
(a) the perception of B; 
(b) the other circumstances of the case; 
(c) whether it is reasonable for the conduct to have that effect. 
(5) The relevant protected characteristics are— 
age; 
disability; 
gender reassignment; 
race; 
religion or belief; 
sex; 
sexual orientation. 
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Further protection is provided by section 27 in the form of victimisation which is 
defined as follows: 
 
(1) A person (A) victimises another person (B) if A subjects B to a detriment 
because— 
(a) B does a protected act, or 
(b) A believes that B has done, or may do, a protected act. 
(2) Each of the following is a protected act— 
(a) bringing proceedings under this Act; 
(b) giving evidence or information in connection with proceedings 
under this Act; 
(c) doing any other thing for the purposes of or in connection with this 
Act; 
(d) making an allegation (whether or not express) that A or another 
person has contravened this Act. 
(3) Giving false evidence or information, or making a false allegation, is not a 
protected act if the evidence or information is given, or the allegation is made, 
in bad faith. 
(4) This section applies only where the person subjected to a detriment is an 
individual. 
(5) The reference to contravening this Act includes a reference to committing 
a breach of an equality clause or rule. 
  
11.3.2 Protected characteristic 
Conduct, which is prohibited in terms of Chapter 2 of Part 2 of the 2010 Act, must 
relate to one of protected characteristics set out in Chapter 1 of Part 2.  
 
Equality Act 2010, section 4 
The following characteristics are protected characteristics— 
age; 
disability; 
gender reassignment; 
marriage and civil partnership; 
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pregnancy and maternity; 
race; 
religion or belief; 
sex; 
sexual orientation. 
 
The UK Equality Act 2010 offers further definition of the terms “religion or belief” in 
section 10: 
 
(1) Religion means any religion and a reference to religion includes a 
reference to a lack of religion. 
(2) Belief means any religious or philosophical belief and a reference to belief 
includes a reference to a lack of belief. 
(3) In relation to the protected characteristic of religion or belief— 
(a) a reference to a person who has a particular protected characteristic 
is a reference to a person of a particular religion or belief; 
(b) a reference to persons who share a protected characteristic is a 
reference to persons who are of the same religion or belief. 
 
Important guidance was given by the Employment Appeal Tribunal in Grainger plc v 
Nicholson3 as to the meaning of “belief” as follows: 
 
(i) The belief must be genuinely held. (ii) It must be a belief and not … an 
opinion or viewpoint based on the present state of information available. (iii) 
It must be a belief as to a weighty and substantial aspect of human life and 
behaviour. (iv) It must attain a certain level of cogency, seriousness, cohesion 
and importance. (v) It must be worthy of respect in a democratic society, be 
not incompatible with human dignity and not conflict with the fundamental 
rights of others4 
 
11.3.3 Scope of protection 
                                                             
3 [2010] ICR 360. 
4 Ibid, per Burton, J at 370. 
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The general principles of non-discrimination which are set out in Part 2 of the 
Equality Act 2010, apply across a range of situations: the provision of goods and 
services etc (Parts 3, 4 and 7); work (Part 5); education (Part 6) and associations (Part 
7). 
The Act also establishes a broad public sector equality duty which includes religion or 
belief. The duty is set out in section 149, as follows: 
 
(1) A public authority must, in the exercise of its functions, have due regard to 
the need to— 
(a) eliminate discrimination, harassment, victimisation and any other 
conduct that is prohibited by or under this Act; 
(b) advance equality of opportunity between persons who share a 
relevant protected characteristic and persons who do not share it; 
(c) foster good relations between persons who share a relevant 
protected characteristic and persons who do not share it. 
(2) A person who is not a public authority but who exercises public functions 
must, in the exercise of those functions, have due regard to the matters 
mentioned in subsection (1). 
(3) Having due regard to the need to advance equality of opportunity between 
persons who share a relevant protected characteristic and persons who do not 
share it involves having due regard, in particular, to the need to— 
(a) remove or minimise disadvantages suffered by persons who share a 
relevant protected characteristic that are connected to that 
characteristic; 
(b) take steps to meet the needs of persons who share a relevant 
protected characteristic that are different from the needs of persons 
who do not share it; 
(c) encourage persons who share a relevant protected characteristic to 
participate in public life or in any other activity in which participation 
by such persons is disproportionately low. 
(4) The steps involved in meeting the needs of disabled persons that are 
different from the needs of persons who are not disabled include, in particular, 
steps to take account of disabled persons' disabilities. 
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(5) Having due regard to the need to foster good relations between persons 
who share a relevant protected characteristic and persons who do not share it 
involves having due regard, in particular, to the need to— 
(a) tackle prejudice, and 
(b) promote understanding. 
(6) Compliance with the duties in this section may involve treating some 
persons more favourably than others; but that is not to be taken as permitting 
conduct that would otherwise be prohibited by or under this Act. 
(7) The relevant protected characteristics are— 
age; 
disability; 
gender reassignment; 
pregnancy and maternity; 
race; 
religion or belief; 
sex; 
sexual orientation 
 
11.3.4 Exemptions 
The Equality Act 2010 sets out these general principles of non-discrimination which 
apply across a broad range of contexts but it also provides for exemptions: some 
general and some specific to each of the protected characteristics, including religion 
or belief.  
 
Part 5 of the Act applies the principles of non-discrimination to the workplace. There 
are however a number of exemptions which are set out in Schedule 9. Paragraph 1 
sets out a general exemption which applies where there is an occupational 
requirement in respect of a particular job; in other words, situations where an 
employer is entitled to specify that the worker must have the particular characteristic 
in order to be able to perform the work. Paragraph 1 provides as follows: 
 
(1) A person (A) does not contravene a provision mentioned in sub-paragraph 
(2) by applying in relation to work a requirement to have a particular protected 
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characteristic, if A shows that, having regard to the nature or context of the 
work— 
(a) it is an occupational requirement, 
(b) the application of the requirement is a proportionate means of 
achieving a legitimate aim, and 
(c) the person to whom A applies the requirement does not meet it (or 
A has reasonable grounds for not being satisfied that the person meets 
it). 
 
This exemption applies to all of the protected characteristics and may therefore 
include situations where an employer wishes to advertise for or employ a person who 
has a particular religious belief. The exemption is controlled by the fact that there is 
an occupational “requirement” and that it is “a proportionate means of achieving a 
legitimate aim”. 
 
Paragraph 3 of Schedule 9 sets out an exemption which is specific to religion or belief 
and which applies only to those employers who have an “ethos based on religion or 
belief”. The exemption applies as follows: 
 
A person (A) with an ethos based on religion or belief does not contravene a 
provision mentioned in paragraph 1(2) by applying in relation to work a 
requirement to be of a particular religion or belief if A shows that, having 
regard to that ethos and to the nature or context of the work— 
(a) it is an occupational requirement, 
(b) the application of the requirement is a proportionate means of 
achieving a legitimate aim, and 
(c) the person to whom A applies the requirement does not meet it (or 
A has reasonable grounds for not being satisfied that the person meets 
it). 
 
A further exemption in the context of work is set out in Schedule 9, paragraph 2. This 
provision specifically permits discrimination on the grounds of sex, sexual 
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orientation, gender reassignment, marriage and civil partnership in the following 
terms: 
 
(1) A person (A) does not contravene a provision mentioned in sub-paragraph 
(2) by applying in relation to employment a requirement to which sub-
paragraph (4) applies if A shows that— 
(a) the employment is for the purposes of an organised religion, 
(b) the application of the requirement engages the compliance or non-
conflict principle, and 
(c) the person to whom A applies the requirement does not meet it (or 
A has reasonable grounds for not being satisfied that the person meets 
it). 
(2) The provisions are— 
(a) section 39(1)(a) or (c) or (2)(b) or (c) [discrimination by 
employers]; 
(b) section 49(3)(a) or (c) or (6)(b) or (c) [discrimination when making 
an appointment to a personal office]; 
(c) section 50(3)(a) or (c) or (6)(b) or (c) [discrimination when making 
an appointment to a public office]; 
(d) section 51(1) [discrimination when making a recommendation in 
respect of a public office]. 
(3) A person does not contravene section 53(1) or (2)(a) or (b) [discrimination 
by qualification bodies] by applying in relation to a relevant qualification 
(within the meaning of that section) a requirement to which sub-paragraph (4) 
applies if the person shows that— 
(a) the qualification is for the purposes of employment mentioned in 
sub-paragraph (1)(a), and 
(b) the application of the requirement engages the compliance or non-
conflict principle. 
(4) This sub-paragraph applies to— 
(a) a requirement to be of a particular sex; 
(b) a requirement not to be a transsexual person; 
(c) a requirement not to be married or a civil partner; 
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(ca) a requirement not to be married to a person of the same sex; 
(d) a requirement not to be married to, or the civil partner of, a person 
who has a living former spouse or civil partner; 
(e) a requirement relating to circumstances in which a marriage or civil 
partnership came to an end; 
(f) a requirement related to sexual orientation. 
 
Several exemptions apply to the general principles of non-discrimination in respect of 
the provision of goods and services. Schedule 23, paragraph 2 applies in respect of the 
provision of services and the use of premises and is relevant in particular to the 
provision of marriage and civil partnership services. Paragraph 2 provides: 
 
 (1) This paragraph applies to an organisation the purpose of which is— 
(a) to practise a religion or belief, 
(b) to advance a religion or belief, 
(c) to teach the practice or principles of a religion or belief, 
(d) to enable persons of a religion or belief to receive any benefit, or to 
engage in any activity, within the framework of that religion or belief, 
or 
(e) to foster or maintain good relations between persons of different 
religions or beliefs. 
(2) This paragraph does not apply to an organisation whose sole or main 
purpose is commercial. 
(3) The organisation does not contravene Part 3, 4 or 7 [Services and Public 
Function; Premises; and Associations respectively], so far as relating to 
religion or belief or sexual orientation, only by restricting— 
(a) membership of the organisation; 
(b) participation in activities undertaken by the organisation or on its 
behalf or under its auspices; 
(c) the provision of goods, facilities or services in the course of 
activities undertaken by the organisation or on its behalf or under its 
auspices; 
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(d) the use or disposal of premises owned or controlled by the 
organisation. 
(4) A person does not contravene Part 3, 4 or 7 [Services and Public Function; 
Premises; and Associations respectively], so far as relating to religion or belief 
or sexual orientation, only by doing anything mentioned in sub-paragraph (3) 
on behalf of or under the auspices of the organisation. 
(5) A minister does not contravene Part 3, 4 or 7 [Services and Public 
Function; Premises; and Associations respectively], so far as relating to 
religion or belief or sexual orientation, only by restricting— 
(a) participation in activities carried on in the performance of the 
minister's functions in connection with or in respect of the 
organisation; 
(b) the provision of goods, facilities or services in the course of 
activities carried on in the performance of the minister's functions in 
connection with or in respect of the organisation. 
(6) Sub-paragraphs (3) to (5) permit a restriction relating to religion or belief 
only if it is imposed— 
(a) because of the purpose of the organisation, or 
(b) to avoid causing offence, on grounds of the religion or belief to 
which the organisation relates, to persons of that religion or belief. 
(7) Sub-paragraphs (3) to (5) permit a restriction relating to sexual orientation 
only if it is imposed— 
(a) because it is necessary to comply with the doctrine of the 
organisation, or 
(b) to avoid conflict with strongly held convictions within sub-
paragraph (9). 
(8) In sub-paragraph (5), the reference to a minister is a reference to a minister 
of religion, or other person, who— 
(a) performs functions in connection with a religion or belief to which 
the organisation relates, and 
(b) holds an office or appointment in, or is accredited, approved or 
recognised for the purposes of the organisation. 
(9) The strongly held convictions are— 
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(a) in the case of a religion, the strongly held religious convictions of a 
significant number of the religion's followers; 
(b) in the case of a belief, the strongly held convictions relating to the 
belief of a significant number of the belief's followers. 
(9A) An organisation does not contravene Part 3, 4 or 7 [Services and Public 
Function; Premises; and Associations respectively], only by refusing to allow 
premises owned or controlled by the organisation to be used— 
(a) to solemnise a relevant Scottish marriage for the reason that the 
marriage is the marriage of two persons of the same sex; 
(b) to register a relevant Scottish civil partnership for the reason that 
the civil partnership is between two persons of the same sex. 
(9B) A person (or a group of persons) does not contravene Part 3, 4 or 7 
[Services and Public Function; Premises; and Associations respectively], only 
by refusing to allow premises owned or controlled by the person (or the group) 
on behalf of an organisation to be used— 
(a) to solemnise a relevant Scottish marriage for the reason that the 
marriage is the marriage of two persons of the same sex; 
(b) to register a relevant Scottish civil partnership for the reason that 
the civil partnership is between two persons of the same sex. 
(9C) An organisation does not contravene section 29 [Provision of Services] 
only by allowing an approved celebrant of the organisation to act as set out in 
sub-paragraph (1) or (2) of paragraph 25B of Schedule 3.5 
(9D) In sub-paragraphs (9A) to (9C), “approved celebrant”, “relevant Scottish 
marriage” and “relevant Scottish civil partnership” have the same meaning as 
in paragraph 25B of Schedule 3. 
(10) This paragraph does not permit anything which is prohibited by section 
29 [Provision of Services], so far as relating to sexual orientation, if it is 
done— 
(a) on behalf of a public authority, and 
                                                             
5 i.e. “25B.— Marriage of same sex couples and civil partnership: Scotland 
(1) An approved celebrant does not contravene section 29 only by refusing to solemnise a relevant 
Scottish marriage for the reason that the marriage is the marriage of two persons of the same sex. 
(2) An approved celebrant does not contravene section 29 only by refusing to register a relevant Scottish 
civil partnership for the reason that the civil partnership is between two persons of the same sex.” 
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(b) under the terms of a contract between the organisation and the 
public authority. 
(11) In the application of this paragraph in relation to sexual orientation, sub-
paragraph (1)(e) must be ignored. 
(12) In the application of this paragraph in relation to sexual orientation, in 
sub-paragraph (3)(d), “disposal” does not include disposal of an interest in 
premises by way of sale if the interest being disposed of is— 
(a) the entirety of the organisation's interest in the premises, or 
(b) the entirety of the interest in respect of which the organisation has 
power of disposal. 
(13) In this paragraph— 
(a) “disposal” is to be construed in accordance with section 38; 
(b) “public authority” has the meaning given in section 150(1).” 
 
Schedule 3, paragraph 29 makes an exception to the general rule that there should be 
no discrimination based on sex in order to permit religious organisations to offer 
separate services to men and women. It provides that: 
 
(1) A minister does not contravene section 29, so far as relating to sex 
discrimination, by providing a service only to persons of one sex or separate 
services for persons of each sex, if— 
(a) the service is provided for the purposes of an organised religion, 
(b) it is provided at a place which is (permanently or for the time 
being) occupied or used for those purposes, and 
(c) the limited provision of the service is necessary in order to comply 
with the doctrines of the religion or is for the purpose of avoiding 
conflict with the strongly held religious convictions of a significant 
number of the religion's followers. 
(2) The reference to a minister is a reference to a minister of religion, or other 
person, who— 
(a) performs functions in connection with the religion, and 
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(b) holds an office or appointment in, or is accredited, approved or 
recognised for purposes of, a relevant organisation in relation to the 
religion. 
(3) An organisation is a relevant organisation in relation to a religion if its 
purpose is— 
(a) to practise the religion, 
(b) to advance the religion, 
(c) to teach the practice or principles of the religion, 
(d) to enable persons of the religion to receive benefits, or to engage in 
activities, within the framework of that religion, or 
(e) to foster or maintain good relations between persons of different 
religions. 
(4) But an organisation is not a relevant organisation in relation to a religion if 
its sole or main purpose is commercial. 
 
There are several significant exemptions from the general requirements of UK 
equality law in respect of education and “faith schools”. Section 85 of the Equality 
Act 2010 sets out a general obligation not to discriminate in terms of admission to 
school and treatment of pupils: 
 
(1) The responsible body of a school to which this section applies must not 
discriminate against a person— 
(a) in the arrangements it makes for deciding who is offered admission 
as a pupil; 
(b) as to the terms on which it offers to admit the person as a pupil; 
(c) by not admitting the person as a pupil. 
(2) The responsible body of such a school must not discriminate against a 
pupil— 
(a) in the way it provides education for the pupil; 
(b) in the way it affords the pupil access to a benefit, facility or service; 
(c) by not providing education for the pupil; 
(d) by not affording the pupil access to a benefit, facility or service; 
(e) by excluding the pupil from the school; 
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(f) by subjecting the pupil to any other detriment. 
(3) The responsible body of such a school must not harass— 
(a) a pupil; 
(b) a person who has applied for admission as a pupil. 
(4) The responsible body of such a school must not victimise a person— 
(a) in the arrangements it makes for deciding who is offered admission 
as a pupil; 
(b) as to the terms on which it offers to admit the person as a pupil; 
(c) by not admitting the person as a pupil. 
(5) The responsible body of such a school must not victimise a pupil— 
(a) in the way it provides education for the pupil; 
(b) in the way it affords the pupil access to a benefit, facility or service; 
(c) by not providing education for the pupil; 
(d) by not affording the pupil access to a benefit, facility or service; 
(e) by excluding the pupil from the school; 
(f) by subjecting the pupil to any other detriment. 
 … 
 (8) In relation to Scotland, this section applies to— 
(a) a school managed by an education authority; 
(b) an independent school; 
(c) a school in respect of which the managers are for the time being 
receiving grants under section 73(c) or (d) of the Education (Scotland) 
Act 1980. 
 … 
 
Exemption for Scottish denominational schools from these general equality 
obligations is provided by virtue of schedule 11. These provisions are explored in 
greater depth in Chapter 4. 
 
Schedule 11, paragraph 5 School with religious character etc. 
Section 85(1) and (2)(a) to (d), so far as relating to religion or belief, does not 
apply in relation to— 
 … 
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(c) a school transferred to an education authority under section 16 of 
the Education (Scotland) Act 1980 (transfer of certain schools to 
education authorities) which is conducted in the interest of a church or 
denominational body; 
(d) a school provided by an education authority under section 17(2) of 
that Act (denominational schools); 
(e) a grant-aided school (within the meaning of that Act) which is 
conducted in the interest of a church or denominational body; 
(f) a school registered in the register of independent schools for 
Scotland if the school admits only pupils who belong, or whose parents 
belong, to one or more particular denominations; 
(g) a school registered in that register if the school is conducted in the 
interest of a church or denominational body. 
 
Schedule 11, paragraph 6 Curriculum, worship, etc. 
Section 85(2)(a) to (d), so far as relating to religion or belief, does not apply in 
relation to anything done in connection with acts of worship or other religious 
observance organised by or on behalf of a school (whether or not forming part 
of the curriculum). 
 
Further or Higher Education Institutions in the UK are exempt from section 91(1) of 
the Equality Act 2010, if they are designated an institution with a religious ethos as 
per schedule 12, part 2, paragraph 5: 
 
Section 91 Students: admission and treatment, etc. 
(1) The responsible body of an institution to which this section applies must 
not discriminate against a person— 
(a) in the arrangements it makes for deciding who is offered admission 
as a student; 
(b) as to the terms on which it offers to admit the person as a student; 
(c) by not admitting the person as a student. 
 
Schedule 12, part 2, paragraph 5 
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(1) The responsible body of an institution which is designated for the purposes 
of this paragraph does not contravene section 91(1), so far as relating to 
religion or belief, if, in the admission of students to a course at the 
institution— 
(a) it gives preference to persons of a particular religion or belief, 
(b) it does so to preserve the institution's religious ethos, and 
(c) the course is not a course of vocational training. 
(2) A Minister of the Crown may by order designate an institution if satisfied 
that the institution has a religious ethos. 
There is also specific provision in respect of the employment of teachers in 
denominational schools which provides an exemption from the general obligation not 
to discriminate on the grounds of religion or belief. This is set out in the Education 
(Scotland) Act 1980, section 21: 
 
(2A) A teacher appointed to any post on the staff of any such school by the 
education authority shall satisfy the Secretary of State as to qualification, and 
shall be required to be approved as regards his religious belief and character 
by representatives of the church or denominational body in whose interest the 
school has been conducted; 
 
The continued application of this exemption is confirmed by the Equality Act 2010. 
Paragraph 1 of Schedule 22 to the Act provides that there is an exemption from the 
general obligations not to discriminate in terms of religion or belief (under Parts 3-7) 
of the Act where it is compliance with other statutory provisions (ie section 21 of the 
1980 Act). Specific provision is made in respect of work in paragraph 3: 
 
Schedule 22, paragraph 3 
(1) A person does not contravene Part 5 (work) only by doing a relevant act in 
connection with the employment of another in a relevant position. 
(2) A relevant position is— 
(a) the head teacher or principal of an educational establishment; 
(b) the head, a fellow or other member of the academic staff of a college, or 
institution in the nature of a college, in a university; 
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(c) a professorship of a university which is a canon professorship or one to 
which a canonry is annexed. 
(3) A relevant act is anything it is necessary to do to comply with— 
(a) a requirement of an instrument relating to the establishment that the head 
teacher or principal must be a member of a particular religious order; 
(b) a requirement of an instrument relating to the college or institution that the 
holder of the position must be a woman; 
(c) an Act or instrument in accordance with which the professorship is a canon 
professorship or one to which a canonry is annexed. 
(4) Sub-paragraph (3)(b) does not apply to an instrument taking effect on or 
after 16 January 1990 (the day on which section 5(3) of the Employment Act 
1989 came into force). 
(5) A Minister of the Crown may by order provide that anything in sub-
paragraphs (1) to (3) does not have effect in relation to— 
(a) a specified educational establishment or university; 
(b) a specified description of educational establishments. 
(6) An educational establishment is— 
(a) a school within the meaning of the Education Act 1996 or the 
Education (Scotland) Act 1980; 
(b) a college, or institution in the nature of a college, in a university; 
(c) an institution designated by order made, or having effect as if 
made, under section 129 of the Education Reform Act 1988; 
(d) a college of further education within the meaning of section 36 of 
the Further and Higher Education (Scotland) Act 1992; 
(e) a university in Scotland; 
(f) an institution designated by order under section 28 of the Further 
and Higher Education Act 1992 or section 44 of the Further and 
Higher Education (Scotland) Act 1992 … 
 
11.4 Domestic equality law: specific contexts 
 
In addition to the framework set out in the Equality Act 2010, there are various 
statutory examples of the application of the general protection against discrimination 
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within specific contexts. This can be seen, for example, in the following provisions 
which set out a framework for protection against discrimination and individual 
complaints, in respect of the armed services: 
 
Armed Forces (Service Complaints Commissioner) Regulations 
2007/3352, regulation 2 
(1) For the purposes of section 338(1) of the Act, a person has been wronged 
in a prescribed way if he has been the subject of: 
(a) discrimination; 
... 
(2) In this regulation “discrimination” means— 
(a) discrimination or victimisation on the grounds of colour, race, 
ethnic or national origin, nationality, sex, gender re-assignment, status 
as a married person or civil partner, religion, belief or sexual 
orientation;  
 
Armed Forces Act 2006, section 338(1) 
(1) This section applies where the Service Complaints Commissioner (“the 
Commissioner”) considers that any communication made to him contains an 
allegation that a person named in such a communication– 
(a) is subject to service law and has been wronged in a prescribed way; 
or 
(b) was wronged in such a way while he was so subject. 
 
Armed Forces (Service Complaints Commissioner) Regulations 
2007/3352, regulation 2 
(1) For the purposes of section 338(1) of the [Armed Forces] Act [2006], a 
person has been wronged in a prescribed way if he has been the subject of: 
(a) discrimination; 
(b) harassment; 
(c) bullying; 
(d) dishonest, improper or biased behaviour. 
(2) In this regulation “discrimination” means— 
270 
 
(a) discrimination or victimisation on the grounds of colour, race, 
ethnic or national origin, nationality, sex, gender re-assignment, status 
as a married person or civil partner, religion, belief or sexual 
orientation; and 
(b) less favourable treatment as a part-time employee.” 
 
Armed Forces (Redress of Individual Grievances) Regulations 2007/3353, 
regulation 9 
(1) A service complaint panel shall include one independent member in any 
case in which the service complaint: 
(a) alleges discrimination; 
... 
(3) In this regulation, “discrimination” means discrimination or victimisation 
on the grounds of colour, race, ethnic or national origin, nationality, sex, 
gender re-assignment, status as a married person or civil partner, religion, 
belief or sexual orientation, and less favourable treatment of part-time 
employees. 
 
A similar context-specific framework of regulation is set out for Scottish prisons in 
the following provision:  
 
Prisons and Young Offenders Institutions (Scotland) Rules 2011/331, part 
1, rule 6 
Subject to the provisions of these Rules or of any direction made for any 
purpose specified in these Rules, the Governor must seek to eliminate within 
the prison discrimination, harassment and victimisation against prisoners on 
the grounds of— 
(a) age; 
(b) disability; 
(c) gender reassignment; 
(d) marriage and civil partnership; 
(e) pregnancy and maternity; 
(f) race; 
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(g) religion or belief; 
(h) sex; 
(i) sexual orientation; or 
(j) other status. 
 
The following provisions all indicate the application of general protection against 
discrimination within a range of specific situations: 
 
 British Nationality Act 1981, section 44 
(1) Any discretion vested by or under this Act in the Secretary of State, a 
Governor or a Lieutenant-Governor shall be exercised without regard to the 
race, colour or religion of any person who may be affected by its exercise. 
 
Consular Relations Act 1968, section 6 
Her Majesty may by Order in Council designate any State for the purposes of 
this section; and where a State is so designated, a member of the crew of a 
ship belonging to that State who is detained in custody on board for a 
disciplinary offence shall not be deemed to be unlawfully detained unless— 
(a) his detention is unlawful under the laws of that State or the 
conditions of detention are inhumane or unjustifiably severe; or 
(b) there is reasonable cause for believing that his life or liberty will be 
endangered for reasons of race, nationality, political opinion or 
religion, in any country to which the ship is likely to go. 
 
Communications Act 2003, section 368F 
(4) Advertising included in an on-demand programme service must not— 
(a) prejudice respect for human dignity; 
(b) include or promote discrimination based on sex, racial or ethnic 
origin, nationality, religion or belief, disability, age or sexual 
orientation... 
 
Communications Act 2003, section 368G 
(11) A sponsorship announcement must not— 
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(a) prejudice respect for human dignity; 
(b) include or promote discrimination based on sex, racial or ethnic 
origin, nationality, religion or belief, disability, age or sexual 
orientation.. 
 
Communications Act 2003, section 368H [in respect of product placement] 
(12) Condition F is that the way in which the product, service or trade mark, or 
the reference to it, is included in the programme by way of product placement 
does not— 
(a) prejudice respect for human dignity; 
(b) promote discrimination based on sex, racial or ethnic origin, 
nationality, religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation... 
 
Act of Sederunt (Sections 25 to 29 of the Law Reform (Miscellaneous 
Provisions) (Scotland) Act 1990) (Association of Commercial Attorneys) 
2009/163, schedule 1 
10.2.3 Attorneys must not discriminate on grounds of race, ethnic origin, sex, 
religion or political persuasion. 
 
11. 5 Accommodation and exemption 
 
The general approach of UK equality legislation is to require equal treatment but in 
some situations it is also recognised that substantive equality may require exemptions 
or particular accommodation to be made. It was noted above that the Equality Act 
2010 permits exemption from the general obligation of non-discrimination in certain 
situations relating to religion or belief. A range of specific examples of exemption or 
of accommodation of religion and belief can also be seen in the following provisions.  
 
Conflict with religious beliefs must be avoided in various contexts, such as when 
parenting orders or community payback orders are made or imposed by courts. 
 
Antisocial Behaviour etc. (Scotland) Act 2004, section 110 
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(1) A court shall ensure that the requirements of a parenting order made by it 
avoid, so far as practicable– 
(a) any conflict with the religious beliefs of the person specified in the 
order; and 
(b) any interference with times at which that person normally works 
(or carries out voluntary work) or attends an educational establishment. 
(2) The supervising officer appointed by a local authority in respect of a 
parenting order shall ensure that the directions given by the officer avoid, so 
far as practicable, the matters mentioned in subsection (1)(a) and (b).” 
 
Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995, section 227E 
(1) In imposing a community payback order on an offender, the court must 
ensure, so far as practicable, that any requirement imposed by the order 
avoids— 
(a) a conflict with the offender's religious beliefs, 
(b) interference with the times, if any, at which the offender normally 
works (or carries out voluntary work) or attends school or any other 
educational establishment. 
(2) The responsible officer must ensure, so far as practicable, that any 
instruction given to the offender avoids such a conflict or interference. 
 
Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995, section 303ZA 
(10) In giving directions under subsection (9)(c) above, a supervising officer 
shall, so far as practicable, avoid— 
(a) any conflict with the alleged offender's religious beliefs; 
 
Failure to undertake work-related activity can be justified on the ground of religious 
customs and practices. 
 
Income Support (Work-Related Activity) and Miscellaneous 
Amendments Regulations 2014/1097, part 2, regulation 7 
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Matters to be taken into account by the Secretary of State in determining 
whether a person has shown good cause for failing to undertake work-related 
activity for the purposes of regulation 6(2) include that— 
... 
(d) the established customs and practices of the religion to which the 
person belongs prevented the person undertaking work-related activity 
on that day or at that time; 
 
Social Security (Incapacity Benefit Work-focused Interviews) Regulations 
2008/2928, regulation 8 
(1) A relevant claimant who is required to take part in a work-focused 
interview but fails to do so must show good cause for that failure within five 
working days of the date on which the Secretary of State gives notification of 
that failure. 
(2) In determining whether a relevant claimant has shown good cause for a 
failure to take part in a work-focused interview, the matters to be taken into 
account include— 
... 
(j) that the established customs and practices of the religion to which 
the relevant claimant belongs prevented attendance on the day or at the 
time fixed for the work-focused interview; 
 
 
Social Security (Jobcentre Plus Interviews for Partners) Regulations 
2003/1886 
Matters to be taken into account in determining whether the partner or the 
claimant has shown good cause for the partner's failure to take part in an 
interview include– 
... 
(d) that the established customs and practices of the religion to which 
the partner belongs prevented him attending on that day or at that time 
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Jobseekers may also impose restrictions on the nature of employment for which they 
are available on the ground of religious belief or conscientious objection. 
 
 Jobseeker's Allowance Regulations 1996/207, part 2, regulation 13 
(1) In any week a person may restrict his availability for employment in the 
following ways, if the circumstances set out apply. 
(2) Subject to regulations 6, 7 and 9, a person may impose restrictions on the 
nature of the employment for which he is available by reason of a sincerely 
held religious belief, or a sincerely held conscientious objection providing he 
can show that he has reasonable prospects of employment notwithstanding 
those restrictions... 
 
The wearing of headgear for religious purposes is variously recognised and respected 
in law.   
 
Armed Forces Act 2006, section 72 
(2) Nothing in section 70 or 71 authorises anyone to require an arrested person 
to remove any of his clothing in public other than an outer coat, jacket, 
headgear or gloves. 
(3) The reference in subsection (2) to headgear does not include headgear 
worn for religious reasons. 
. 
Road Traffic Act 1988, section 16 
(1) The Secretary of State may make regulations requiring, subject to such 
exceptions as may be specified in the regulations, persons driving or riding 
(otherwise than in side-cars) on motor cycles of any class specified in the 
regulations to wear protective headgear of such description as may be so 
specified. 
(2) A requirement imposed by regulations under this section shall not apply to 
any follower of the Sikh religion while he is wearing a turban. 
 
Horses (Protective Headgear for Young Riders) Regulations 1992/1201, 
regulation 3 
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(1) Section 1 of the [Horses (Protective Headgear for Young Riders)] Act 
[1990 c. 25] shall not apply in relation to a child described in paragraph (2) 
nor to the riding of horses in the circumstances specified in paragraph (3). 
(2) A child referred to in paragraph (1) is a child who is a follower of the Sikh 
religion while he is wearing a turban. 
 
Disabled Persons (Badges for Motor Vehicles) (Scotland) Amendment 
(No. 2) Regulations 2011/410, schedule 3, paragraph 1(2)(a)(vi) 
The additional specifications applicable to an individual's badge as follows:— 
(a) subject to sub-paragraph (b), the rear side of an individual's badge 
must contain a close-up digital photograph of the head and shoulders 
of the badge holder. The photograph must have a strong definition 
between face and background and must be: 
... 
(vi) of the full head of the holder (without any other person 
visible or any covering, unless it is worn for religious beliefs or 
medical reasons) – 
 
Personal Licence (Scotland) Regulations 2007/77, regulation 3 
(1) A personal licence application or a personal licence renewal application is 
to be– 
... 
(b) accompanied by– 
... 
(ii) two photographs of the applicant which comply with paragraph (2) 
and one of which has a statement on it in accordance with paragraph 
(3). 
 (2) The two photographs of the applicant must– 
... 
(d) show the full face of the applicant, without the applicant wearing 
sunglasses or any head covering (unless the applicant wears such a 
covering on account of a religious belief). 
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The possession of blades, points, swords and other suchlike potentially offensive 
weapons is variously accommodated and acknowledged in criminal law, when such 
items are carried for religious purposes.  
 
Criminal Justice Act 1988, section 139 
(1) Subject to subsections (4) and (5) below, any person who has an article to 
which this section applies with him in a public place shall be guilty of an 
offence. 
(2) Subject to subsection (3) below, this section applies to any article which 
has a blade or is sharply pointed except a folding pocketknife. 
(3) This section applies to a folding pocketknife if the cutting edge of its blade 
exceeds 3 inches. 
(4) It shall be a defence for a person charged with an offence under this 
section to prove that he had good reason or lawful authority for having the 
article with him in a public place. 
(5) Without prejudice to the generality of subsection (4) above, it shall be a 
defence for a person charged with an offence under this section to prove that 
he had the article with him— 
(a) for use at work; 
(b) for religious reasons; or 
(c) as part of any national costume. 
 
Similar provisions are made in the Criminal Law (Consolidation) (Scotland) Act 
1995, sections 49(5)(b) (blade or point in public), 49A(4)(c) (offensive weapons in 
schools), and 49C(3)(c) (offensive weapons in prisons). 
 
Criminal Justice Act 1988, section 141ZA 
(1) This section applies where the Scottish Ministers make an order under 
subsection (2) of section 141 directing that the section shall apply to swords. 
(2) The Scottish Ministers may include in the order provision for or in 
connection with modifying section 141 in its application to swords. 
(3) The Scottish Ministers may in particular– 
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(a) provide for defences (including in particular defences relating to 
religious, cultural or sporting purposes) to offences; 
Criminal Justice Act 1988 (Offensive Weapons) Order 1988/2019, 
schedule 1, paragraph 5A 
It shall be a defence for a person charged— 
(a) with an offence under section 141(1) [offensive weapons] of the 
Criminal Justice Act 1988; or 
(b) with an offence under section 50(2) or (3) [improper importation of 
goods] of the Customs and Excise Management Act 1979, in respect of 
any conduct of his relating to a weapon to which section 141 of the 
Criminal Justice Act 1988 applies by virtue of paragraph 1(r) to show 
that his conduct was for the purpose only of making the weapon 
available for the purposes of use in religious ceremonies. 
 
Criminal Law (Consolidation) (Scotland) Act 1995, section 49C 
(1) Any person who has with him in a prison– 
(a) an offensive weapon, or 
(b) any other article which has a blade or is sharply pointed, 
commits an offence. 
(2) It is a defence for a person charged with an offence under subsection (1) to 
show that the person had a reasonable excuse or lawful authority for having 
the weapon or other article with him in the prison. 
(3) A defence under subsection (2) includes, in particular, a defence that the 
person had the weapon or other article with him in prison– 
(a) for use at work, 
(b) for religious reasons, or 
(c) as part of any national costume. 
 
The slaughter of animals by religious methods is permitted under UK regulations, and 
such administrative provisions are generally acknowledged in the Treaty on the 
Functioning on the European Union.  
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Welfare of Animals (Slaughter or Killing) Regulations 1995/731, part 4, 
regulation 21 
Schedule 12 shall have effect in relation to the slaughter of any animal by a 
religious method. 
 
Schedule 12 to these Regulations consists of 15 paragraphs relating to the slaughter of 
animals by religious methods in accordance with the requirements of the Jewish and 
Muslim faiths.  According to the Explanatory Note, these 1995 Regulations “which 
extend to Great Britain, give effect to the provisions of Council Directive 93/119/EC 
on the protection of animals at time of slaughter or killing.” 
 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, article 13 
In formulating and implementing the Union’s agriculture, fisheries, transport, 
internal market, research and technological development and space policies, 
the Union and the Member States shall, since animals are sentient beings, pay 
full regard to the welfare requirements of animals, while respecting the 
legislative or administrative provisions and customs of the Member States 
relating in particular to religious rites, cultural traditions and regional heritage. 
 
The display of human remains for religious purposes is accommodated both in the 
Anatomy Act 1984 and in the Human Tissue Act 2004.  
 
Anatomy Act 1984, section 6A 
  (1) Subject to subsections (2) to (8), no person shall publicly display— 
(a) an anatomical specimen, 
(b) a body or part of a body which has been used for anatomical 
examination, or 
(c) a body or part of a body which has been used outwith Scotland for 
anatomical examination or examination which has the characteristics 
of anatomical examination, 
whether or not it has undergone a process to preserve it. 
... 
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(13) For the purposes of this section, public display, in relation to the body or 
part of the body of a deceased person (including an anatomical specimen) does 
not include— 
(a) display of the body or part for the purposes of enabling people to 
pay their final respects to the deceased or which is incidental to the 
deceased's funeral, 
(b) use of the body or part for the purpose of public display at a place 
of public religious worship, or at a place associated with such a place, 
if there is a connection between the body or, as the case may be, the 
part and the religious worship which takes place at the place in 
question. 
 
Human Tissue Act 2004, section 40 
 (1) This section applies– 
(a) to the use of– 
(i) the body of a deceased person, or 
(ii) relevant material which has come from a human body, 
for the purpose of public display at a place of public religious worship 
or at a place associated with such a place, and 
(b) to the storage of– 
(i) the body of a deceased person, or 
(ii) relevant material which has come from a human body, 
for use for the purpose mentioned in paragraph (a). 
(2) An activity to which this section applies is excluded from sections 14(1) 
[concerning the remit of the Human Tissue Authority] and 16(2) [concerning 
the licensing of various activities involving human tissue] if there is a 
connection between– 
(a) the body or material to which the activity relates, and 
(b) the religious worship which takes place at the place of public 
religious worship concerned. 
(3) For the purposes of this section, a place is associated with a place of public 
religious worship if it is used for purposes associated with the religious 
worship which takes place there.” 
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Persons within religious organisations are variously exempted from provisions 
surrounding the disclosure of information in relation to gender recognition. 
 
Gender Recognition (Disclosure of Information) (Scotland) Order 
2005/125, article 4 
(1) It is not an offence under section 22 of the [Gender Recognition] Act 
[2004, c.7] for a person who acquired protected information in an official 
capacity in relation to an organised religion to disclose that information to any 
other person acting in such a capacity if the conditions set out in paragraphs 
(2) and (3) are met. 
(2) The disclosure is made for the purpose of enabling any person to make a 
decision in relation to– 
(a) whether to solemnise or permit the marriage of the subject; 
(b) the validity or dissolution of a marriage of the subject; 
(c) the admission or appointment of the subject– 
(i) as a minister of religion; 
(ii) to any employment, office or post for the purposes of an 
organised religion; 
(iii) to any religious order or community associated with an 
organised religion; or 
(iv) to membership, or any category of membership, of an 
organised religion; 
(d) the validity, suspension, termination or revocation of any admission 
or appointment mentioned in sub-paragraph (c); or 
(e) the eligibility of the subject to receive or take part in any religious 
sacrament, ordinance or rite, or take part in any act of worship or 
prayer, according to the practices of an organised religion. 
(3) The disclosure is made for the purpose of enabling any person to make a 
decision in relation to the matters specified in paragraph (2)(c), (d) or (e) and 
the person who makes the disclosure reasonably believes that the person to 
whom the disclosure is made may require the information in order to make a 
decision in a way which complies with the doctrines of the religion or avoids 
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conflicting with the strongly held convictions of a significant number of the 
followers of the religion. 
(4) It is not an offence under section 22 of the Act for a person who acquired 
protected information in an official capacity in relation to an organised 
religion, and who requires to make a decision in relation to the any of the 
matters specified in paragraph (2), to disclose that information to any person 
responsible for the supervision of the person making the disclosure.” 
 
Religious communities are not obliged to pay resident members of such communities 
the National Minimum Wage.  
 
National Minimum Wage Act 1998, section 44A 
(1) A residential member of a community to which this section applies does 
not qualify for the national minimum wage in respect of employment by the 
community. 
(2) Subject to subsection (3), this section applies to a community if— 
(a) it is a charity or is established by a charity, 
(b) a purpose of the community is to practise or advance a belief of a 
religious or similar nature, and 
(c) all or some of its members live together for that purpose. 
(3) This section does not apply to a community which— 
(a) is an independent school or an alternative provision Academy that 
is not an independent school, or 
(b) provides a course of further or higher education. 
(4) The residential members of a community are those who live together as 
mentioned in subsection (2)(c). 
 
11. 6 Conclusions 
 
As explained in the Introduction, the aim of this Chapter is not to explain or analyse 
equality law in depth but simply to set out key statutory provisions as part of a 
General Audit of contemporary law as it relates to religion or belief. To draw any 
conclusions would not be appropriate. Some general comments can however be made 
simply on the basis of the range and extent of statutory provision. 
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One key distinction can be made between provisions which seek to establish formal 
equality on the basis of equal treatment and those which seek to promote substantive 
equality and which may require different treatment where that is required by the 
different needs of particular individuals. Both approaches are evident in the 
provisions set out above. There is also something of a distinction between traces of 
“old style” religion – evident perhaps in the special treatment of denominational 
schools – and traces of “new style” religion – emerging in the equivalence between 
religion and belief. 
 
It is clear in this Chapter, that there is “quite a lot of law”. Or at least, there are 
numerous statutory provisions. There have been, however, relatively few cases and in 
particular there is little guidance from the higher courts in many of these areas. To 
date no equality cases concerning religion or belief have been heard by the Court of 
Justice of the European Union (CJEU) in contrast to other protected characteristics 
where the Court has been a significant source of guidance. It is therefore a largely 
untested area of law where there is potential for considerable further development. 
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Chapter 12 
Family law 
 
Chapter 12 Family law 
12.1 Introduction 
12.2 Divorce 
12.3 Social work, care and adoption 
12.4 Conclusions 
 
12.1 Introduction 
 
Family law is an area of Scots law where the links with religion were historically 
clear and very strong. Key elements of what we now think of as “family law” were 
governed according to Canon law and, even after the Reformation, many of the 
principles continued relatively unchanged. Scots family law has been transformed 
over the last century or so by a process of extensive statutory reform and it might be 
argued that obvious links to religion have disappeared from what is a “modern” 
system of secular family law.  
 
The legal regulation of marriage has been considered in detail in chapter 3. This 
chapter brings together a range of other provisions in family law where there is some 
acknowledgement or accommodation of religion. 
 
12.2 Divorce 
 
Against a trend of secularisation, it is perhaps rather surprising to find a new 
provision being introduced as recently as 2006, which takes account explicitly of 
religious divorce. The Divorce (Scotland) Act 1976 was amended in 20066 
concerning postponement of a decree of divorce where a religious impediment to 
remarry exists. This was intended to address a particular problem concerning Jewish 
                                                             
6 By the Family Law (Scotland) Act 2006, s. 15. 
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religious divorces which the British legislature had already addressed for England and 
Wales but the statutory language is broad. The provision, in section 3A of the 1976 
Act is in the following terms: 
 
(1) Notwithstanding that irretrievable breakdown of a marriage has been 
established in an action for divorce, the court may— 
(a) on the application of a party (“the applicant”); and 
(b) if satisfied— 
(i) that subsection (2) applies; and 
(ii) that it is just and reasonable to do so, 
postpone the grant of decree in the action until it is satisfied that the other 
party has complied with subsection (3). 
(2) This subsection applies where— 
(a) the applicant is prevented from entering into a religious marriage 
by virtue of a requirement of the religion of that marriage; and 
(b) the other party can act so as to remove, or enable or contribute to 
the removal of, the impediment which prevents that marriage. 
(3) A party complies with this subsection by acting in the way described in 
subsection (2)(b). 
(4) The court may, whether or not on the application of a party and 
notwithstanding that subsection (2) applies, recall a postponement under 
subsection (1). 
(5) The court may, before recalling a postponement under subsection (1), 
order the other party to produce a certificate from a relevant religious body 
confirming that the other party has acted in the way described in subsection 
2(b). 
(6) For the purposes of subsection (5), a religious body is “relevant” if the 
applicant considers the body competent to provide the confirmation referred to 
in that subsection. 
(7) In this section— 
“religious marriage” means a marriage solemnised by a marriage celebrant of 
a prescribed religious body, and “religion of that marriage”shall be construed 
accordingly; 
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“prescribed” means prescribed by regulations made by the Scottish Ministers. 
(8) Any reference in this section to a marriage celebrant of a prescribed 
religious body is a reference to— 
(a) a minister, clergyman, pastor or priest of such a body; 
(b) a person who has, on the nomination of such a body, been 
registered under section 9 of the Marriage (Scotland) Act 1977 (c.15) 
as empowered to solemnise marriages; or 
(c) any person who is recognised by such a body as entitled to 
solemnise marriages on its behalf. 
(9) Regulations under subsection (7) shall be made by statutory instrument; 
and any such instrument shall be subject to annulment in pursuance of a 
resolution of the Scottish Parliament. 
 
Scots law is not alone in having introduced such a provision and it may be seen as 
part of a move towards recognising the multiple obligations – civil and religious – 
which some spouses may make on marriage. It can be argued in particular to be a 
provision which protects women who might otherwise remain tied to their husbands 
in the eyes of their religious community. Nonetheless, it is a somewhat surprising 
reintroduction of religion into the law of divorce. 
 
12.3 Social work, care and adoption 
 
In the area of social work, residential care homes, and adoption, various statutory and 
regulatory provisions are found in Scots law concerning the religious persuasions of 
children. This appears to be one of the few areas of law where the beliefs of children 
are taken into account in their own right, rather than being considered primarily in the 
light of a child’s parent’s belief, as is the case for example in education law, although 
that is not to say that the beliefs of parents are not taken into account. The emphasis 
on the beliefs of children within this context is entirely to be expected, the usual bond 
between parent and child having been broken by factors such as the death of a child’s 
parents, or by the intervention of government agencies.   
 
287 
 
The Secretary of State for Scotland may make regulations in respect of the functions 
of a local authority in providing for children in need in order to take account of a 
child’s religious background. This is set out in the Social Work (Scotland) Act 1968, 
section 5 as follows: 
 
(2) The Secretary of State may make regulations in relation to— 
(a) the performance of the functions assigned to local authorities by 
this Act; 
(b) the activities of voluntary organisations in so far as those activities 
are concerned with the like purposes; 
(c) the performance of the functions of local authorities under any of 
the enactments mentioned in paragraphs (b), (d), (e), (g), (h), (i), (l), 
(o), (p), (q) and (s) of subsection (1B) above. 
(3) Without prejudice to the generality of subsection (2) above, regulations 
under this section may make such provision as is mentioned in subsection (4) 
of this section as regards— 
(a) the boarding out of persons other than children by local authorities 
and voluntary organisations, whether under any enactment or 
otherwise; and 
(b) the placing of children under paragraph (a), or the making of 
arrangements in respect of children under paragraph (c), of section 
26(1) of the Children (Scotland) Act 1995, by local authorities. 
(4) The provision referred to in subsection (3) of this section is— 
...  
(c) for securing that, where possible, the person with whom a child is 
so placed or with whom such arrangements are made is either of the 
same religious persuasion as the child or gives an undertaking that the 
child shall be brought up in that persuasion; 
... 
and that he shall be removed from the place in question if his welfare appears 
to require it. 
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A child’s religious persuasion is often mentioned in statutory provisions, together 
with a child’s racial origin and cultural and linguistic background, as shown in the 
following provisions:  
 
 Children (Scotland) Act 1995, section 17 
(1) Where a child is looked after by a local authority they shall, in such 
manner as the Secretary of State may prescribe— 
(a) safeguard and promote his welfare (which shall, in the exercise of 
their duty to him be their paramount concern); 
(b) make such use of services available for children cared for by their 
own parents as appear to the authority reasonable in his case; and 
(c) take such steps to promote, on a regular basis, personal relations 
and direct contact between the child and any person with parental 
responsibilities in relation to him as appear to them to be, having 
regard to their duty to him under paragraph (a) above, both practicable 
and appropriate. 
... 
(4) In making any such decision a local authority shall have regard so far as 
practicable— 
(a) to the views (if he wishes to express them) of the child concerned, 
taking account of his age and maturity; 
(b) to such views of any person mentioned in subsection (3)(b) to (d) 
above as they have been able to ascertain; and 
(c) to the child's religious persuasion, racial origin and cultural and 
linguistic background. 
 
Children (Scotland) Act 1995, section 22 
(1) A local authority shall— 
(a) safeguard and promote the welfare of children in their area who are 
in need; and 
(b) so far as is consistent with that duty, promote the upbringing of 
such children by their families, 
by providing a range and level of services appropriate to the children's needs. 
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(2) In providing services under subsection (1) above, a local authority shall 
have regard so far as practicable to each child's religious persuasion, racial 
origin and cultural and linguistic background. 
 
Adoption and Children (Scotland) Act 2007, section 14 
(1) Subsections (2) to (4) apply where a court or adoption agency is coming to 
a decision relating to the adoption of a child. 
(2) The court or adoption agency must have regard to all the circumstances of 
the case. 
(3) The court or adoption agency is to regard the need to safeguard and 
promote the welfare of the child throughout the child's life as the paramount 
consideration. 
(4) The court or adoption agency must, so far as is reasonably practicable, 
have regard in particular to— 
(a) the value of a stable family unit in the child's development, 
(b) the child's ascertainable views regarding the decision (taking 
account of the child's age and maturity), 
(c) the child's religious persuasion, racial origin and cultural and 
linguistic background, and 
(d) the likely effect on the child, throughout the child's life, of the 
making of an adoption order 
 
Generally, local authorities, adoption agencies and care homes must have regard to 
the religious persuasion of children, and must ensure that a child continues to be 
brought up in accordance with their religious persuasion.  
 
Looked After Children (Scotland) Regulations 2009/210 (Scottish SI), 
part 2, reg. 4 ((1)(k)) 
(1) The local authority must make an assessment of– 
(a) the child's immediate needs and how those needs can be met; 
(b) the child's long term needs and how those needs can be met; 
(c) proposals for safeguarding and promoting the child's welfare; 
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(d) proposals for making sustainable and long term arrangements for 
the care of the child; 
(e) the nature of the services proposed for the child in the immediate 
and long term with particular regard to the information specified in 
Schedule 1; 
(f) alternative courses of action including the possibility of making an 
arrangement in accordance with regulation 8 or approving a person as 
a kinship carer; 
(g) whether the local authority should seek a change in the child's legal 
status; 
(h) the arrangements which require to be made for the time when the 
child will no longer be looked after by the local authority; 
(i) the existing health arrangements for the child and whether there is a 
need to change such arrangements taking into account the information 
specified in paragraph 9 of Schedule 1; 
(j) having regard to the information specified in paragraph 10 of 
Schedule 1, the child's educational needs, the proposals for meeting 
those needs, and the proposals for achieving continuity in the child's 
education; 
(k) the child's religious persuasion and the need for the child to 
continue to be brought up in accordance with their religious 
persuasion; and 
(l) any other matter relating to the welfare of the child either in the 
immediate or long term as appears to the local authority to be relevant. 
 
Adoption Agencies (Scotland) Regulations 2009/154 (Scottish SI), 
schedule 1, part 1 (Information about prospective adopters), paras. 16 & 
17 
16. Religious persuasion including the degree of religious observance. 
 
17. The ability of the prospective adopter to have regard to a child's religious 
persuasion, racial origin and cultural and linguistic background. 
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Adoption Agencies (Scotland) Regulations 2009/154 (Scottish SI), 
schedule 1, part 2 (Information about the child), paras. 4 & 15 
 
4. Religious persuasion of the child including details of any baptism, 
confirmation or equivalent ceremonies and level of current religious 
observance. 
 
15. The child's views in relation to adoption and whether an application should 
be made for a permanence order with authority for the child to be adopted 
under section 80 of the [Adoption and Children (Scotland)] Act [2007, asp 4] 
taking into account the age and maturity of the child and any wishes in respect 
of their religious persuasion, racial origin and cultural and linguistic 
background. 
 
The religious background of a child is a relevant factor to be considered in the context 
of placing the child for adoption. This can be seen, for example, in the Adoption 
Agencies (Scotland) Regulations 2009/154, part 4, regulation 12: 
 
(1) This regulation applies where an adoption agency is considering adoption 
for a child. 
(2) The adoption agency must, so far as is reasonably practicable and in the 
child's best interests– 
(a) consult and take into account the views of– 
(i) the child, taking account of their age and maturity; and 
(ii) the child's parents and guardians if their whereabouts are 
known; 
(b) take account of the child's religious persuasion, racial origin and 
cultural and linguistic background where known;  
 
The religious persuasion of the parents and relations of children put up for adoption, 
together with any wishes such family members have in respect of a child’s religious 
upbringing, must be compiled by adoption agencies, as provided by the Adoption 
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Agencies (Scotland) Regulations 2009/154, schedule 1, part 3 (Information about the 
child’s family), paragraph 8: 
 
8. Religious persuasion of the child's parents, guardian and other relatives 
including any wishes they have expressed as to the child's religious 
upbringing. 
  
It is made clear, however, that such wishes are not binding, since any decisions will 
be guided by the welfare principle. This is explained in the following terms: 
 
Adoption Agencies (Scotland) Regulations 2009/154, schedule 2 
(Memorandum), paragraph 1 
 
This memorandum is addressed to the parent or guardian of a child for whom 
an adoption application is to be made.... 
1. If the court makes an adoption order, your responsibilities and rights 
(including financial obligations) as a parent or guardian will be transferred to 
the adopters and they will become in law your child's parents. You will then 
have no further right to see your child, unless voluntary contact is agreed by 
the adopters. You may however apply to the court for a contact order although 
leave of the court to make the application must be granted. You will cease to 
be the child's parent and will have no right to have your child returned to you. 
2. If you wish your child to be brought up in a particular religious faith or have 
any other views on the upbringing of your child which you wish to be taken 
into account you should inform the adoption agency. The adoption agency is 
obliged, however, to make the welfare of the child its paramount 
consideration. 
 
Nevertheless regard must be had to a child’s religious persuasion, as well as to a 
child’s racial original, cultural background and linguistic background. In this it may 
be the case that, as regards adoption, the wishes of children as to religious upbringing 
enjoy greater force than the wishes of parents and other family members, although the 
age of a child may have a bearing on the extent to which a child can be deemed to 
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have sufficiently clear wishes which will prevail over parental wishes. Be that as it 
may, decisions are ultimately governed by what is deemed to be best for the welfare 
of a child, and this guiding principle is capable of overriding considerations as to 
religion.  
 
The importance of a child’s ethnic, religious and cultural background is also found in 
regulations and statutory provisions concerning adoptions with a foreign element or 
inter-country adoptions.  
 
Adoptions with a Foreign Element (Scotland) Regulations 2009/182, part 
3, regulation 46 
(1) The adoption panel must consider the proposed placement referred to it by 
an adoption agency under regulation 45(7) and make a recommendation to the 
agency as to whether– 
(a) the Convention prospective adopter is suitable to be an adoptive 
parent for the child; and 
(b) the proposed placement is in the best interests of the child. 
(2) In considering what recommendation to make under paragraph (1), the 
adoption panel– 
(a) must have regard to– 
(i) the child's upbringing and ethnic, religious and cultural 
background; … 
 
 Adoption (Intercountry Aspects) Act 1999 
Schedule 1: Convention on Protection of Children and Co-Operation in 
Respect of Inter-country Adoption, Article 16 
1. If the Central Authority of the State of origin is satisfied that the child is 
adoptable, it shall— 
(a) prepare a report including information about his or her identity, 
adoptability, background, social environment, family history, medical 
history including that of the child's family, and any special needs of the 
child; 
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(b) give due consideration to the child's upbringing and to his or her 
ethnic, religious and cultural background; 
(c) ensure that consents have been obtained in accordance with Article 
4; and 
(d) determine, on the basis in particular of the reports relating to the 
child and the prospective adoptive parents, whether the envisaged 
placement is in the best interests of the child. 
 
 
In residential care homes, regard must be had to a child’s wishes, and provision ought 
to be made so far as practicable to for children to receive religious instruction and to 
attend religious services in conformity with the religious persuasion of such children. 
 
The Health and Social Services and Social Security Adjudications Act 1983, schedule 
4, part 1, paragraph19 provides that: 
 
(1) The Secretary of State may make regulations as to the conduct of 
residential care homes, and in particular— 
... 
(h) making provision for children under the age of 18 years who are 
resident in such homes to receive a religious upbringing appropriate to 
the religious persuasion to which they belong; 
 
Further provision is made in respect of facilitating a child in residential care in 
practicing their religion through collective worship and religious education: 
 
Residential Establishments - Child Care (Scotland) Regulations 
1996/3256, part 2, regulation 14 
The managers of a residential establishment shall, so far as is practicable and 
having regard to the child's wishes and feelings, arrange that every child 
resident in the establishment is able to attend such religious services and to 
receive such religious instruction as may be appropriate to the child's religious 
persuasion. 
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Residential Establishments - Child Care (Scotland) Regulations 
1996/3256, schedule 1 (Matters to be included in a statement of functions 
and objectives), paragraph 1 
Arrangements to meet the needs and development potential of all children 
resident in the establishment, including the child's emotional, spiritual, 
intellectual and physical needs and which give due regard to the child's 
religious persuasion, cultural and linguistic background and racial origin. 
 
 
12.4 Conclusions 
 
To a large extent, religion has little explicit influence within contemporary Scots 
family law. Its changing place within marriage has been explored in some detail in 
chapter 4 of this Report and it might be argued that the legal acceptance of same sex 
relationships, both in terms of same sex marriage and civil partnership, is clear 
evidence of secularisation of family law. There is certainly little evidence of one 
particular religious tradition or one predominant religious body, but there is ongoing 
recognition of the importance to particular individuals of religious belief and religious 
obligation.
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13.5 Detention centres 
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13.1 Introduction 
 
The main focus of this Report is on Scots law as it applies within Scotland and 
therefore the focus is predominantly inward looking. Legal systems, however, 
sometimes also have to look outwards to other jurisdictions.  There are two situations 
where Scots (or UK) law may have to look at other countries and their legal systems, 
and where religion may be an issue: in the area of international private law and in the 
context of immigration, asylum and extradition.  
 
International private law encompasses the rules and principles which govern 
questions of jurisdiction and of choice of laws. How do the Scottish courts decide 
which law to apply when faced with a situation involving foreign nationals, foreign 
legal systems and a choice of laws. How should a Scottish court proceed, for example, 
when presented with a question concerning the validity of a divorce procedure gone 
through in Pakistan by Pakistani nationals who are now living in Scotland? Such 
questions sometimes raise issues not only of foreign laws but of foreign religious laws 
but, IPL is a very detailed and complex area of law which is beyond the scope of this 
relatively short Report.  
 
297 
 
The second area of law is, however, predominantly statute-based and therefore well 
suited to inclusion in our Report. Decisions about which individuals may be permitted 
to enter and remain in the UK and decisions about extradition to other jurisdictions 
sometimes include consideration of religion. As with many other areas mentioned in 
this Report, the law and in particular the practice of decision making is complex and 
often controversial. We have not attempted to deal with the practice but simply to 
highlight key provisions which give some indication of the ways in which religion 
features. These provisions are significantly different to the other provisions set out in 
this Report in that they refer to the way that religion is treated in other jurisdictions. 
 
13.2 Asylum claims 
 
Various characteristics of persons seeking asylum in the UK are to be taken into 
account when deciding the validity of claims for asylum based on human rights, such 
characteristics including religion among many others. The range of statutory 
provisions highlight an awareness of the potential issues which might make it 
dangerous for individuals to return to the country from which they came or in which 
they have a right to reside.  
 
The Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002, section 94, deals with the power 
of the Secretary of State to declare “a protection claim or human rights claim” as 
“clearly unfounded”. The underlying function of this provision is to ensure that 
individuals of a certain description are not forced to return to a state in which they 
have a right to reside if there is a serious risk of persecution. The relevant description 
of the individual at risk relate to:  
  
 s94(5C) … 
(a) gender, 
(b) language, 
(c) race, 
(d) religion, 
(e) nationality, 
(f) membership of a social or other group, 
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(g) political opinion, or 
(h) any other attribute or circumstance that the Secretary of State 
thinks appropriate. 
A range of statutory provisions, regulating the process for dealing with asylum and 
immigration claims, share a particular formula of words. Part of the test for whether 
or not an individual may be removed from the UK focuses on whether or not the state 
to which he or she would be returned would be a place where life and liberty would 
be threatened by reasons including religion. This formula can be seen, for example, in 
the Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants, etc.) Act 2004, schedule 3, 
part 2, paragraph 3: 
 
(1) This paragraph applies for the purposes of the determination by any 
person, tribunal or court whether a person who has made an asylum claim or a 
human rights claim may be removed– 
(a) from the United Kingdom, and 
(b) to a State of which he is not a national or citizen. 
(2) A State to which this Part applies shall be treated, in so far as relevant to 
the question mentioned in sub-paragraph (1), as a place– 
(a) where a person's life and liberty are not threatened by reason of his 
race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or 
political opinion, 
(b) from which a person will not be sent to another State in 
contravention of his Convention rights, and 
(c) from which a person will not be sent to another State otherwise 
than in accordance with the Refugee Convention. 
 
The same wording forms part of the various stages of the application and appeal 
process as seen in the following provisions: 
 
Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants, etc.) Act 2004, 
schedule 3, part 2, paragraph 6 
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A person who is outside the United Kingdom may not bring an immigration 
appeal on any ground that is inconsistent with treating a State to which this 
Part applies as a place– 
(a) where a person's life and liberty are not threatened by reason of his 
race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or 
political opinion, 
(b) from which a person will not be sent to another State in 
contravention of his Convention rights, and 
(c) from which a person will not be sent to another State otherwise 
than in accordance with the Refugee Convention. 
 
Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants, etc.) Act 2004, 
schedule 3, part 3, paragraph 8 
(1) This paragraph applies for the purposes of the determination by any 
person, tribunal or court whether a person who has made an asylum claim may 
be removed– 
(a) from the United Kingdom, and 
(b) to a State of which he is not a national or citizen. 
(2) A State to which this Part applies shall be treated, in so far as relevant to 
the question mentioned in sub-paragraph (1), as a place– 
(a) where a person's life and liberty are not threatened by reason of his 
race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or 
political opinion, and 
(b) from which a person will not be sent to another State otherwise 
than in accordance with the Refugee Convention. 
  
Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants, etc.) Act 2004, 
schedule 3, part 3, paragraph 11 
A person who is outside the United Kingdom may not bring an immigration 
appeal on any ground that is inconsistent with treating a State to which this 
Part applies as a place– 
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(a) where a person's life and liberty are not threatened by reason of his 
race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or 
political opinion, and 
(b) from which a person will not be sent to another State otherwise 
than in accordance with the Refugee Convention. 
 
Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants, etc.) Act 2004, 
schedule 3, part 4, paragraph 13 
 
(1) This paragraph applies for the purposes of the determination by any 
person, tribunal or court whether a person who has made an asylum claim may 
be removed– 
(a) from the United Kingdom, and 
(b) to a State of which he is not a national or citizen. 
(2) A State to which this Part applies shall be treated, in so far as relevant to 
the question mentioned in sub-paragraph (1), as a place– 
(a) where a person's life and liberty are not threatened by reason of his 
race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or 
political opinion, and 
(b) from which a person will not be sent to another State otherwise 
than in accordance with the Refugee Convention. 
 
Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants, etc.) Act 2004, 
schedule 3, part 4, paragraph 16 
A person who is outside the United Kingdom may not bring an immigration 
appeal on any ground that is inconsistent with treating a State to which this 
Part applies as a place– 
(a) where a person's life and liberty are not threatened by reason of his 
race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or 
political opinion, and 
(b) from which a person will not be sent to another State otherwise 
than in accordance with the Refugee Convention. 
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Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants, etc.) Act 2004, 
schedule 3, part 5, paragraph 17 
This Part applies to a person who has made an asylum claim if the Secretary of 
State certifies that– 
(a) it is proposed to remove the person to a specified State, 
(b) in the Secretary of State's opinion the person is not a national or 
citizen of the specified State, and 
(c) in the Secretary of State's opinion the specified State is a place– 
(i) where the person's life and liberty will not be threatened by 
reason of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a 
particular social group or political opinion, and 
(ii) from which the person will not be sent to another State 
otherwise than in accordance with the Refugee Convention. 
 
13.3 Refugee status 
 
In deciding whether or not a person is a refugee, the religion of the person may be 
taken into account, including such a person’s theistic, non-theistic, and atheistic 
beliefs.  
 
Refugee or Person in Need of International Protection (Qualification) 
Regulations 2006/2525, reg. 6 
(1) In deciding whether a person is a refugee: 
(a) the concept of race shall include consideration of, for example, 
colour, descent, or membership of a particular ethnic group; 
(b) the concept of religion shall include, for example, the holding of 
theistic, non-theistic and atheistic beliefs, the participation in, or 
abstention from, formal worship in private or in public, either alone or 
in community with others, other religious acts or expressions of view, 
or forms of personal or communal conduct based on or mandated by 
any religious belief; 
... 
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(d) a group shall be considered to form a particular social group where, 
for example: 
(i) members of that group share an innate characteristic, or a 
common background that cannot be changed, or share a 
characteristic or belief that is so fundamental to identity or 
conscience that a person should not be forced to renounce it, 
and 
(ii) that group has a distinct identity in the relevant country, 
because it is perceived as being different by the surrounding 
society; … 
 
13.4 Transit visas 
 
Key to many of these provisions about asylum and immigration is the various ways in 
which people may be classified and the different characteristics which feature in their 
identity. In a specific provision relating to transit visas, it is notable that religion is not 
an accepted means of categorizing passengers. Transit visas may not describe persons 
in respect of their race, colour, or religion, as set out in the Immigration and Asylum 
Act 1999, section 41: 
 
(1) The Secretary of State may by order require transit passengers to hold a 
transit visa. 
(2) “Transit passengers” means persons of any description specified in the 
order who on arrival in the United Kingdom pass through to another country 
without entering the United Kingdom; and “transit visa” means a visa for that 
purpose. 
(3) The order— 
(a) may specify a description of persons by reference to nationality, 
citizenship, origin or other connection with any particular country but 
not by reference to race, colour or religion; ... 
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13.5 Detention centres 
 
The provisions set out above all relate to what can be a very lengthy decision making 
process concerning the status of individuals entering, or seeking to enter, the UK. One 
very practical aspect of this process relates to their possible physical detention during 
the process. Detention centres, rather like prisons and young offenders’ institutions, 
make provision for the persons detained in such centres to continue to practise their 
religion. The following Rules indicate a range of ways in which religion and religious 
practices are respected: 
 
Detention Centre Rules 2001/238, part 2, rules 13, 14, 20-25 
13. Food 
(1) Subject to any directions of the Secretary of State, no detained person shall 
be allowed, except as authorised by the medical practitioner to have any food 
other than that ordinarily provided. 
(2) No detained person shall be given less food than is ordinarily provided, 
except with his written consent and upon the written recommendation of the 
medical practitioner. 
(3) The food provided shall: 
(a) be wholesome, nutritious, well prepared and served, reasonably 
varied, sufficient in quantity and 
(b) meet all religious, dietary, cultural and medical needs. 
 
14. Alcohol 
 No detained person shall be allowed to have any intoxicating liquor except:— 
(a) by written order of the medical practitioner, specifying the quantity 
and the name of the detained person and the medical reason for the 
order; or 
(b) for the observance of religious festivals, and for sacraments, with 
the prior agreement of the manager. 
 
20. Diversity of religion 
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The practice of religion in detention centres shall take account of the diverse 
cultural and religious background of detained persons. 
 
21. Religious denomination 
If a detained person wishes to declare himself to belong to a particular 
religion, the manager shall upon that person's reception at the detention centre 
record the religion to which the detained person wishes to belong. 
 
22. Manager of religious affairs and ministers of religion 
(1) Every detention centre shall have a manager of religious affairs whose 
appointment shall be approved by the Secretary of State. 
(2) Where in any detention centre the number of detained persons who belong 
to a particular religion is such as in the opinion of the Secretary of State to 
require the appointment of a minister of that religion, the Secretary of State 
may appoint such a minister to that detention centre. 
(3) The manager of religious affairs shall make arrangements for a minister of 
religion to meet with every detained person of his religion individually soon 
after the detained person's reception into the detention centre if the detained 
person so wishes. 
(4) A minister of religion shall visit daily all detained persons of his religion 
who are sick, under restraint, in temporary confinement, or undergoing 
removal from association, as far as he reasonably can and to the extent that the 
detained person so wishes. 
 
23. Regular visits by ministers of religion 
(1) The manager shall make arrangements for a minister of religion to visit 
detained persons of his religion as often as he reasonably can and to the extent 
that the detained person so wishes. 
(2) Where a detained person belongs to a religion for which no minister of 
religion has been appointed the manager will do what he reasonably can, if so 
requested by the detained person, to arrange for him to be visited by a minister 
of that religion as often as he reasonably can and to the extent that the detained 
person so wishes. 
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24. Religious services 
The manager shall make arrangements for ministers of religion to conduct 
religious services for detained persons of their religions at such times as may 
be arranged. 
 
 25. Religious books 
There shall, so far as reasonably practicable, be available for the personal use 
of every detained person such religious books recognised by his religion as are 
approved by the Secretary of State for use in detention centres. 
 
13.6 Extradition 
 
In asylum and immigration claims, provision is made, as shown above, for the UK to 
seek to protect individuals against persecution on grounds of a range of factors 
including religion. This is a way of the UK seeking to ensure that it abides with 
international human rights conventions. Similar considerations apply in the context of 
extradition. Put simply, the UK may not extradite persons to states in which such 
persons are entitled to reside, if such persons may be variously at risk in such states 
on the grounds of various characteristics, including religion. This position can be seen 
clearly in the Extradition Act 2003, section 13 of which provides that: 
 
A person's extradition to a category 1 territory is barred by reason of 
extraneous considerations if (and only if) it appears that— 
(a) the Part 1 warrant issued in respect of him (though purporting to be 
issued on account of the extradition offence) is in fact issued for the 
purpose of prosecuting or punishing him on account of his race, 
religion, nationality, gender, sexual orientation or political opinions, or 
(b) if extradited he might be prejudiced at his trial or punished, 
detained or restricted in his personal liberty by reason of his race, 
religion, nationality, gender, sexual orientation or political opinions. 
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Related and similar provision is made in sections 40 and 81 of the Extradition Act 
2003.  
 
13.7 Conclusions 
 
The presence of religion as a factor within statutory provisions relating to asylum and 
refugee status is not surprising as it reflects the operation of both the human right to 
freedom of conscience and religion and the position of religion as a protected 
characteristic in terms of equality. It is perhaps more surprising that these provisions 
all refer only to religion and not to the increasingly prevalent category of religion or 
belief. 
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14.1 Introduction 
 
While a search for the particular term “oath” was not undertaken as part of this report, 
results for oaths have variously been generated by other search terms used. The use of 
oaths is common in almost all legal systems and has a long and complex history, with 
various explanations as to their significance.1 The words of individual oaths clearly 
reference particular religions and to some extent there is recognition of religious 
diversity in the form of permitted variations. Provision is also made in most 
circumstances for the use of  “affirmation” as an alternative to an oath. 
 
14.2 Oaths of allegiance 
 
As is noted in Chapter 2, concerning the Church of Scotland, oaths still form a 
procedural part of the appointment of the British Head of State, and include oaths to 
uphold both the Church of England and the Protestant religion as established in 
Scotland. The Regency Act 1937 adds a little more detail to this picture, as a regent’s 
oath involves explicit mention of various historical Scottish Acts relating to the place 
of Protestantism in Scotland. The Regency Act 1937 provides in section 4 that: 
                                                             
1 A fascinating and detailed historical and comparative account of the use of oaths can be found in H. 
Silving, “The Oath: I” (1959) 68(7) The Yale Law Journal 1329; “The Oath: II” (1959) 68(8) The Yale 
Law Journal 1527. 
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(1) The Regent shall, before he acts in or enters upon his office, take 
and subscribe before the Privy Council the oaths set out in the 
Schedule to this Act, and the Privy Council are empowered and 
required to administer those oaths and to enter them in the Council 
Books. 
(2) The Regent shall not have power to assent to any Bill for changing 
the order of succession to the Crown or for repealing or altering an Act 
of the fifth year of the reign of Queen Anne made in Scotland entitled 
“An Act for Securing the Protestant Religion and Presbyterian Church 
Government. 
 
One of the oaths taken by a Regent runs (Sched 1, para 3): 
 
I swear that I will inviolably maintain and preserve in England and in Scotland 
the Settlement of the true Protestant religion as established by law in England 
and as established in Scotland by the laws made in Scotland in prosecution of 
the Claim of Right, and particularly by an Act intituled “An Act for Securing 
the Protestant Religion and Presbyterian Church Government” and by the Acts 
passed in the Parliament of both Kingdoms for Union of the two Kingdoms, 
together with the Government, Worship, Discipline, Rights, and Privileges of 
the Church of Scotland. So help me God. 
 
It may be noted that Oaths of Allegiance are routinely administered to members of the 
House of Lords, the House of Commons, the Scottish Parliament, members of the 
Scottish judiciary, various officers of state – such as the First Minister of Scotland, 
and to members of the Armed Forces. While Oaths of Allegiance are often taken to be 
simply a matter of formality, in law they enshrine the principle that persons in 
positions of trust and responsibility within the British State must be loyal to and 
acknowledge the heirs and successors of the British sovereign according to law. The 
line of succession is still governed by religious considerations dating back to the Bill 
and Claim of Rights and the constituting documents of the United Kingdom of Great 
Britain. As such, all those who take this oath accept the principle that only Protestants 
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may stand in the line of succession to the British Crown until such time as 
Westminster legislates otherwise. 
 
14.3 Solemn affirmation 
 
In general, any person who objects to taking an oath may make a solemn affirmation 
instead. The Oaths Act 1978, section 5 provides that:  
 
(1) Any person who objects to being sworn shall be permitted to make his 
solemn affirmation instead of taking an oath. 
(2) Subsection (1) above shall apply in relation to a person to whom it is not 
reasonably practicable without inconvenience or delay to administer an oath in 
the manner appropriate to his religious belief as it applies in relation to a 
person objecting to be sworn. 
(3) A person who may be permitted under subsection (2) above to make his 
solemn affirmation may also be required to do so. 
(4) A solemn affirmation shall be of the same force and effect as an oath. 
 
14.4 Lack of religious belief 
 
A lack of religious belief on the part of a person by whom an oath is taken does not 
invalidate such an oath. This is provided in section 4 of the Oaths Act 1978: 
 
(1) In any case in which an oath may lawfully be and has been administered to 
any person, if it has been administered in a form and manner other than that 
prescribed by law, he is bound by it if it has been administered in such form 
and with such ceremonies as he may have declared to be binding. 
(2) Where an oath has been duly administered and taken, the fact that the 
person to whom it was administered had, at the time of taking it, no religious 
belief, shall not for any purpose affect the validity of the oath. 
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14.5 Armed services 
 
Oaths are variously mentioned in Regulations affecting the armed services as shown 
in the provisions set out below. Although it is clear that religious belief is central to 
the various oaths, provision is nonetheless made to accommodate diversity of belief as 
evidenced by this provision in the Armed Forces (Service Inquiries) Regulations 
2008/1651, schedule 1, para. 3: 
 
If none of the forms of oath provided in this Schedule is appropriate to the 
religious beliefs of the person taking the oath, an oath may be administered in 
such form and manner as the person taking the oath declares to be binding on 
his conscience in accordance with his religious beliefs. 
 
This same clause is also used in: 
 
Courts-Martial (Royal Navy) Rules 2007/3443, schedule 4, part 1, para. 3; 
Naval Custody Rules 2000/2367, schedule 4, part 1, para. 3; 
Summary Appeal Court (Navy) Rules 2000/2370, schedule 5, part 1, para. 3; 
Summary Appeal Court (Air Force) Rules 2000/2372, schedule 5, part 1, para. 
3; 
Administration of Oaths (Summary Appeal Court) (Navy) Order 2000/2376, 
schedule 1, para. 3; 
Administration of Oaths (Summary Appeal Court) (Air Force) Order 
2000/2378, schedule 1, para. 3; 
Armed Forces (Powers of Stop and Search, Search, Seizure and Retention) 
Order 2009/2056, schedule 2, para.3; 
Courts-Martial (Royal Air Force) Rules 2007/3444, schedule 4, part 1, para. 3. 
 
The Armed Forces (Powers of Stop and Search, Search, Seizure and Retention) Order 
2009/2056, schedule 2, paras. 1 & 5 provide: 
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1. The service policeman taking the oath shall hold the New Testament, or if a 
Jew the Old Testament, in his uplifted hand and shall say, or repeat after the 
person administering it, the oath provided in paragraph 5 of this Schedule. 
 
5. The oath shall be sworn in the following form: 
“I swear by Almighty God that I shall truthfully answer any questions I am 
asked.” 
 
The clause found in para. 1 above, is also used in: 
 
Armed Forces (Service Inquiries) Regulations 2008/1651, schedule 1, para. 1; 
Courts-Martial (Royal Navy) Rules 2007/3443, schedule 4, part 1, para. 1; 
Courts-Martial (Royal Air Force) Rules 2007/3444, schedule 4, part 1, para. 1; 
Naval Custody Rules 2000/2367, schedule 4, part 1, para. 1; 
Summary Appeal Court (Navy) Rules 2000/2370, schedule 5, part 1, para. 1; 
Summary Appeal Court (Air Force) Rules 2000/2372, schedule 5, part 1, para. 
1; 
Administration of Oaths (Summary Appeal Court) (Navy) Order 2000/2376, 
schedule 1, para.1; 
Administration of Oaths (Summary Appeal Court) (Air Force) Order 
2000/2378, schedule 1, para.1. 
 
The use of solemn affirmation as an alternative to oath is shown, for example, in the 
Armed Forces (Powers of Stop and Search, Search, Seizure and Retention) Order 
2009/2056, part 2, art. 11: 
 
(1) Before a judge advocate asks any question which a service policeman 
would be required under article 8(6) to answer on oath, an oath shall be 
administered to the service policeman. 
(2) If— 
(a) a service policeman required under article 8(6) to answer on oath 
objects to being sworn, or 
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(b) it is not reasonably practicable without inconvenience or delay to 
administer an oath to a service policeman in the manner appropriate to 
his religious belief, 
he shall be required to make a solemn affirmation instead of taking an oath. 
(3) An oath or affirmation required to be administered under this Order shall 
be administered in the form and manner set out in Schedule 2 by the judge 
advocate or by another person acting on his behalf. 
 
The availability of affirmation as an alternative to oath is also shown in the Armed 
Forces (Service Inquiries) Regulations 2008/1651, reg. 11(8): 
 
(8) Where the president would, apart from this paragraph, require a witness to 
give oral evidence on oath and— 
(a) the witness objects to taking an oath; or 
(b) it is not reasonably practicable without inconvenience to, or 
without delaying the proceedings of, the panel to administer an oath to 
a witness in the manner appropriate to his religious belief, 
he must be required to make a solemn affirmation instead of taking an oath. 
 
Similar permission, although in this case the language is permissive rather than 
obligatory, is set out in the Courts-Martial (Royal Navy) Rules 2007/3443, part 9, rule 
56: 
 
(3) If— 
(a) a person required to take an oath for the purposes of proceedings 
before the court objects to being sworn, or 
(b) it is not reasonably practicable to administer an oath to such a 
person as aforesaid in the manner appropriate to his religious belief, 
he shall be permitted to make a solemn affirmation instead of taking an oath… 
 
A similar provision is also to be found in: 
 
Courts-Martial (Royal Air Force) Rules 2007/3444, part 9, rule 59 
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Summary Appeal Court (Navy) Rules 2000/2370, part v, rule 31(4) 
Naval Custody Rules 2000/2367, part v, rule 27(2) 
Summary Appeal Court (Air Force) Rules 2000/2372, part v, rule 31(4) 
 
14.6 Conscientious objection 
 
The use of oaths in the context of establishing conscientious objection is well 
established and is evidenced, for example, in the context of assisted reproduction.  
The Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990, section 38 provides that: 
 
(1) No person who has a conscientious objection to participating in any 
activity governed by this Act shall be under any duty, however arising, to do 
so. 
(2) In any legal proceedings the burden of proof of conscientious objection 
shall rest on the person claiming to rely on it. 
(3) In any proceedings before a court in Scotland, a statement on oath by any 
person to the effect that he has a conscientious objection to participating in a 
particular activity governed by this Act shall be sufficient evidence of that fact 
for the purpose of discharging the burden of proof imposed by subsection (2) 
above. 
 
14.7 Conclusions 
 
The use of oaths in the legal and constitutional setting has a very long and complex 
history and there are many explanations for their significance; these include ideas that 
the modern judicial oath may stem from pagan or pre-religious periods. In Scotland, 
and the UK more broadly, contemporary versions of oaths clearly reference religion 
and religious belief but provisions have been introduced to ensure that, in general, no 
one religion dominates but that there should be accommodation of diversity of 
religious belief. There is also provision for solemn affirmation as an alternative to 
oath. Although the law has been amended in a relatively piecemeal way in order to 
make it more suitable for a pluralist society, there has been much less fundamental 
reconsideration of the nature, significance and impact of oaths. 
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15.1 Introduction 
 
A variety of terms including “religion”, “religion or belief”, “religion, belief or non-
belief” and “religious group” are used in various places throughout the laws in force 
in Scotland. Generally there is a trend towards including “belief” in conjunction with 
the word “religion” although this is not universal. Even where “belief” is not 
juxtaposed with religion, it is often made clear that the word “religion” is to be 
interpreted as including other non-religious beliefs.  
 
The following selection of statutory provisions, while not exhaustive, gives an 
indication of the range of terminology used and the various contexts in which it is 
used. The Scottish courts have had little opportunity to interpret these various 
statutory provisions and therefore the focus here is simply on setting out the words as 
they appear in statute. Some of these provisions are included in other sections of this 
report where they are looked at in the context of the particular substantive area of law 
but here they are set out simply to show the range of concepts and definitions which 
are used.  
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15.2 Individual rights and protections 
 
The terms religion or religion or belief are found in various UK and international 
measures aimed at protecting individual equality and human rights. A key starting 
point for individual rights is the European Convention on Human Rights which 
provides in Article 9 that: 
 
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this 
right includes freedom to change his religion or belief and freedom, either 
alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his 
religion or belief, in worship, teaching, practice and observance. 
2. Freedom to manifest one's religion or beliefs shall be subject only to such 
limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society 
in the interests of public safety, for the protection of public order, health or 
morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. 
 
Individual rights are also protected in terms of equality or non-discrimination; 
concepts which form a fundamental element of the European Union. The Treaty on 
the Functioning of the European Union provides in Article 10 that: 
 
In defining and implementing its policies and activities, the Union shall aim to 
combat discrimination based on sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, 
disability, age or sexual orientation. 
 
That broad aspiration is given more precise focus in Article 1 of the EU Directive 
2000/78/EC of 27 November 2000 establishing a general framework for equal 
treatment in employment and occupation which provides that: 
 
The purpose of this Directive is to lay down a general framework for 
combating discrimination on the grounds of religion or belief, disability, age 
or sexual orientation as regards employment and occupation, with a view to 
putting into effect in the Member States the principle of equal treatment. 
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The European Directive is, in turn, implemented in the UK by means of the Equality 
Act 2010. For the purposes of the 2010 Act, the protected characteristic of “religion 
or belief” has been defined in such a way that “religion” includes a lack of religious 
belief, and “belief” includes religious and philosophical belief, as well as a lack or 
belief.  Section 10 of the Equality Act 2010 provides that: 
(1) Religion means any religion and a reference to religion includes a 
reference to a lack of religion. 
(2) Belief means any religious or philosophical belief and a reference to belief 
includes a reference to a lack of belief. 
(3) In relation to the protected characteristic of religion or belief— 
(a) a reference to a person who has a particular protected characteristic 
is a reference to a person of a particular religion or belief; 
(b) a reference to persons who share a protected characteristic is a 
reference to persons who are of the same religion or belief. 
 
The Equality Act explicitly includes religion and belief but in other legislation, 
although the category of “religion” is set out without the addition of the phrase “or 
belief”, it is provided that the term can be defined to include “belief”. For example, 
the following Regulations provide that “religion” is taken to include the “holding of 
theistic, non-theistic, and atheistic beliefs”.  
 
In addition to general protection against discrimination, as set out above, there is also 
provision in the specific context of the armed services. In the Armed Forces Act 2006, 
the format of the provision is slightly different with belief simply being listed as one 
of the protected characteristics, rather than being linked by “or” with religion. The 
Armed Forces (Service Complaints Commissioner) Regulations 2007/3352 provide at 
regulation 2: 
 
(1) For the purposes of section 338(1) of the [Armed Forces] Act [2006], a 
person has been wronged in a prescribed way if he has been the subject of: 
(a) discrimination; 
(b) harassment; 
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(c) bullying; 
(d) dishonest, improper or biased behaviour. 
(2) In this regulation “discrimination” means— 
(a) discrimination or victimisation on the grounds of colour, race, 
ethnic or national origin, nationality, sex, gender re-assignment, status 
as a married person or civil partner, religion, belief or sexual 
orientation; … 
 
Where there is protection in respect of religion and religious beliefs, there is a trend 
towards defining the scope of protection broadly both in terms of the particular 
religion and non-religious beliefs. This can be seen, for example, in criminal law 
regulating offensive behaviour at football. Although this protection may have been 
conceived within the particular Scottish context of Protestant and Catholic 
sectarianism, the statutory language used in the Offensive Behaviour at Football and 
Threatening Communications (Scotland) Act 2012, section 7 is notably broad: 
 
(1) For the avoidance of doubt, nothing in section 6(5) [regarding threatening 
communications] prohibits or restricts— 
(a) discussion or criticism of religions or the beliefs or practices of 
adherents of religions, 
(b) expressions of antipathy, dislike, ridicule, insult or abuse towards 
those matters, 
(c) proselytising, or 
(d) urging of adherents of religions to cease practising their religions. 
 (2) In subsection (1), “religion” includes — 
(a) religions generally, 
(b) particular religions, 
(c) other belief systems. 
 
In various areas of Scots law, specific protection is given to individuals in order to 
respect their beliefs. This can be seen, for example, in the Data Protection Act 
1998,which makes special provision for sensitive personal data. Information about 
religious or other beliefs is treated as “sensitive” in terms of section 2:.  
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In this Act “sensitive personal data” means personal data consisting of 
information as to— 
... 
(c) his religious beliefs or other beliefs of a similar nature, 
 
It is interesting to note in this provision the inclusion of the phrase “of a similar 
nature” in contrast to the provisions set out above where no such explicit limitation is 
placed on “beliefs”. 
 
There is a similarly broad definition in the Refugee or Person in Need of International 
Protection (Qualification) Regulations 2006/2525, regulation 6 which provides that: 
 
1) In deciding whether a person is a refugee: 
… 
(b) the concept of religion shall include, for example, the holding of 
theistic, non-theistic and atheistic beliefs, the participation in, or 
abstention from, formal worship in private or in public, either alone or 
in community with others, other religious acts or expressions of view, 
or forms of personal or communal conduct based on or mandated by 
any religious belief; 
 
The disclosure, or not of information about religion or belief, is also dealt with in the 
context of prisons and data about prisoners. The Prisons and Young Offenders 
Institutions (Scotland) Rules 2011/331 part 2, rule 13 provides that: 
 
(1) Details about a prisoner's religion, belief or non-belief must be recorded by 
the Governor in accordance with this rule. 
(2) A prisoner is to be treated as having a particular religion, belief or non-
belief for the purposes of these Rules if he or she has declared this upon 
reception at the prison or at any other time. 
(3) A prisoner is not obliged to give any information about having a particular 
religion, belief or non-belief at reception or at any other time. 
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(4) Any information provided in accordance with paragraph (2) must be 
recorded and passed to the chaplaincy team. 
 
15.3 Groups, organisations and bodies 
 
Human rights and rights in respect of non-discrimination and equality are primarily 
individual rights but there is provision in several aspects of Scots law for religious 
groups or bodies. The Criminal Justice (Scotland) Act 2003 defines “religious group” 
as meaning persons defined by their adherence to their “religious belief, or lack of 
religious belief”.  
 
In section 74(7) of the Act the term “religious group” is given the following meaning: 
 
In this section, “religious group” means a group of persons defined by 
reference to their— 
(a) religious belief or lack of religious belief; 
(b) membership of or adherence to a church or religious organisation; 
(c) support for the culture and traditions of a church or religious 
organisation; or 
(d) participation in activities associated with such a culture or such 
traditions. 
 
This definition highlights some of the nuances of individual behaviour in terms of 
association with a particular religion or belief, with references to the wide variety of 
links which sociologists of religion might describe in terms of “ believing” or 
“belonging”.  
 
The Marriage and Civil Partnership (Scotland) Act 2014 introduced the new concept 
of “religious or belief body” in respect of the authorisation of celebrants to solemnize 
marriage or register civil partnership. The definition is the same in both Acts and can 
be seen in section 135 of the Civil Partnership Act 2004, as amended by section 24 of 
the 2014 Act.  
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(1) In this Part, unless the context otherwise requires: 
... 
“religious or belief body” means an organised group of people— 
(a) which meets regularly for religious worship, or 
(b) the principal object (or one of the principal objects) of which is to 
uphold or promote philosophical beliefs and which meets regularly for 
that purpose; 
 
15.4 Behaviour and beliefs 
 
Religion, and now belief, is acknowledged in the context of functions or forms of 
behaviour in various statutes. Charity law and the idea of charitable functions or 
purposes was traditionally closely linked with religion but here too there is a trend 
towards the extension of religion to include other non-religious beliefs. In Scots 
charity law, the “advancement of any philosophical belief (whether or not involving 
belief in a god)” is now treated in statute as analogous to the advancement of religion.  
 
The test for charitable status is set out in section 7 of the Charities and Trustee 
Investment (Scotland) Act 2005, in the following terms: 
 
  (1) A body meets the charity test if– 
(a) its purposes consist only of one or more of the charitable purposes, 
and 
(b) it provides (or, in the case of an applicant, provides or intends to 
provide) public benefit in Scotland or elsewhere. 
(2) The charitable purposes are– 
... 
(b) the advancement of education, 
(c) the advancement of religion, 
... 
(p) any other purpose that may reasonably be regarded as analogous to 
any of the preceding purposes. 
(3) In subsection (2)– 
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... 
(f) for the purposes of paragraph (p), the advancement of any 
philosophical belief (whether or not involving belief in a god) is 
analogous to the purpose set out in paragraph (c).” 
 
In general, this Scottish Act accords with the UK Charities Act 2011, chapter 1 of 
which affects Scots law “in so far as it affects the construction of references to – (a) 
charities, or (b) charitable purposes” (s. 7(1)). Section 3(1)(c) of the 2011 Act states 
that “advancement of religion” is a charitable purpose, and defines “religion” as used 
in that subsection (1)(c) as including “(i) a religion which involves belief in more than 
one god, and (ii) a religion which does not involve belief in a god.”  
 
The idea of administering an oath was tied up with ideas of religious belief and 
adherence. Although many of the provisions which have been cited in this chapter are 
relatively recent, the Oaths Act 1978 signals a well established practice to 
accommodate individuals who do not have a religious belief. Section 4 of the 1978 
Act provides that: 
 
(1) In any case in which an oath may lawfully be and has been administered to 
any person, if it has been administered in a form and manner other than that 
prescribed by law, he is bound by it if it has been administered in such form 
and with such ceremonies as he may have declared to be binding. 
(2) Where an oath has been duly administered and taken, the fact that the 
person to whom it was administered had, at the time of taking it, no religious 
belief, shall not for any purpose affect the validity of the oath. 
 
15.5 Conclusions 
 
The terms and phrases highlighted in this chapter are certainly not widespread in 
Scots law but they do appear in a variety of contexts. As a general trend, where there 
is provision for “religion”, there is now also provision for “belief”. The trend is 
similar although the exact language is not always the same and in particular it is not 
always clear to what extent belief must in some way correspond to religion or whether 
322 
 
it is a completely freestanding concept. The provisions highlighted in this chapter also 
help to show the different ways in which religion and belief have entered Scots law. 
Some are current versions of quite long established presence: for example the 
provisions relating to charities. Other provisions are much more recent in origin: 
individual human rights and rights to equality and protection against discrimination.
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Sabbath in Scots Law 
 
Chapter 16 Sabbath in Scots law  
 16.1 Introduction 
16.2 The reach of desuetude: Sunday commerce 
16.3 Sunday church attendance 
 16.4 A “perpetuall commandment”?  
 16.5 Miscellaneous statutory provisions 
  16.5.1 Employment on the Sabbath  
16.5.2 Sabbatarianism in local authority policy 
16.6 Conclusions 
 
 
16.1 Introduction 
 
The Sabbath was, after the Reformation of 1560, to become a central test of 
conformity to the Presbyterian order of Scotland.1 Initially opposed by John Knox, it 
emerged in the seventeenth century with geographical variations in the enforcement 
applied by Reformers, but from the 1640s it became a test of puritanical zeal in many 
places. So much so, that in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, Sabbatarian 
strictures intensified. Battles over the application of Sunday closure applied to various 
branches of the industrialising economy: the running of Sunday trains and sailing of 
Sunday ferries, the opening of museums and art galleries, the playing of games and 
sports (which were mostly banned by local byelaws), and of course Sunday working 
                                                             
1 To read about the history of the Sabbath in Scotland, see R.D. Brackenridge, ‘Sunday observance in 
Scotland 1689-1900,’ unpublished PhD thesis, University of Glasgow, 1962; L. Leneman, 
‘“Prophaning” the Lord’s Day: Sabbath breach in early modern Scotland,’ History vol. 74 (1989), pp. 
217-31; J. Carter, ‘Sunday observance in Scotland 1560-1605’, unpublished PhD thesis, University of 
Edinburgh, 1957; C.J.A. Robertson, ‘Early Scottish railways and the observance of the Sabbath’, 
Scottish Historical Review vol. 57, 1978, pp. 143- 67; R.D. Brackenridge, ‘The “Sabbath war” of 1865-
66: the shaking of the foundations’, Records of the Scottish Church History Society vol. xvi (1966-8); 
Callum G Brown, ‘Spectacle, restraint and the twentieth-century Sabbath wars: the “everyday” Scottish 
Sunday’, in L. Abrams and C.G. Brown (eds.), A History of Everyday Life in Twentieth-century 
Scotland (Edinburgh, Edinburgh University Press, 2010), pp. 153-80. 
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in factories. By the late Victorian period, families were accustomed to there being a 
restricted menu of “respectable” activities on a Sunday, which included walks in 
parks but not playing sport in them. But things were already changing. Though many 
local authorities continued to ban sport on their land until the 1960s (notably public 
golf courses and football playing fields), the statutory law on restricted Sunday 
pastimes was already falling into desuetude as social pressure increased (especially 
from working people whose only day for leisure was on a Sunday, and from non-
protestants who were less inclined or not inclined at all to uphold Sabbatarian values).  
But it was in the 1960s and 1970s that the custom of, as distinct from the law 
enforcing, upholding the Christian holy day started to seriously collapsed with the full 
opening of shops and, very quickly, cinemas, playing fields, spectator sport venues, 
public houses and off licenses.  In this story, custom and local authority bye laws, 
enabled by permissive legislation, were as important as statutory law. 
 
16.2 The reach of desuetude: Sunday commerce  
 
The place of the Sabbath in Scots law is usefully set out in one of the last-reported 
cases dealing with the subject in the Outer House of the Court of Session, namely 
Brown v. Magistrates of Edinburgh (1931, S.L.T., 456), which was heard by Lord 
MacKay. This case occurred some twenty-five years after the passage of the Statute 
Law Revision (Scotland) Act 1906 by which many of the older Scottish statutes 
dealing with the Sabbath had been repealed. In this Brown contained an analysis by 
Lord MacKay of precisely which statutes had been repealed, which statutes remained 
on the statute book, and, of those which had not been repealed, which could be 
considered to have fallen into desuetude.  
 
Brown concerned an attempt by several members of the public to have the magistrates 
of Edinburgh, acting as a licensing authority, restrained from permitting cinema 
performances on Sundays. The pursuers based their action on various historical 
Scottish Acts, namely the Sunday Act 15792, the Sunday Act 16613, the Confession of 
Faith Act 1690,4 and the Scottish Episcopalians Act 1711.5 
                                                             
2 I.e. the Act anent Discharging of markets and labouring on Sundays or playing and drinking in 
time of sermon (RPS, 1579/10/23). 
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The Sunday Act of 1579 forbade the “halding and keiping of ... mercattis and fairis on 
Sondayis, using of handy laubor and working thairon as on the remanent dayis of the 
oulk, ... gamyng and playing, passing to tavernis and ailhouses, and wilfull remaning 
fra the paroche kirk in tyme of sermone or prayers on the Sonday” under various 
pecuniary pains, with an ultimate sanction of putting offenders in public stocks. The 
Sunday Act of 1661 inhibited and discharged “all salmond fishing, going of salt pans, 
milnes or kills, all hireing of shearers, carieing of loads, keeping of mercats or useing 
any sorts of merchandice on the said day, and all other prophanation thairof 
whatsoever...”. The Confession of Faith Act 1690 in a sense incorporated the 
Westminster Confession of Faith into Scots law. The Scottish Episcopalians Act 
1711, s. 8 ran “Provided always and it is the true Intent and Meaning of this Act That 
all the Laws made against Prophaness and Immorality and for the frequenting of 
Divine Services on the Lords Day commonly called Sunday shall be still in force and 
executed against all Persons that offend against the said Laws or shall not resort either 
to some Church or to some Congregation or Assembly of religious Worship allowed 
and permitted by this Act.” 
 
While there had been a good many other historical Acts passed in favour of the 
Sabbath since the sixteenth century, those cited in Brown were the only Acts which 
had not been explicitly repealed by the Statute Law Revision (Scotland) Act 1906.  
 
One of the points to which the Lord Ordinary, Lord Mackay, therefore had to devote 
his attention was whether or not those Acts touching upon the Sabbath which had not 
been repealed in 1906 had fallen in desuetude. While this point was not finally 
determined, Mackay’s judgment on this head is particularly helpful for understanding 
the parameters involved in trying to determine the status of historical Scottish Acts 
                                                                                                                                                                              
3 I.e. the Act for the due observation of the Sabbath day (RPS, 1661/1/345). 
4 I.e. the Act ratifying the Confession of Faith and settling presbyterian church government (RPS, 
1690/4/43). 
5 I.e. “10 Anne, cap. 7”. It must be noted that Scots Statutes Revised notes that what is referred to in the 
“common printed editions” as chapter 7 of the 10th year of the reign of Queen Anne is now referred to 
as chapter 10. That is to say, 10 Anne, cap. 7 is now referred to at 10 Anne, cap. 10, which is the 
Scottish Episcopalians Act 1711. 
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which remain on the statute book, a topic which also has considerable significance for 
the problem of the status of the Church of Scotland in law. 
 
Lord Mackay made the following distinctions: Acts of the pre-Union Scottish 
parliament may fall into desuetude; Acts of the pre-Union English parliament may 
not, and as such must be repealed if they are to cease to be part of the law of England 
and Wales. Acts of the British parliament are treated in the same way as Acts of the 
pre-Union English parliament. In this respect Mackay held that the pre-1707 Scottish 
Sabbath Acts were capable of falling into desuetude, whereas Scottish Episcopalians 
Act 1711 could not fall into desuetude, but rather had to be repealed in order to cease 
to be law.  
 
Lord Mackay then offered a definition of desuetude in Scots law: “I hold it clear in 
law that desuetude requires for its operation a very considerable period, not merely of 
neglect, but of contrary usage of such a character as practically to infer such 
completely established habit of the community as to set up a counter law or establish 
a quasi-repeal. I shall adopt the statements of its import given in Erskine (I. i. 45), 
Bell’s Dictionary under title Desuetude, and Paterson v. Just (6th December 1810, 
F.C.) (as corrective of Bankton’s statement). Erskine treats it as “a posterior custom 
repealing or derogating from a statute”; and assigns his reason, “for the contrary 
immemorial custom sufficiently presumes the will of the community to alter the law 
in all its clauses.”” 
 
This definition of desuetude was then applied in so far as possible within the confines 
of the process to the historical Acts cited by the pursuers. One point in effect granted 
by the pursuers’ council was that the compulsory attendance at church enjoined by the 
Sunday Act 1579 was no longer observed, from which it was concluded by Mackay 
that at least that part of the 1579 Act was in desuetude. The question of what might be 
termed “partial desuetude” of a pre-Union un-repealed Act was also addressed, in that 
Lord Mackay, following earlier precedent, stated that Acts may “go into desuetude in 
part and not in whole, providing the parts in question are sufficiently independent one 
of the other”. From this position, Lord Mackay declared himself “satisfied with the 
argument of the pursuer's counsel that in this case the provisions are so distinct, and 
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therefore, in spite of his admission of part desuetude, he is entitled to found upon the 
remaining sections of the four Acts.” That the remaining parts of the four Acts were 
held not to be in desuetude resulted from the failure of council for the defence to 
provide sufficient arguments to that effect, such as could be admitted to proof.6  
 
Despite the Lord Ordinary holding the “remaining sections of the four Acts” not to be 
in desuetude, in the event the contents of these Acts were not such as to render the 
pursuers’ plea in Brown relevant or competent and the action was accordingly 
dismissed, in that it was held that they did not prohibit the magistrates of Edinburgh 
from granting a licence for the cinema in question to show films on a Sunday, 
although it remained an open question whether or not some of the activities 
undertaken in the cinema while open on a Sunday might not fall within the terms of 
the fourth Act. 
 
What then of the subsequent history of the four Acts in question? Both the 1579 Act 
and the 1661 Act were partially repealed by the Statute Law Revision (Scotland) Act 
1964 c. 80. The title of the 1579 Act became simply “Discharging of markets on 
Sundays”, and nothing was left of the Act other than the general preamble concerning 
the common violation of the Sabbath, the actual legislative remedy of the 1579 Act 
being entirely repealed.7 The 1661 Act was partially repealed so as to read “our 
sovereign lord, with advice and consent of his estates of parliament, ratifies and 
approves all former acts of parliament made for observation of the Sabbath day, and 
against the breakers thereof and, by this act, inhibits and discharges keeping of 
markets or using any sorts of merchandise on the said day, under the pains and 
penalties following, namely the sum of £10, and if the party offending be not able to 
pay the penalties foresaid then to be exemplarily punished in his body according to 
the merit of his fault.”8 This prohibition on the “keeping of markets” on Sundays may 
                                                             
6 Generally speaking, it may be noted that there is a presumption in favour of un-repealed Acts still 
being regarded as being in force, although the presumption may be rebutted by demonstrating that an 
Act or part of an Act had fallen into desuetude. 
7 i.e. extent of repeal: “In the title the words “and Labouring” and the words “or playing and drinking 
in tyme of sermone”. In the Act from the beginning to the words “sonday Thairfoir” and from the 
words “nor yit within kirkis” to the end.” 
8 i.e. extent of repeal: “The words from “The Kings Maiestie” to “otherwise Thairfor”, the words from 
“salmond fishing going” to “carieing of loads”, the words “and all other prophanation thairof 
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reasonably be presumed to have either been repealed or to have fallen into desuetude, 
since the Christmas Day and New Year's Day Trading (Scotland) Act 2007, asp 13, 
according to the explanatory note appended thereto, which admittedly forms no part 
of the 2007 Act, “prohibits large shops from opening for the purpose of retail trading 
on Christmas day and confers power to prohibit such shops opening on New Year's 
day. At present there is no legislation in place in Scotland to stop shops of any size 
from trading on any day of the year.” From this it is tolerably clear that by 2007 the 
Scottish legislature at the least was not aware of any statute prohibiting Sunday 
trading, although it may be noted that legislatures within these islands have frequently 
erred on such matters in the past. 
 
Separate legislation from at least 1828 has controlled the sale of alcohol on Sunday in 
Scotland. By the Licensing (Scotland) Act 1853 (commonly known as the Forbes 
Mackenzie Act), sale of alcohol in public houses was banned on Sundays, a ban not 
lifted until the Licensing (Scotland) Act 1976, which, as amended by subsequent 
legislation, had the effect of merging hours of opening across the days of the week. 
However, it may be noted that as to the sale of alcohol for consumption off the 
premises at which the alcohol was sold (i.e. supermarkets and the like selling alcohol 
in Scotland by virtue of “off-sales” licenses), until 2009 Sunday was slightly 
differentiated from other days of the week, in that sales of alcohol on Sundays could 
only occur at a later time that the other six days of the week. However, in 2009 it 
became lawful for such licensed premises to sell alcohol seven days a week between 
the hours of 10.00 and 22.00. The non-differentiation of Sundays was an original 
feature of the Licensing (Scotland) Act 2005 asp 16, s. 65(3),9 although the 2005 Act 
was not fully implemented until 1 September 2009 (Licensing (Scotland) Act 2005 
(Commencement No. 4) Order 2007/472 (Scottish SI), art. 3), hence the relative delay 
in the reform of Sunday off-sales of alcohol. 
                                                                                                                                                                              
whatsoever”, the words from “the summe of Tuentie pund” to “the said sume of”, and the words from 
“for everie other” to “justices of peace”.” 
9 i.e. “(3) If the off-sales hours proposed in the application are such that alcohol would be sold for 
consumption off the premises— 
(a) before 10am, 
(b) after 10pm, or 
(c) both, 
on any day, the Board must refuse the application.” 
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16.3 Sunday church attendance 
 
The Scottish Episcopalians Act 1711, s. 8 has never been repealed by the British 
Parliament and as such must still be regarded as being in force. Yet the 1711 Act 
simply enacted that “all the laws made...for the frequenting of Divine Services on the 
Lords Day commonly called Sunday shall still be in force”, and it is tolerably clear 
from Brown that both the Lord Ordinary and the council for the pursuers held any 
historical Scottish Acts, or parts of such Acts, touching upon compulsory attendance 
at divine services on Sunday to be in desuetude by 1931. It is difficult to see that such 
a view could reasonably be dissented from today, and as such the 1711 Act may be 
understood to refer to pre-Union Scottish Acts either now repealed or in desuetude in 
respect of compulsory attendance at divine services on Sunday, and as such its 
provision, though still on the statute book, had been hollowed out in this respect. 
 
16.4 A “perpetuall commandment”?  
 
This leaves the Confession of Faith Act 1690, which has never been repealed due to 
the difficulties concerning the constituting documents of the British State. 
 
The Confession of Faith Ratification Act 1690, which was ratified by the Act for 
securing of the Protestant Religion and Presbyterian church government 1707, which 
was in turn appended to the Treaty of Union by the Scottish Act whereby the same 
was ratified in 1707, formally “ratified and established” the Westminster Confession 
of Faith “...as the public and avowed Confession of this Church [i.e. the Church of 
Scotland] containing the sum and substance of the doctrine of the reformed 
Churches...”. Part XXI, ss. 7 & 8 of the Westminster Confession concern the 
observance of the Sabbath, and run: 
 
s. 7 As it is of the law of nature that in generall a due proportion of time be set 
apart for the worship of God so in his word by a positive morall and perpetuall 
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commandment binding all men in all ages he hath particularly appointed one 
day in seven for a Sabbath to be kept holy unto him which from the beginning 
of the world to the resurrection of Christ was the last day of the week and 
from the resurrection of Christ was changed into the first day of the week 
which in Scripture is called the Lords day and is to be continued to the end of 
the world as the Christian Sabbath. 
 
s. 8 This Sabbath is then kept holy unto the Lord when men after a due 
preparing of their hearts and ordering of their common affairs before hand do 
not only observe a holy rest all the day from their own works words and 
thoughts about their worldly employments and recreations but also are taken 
up the whole time in the publick and private exercises of his worship and in 
the duties of necessity and mercy. 
 
It is noted in the discussion of blasphemy case Thomas Paterson heard in the High 
Court of Justiciary in 1843 (see Chapter 6 above), that at that time the Lord Justice-
Clerk, Lord Hope, maintained that the Westminster Confession of Faith formed part 
of the law of Scotland by virtue of the 1690 Act. But the manner in which the 
Confession formed part of the law of Scotland by virtue of that Act has also been 
considered within the context of Paterson, and it appears that the Westminster 
Confession is not a direct source of law, but rather a standard of religious belief 
incorporated into the law of Scotland as a standard against which the courts may 
judge offences and crimes against the historical Protestant faith of Scotland. And what 
is clear from the relevant sections of the Confession of Faith is that they do not enjoin 
the civil magistrate to punish those who fail to observe the Sabbath (in contrast to 
those sections of the Confession which enjoin the civil magistrate to punish 
blasphemers and heretics), and as such it is difficult to see that the Sabbatarian 
sections of the Confession amount to more than a religious exhortation binding upon 
the consciences of the Reformed Protestant faithful.  
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16.5 Miscellaneous statutory provisions 
 
16.5.1 Employment on the Sabbath 
Though a case in 1835 from Dundee had seemingly established a worker’s right not to 
be forced to work on a Sunday (when an apprentice barber in Phillips v Innes, who 
refused to shave customers on a Sabbath on grounds of religious conviction, was 
successfully charged before the magistrates on breach of indenture, with the finding 
disputed through three courts, finally finding for the apprentice in the House of 
Lords),10 by the twenty-first century, Scots law appears to have been so entirely free 
of any statutory laws concerning the observation of a Sunday day of rest in respect of 
commercial activities that the UK legislature had to intervene in order to prevent 
employees (specifically shop workers and betting shop employees) being compelled 
to work on Sundays in Scotland against their consciences. Accordingly the 
Employment Rights Act 1996, c. 18, was amended by the Sunday Working (Scotland) 
Act 2003, c. 18.  
 
16.5.2 Sabbatarianism in local authority policy 
The general lesson of Brown (1931) was that where a local authority sought to relax 
some aspect of restrictions historically placed upon commercial premises on Sundays, 
an attempt to bind a local authority to an historical pattern of Sabbatarian policy 
through recourse to statutory law did not enjoy a clear chance of success. As has 
already been discussed above, statutory provisions in respect of the Sabbath were 
already much reduced by the Statute Law Revision (Scotland) Act 1906, and that 
even the surviving statutory provisions founded upon in Brown were substantially 
repealed by the Statute Law Revision (Scotland) Act 1964 c. 80, which left only a 
rump of limited statutory provisions which could not readily be expected to place 
significant statutory obligations upon local authorities. 
 
In this respect the ongoing implementation of Sabbatarian policies in Scotland was a 
matter for the discretion of local authorities which were relatively free of any clear 
                                                             
10 For a review of this and other cases, see Callum G Brown, ‘Spectacle, restraint and the twentieth-
century Sabbath wars: the “everyday” Scottish Sunday’, in L. Abrams and C.G. Brown (eds.), A 
History of Everyday Life in Twentieth-century Scotland (Edinburgh, Edinburgh University Press, 
2010), pp. 153-80. 
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statutory obligations in respect of historically limited Sunday activities, which ranged 
from opening golf courses run by councils, licensing cinemas, licensing premises in 
respect of the sale of alcohol, opening publicly owned harbours and ports, and so 
forth. Within the history of the rapid decline of the maintenance of Sabbatarian 
policies by local authorities in Scotland, the conflict over Sabbatarianism in Scotland 
did not revolve around statutory law, but rather around the policies of local 
authorities. In this respect, while Sabbatarianism declined rapidly in Scotland from 
the 1970s, it endured into the twenty-first century within the territory of the Western 
Isles Council (Comhairle nan Eilean Siar), particularly in respect to the islands of 
Lewis, Harris, and North Uist.11  
 
In terms of case reports which appear to confirm this view, the following may be 
noted. In an action for judicial review, Macdonald v Western Isles Licensing Board 
(2001 S.C. 628), the Outer House of the Court of Session reduced a decision of the 
Western Isles Licensing Board which  had refused the pursuer’s application to extend 
the licensed hours of her hotel - the Doune Braes Hotel, Carloway, Isle of Lewis - 
from 11 pm on Saturday to 1 am on Sunday, and from 2.30 pm to 6.30 pm on Sunday. 
Although the Board had previously granted extended licensing hours to the pursuer in 
respect of Sunday afternoons in previous years (applications for such extensions 
having to be made annually), on this occasion the Board declined to grant the desired 
exception, in part because “they had taken into account their general knowledge and 
experience of the locality, in particular the strong tradition and body of public opinion 
in favour of Sabbath observance.” In the event the decision of the Board was reduced 
without entering into any specific arguments about the status of the Sabbath on the 
Isle of Lewis. Rather, the Board was held to have acted against natural justice by 
failing to inform the hotelier “of the fact that observance of the Sabbath might be a 
live issue and possibly a determinative factor in the board’s deliberations. Not only 
had the petitioner not been given such notice, but she was on one view justified in 
assuming that observance of the Sabbath was not a factor likely to prove adverse to 
her application, as she had been granted Sunday extensions in 1996–97, 1998–99, and 
1999–2000.” 
 
                                                             
11 Brown, ‘Spectacle, restraint and the twentieth-century Sabbath wars’, pp. 153-80. 
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In 1989 the Western Isles Council attempted to have a local byelaw confirmed by the 
Sheriff Principal sitting at Lochmaddy (Western Isles Islands Council v Caledonian 
MacBrayne Ltd (1990 S.L.T. (Sh. Ct.) 97)). The byelaw in question had been passed 
by virtue of the Harbours Docks and Piers Clauses Act 1847, s. 83, and purported “to 
prohibit the shipping or unshipping of goods or vehicles from or onto Lochmaddy pier 
at any time on Sundays”. In the event the byelaw was not confirmed, it being held that 
“a harbour authority, which had a duty under s. 33 of the 1847 Act to open the pier to 
all persons on payment of the harbour dues, was not entitled to restrict that right 
except for purposes related to the working of the harbour; and that in these 
circumstances the byelaw was ultra vires the harbour authority”. In effect, the attempt 
to prohibit the use of the pier at Lochmaddy in North Uist by enacting a byelaw which 
reflected the Council’s Sabbatarian policies was held to be ultra vires because such a 
restriction was contrary to statute. This case provides a contrast to Brown (1931) in 
which an unsuccessful appeal to statute was made in order to prevent a local authority 
from relaxing its Sabbatarian policies.  
 
This 27 June 1989 case was immediately followed on 6 July 1989 by Caledonian 
MacBrayne Ltd v Western Isles Islands Council (1990 S.L.T. 441). In this case 
Caledonian MacBrayne sought interdict against the Western Isles Islands Council 
“from obstructing, by means of a gate secured with a padlock, a linkspan at 
Lochmaddy pier on Sundays” before the Outer House of the Court of Session. The 
case report sums up the case as follows: 
 
“The council had a policy of preserving the peace on a Sunday and had endeavoured 
to prevent the arrival of vessels on a Sunday at inter alia Lochmaddy pier. The council 
had resolved that Sunday sailing of ferries should be opposed and had made a byelaw 
to restrict the shipping and unshipping of goods and vehicles from or onto the pier at 
Lochmaddy at any time on a Sunday. The sheriff principal had held that the byelaw 
was ultra vires and had refused to confirm it. The council had also instructed the 
harbour master to keep the gate to the linkspan closed and locked on Sundays, despite 
the presence of the company’s vessel. The company argued that the linkspan bridge 
was part of the harbour dock and pier and that they were statutorily entitled to access 
over it. They moved for interim interdict accordingly. The council argued that a 
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linkspan bridge was merely a facility provided under s. 40 of the Harbours Act 1964, 
which provision enabled the council to allow the use of such services and facilities 
subject to such terms and conditions as the council saw fit. 
 
Held, that the linkspan bridge was clearly a work connected with the harbour, dock or 
pier and thus that s. 33 of the 1847 Act applied and the council had no right to 
obstruct access over it; and, the balance of convenience also favouring the company, 
interim interdict granted.” 
 
In this, the Sabbatarian byelaw having been found to be ultra vires, what appeared to 
have been a very limited attempt to continue to maintain some vestige of 
Sabbatarianism in respect of Lochmaddy pier and harbour was deemed to be unlawful 
obstruction on the part of the council. 
 
The evidence from the case reports from Scottish courts concerning the Sabbath 
permit only general conclusions. Generally, there does not appear to be a sufficient 
statutory basis for the Sabbath to prevent local authorities and their various boards 
from pursuing non-Sabbatarian policies. Conversely, it appears that at least some 
aspects of lingering Sabbatarian policies in the Western Isles may be contrary to 
statute. In this, what happens to still endure in respect of local authorities’ policies 
and the Sabbath are presumably based upon local demographics and the presence of 
Sabbatarians on local authorities and their various boards. From this view it is perhaps 
no more than a matter of local custom, and indeed, unlike local authority policy in 
respect of religion in schools, is not a custom enjoying any statutory recognition, nor 
is it a custom reflecting any statutory obligation. 
     
16.6 Conclusions 
 
With the decay of statutory provisions concerning upholding a Christian Sabbath in 
Scotland in terms of employment, commerce and licensing, it seems to be the case 
that in 2016 most lingering Sabbatarian strictures in Scottish society are the product 
of local authority decisions, many instituted many decades ago, which, when 
335 
 
confronted by legal challenge, are found to conflict with other rights - to freedoms to 
trade and leisure, for instance.   
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17.1 Introduction 
 
A limited search has been conducted of tax legislation as it applies to ministers of 
religion and religious buildings etc. Taxation is a detailed and complex area of legal 
regulation and this Report can only highlight key aspects of it. More detailed 
guidance on particular aspects, such as income tax, can be found in the guidance 
provided by HMRC.1 
 
17.2 Income tax 
 
There are various provisions in tax law, which take account of the common practice 
whereby ministers of religion are provided with accommodation tied to their position 
or with some form of accommodation allowance. Some of these include further 
provision to take account of the low-paid status of certain ministers. The key 
provisions are set out in the Income Tax (Earnings and Pensions) Act 2003, Part 4, 
Chapter 8, as follows: 
 
s290 Accommodation benefits of ministers of religion 
                                                             
1 See eg https://www.gov.uk/hmrc-internal-manuals/employment-income-manual/eim60001. 
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(1) No liability to income tax in respect of a person employed as a full-time 
minister arises by virtue of— 
(a) the payment or reimbursement of a statutory amount payable in 
connection with qualifying premises, or 
(b) the reimbursement of a statutory deduction made in connection 
with qualifying premises. 
(2) No liability to income tax in respect of a person employed as a full-time 
minister arises by virtue of the payment or reimbursement of expenses 
incurred in connection with providing living accommodation in qualifying 
premises if the employment is excluded employment. 
(3) Subsection (1) does not apply if or to the extent that the amount or 
deduction is properly attributable to a part of the premises for which the 
minister receives rent. 
(4) Premises are qualifying premises in relation to a person employed as a 
minister if—  
(a) an interest in them belongs to a charity or an ecclesiastical 
corporation, and 
(b) because of that interest and by reason of holding the employment, 
the minister has a residence in them from which to perform the duties 
of the employment. 
(5) In this section— … 
“full-time minister” means a person in full-time employment as a minister of a 
religious denomination, 
“statutory amount” means an amount paid in pursuance of a provision in, or 
having the force of, an Act, and 
“statutory deduction” means a deduction made in pursuance of such a 
provision. 
 
s290A Accommodation outgoings of ministers of religion 
(1) No liability to income tax arises in respect of a person in lower-paid 
employment as a minister of a religious denomination by virtue of the 
payment or reimbursement of accommodation outgoings. 
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(2) Subsection (1) does not apply if the minister is paid an allowance intended 
to be used, wholly or in part, for paying accommodation outgoings (as to 
which see section 290B). 
(3) In this section— 
“accommodation outgoings” means amounts incurred by the minister in— 
(a) heating, lighting or cleaning qualifying premises; or 
(b) maintaining a garden forming part of qualifying premises; 
“lower-paid employment” has the meaning given by section 217;  
“qualifying premises” has the same meaning as in section 290 
 
s290B Allowances paid to ministers of religion in respect of 
accommodation outgoings 
(1) This section applies where a person in lower-paid employment as a 
minister of a religious denomination is paid an allowance intended to be used, 
wholly or in part, for paying accommodation outgoings. 
(2) No liability to tax arises by virtue of the payment of the allowance to the 
extent that it is used for paying accommodation outgoings. 
(3) In this section— 
“accommodation outgoings” and “lower-paid employment” have the same 
meanings as in section 290A; 
“qualifying premises” has the same meaning as in section 290.  
 
s290D Meaning of “lower-paid employment as a minister of religion” 
(1) For the purposes of this Part an employment is “lower-paid employment as 
a minister of religion” in relation to a tax year if— 
(a) the employment is direct employment as a minister of a religious 
denomination, and 
(b) the earnings rate for the employment for the year (calculated under 
section 290E) is less than £8,500. 
(2) An employment is not “direct employment” for the purposes of subsection 
(1)(a) if— 
(a) it is an employment which is treated as existing under— 
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(i) section 56(2) (deemed employment of worker by 
intermediary), or 
(ii) section 61G(2) (deemed employment of worker by 
managed service company), or 
(b) an amount counts as employment income in respect of it by virtue 
of section 554Z2(1) (treatment of relevant step under Part 7A 
(employment income provided through third parties)). 
(3) Subsection (1) is subject to section 290G.  
 
Further detailed provision is made in section 290E as to the formula for calculating 
the earnings rate for a tax year; in section 290F for account to be taken of any benefits 
relating to the provision of a car or other vehicle, and in section 290G for the situation 
where a person is employed in two or more related employments. 2 
 
Various rents and expenses incurred by ministers of religion in respect of premises 
used in whole or in part for the performance of the religious duties of such persons are 
tax allowable for the purposes of Income Tax. The key statutory provision is found in 
the Income Tax (Trading and Other Income) Act 2005, section 159 which provides 
that: 
 
(1) This section applies for the purpose of calculating the profits of the 
profession or vocation of a minister of a religious denomination. 
(2) If the minister pays rent in respect of a dwelling-house and any part of the 
dwelling-house is used mainly and substantially for the purposes of the 
minister's duty, a deduction is allowed for– 
(a) one-quarter of the rent, or 
(b) if less, the part of the rent that, on a just and reasonable 
apportionment, is attributable to that part of the dwelling-house. 
(3) If– 
(a) an interest in premises belongs to a charity or an ecclesiastical 
corporation, 
                                                             
2 Some of these provisions are not yet in force but will take effect from 6 April 2016. 
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(b) because of that interest, the minister has a residence in the premises 
from which to perform the minister's duty, and 
(c) the minister incurs expenses on the maintenance, repair, insurance 
or management of the premises,  
a deduction is allowed under this subsection for part of those expenses. 
(4) The amount of the deduction under subsection (3) is– 
A/4 – B  
where– 
A is the amount of the expenses, and 
B is the amount of the expenses for which a deduction is otherwise allowable. 
 
17.3 Corporation tax 
 
The profits and gains of contemplative religious communities are exempt from 
corporation tax as provided for in sections 508A and 508 B of the Income and 
Corporation Taxes Act 1988. 
 
s508A Contemplative religious communities: profits exempt from 
corporation tax 
(1) Subsection (2) applies in a case where members of a qualifying 
contemplative religious community transfer all their income and assets, or 
covenant all their income, to the community (“the independent community”) 
(and for this purpose it is irrelevant whether or not the community is part of an 
order or religious institution). 
(2) As respects each chargeable period of the independent community, and 
each person who is a qualifying member of the independent community at any 
time in that period, the independent community shall be treated for the 
purposes of corporation tax as if an amount of its profits for the chargeable 
period equal to the relevant amount (see subsections (5) to (7)) were income of 
the qualifying member. 
(3) Subsection (4) applies in a case where— 
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(a) one or more qualifying contemplative religious communities 
(“constituent communities”) are part of an order or religious institution 
(“the parent body”), and 
(b) members of the constituent communities transfer all their income 
and assets, or covenant all their income, to the parent body. 
(4) As respects each chargeable period of the parent body, and each person 
who is a qualifying member of a constituent community at any time in that 
period, the parent body shall be treated for the purposes of corporation tax as 
if an amount of its profits for the chargeable period equal to the relevant 
amount (see subsections (5) to (7)) were income of the qualifying member. 
(5) For the purposes of subsections (2) and (4), the relevant amount, in relation 
to a chargeable period, is the amount of the annual personal allowance for 
persons [born after 5 April 1948] 2 (see section 35 of ITA 2007) for— 
(a) the tax year which begins in the chargeable period, or 
(b) if no tax year begins in the chargeable period, the tax year which is 
current when the chargeable period begins. 
(6) But, if the chargeable period is less than 12 months, the relevant amount 
is— 
P/365 x A 
where— 
P is the number of days in the chargeable period; A is the amount determined 
under subsection (5) in relation to the chargeable period. 
(7) If, during the chargeable period, an individual ceases to be a qualifying 
member of the independent community or a constituent community (otherwise 
than on death), the relevant amount, in relation to the chargeable period and 
that qualifying member, is— 
Q/P x B 
where— 
Q is the number of days in the chargeable period for which the individual is a 
qualifying member of the independent community or constituent community; 
P is the number of days in the chargeable period; 
B is the amount determined under subsection (5), or subsections (5) and (6), in 
relation to the chargeable period. 
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(8) So far as the exemption from corporation tax conferred by this section calls 
for repayment of tax, no repayment shall be made except on a claim made by 
the independent community or parent body. 
(9) In a case where a member of an independent community or constituent 
community— 
(a) has transferred or covenanted income to the community (in the case 
of an independent community) or the parent body (in the case of a 
constituent community), and 
(b) has income for a tax year which does not exceed 20% of the annual 
personal allowance for persons [born after 5 April 1948] 2 (see section 
35 of ITA 2007) for that tax year, 
the member is, for the purposes of this section, to be taken to have transferred 
or covenanted all his or her income for that tax year to the community or 
parent body. 
(10) For the purposes of this section a contemplative religious community is a 
“qualifying” contemplative religious community if— 
(a) the community is established in the United Kingdom, 
(b) the members of the community live and practise their religion in a 
communal establishment, and 
(c) the community is not a charity, but the religion that is professed by 
the members of the community does not prevent the community from 
being a charity. 
(11) In this section— 
“member”, in relation to a religious community, means an individual who— 
(a) is living in the community, and 
(b) has taken vows or made equivalent commitments (whether 
probationary or not); 
“qualifying member”, in relation to a religious community, means a member 
of the community who— 
(a) has been a member of the community for a period of at least six 
months, and 
(b) has transferred all his or her income and assets, or 
covenanted all his or her income, to the community (in the case of an 
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independent community) or the parent body (in the case of a 
constituent community). 
 
508B Contemplative religious communities: gains exempt from 
corporation tax 
(1) Subsection (2) applies if, as respects a chargeable period— 
(a) section 508A(2) applies in relation to an independent community, 
(b) the profits of the independent community in the chargeable period 
are less than the total of the amounts that fall to be treated as income of 
the qualifying members of the community in accordance with section 
508A(2), and 
(c) the independent community has chargeable gains in the chargeable 
period. 
(2) As respects the chargeable period and each qualifying member of the 
independent community, the community shall be treated for the purposes of 
corporation tax as if the relevant amount of its chargeable gains for that period 
were income of the qualifying member. 
(3) Subsection (4) applies if, as respects a chargeable period— 
(a) section 508A(4) applies in relation to a parent body, 
(b) the profits of the parent body in the chargeable period are less than 
the total of the amounts that fall to be treated as income of the 
qualifying members of the constituent communities in accordance with 
section 508A(4), and 
(c) the parent body has chargeable gains in the chargeable period. 
(4) As respects the chargeable period and each qualifying member of a 
constituent community, the parent body shall be treated for the purposes of 
corporation tax as if the relevant amount of its chargeable gains for that period 
were income of the qualifying member. 
(5) For the purposes of subsections (2) and (4), the relevant amount, in relation 
to a qualifying member of the independent community or a constituent 
community, is the smaller of— 
(a) the shortfall in profits, and 
  (b) the average gain. 
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(6) The shortfall in profits is the difference between— 
(a) the relevant amount determined under section 508A(5) to (7) in 
relation to the qualifying member, and 
(b) the amount that has actually been treated as the income of the 
qualifying member. 
(7) The average gain is— 
G/N 
where— 
G is the amount of the chargeable gains which the independent community or 
parent body has in the chargeable period; 
N is the number calculated by adding together the relevant value for each 
qualifying member of the independent community or constituent communities 
who, under section 508A(2) or (4), falls to be treated as having income. 
(8) For the purposes of calculating “N” in subsection (7)— 
(a) the relevant value for a qualifying member is 1; 
(b) but, if section 508A(7) applies in relation to the qualifying member, 
the relevant value for that member is— 
1 × Q/P 
where 
Q and P have the same meanings as in section 508A(7). 
(9) So far as the exemption from corporation tax conferred by this section calls 
for repayment of tax, no repayment shall be made except on a claim made by 
the independent community or parent body. 
 
17.4 Council Tax 
  
Manses, presbyteries etc are not exempt from the payment of Council Tax when they 
are occupied by either a minister of religion, a tenant, or a caretaker.3 However, when 
a manse, presbytery etc is unoccupied, it is exempt from Council Tax. Council Tax 
                                                             
3 Although such dwellings may in specific circumstances now qualify for a 50% discount along with all 
‘job-related dwellings’ as per Council Tax (Variation for Unoccupied Dwellings) (Scotland) 
Regulations 2013 (SI, 2013/45), schedule 1, paragraph 2, sub-paragraph 6. 
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(Exempt Dwellings) (Scotland) Order 1997 (SI 1997/728), schedule 1, paragraph 9 
provides that:  
 
A dwelling which (a) is not the sole or main residence of any person; and (b) 
is held by or on behalf of a religious body for the purpose of being available 
for occupation by a minister of religion as a residence from which to perform 
the duties of his office. 
 
Various other types of dwelling are also exempted from Council Tax when 
unoccupied, including those owned or rented by charities (schedule 1, paragraph 3), 
although in the case of charities it appears that the exemption lasts for only six 
months:  
An unoccupied dwelling– (a) in respect of which– (i) a body established for 
charitable purposes only is a qualifying person; and (ii) less than 6 months 
have elapsed since the last occupation day; and (b) which was on that day 
occupied in furtherance of the objects of the body in question. 
 
Generally, unoccupied and unfurnished dwellings are exempt from Council Tax for 
six months (schedule 1, paragraph 4), although the six month limit does not apply 
when the dwellings in question are unfurnished “agricultural dwellings” that is to say 
are in effect tied cottages and the like on estates and farms (schedule 1, paragraph 14). 
 
New regulations governing reductions in Council Tax have come into force in 
Scotland since 1 April 2013 (Council Tax (Variation for Unoccupied Dwellings) 
(Scotland) Regulations 2013 (SI, 2013/45)). Schedule 1, paragraph 2 concerns “Job-
related dwellings” and states that various such dwellings are entitled to a 50% 
discount when the person residing there owns or rents another property, and lives in 
the job-related dwelling for the purposes of discharging his or her work related duties, 
including sub-paragraph (6):  
 
A dwelling is job related for a person if that person or that person's spouse or 
civil partner is a minister of religion and the dwelling is inhabited by that 
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person as a residence from which that person performs the duties of that 
person's office. 
 
17.5 Conclusions 
 
As with many areas of law, there are remnants of special treatment of religion with a 
long historical past and there are more recent attempts to situate contemporary 
regulation of religious clergy and religious organisations within broader areas of 
policy. There is, for example, little evidence of churches and religious organisations 
being privileged as of right in terms of different forms of taxation but, rather, where 
there are empty church buildings they are treated in a similar way to other empty 
properties and manses are, broadly speaking, treated in the same way as other forms 
of “tied accommodation”.
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Chapter 18 
Miscellaneous 
 
This section contains a disparate collection of miscellaneous results generated by the 
search terms used. The items concern liability for damage caused by riotous 
assemblies, where the list of places specifically includes religious premises; the 
employment status of choristers; the ineligibility of members of religious orders in 
respect of Universal Credit; the duty of ships’ masters to make provision for any 
religious dietary requirements of seafarers aboard their ships; a note about companies 
limited by guarantee and provision for exemption from non-domestic rates.  
 
Riotous Assemblies (Scotland) Act 1822, section 10 
Provision for recovering damages sustained in Scotland. 
In every case where any damage or injury shall be done to any church, chapel, 
or building for religious worship, or to any house, shop, or other building 
whatsoever, or any fixtures attached thereto, or any furniture, goods, or 
commodities therein, by the act or acts of any unlawful, riotous, or tumultuous 
assembly of persons, or by the act or acts of any person or persons engaged in 
or making part of such unlawful, riotous, or tumultuous assembly, the party 
injured or damnified thereby shall be entitled to recover full compensation for 
the loss or injury, by summary action against the council (being a council 
constituted under section 2 of the Local Government etc. (Scotland) Act 1994) 
within whose area the loss or injury shall have been sustained; which action 
shall and may be brought before any competent court in Scotland” 
 
Children and Young Persons (Scotland) Act 1937, section 37 
For the purposes of the foregoing provisions of this Part of this Act and of any 
byelaws made thereunder— 
... 
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(f) A chorister taking part in a religious service or in a choir practice 
for a religious service shall not, whether he receives any reward or not, 
be deemed to be employed. 
 
Universal Credit Regulations 2013/376, part 2, regulation 19 
(1) Entitlement to universal credit does not arise where a person is— 
(a) a member of a religious order who is fully maintained by their order; … 
 
Merchant Shipping (Maritime Labour Convention) (Minimum 
Requirements for Seafarers etc.) Regulations 2014/1613, part 8, 
regulation 34 
(1) The shipowner and the master of a ship must ensure that food and drinking 
water are provided on board the ship which— 
(a) are suitable in respect of quantity, quality and, in relation to food, 
nutritional value and variety, taking account of— 
(i) the number of seafarers on board and the character, nature 
and duration of the voyage; and 
(ii) the different religious requirements and cultural practices in 
relation to food of the seafarers on board; … 
 
Company, Limited Liability Partnership and Business (Names and 
Trading Disclosures) Regulations 2015/17, part 2, regulation 3 
Private companies limited by guarantee do not need to use ‘limited’ in their 
title, in effect if the purpose of such companies is the “promotion or regulation 
of commerce, art, science, education, religion, charity or any profession, and 
anything incidental or conducive to any of those objects” although other 
conditions also apply. 
 
Valuation and Rating (Scotland) Act 1956, section 22 
 (1) No non-domestic rate shall be levied on any premises to the extent that 
they consist of— 
(a) a building occupied by a religious body and used for the purpose of 
religious worship; 
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(b) a church hall, chapel hall or similar premises used in connection 
with a building such as is referred to in paragraph (a) above for the 
purposes of the religious body which occupies that building; or 
(c) any premises occupied by a religious body and used by it— 
(i) for carrying out administrative or other activities relating to 
the organisation of the conduct of religious worship in a 
building such as is referred to in paragraph (a) above; or 
(ii) as an office or for office purposes, or for purposes ancillary 
to its use as an office or for office purposes. 
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Part IV 
 
Chapter 19  
Conclusion 
 
 
Chapter 19 Conclusion 
19.1 Current state of Scots law 
19.2 Directions of change 
 
 
9.1 Current state of Scots law 
The principal objective of this project was to provide a snapshot of the current state of 
Scots law in terms of the place that religion has within it. It is by no means a perfect 
picture – it is limited by the fact that it focuses mainly on primary legislation and 
includes little on cases, secondary legislation, policy or practice - but it is nonetheless 
a significant beginning as this is an aspect of Scots law which has attracted relatively 
little attention in recent decades. In some areas - the Church of Scotland, marriage and 
education - we have moved beyond a simple presentation of what the legislation says 
now, to explore how and why legal regulation has evolved, and to trace pathways of 
legal reform which have led to the current position. These case studies are examples 
of the kind of exploration which might be undertaken in respect of other areas of 
Scots law. 
 
Having completed this project, what can we say about the current state of Scots law in 
respect of religion? We might say that, on the surface at least, it shows relatively little 
evidence of current religious influence, or of the prioritisation of a single dominant 
religion. Undoubtedly, there are remnants of earlier systems where religion, generally, 
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and Protestantism and the Church of Scotland more specifically, had much stronger 
and more clearly defined legal standing, but these remnants are relatively few. We 
might say that, for a secular system, religion is surprisingly present in various aspects 
of law. To a large extent, however, the examples of current statutory provisions which 
in some way reference religion are the result not of historical power or privilege, but 
of a much newer individual rights-based framework. We might also say that there are 
areas of uncertainty and some inconsistency. To some extent that is a comment, which 
is not particular to the treatment of religion within Scots law, but which might be said 
of the legal system as a whole. Despite substantial statutory reform, Scotland is a 
small jurisdiction with a fairly low level of cases, and therefore legislation can be left 
untested, with the result that areas of uncertainty may long remain unexplored and 
relatively undefined. 
 
Law changes with the society where it applies. This change can, however, sometimes 
be rather slower than the pace of change in government, economy, societal values and 
structures. Much of the law we have set out in this report is relatively recent, but some 
of it is very old. Some elements of law may not be repealed but left to fall into disuse: 
still “in force” but not enforced. They might remain unchanged due to neglect, or 
sometimes change may be viewed as simply too difficult. This might be the result of 
constitutional complications; at various points in this Report, for example, we have 
noted that the Confession of Faith Ratification Act 1690 may still have bearings 
upon issues as diverse as the established status of the Church of Scotland, the 
maintenance of laws against Sabbath profanation, and the law against blasphemy.  
 
Much of the current statutory framework is, however, relatively new. Contemporary 
Scots law has in place protection for the religious rights of the individual, and of 
religion and belief groups. Many of these rights are of recent vintage; often with their 
origins in European or international law. Most striking, there has been distinct 
movement to protect the position of those without a religion in a way that had 
formerly been inadequately considered in Scots law.  As society and its values have 
changed, so new freedoms have been envisaged and enacted. Though clear legislative 
principles and precedents have already been set, these are relatively new areas of 
regulation and as yet there have been few decisions, particularly of the higher courts 
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and there are many uncertainties as to scope, application and interaction. This is likely 
to be a dynamic area of law for some time. 
 
In some areas, the law has remained substantially the same over a period of time, but 
social changes increasingly question its suitability. One such area is Education. The 
legal framework in Scotland is based around a structure of “non-denominational” and 
“denominational” public-funded schools; drawn up in an era (1872 and 1918) when 
that division matched a perceived social need. The legal framework was devised to 
reflect what was, at that time, the new reality of a society in which, as a result of 
large-scale immigration from Ireland and Europe, Scottish Christianity was divided 
between two main groups – Reformed Protestant and Roman Catholic. Each group 
required recognition in order to establish some form of equity of treatment by the 
state. Since then, a newer social reality has now dawned, manifest in the results of the 
national censuses of 2001 and 2011 in which there is revealed a large bloc in Scottish 
society composed of people who have indicated that they do not adhere to any church 
or religion. (In 2011, this bloc amounted to 37.5 per cent of people responding to the 
census question, excluding those who made no indication). This group is currently 
without a clear place in education law (with the exception of the longstanding 
conscience clause), where the assumption remains that religion is present in all state 
schools and the choice is simply between “denominational” and “non-
denominational”.   
 
The pattern of legal change often reflects social demand, and it may also reflect the 
changing nature of religions and religious institutions within Scotland. In our study 
we were concerned in particular with what might be regarded, for various reasons, as 
the dominant religious institution, that is, the Church of Scotland. What was its place 
within Scots law and how had it changed? There are remaining areas of uncertainty as 
to the precise legal status of the Church of Scotland but the theoretical question of 
whether a church is an “established” church needs to be considered in the context of 
what that status might mean in practice. There is no single accepted definition of 
“establishment”, and in contemporary Scots law there is relatively little evidence that 
the Church of Scotland is in a significantly different legal position to any other 
religious organisation or indeed other voluntary association.  In terms of the law 
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relating to the solemnisation of marriage, it retains a separate statutory category which 
may reflect an assumption that it is an “established” church or a “national” church. In 
some ways it continues to have a special place in law by means of the Declaratory Act 
of 1921. But in other ways, it is difficult to see that it enjoys a legal status 
significantly at variance with that enjoyed by any church or religious group, or indeed 
by any other voluntary association.  
 
Scotland has been transformed since the 1960s by the rise of other churches and 
religions, many as a result of immigration from the former British Commonwealth, 
and others as a result of the freedom of movement attendant upon the development of 
the European Union in the last quarter of the twentieth century. A multi-faith society 
has brought areas of change in relation to human rights, and may bring new areas of 
demand for those religious groups which conceive of the need to establish legal 
processes and accommodations in agreement with their faith positions.  
 
Beyond a move from dominant church to pluralist religious beliefs, there is a further 
striking shift from “religion” to “religion or belief”. There has been a foundational 
shift in law in recent years from viewing religion as meaning one dominant religion, 
to recognising equally all religions, and now to treating religion and non-religious 
belief as a single category. This is a trend which is most obvious in Scots law within 
the context of the solemnisation of marriage. The process began in 2005, with the 
temporary authorisation by the Registrar General of Humanist celebrants within the, 
broadly defined, category of “religious” celebrants. With the reforms of the Marriage 
and Civil Partnership (Scotland) Act 2014, this pragmatic development of law in 
practice has been given statutory footing by the introduction of a new category of 
“religious or belief” celebrant. The precise parameters of the “ religious or belief” 
groups have yet to be agreed but nonetheless this is a very significant example of the 
way in which law reform can come about to reflect changing social needs and 
demands.  
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9.2 Directions of change 
 
It would be foolhardy to predict the future of the relationship between Scots law and 
religion or belief, but we can at least highlight some of the patterns of change to date. 
One broad distinction which might be drawn is between “old style” religion and 
“new.” If we think in Scots law of “old style” religion, then pre-Reformation it was 
the Roman Catholic Church, whilst post-Reformation it has been Protestantism in 
various forms institutionalised as the Church of Scotland. Here, the direction of 
change in legal terms is quite clearly one of decline. There is relatively little 
remaining evidence of the protection, privileging or place of one single religious 
doctrine or institution within Scots law. But in focusing only on the decline of “old 
style” religion, we risk missing developments in the new. 
 
“New” religion is the religion of individual human rights and of equality, and in these 
regards the direction of change is towards increased presence. Since the mid-twentieth 
century, and particularly in the last few decades, new rights for individuals have been 
introduced, designed to ensure that they have their religious and other beliefs 
respected and protected. This is an area where there has been considerable legislative 
reform and where it seems likely we will now see many more cases in years to come. 
The trend towards a human rights agenda is clearly the most significant to have 
emerged in Scots law in recent decades, much of it the result of protection of human 
rights on global and European levels. Rights in regard to religious, gender, racial and 
sexual identities have their bearing upon the sphere of religion and belief, and how 
these rights will develop and be accommodated is still far from clear.  
 
In looking at change, we have concentrated on the substance rather than the process 
by which that change is achieved. Much reform of Scots law has tended to be 
piecemeal in nature. There have been large-scale reform projects, but much change 
happens bit by bit and often it is reactive. While being responsive clearly has benefits, 
there can be dangers too, in reform which is too quick or too political. This project 
has not touched upon the wider moral landscape in Scotland and the influence of 
individual beliefs in the law-making process – in areas, for example, such as sexual 
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practices, sexualities, medicine, censorship. The direction of travel in the law’s 
dealings with moral issues in the West – ranging from same-sex marriage, assisted 
dying, advances in medical genetics and teaching – is generally towards taking 
account of pluralism, the rights of the individual to freedom of speech and action, and 
the prevention of hate crimes. There can be conflicts between these rights, different 
jurisdictions may move at different speeds on individual issues, and occasionally may 
move contrary to established trends.1 Scotland has already established a strong 
tradition in recent decades of enhancing individual rights, removing restrictions upon 
religion and belief, and creating equal treatment in law between religion and belief 
positions.  The Scottish Parliament has committed itself to a system of law making 
which places great emphasis on the process of consultation with the public. While 
Scots law no longer reflects the dominance of one single religion or religious 
institution, it does offer considerable scope for the influence and protection of 
individual religious, or non- religious, beliefs. 
 
 
 
 
 
END 
 
 
                                                             
1 As in the case of Ireland in relation to its new law on blasphemy introduced in 2009.  
